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2011 DIGILAW 448 (JHR)

Dhirendra Singh v. The State of Jharkhand

2011-05-19

H.C.MISHRA, PRAKASH TATIA

body2011
Order We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State. 2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 12.8.2010 passed by the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Lohardaga under Section 12(2) of the Crime Control Act, 2002 (earlier known as Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981) after forming an opinion that it is necessary to detain the petitioner by passing a preventive order in view of the fact that the petitioner was facing a number of criminal cases and at the time of consideration of his case, the petitioner was in jail and it is apprehended that immediately after release from the jail on any ground, he may tamper with the witnesses and indulge in criminal activities by joining hands with the terrorist organizations. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of Sub-Clause 4 of Article 22 of the Constitution of India, no one can be detained for a period more than three months and further even in view of Section 12(2) proviso also, the petitioner could not be detained for more than three months. On facts, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no sufficient material placed before the Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Lohardaga who passed the impugned order dated 12.8.2010, which is apparent from the materials placed on record by the present petitioner along with supplementary affidavit indicating that in five of the cases the petitioner was already acquitted. The petitioner has placed on records the copy of the orders of acquittal passed in his favour. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Lohardaga proceeded assuming that the petitioner was facing several criminal case and very foundation of passing of the order falls to the ground. 4. We considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, Deputy Commissioner-cum-District Magistrate, Lohardaga proceeded assuming that the petitioner was facing several criminal case and very foundation of passing of the order falls to the ground. 4. We considered the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner and perused the record. The Article 22 (4) provided that no law providing for preventive detention shall authorize the detention of a person for a longer period than three months but that is not an absolute bar but it contain the contingencies in which the detention order may for more than three months which is provided in Article 22 (4) (a) which indicates that if within three months, an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention. Therefore, Article 22 (4) of the Constitution of India also nowhere has provided complete bar against passing the order of detention beyond period of three months and it itself has allowed framing of law providing for detention beyond three months on compliance of Article 22 (4) (a) of the Constitution of India. However, the petitioner has not challenged the vires of any of the provisions of the Act of 1981. The contention is legally not sustainable and factually incorrect on this ground. 5. It appears from the order dated 12.8.2010 that the authority concerned took note of ten criminal cases which the petitioner faced and according to the State, out of ten cases, the petitioner was acquitted in five cases and learned counsel for the petitioner fairly admitted that at the time of passing of the impugned order dated 12.8.2010, the petitioner was in jail and therefore, this fact has been taken note of by the said authority and apprehension shown by the jail authority was that the petitioner may join hands with the terrorist organizations. Therefore, there was sufficient material and it is admitted fact that the petitioner was in jail at the time of passing of the order dated 12.8.2010. The acquittal of the petitioner in five cases was because of the witnesses turning hostile and even the petitioner at the time of passing of the order dated 12.8.2010 was facing five cases. 6. Therefore, there was sufficient material and it is admitted fact that the petitioner was in jail at the time of passing of the order dated 12.8.2010. The acquittal of the petitioner in five cases was because of the witnesses turning hostile and even the petitioner at the time of passing of the order dated 12.8.2010 was facing five cases. 6. In view of the above reasons, it cannot be said that the authority concerned has not applied mind on the facts of the case. Therefore, we do not find any merit in this petition which is accordingly dismissed.