JUDGMENT Talukdar, J. 1. "A mother is the truest friend we have, when trials heavy and sudden, fall upon us; when adversity takes the place of prosperity; when friends who rejoice with us in our sunshine desert us; when trouble thickens around us, still will she cling to us, and endeavour by her kind precepts and Counsels to dissipate the clouds of darkness, and cause peace to return to our hearts." The inimitable words of Washington Irving as quoted by H. L. Dattu, J. in Satni Baiv. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2010)2 SCC 646 would have axiomatic application in the fact situation of the present case. 2. "UNUSUAL fact situation posing issues for resolution is an opportunity for innovation. Law as administered by Courts, transforms into justice." - imbibed by the aforesaid finding of R. C. Lahoti, Chief Justice of India speaking for the three-Judge Bench in B. P. Achala Anandv. S. Appi Reddy, reported in (2005)3 SCC 313 : (2005)2 WBLR (SC) 82 we would be required to answer the question that has fallen for consideration in this appeal. Background facts necessary to be set out so as to have a good grasp of the entire issue shows that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, 1st Court, Bankura on 13.09.2010 in connection with M.A.C.C. No. 215 of 2002 passed an award of Rs. 1,57,000/- less Rs.50,000/- already received under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act (hereinafter referred to as the said Act). Barring application of the default clause of interest no order in respect of the same was passed. 3. THE Appellants herein-the husband (A-1) of the deceased and her little child (A-2) have come up in appeal against the said Award being aggrieved with the quantum and assessment of the income of the deceased. Followed by the same was also the prayer for interest on the aforesaid amount. 4. IN an Autumn evening of 17.11.2001 two Ambassador cars were proceeding from Durgapur. The one preceding the other had on board the deceased Esha Chowdhury with A-2 by her side and her other relatives while the second one had A-1 on board when death claimed Esha Chowdhury in the circumstances as known to Section 166 of the said Act. 4. IN an Autumn evening of 17.11.2001 two Ambassador cars were proceeding from Durgapur. The one preceding the other had on board the deceased Esha Chowdhury with A-2 by her side and her other relatives while the second one had A-1 on board when death claimed Esha Chowdhury in the circumstances as known to Section 166 of the said Act. In course of the proceeding before the Tribunal the Claimant (A-1) examined himself as P.W.-1, a cousin of his deceased wife was examined as P.W.-2 and another eye-witness was examined as P.W.-3. 5. ACCEPTING the liability of the insurer the Award was passed to the tune of Rs. 1,57,000/- which was divided into equal ratio of 1/2 each for A-1 and A-2 mainly on the following premises : "But there was no clear indication either from the petition or from the evidence of the P.Ws. why and how they claimed an amount of five lac as compensation. The Petitioner No. 1 (A-1) is not at all dependent and he has already contacted second marriage but the petitioner No. 2 (A-2) has lost his mother and her care. He is actually the worst sufferer for the death of his mother but he is also not dependent on the income of his mother. His mother was a housewife and she had no independent income of her own." 6. ON such premises as it was felt by the learned Tribunal, -" the deceased had no income because she was a housewife, neither her husband nor her child was dependent on her income. But she did some work as the housewife and which should be viewed and her income should be notionally calculated. The petitioners have no proof of her age but claimed that she was 30 years of age." In the prism of the said finding the learned Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased to be notional within Clause 6 of the 2nd Schedule of the said Act and fixed the amount as Rs. 1,57,000/-. We have heard Sri Banik and Sri Bhowmik for the appellants and the Insurance Company respectively. Sri Banik has.questioned the finding of the Tribunal with regard to notional income of the deceased. Sri Banik has referred to the decisions of Arun Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. National Insurance Company and Ors., reported in (2010)3 ACC 313 (SC). 1,57,000/-. We have heard Sri Banik and Sri Bhowmik for the appellants and the Insurance Company respectively. Sri Banik has.questioned the finding of the Tribunal with regard to notional income of the deceased. Sri Banik has referred to the decisions of Arun Kumar Agrawal and Anr. v. National Insurance Company and Ors., reported in (2010)3 ACC 313 (SC). According to Sri Banik the income of his wife cannot be calculated on the basis of notional income keeping in mind her contribution to the family which cannot be otherwise valued. He also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in (2001)2 ACC 316 (SC) and a Division Bench decision of our Court in The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shyamsundar Haider and Ors., reported in (2009)2 WBLR (Cal) 994 on the selfsame proposition. Sri Banik submitted that the Tribunal has assessed the income capacity of the deceased on notional basis which was not permissible simply because of the fact that she did not work, as such, the decisions which he had placed were quite otherwise. He has accordingly prayed for enhancement of the claim and also award of interest on the amount which the learned Tribunal has not considered. 7. ON the other hand Sri Bhowmik placed before us the decision of Syed Basheer Ahamed and Ors. v. Mohammed Jameel and Anr., reported in (2009)1 Supreme 266 : (2009)2 WBLR (SC) 304. Sri Bhowmik referred to the said decision and submitted that the question of - to prove the earning capacity of the deceased - the onus always lies on the claimant to prove it. In the absence of any such proof given by A-1 Sri Bhowmik was of the view that the Tribunal has rightly proceeded on the notional aspect. 8. SRI Bhowmik thereafter referred to (2008)4 SCC 717 : Ponnumany Alias Krishnan and Anr. v. V. A. Mohanan and Ors. on identical situation. In the grillage of the same we would be required to see as to how far we can sustain the claim of Sri Banik in the eye of the opposition for the Insurance Company. 8. SRI Bhowmik thereafter referred to (2008)4 SCC 717 : Ponnumany Alias Krishnan and Anr. v. V. A. Mohanan and Ors. on identical situation. In the grillage of the same we would be required to see as to how far we can sustain the claim of Sri Banik in the eye of the opposition for the Insurance Company. At the outset we find that the learned Tribunal was in a dilemma since it held - "the petitioners have not proved her age but claimed that she was 30 years of age." We feel the same need did not detain us for a single moment. The claim petition manifestly shows that she was 30 years of age when she met with her end. The Autopsy Examination held by Professor S. K. Kar, Professor and Head of the Department of Forensic State and Medicine, Bankura Sammilani Medical College and Hospital (Exbt. 1/3) also shows that deceased Esha Chowdhury was 30 years. Her spouse also spoke in the same line. As such we cannot appreciate the quandary in which the learned Tribunal found itself with regard to the ags oi the deceased. 9. NOW this would being us to the question as to whether she could be classified under the heading "notional income" as she did not patently have any earning. We have with utmost circumspection read, if we may be permitted to say, the classic Judgment of the Supreme Court in Arun Kumar Agrawal and Ors. (supra). Their Lordships have, in paragraph 23, captured the entire situation - "in India the Courts have recognised that the contributions made by the wife to the house is invaluable and cannot be computed in terms of money. The gratuitous services rendered by wife with her love and affection to the children and husband and managing the household affairs cannot be equated with the service rendered by the others. A wife or a mother does not work by the clock. She is in the constant attendance of the family though out the day and night unless she is employed and is required to attend the employer's work for a particular hour. She takes care of all the requirements of husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. She takes care of all the requirements of husband and children including cooking of food, washing of clothes etc. She teaches small children and provides invaluable guidance to them for their future life. A housekeeper or maid servant can do the household work, such as cooking food, washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for a wife or a mother who renders selfless service to her husband and children. "It is not possible to quantify any amount in lieu of the services rendered by the wife or the mother to the family i.e. husband and children...........". 10. SRI Bhowmik referred to the decisions of Syed Basheer Ahamed and Ors. v. Mohammed Jameel and Anr. (supra) and also Ponnumany Alias Krishnan and Anr. v. V. A. Mohanan and Ors. (supra) to illustrate his point that onus lies on the claimant to prove the income and where there is a non- salaried person notional income can be rightly assessed. In our opinion, both the decisions relied upon by SRI Bhowmik are quite distinguishable. In Syed Basheer Ahamed and Ors. v. Mohammed Jameel and Anr. (supra) the Supreme Court was considering a case of just compensation and for the purpose of ascertaining the net income of the deceased had found that it was necessary to read evidence with regard to the actual income of the deceased. In Ponnumany Alias Krishnan and Anr. v. V. A. Mohanan and Ors. (supra) in connection with an appeal against an award passed on notional income the case was decided in respect of a non-salaried person on the basis of notional income. In our humble view none of the decisions of Syed Basheer Ahamed and Ors. v. Mohammed Jameel and Anr. (supra) and Ponnumany Alias Krishnan andAnr. v. V. A. Mohanan and Ors. (supra) referred to by SRI Bhowmik can be made applicable in the factual matrix of the present case. In the turn of events we would be required to notice that A-1 has relocated himself in life and found a new life's partner. In the strict sense of the term neither he nor A-2 was ever dependent, if any, on the income of the deceased. It was, as already held by the learned Tribunal, the A-2 who was the worst sufferer. He, in fact, remained the hidden agenda in the entire scheme of things. 11. In the strict sense of the term neither he nor A-2 was ever dependent, if any, on the income of the deceased. It was, as already held by the learned Tribunal, the A-2 who was the worst sufferer. He, in fact, remained the hidden agenda in the entire scheme of things. 11. FATE robbed this poor boy of his mother while he was travelling on board the vehicle, insured by the R-1 (The New India Assurance Company Ltd.), by her side. He was barely three when misfortune grasped him. The cross-examination of P.W.-1 reveals that he (A-2) is taken care of by him and his present wife. 12. AS we have found in the prelude of our order that this is not a run-of-the-mill situation. Some deep human emotions and fine sentiments have their interplay where a helpless little child who has lost his mother being interposed with the Court's order, a step-mother and a father who has already found a substitute. The Tribunal has assessed the notional income of the deceased and directed it to be shared between both the father and the son (A-1 and A-2). We cannot break bread with the same for the reasons which we would discuss. Now for the present was it justified for the Tribunal to have assessed the income of the deceased on notional basis since she did not have any fructified income on paper ? Keeping in mind the ratio of the decision in Arun Kumar Agrawal (supra) and the observations made by Their Lordships we feel neither there can be any divider nor multiplier or any equaliser to assess the income of his wife. Yet, the quantification of the same on the basis of notional income would be adding insult to the memory of the deceased. If we recapitulate the immortal lines of Tagor's play 'Chitrangada' we note that she was never featured as a mere consort nor to be kept in a high pedestal being simply adored but in all in nothing, in pain, in delight -it was her presence and company that enliven the King. It is the role of Chitranqadas in the household that keeps the pot boiling and the taper of life alive. How one could evaluate the same ? it is simply to be felt and not assessed. 13. INTANGIBLE cannot be valued. It is the role of Chitranqadas in the household that keeps the pot boiling and the taper of life alive. How one could evaluate the same ? it is simply to be felt and not assessed. 13. INTANGIBLE cannot be valued. It would be like quantifying the fees of Portia as Counsel for Bassanio while defending him against the onslaught of his pound of flesh from Shylock in Shakespeare's 'Merchant of Venice' and another Portia who stood behind Julius Caesar when the premonition of death haunted the Empress. 14. IT is said that the cold logic of law must apply. Balancing the same with the ground reality where little Abhirup (A-2) was pitchforked on account of the tragic death of her mother. We have to see it is Just Desert. In Arun Agrawal's (supra) case the Supreme Court referring to Clause 6 of Schedule 2 of the said Act had proceeded to fix the income but as the income of P.W.-1 is not known (see the evidence) we would rely on Lafa Wadhwa (supra) and accept her contribution as Rs. 3000/- per month which after multiplied by 12 would take us to Rs. 36,000/- per annum less 1/3rd takes up to Rs. 24,000/-. Since she was found to be of 30 years when death claimed her, we would apply the multiplier of 18 that would see us to Rs. 4,32,000/-. The Division Bench in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Shyamsundar Haldar and Ors. (supra) also approved the said quantification in appeal. As we have found that A-1 is not dependent even if his departed wife had any income on the same. He is a practicing Lawyer as it is found out from his deposition. It is found from his evidence that both he and his present wife takes care of A-2 - "properly as per as practicable". This raises a big question and is susceptible to a broad interpretation which of course we would not engage ourselves in the present logjam of the situation. What we feel necessary, keeping in mind the larger interest of little Master Debrup Chowdhury (A-2), the entire modified amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- should be invested in his name which would stand him in good stead in the future. 15. What we feel necessary, keeping in mind the larger interest of little Master Debrup Chowdhury (A-2), the entire modified amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- should be invested in his name which would stand him in good stead in the future. 15. WE would, in the extenuating situation, for safeguarding the interest of a child with whom fate had played truant direct the said sum along with interest which we are also awarding be put in the local branch of the State Bank of India in a Fixed Deposit with compound interest till such time he attains majority. Needless to say that P.W.-1 is his Father and Natural Guardian. Law has put him in that place. Yet, fact remains between him and A-2 there is another new entrant who may make all the difference. To alley such apprehension we would engineer slight judicial activism which is necessary in the fact situation of the present case and direct that the R-1 (The New India-Assurance Company Ltd.) will deposit the entire amount by an Account Payee Cheque before the Tribunal which will see that the same is deposited in the manner as directed by us. The Tribunal would have lien over the amount till such time A-2 attains majority. 16. WE have found that A-1 is a practicing lawyer and he and his present wife is taking care of A-2. That apart, as the father it is his moral obligation to maintain this child. As such, we are not directing that the Fixed Deposit will carry any monthly interest. It would be in the maximum interest of the child that the principal amount with interest is available altogether before A-2 on his attaining majority. Transposed from the theme area to the flanks of the appeal we have to assess the maintainability of the prayer for interest, as made by Shri Banik. The Tribunal, barring application of the default cause, did not pass any order of interest. 17. SECTION 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 postulates - "..........in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate........". It should be noted that no rate has been fixed by the statute. Interest, after all is the earning capacity of a person. In fact, right of compensation accrues from the date of accident itself. Ideally the claim should be settled with utmost despatch; but it is not always so. It should be noted that no rate has been fixed by the statute. Interest, after all is the earning capacity of a person. In fact, right of compensation accrues from the date of accident itself. Ideally the claim should be settled with utmost despatch; but it is not always so. Delay in payment of the same multiplies the woes of the claimant for whatever reason - be it Court's delay or administrative reasons. It is compensation for forbearance or detention of money. Interest is awarded to a party when he/she is kept out of the money which ought to have been otherwise paid to him earlier. 18. OF course, Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, which is pari materia with Section 110cc of the Act of 1939, casts a discretion on the Tribunal to award interest. But it is the exercise of such a discretion that is required to be evaluated by the Superior Court. Even though, the legislature had made it directory by inserting the word 'may' between the phrase such tribunal directs that in addition to the amount of compensation : but as this is as social welfare legislation, aimed at amelioration of the plight of the distressed, the word 'may' should be read as "shall"\r\ the said provision so as to further the legislative intent in Chapter XII of the said Act. Question of grant of interest is no longer res integra in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Arun Kumar Agrawaland Anr. v. National Insurance Company and Ors. (supra), Abati Bezbaruah v. Deputy Director General, Geological Survey of India, (2003)3 SCC 148 : (2003)2 WBLR (SC) 331 ; Smt. Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2001)2 SCC 9 : 2001 WBLR (SC) 207 and the series of Division Bench decisions of this Court in Kohinoor Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2008)2 T.A.C. 711 (Cal); Mira DeviChaudhuriv. Chhatelal Chaudhuri, (2007)1 WBLR (Cal) 596 ; Smt. Sabita Singha and Ors. v. M/s. National Council of Regional Scheme Centre and Anr., (2007)1 WBLR (Cal) 184 and AmitBarv. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2008)1 T.A.C. 52 (Cal). 19. IN the instant appeal, we find that neither the Tribunal awarded any interest nor gave any reasons, apart from applying the default clause, for refusal thereof. 20. THE Statute provides award of interest. It may be a discretionary relief. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2008)1 T.A.C. 52 (Cal). 19. IN the instant appeal, we find that neither the Tribunal awarded any interest nor gave any reasons, apart from applying the default clause, for refusal thereof. 20. THE Statute provides award of interest. It may be a discretionary relief. But the said exercise has to be done upon proper application of a Judicial Mind. It cannot be the child of either whims or caprice. It is not a sense of charity which the Court extends to an indigent claimant by way of granting interest. There is no warrant jn law for application of the default clause, as has been done in the instant case by the Tribunal. Interest, otherwise, is an accrued right in an element of compensation which should be adjusted to have an over all workout of a just compensation. Since the Statute has not fixed any rate, obviously it has been left to the discretion of the Court. Various decisions of the Supreme Court have held - rates of interest to be varied. We will go by the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Dipa Garg (Smt.) v. Rakesh Kumar, (2010)2 SCC 367 : (20010)2 WBLR (SC) 696 where the Supreme Court had calculated the interest @ 12% p.a. We have noted in Abati Bezbaruah v. Deputy Director General, Geological Survey of India (supra); Smt. Kaushnuma Begum v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (supra) the Supreme Court had calculated the interest @ 9% p.a. But, these related to the year 2003. Now, with the rise in price index and cost of living, we feel resort to the rate adopted in Dipa Garg's case (supra) would be just and proper. 21. IN our opinion, money cannot restore the poor child his lost mother, but with a fond hope that it will at least help him to shape up as a useful citizen of tomorrow, we would direct that the modified amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- (Rupees four lakhs thirty-two thousand only) would carry an interest @ 12% p.a. from the date of filing (i.e. from 05.10.2002) till such time the claim amount, as modified, has been extinguished. R-1 is directed to disburse the said amount after calculation of interest on the modified amount and by way of an Account Payee Cheque deposit it before the Tribunal. R-1 is directed to disburse the said amount after calculation of interest on the modified amount and by way of an Account Payee Cheque deposit it before the Tribunal. Thereafter the later would invest the same in the fashion as pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs. 22. APPEAL stands allowed. No order as to costs. Dey, J.-I agree.