Anil Kumar,J.:- Heard Sri Mohd. Adil Khan holding brief of Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, Senior Advocate, learned counsel for the revisionist, Km. Rafat Farooqui holding brief of Sri Z. Zilani, learned counsel for the respondents and perused the record. 2. Facts of the present case are to the effect that initially in Suit No. 281 of 1982, a certificate of registration dated 01.02.1983 of the entire property left by one Sri Monday Khan was obtained which indicated that the entire property was registered as Waqf property and respondent no.4 was appointed as Mutawalli. 3. As per the version of the revisionist, thereafter he came to know the above said fact on 17.09.1983 and moved an application for reference under Section 33(2) and Section 29(8) read with Section 71 of U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 on 17.12.1983 alongwith an application supported with an affidavit under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4. Application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act was rejected by the court below vide order dated 27.03.1984 on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act was not applicable under the proceedings of U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act. 5. Aggrieved by the said order, revisionist had approach this Court by filing a Revision No. 59 of 1984 allowed by order dated 18.03.1986 with the direction that under the U.P. Muslim Waqfts Act, Limitation Act will apply, accordingly it was directed to decide the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 6. In view of the above said facts after remanded the matter in question came for consideration before the court below, registered as Misc. Suit No. 64 of 1983(Dr. Habib Ahmad Khan Vs. U.P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs and others). 7. By order dated 04.09.1987, Civil Judge, Raebareily dismissed the application of the revisionist under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that there was no sufficient and good explanation and reason given by the revisionist for condonation of delay as well as he had failed to explain the day to day delay in the matter in question. Accordingly, court below came to the conclusion that the reference made by the revisionist was beyond to the statutory period of 90 days provided under the Act and passed the impugned order. 8. Accordingly, court below came to the conclusion that the reference made by the revisionist was beyond to the statutory period of 90 days provided under the Act and passed the impugned order. 8. Aggrieved by the order dated 04.09.1987 passed by the Civil Judge, Raebareily, the present revision has been filed under Section 75 of the U.P. Muslim Waqf, 1960. 9. Learned counsel for the revisionist while assailing impugned order under challenge passed by the Civil Judge, Raebareily, submits that the same is illegal, arbitrary and contrary to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court that while deciding the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, liberal consideration should be given in order to advance the substantial justice. 10. He further submits that now as per the settled proposition of law, there is no necessity whatsoever to explain day to day delay in moving the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, hence, the order dated 04.09.1987 passed by the Civil Judge, Rabareily is illegal and liable to be set aside. 11. Km. Rafat Farooqui holding brief of Sri Z. Zilani, learned counsel for the respondents submits that the order passed by the court below is perfectly valid and needs no interference as the revisionist failed to give sufficient reasons for condoning the delay while filing the application under Section 5 of Limitation Act. 12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record. 13. So far as the factual matrix of the present case, it is not disputed that the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act is applicable in the matter in question. 14. Further, in the present case, the revisionist moved an application under Section 33(2) and Section 29(8) read with Section 71 of U.P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 alongwith an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 15. Needless to mention here that in respect to the matter relating to condonation of delay, it is settled proposition of law that liberal consideration shall be given in order to advance the substantial justice. If technical and substantial justice are pitted together, the way should be given to the substantial justice, and there is no need to explain day to day delay in filing an application for condonation of delay. If technical and substantial justice are pitted together, the way should be given to the substantial justice, and there is no need to explain day to day delay in filing an application for condonation of delay. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 04.09.1987 passed by the Court below is arbitrary in nature and liable to be set aside. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shakuntala Devi Jain Vs. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that unless want bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out of any delay cannot be refused to be condoned. 17. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Smt. Shanti Misra, AIR 1976 SC 237 Hon'ble Supreme Court held that discretion given by section 5 should not be defined or crystallized so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression" sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. 18. In O.P. Kathpalia Vs Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. 19. In the case of Collector Land Acquisition Vs. Mst. Kati Ji and others, 1987(13) ALR 306 (SC) : ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) (SC) Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "The legislator has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 5 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable th Courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matter on "merits". The expression "sufficient cause" employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice - that being the life - purpose of the existence of the institution of Courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other Courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that:- 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this; when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would he decided on merit after hearing the parties. 3. "Every" day's delay must be explained" does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side can not claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grapped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 20. In Smt. Prabha Vs. Ram Praskash Kalra, 1987 (Suppl.) SCC 339 the Supreme Court took the view that the Court should not adopt an injustice- oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. 21. In the case of N. Balakrishnan Vs.M.Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 : ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 )the Apex Court explained the scope of limitation and condoning of delay, observing as under :- "The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. The time- limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. The time- limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the rights of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. The law of limitation is thus founded on public policy." 22. In the case of Vedabai alias Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vs. Shantaram Baburao Patil and others, 2001 (44) ALR 577 (SC) : ( AIR 2001 SC 2582 ) (SC) the Apex Court made a distinction in delay and inordinate delay observing as under:- "In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the otherwise will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach." 23. For the foregoing reasons, the order dated 04.09.1987 passed by the court below is set aside. Revision is allowed. Matter is remanded back to the court below to decide afresh in accordance with law after giving opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.