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2011 DIGILAW 452 (PNJ)

Partap v. Panipat Co-op. Sugar Mills Ltd.

2011-02-03

M.M.S.BEDI

body2011
JUDGMENT : M.M.S. BEDI, J. 1. The following substantial question of law arises in the present case: “(i) Whether a claimant having been injured on account of murderous assault 15 minutes prior to the starting of his shift will not be entitled to compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 and whether he cannot be said to be ‘employee’ under section 2(1)(n)(ii) of the Act?” 2. The learned Commissioner has relied upon Regional Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation v. Francis De Costa, 1992 ACJ 636 (SC) and held that the appellant did not receive injury during the course of employment. 3. I have heard counsel for the appellant and gone through the above said judgment. A perusal of the judgment indicates that the Supreme Court in the said case while interpreting ‘employment injury’ as defined in section 2(8) of the Employees State Insurance Act vis-a-vis disablement benefit under section 51 of the said Act has held that injury suffered by an employee in the said case one kilometre away from the factory caused by an accident would not be an employment injury under section 2(8) of Employees State Insurance Act. Section 2(8) defining ‘employment injury’ reads as follows: “Section 2(8): ‘employment injury’ means a personal injury to an employee caused by accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment, whether the accident occurs or the occupational disease is contracted within or outside the territorial limits of India.” 4. A perusal of the above said definition indicates that ‘employment injury’ is, as per the Employees State Insurance Act, a personal injury to an employee caused by an accident or an occupational disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, being an insurable employment. The broad principles which have been laid down in para 29 of the judgment are as follows: “(29) Although the facts of this case are quite dissimilar, the principles laid down in this case are instructive and should be borne in mind. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment, and (3) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment. In order to succeed, it has to be proved by the employee that (1) there was an accident, (2) the accident had a causal connection with the employment, and (3) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment. In the facts of this case, we are of the view that the employee was unable to prove that the accident had any causal connection with the work he was doing at the factory and in any event, it was not suffered in the course of employment.” 5. Following the above said guidelines, it can be safely arrived at a conclusion that in order to succeed in a petition for compensation on account of an accident, an employee would be required to prove that: (i) there was an accident, (ii) the accident had a causal connection with the employment, and (iii) the accident must have been suffered in course of employment. The liability of an employer to pay compensation under Workmen's Compensation Act arises from section 3 of the Act. It is a settled principle of law that liability for compensation under section 3(1) of the Act arises from the following three conditions: (i) personal injury; (ii) accident; and (iii) arising out of and in the course of employment. 6. It is a settled principle of law that in order to succeed in an application for getting compensation under section 3 of the Act, a claimant has to establish the following points: (i) The accident had arisen out of and in the course of workman's employment; (ii) there must be causal connection between the injury and the accident and the work done in the course of employment; and (iii) the workman had to see that while doing a part of his duty or incidental thereto resulted into an accident. 7. Applying the above said principle, I am of the opinion that the injured in the present case was going for his duties to the factory and his shift was to start at 2 a.m. He had worked from 2 a.m. to 10 a.m. It is a fact established on the record that the incident had taken place 15 minutes before he joined his duty. It cannot be said that there is no connection between the accident and the employment. It cannot be said that there is no connection between the accident and the employment. Claimant had been attacked while on his way to join his duties just a few minutes before joining his duties in the factory. It is not necessary that workman must be working at the time of injury or the accident. The ratio of the judgment in Francis De Costa's case (supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 8. The law laid down in Superintending Engineer, Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v. Sankupathy, 2005 ACJ 630 (Madras) and the judgment of this court in Managing Director, Haryana Dairy Development Coop. Federation Ltd. v. K.L. Sharma, 2009 LLR 408, granting compensation for an accident while the claimant was proceeding for his employment are applicable to the facts of the present case. The order passed by the Commissioner is illegal. The order dated 19.10.2009 passed by the Commissioner is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded to the Commissioner to redetermine the compensation, if any, payable to appellant. The appellant and respondent will appear before the Commissioner for re-adjudication of the matter considering that the incident/accident occurred during the course of employment on 1.3.2011. 9. Appeal disposed of.