JUDGMENT Heard Mr. Godinho, learned counsel for the petitioner and Ms. Linhares, learned counsel for the respondent. 2. Rule. By consent heard forthwith. 3. By this petition under article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner challenges judgment and order dated 6/12/2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal, Panaji in Land Revenue Appeal no.69/2010 rejecting appeal preferred under Section 188 of the Land Revenue Code, 1968 (“The Code” for short) against the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Deputy Collector and Sub-Divisional Officer, Panaji-Goa. 4. By Show Cause Notice dated 25/9/2000 issued by the Deputy Collector and Sub Divisional Officer, Panaji, the predecessor in title of the petitioner was called upon to show cause with respect to the alleged encroachment into the Government property to the extent of 187 sq.metres. Pursuant to the said show cause notice, Case No.LND/ENC/D.Paula/4/2000 was registered against the petitioner herein. Reply to show cause notice was submitted by the petitioner. 5. Thereafter, the original petitioner expired and his legal representatives were brought on record. In the course of the inquiry, the petitioner filed an application dated 24/8/2010 seeking to rely upon and produce seven documents mentioned in the said application. The said application was opposed by the respondent. By order dated 1/9/2010, the Dy. Collector and S.D.O allowed the application. 6. Against the said order, the respondent preferred an appeal under Section 188 of the Code. The Administrative Tribunal by the impugned judgment and order dated 6/12/2010 allowed the appeal and consequently dismissed the application dated 24/8/2010 filed by the petitioner herein. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the petitioner has filed the present petition. 7. Mr. Godinho, learned counsel for the petitioner at the outset submitted that the appeal filed before the Tribunal by the respondent under Section 188 of the Code was not maintainable since the order passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer was not the original order and as such, the proceedings before the Tribunal were without jurisdiction. Mr. Godinho, further submitted that although Section 188 provides that an appeal shall lie from every original order other than an interim order passed by the Collector to the Administrative Tribunal, the order passed by the Dy. Collector and S.D.O cannot be termed to be an original order since it does not decide the rights of the parties. In support of his submissions, Mr. Collector and S.D.O cannot be termed to be an original order since it does not decide the rights of the parties. In support of his submissions, Mr. Godinho placed reliance upon the following judgments: I) The Central Bank of India Ltd. V. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 . II) The German Democratic Republic V. The Dynamic Industrial Undertaking Ltd, AIR 1972 Bombay 27. III) Shrawan S/o Sadhuji Gorle Vs. Vasantrao S/o Santoshrao Jagtap & Ors., 2006 (5) ALL MR 353. IV) Midnapore Peoples' Coop. Bank Ltd and others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and others, (2006) 5 Supreme Court Cases 399. 8. Per contra, Mrs. Linhares, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for the respondent submitted that the order passed by the Dy. Collector and S.D.O dated 1/9/2010 was not an interim order and being an original order, the appeal filed by the respondent before the Administrative Tribunal was maintainable. In support of her submissions, Ms Linhares placed reliance on the following judgments: i) Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar Vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1968 SC 733 . ii) Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (P) Ltd. (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 97. iii) Ouseph Mathai and others Vs. M. Abdul Khadir (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 319. 9. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record and the judgments relied upon. 10. The question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether the appeal filed by the respondent before the Administrative Tribunal challenging the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector was maintainable under Section 188 of the Code. 11. 9. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the record and the judgments relied upon. 10. The question which arises for consideration in this petition is whether the appeal filed by the respondent before the Administrative Tribunal challenging the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector was maintainable under Section 188 of the Code. 11. Section 188 of the Code reads thus: Appeals – (1) Save as otherwise expressly provided, an appeal shall lie from every original order, other than an interim order passed under this Code - (a) if such an order is passed by an officer subordinate to the Sub-Divisional Officer, to the Sub-Divisional Officer; (b) if such an order is passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, to the Collector; (c) if such an order is passed by the Collector, to the Tribunal; (d) if such an order is passed by an Assistant Survey and Settlement Officer, to the Survey and Settlement Officer or to a revenue officer notified by the government in the Official Gazette to be the appellate authority; (e) if such an order is passed by a Survey and Settlement Officer to the Director of Settlement and Land Records or to a revenue office notified to be the appellate authority; and (f) if such an order is passed by the Inspector of Surveys and Land Records, to the Superintendent of Surveys and Land Records. (2) A second appeal shall lie against any order passed in first appeal: (a) if the first appeal was filed under clause (a) of sub-section (1) to the Collector; (b) if the first appeal was filed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) to the Tribunal; (c) if the first appeal was filed under clause (d) of sub-section (1) to the Director of Settlement and Land Records or to a Revenue Officer notified by the government in the Official Gazette to be the second appellate authority; and (d) if the first appeal was filed under clause (e) or (f) of sub-section (1), to the Tribunal. 12. From a bare reading of Section 188 of the Code it is evident that against an order passed by the Collector, an appeal would lie to the Administrative Tribunal from every original order and an appeal preferred against the original order is maintainable and not against an interim order. The question therefore, is whether the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. The question therefore, is whether the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector can be termed as an original order against which an appeal under Section 188 of the Code could have been filed by the respondent. 13. In the case of the Central Bank of India Ltd. (supra), relied by Mr. Godinho, the Apex Court was dealing with the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958. Section 38 (1) of the Act read thus: “An appeal shall lie from every order of the Controller made under this Act to the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal) consisting of one person only to be appointed by the Central Government by notification in the Official Gazette.” 14. In paragraph 3 of the judgment, the Apex Court held that the object of Section 38(1) was to give a right of appeal to the petitioner aggrieved by some order which affects his rights or liability. The Apex Court further held that although the word “every order of the Controller made in this Act”, though were very wide, do not include interlocutory orders, which are merely procedural and do not affect the rights or liabilities of the parties. In a pending proceedings, the controller may pass many interlocutory orders under Sections 36 and 37, such as orders regarding the summoning of witnesses, discovery, production and inspection of documents, issue of a commission for examination of witnesses, inspection of premises, fixing a date of hearing and the admissibility of a document or the relevancy of a question. The Apex Court further held that all these interlocutory orders are steps taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending prosecution of their case; they regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties. The Apex Court further held that the legislature could not have intended that the parties would be harassed with endless expenses and delay by appeals from such procedural orders. It is open to a party to set forth the error, defect, irregularity, if any, in such an order as ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceedings. 15. As stated above, Section 188 provides for an appeal from an original order and not from an interim order. By order dated 1/9/2010 the Dy. It is open to a party to set forth the error, defect, irregularity, if any, in such an order as ground of objection in his appeal from the final order in the main proceedings. 15. As stated above, Section 188 provides for an appeal from an original order and not from an interim order. By order dated 1/9/2010 the Dy. Collector rejected the prayer of the respondent seeking leave to produce certain documents. In my considered opinion, the said order cannot be termed as an order affecting the rights of the respondent. If impugned order is tested in the light of the principles laid down in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd., (supra) it is evident that the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector cannot be termed as an original order. It is also pertinent to note that the documents sought to be produced by the respondent in proceedings under Section 40 of the Code which are summary in nature. This being the position, applying the test laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd, supra, the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector cannot be termed as an order affecting the rights of the respondent, and as such an original order for the purpose of Section 188 of the Code. In my opinion, the ratio laid down in the case of Central Bank of India Ltd, (supra) is squarely applicable in the present case although the said judgment was delivered in the context of the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. 16. I do not deem it necessary to deal with the other judgments referred to by Mr. Godinho since the said judgments were delivered in entirely different factual situations and they do not deal with the issue involved in the present case. 17. In so far as the authorities relied upon by Ms. Linhares in support of her contention that the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Dy. Collector is the final order is concerned, in my opinion, the said authorities do not advance the case of the respondent. 18. In the case of Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar, (supra), the Apex Court was considering as to when an interlocutory order passed can be said to be final. In the present case, we are concerned as to whether the order passed by the Dy. 18. In the case of Mohanlal Maganlal Thakkar, (supra), the Apex Court was considering as to when an interlocutory order passed can be said to be final. In the present case, we are concerned as to whether the order passed by the Dy. Collector is an original order or whether it is an final order. Therefore, the ratio of the judgment in the said case does not advance the case of the respondent. In so far as the case of Estralla Rubber, (supra) is concerned, the Apex Court has held that jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can be exercised to interfere with the orders of the lower Court only in case serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice or if the findings recorded by the Courts and Tribunals are based on no evidence at all or are so perverse that no reasonable person could come to such conclusions. In the present case, the issue is whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction at all to entertain the appeal filed under Section 188 of the Code. Therefore, the judgment in the case of Estralla Rubber (supra) is not of any help to the respondent. In the case of Ouseph Mathai and others, (supra), the Apex Court has held that mere wrong decision is not a ground for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227. The High Court may intervene in favour of a defaulting party only if such party has been made to suffer grave injustice. 19. In view of the above discussion, I hold that the appeal filed by the respondent against the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Deputy Collector was not maintainable. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order dated 6/12/2010 passed by the Administrative Tribunal is quashed and set aside. 20. At this stage Ms. Linhares, learned Additional Government Advocate for the respondent states that liberty be given to the respondent to prefer revision to the State Government against the order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Deputy Collector. 21. Mr. Godinho, learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection if the respondent is permitted to file revision against order dated 1/9/2010. 22. Therefore, liberty is granted to the respondent to file revision against order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Deputy Collector. 21. Mr. Godinho, learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection if the respondent is permitted to file revision against order dated 1/9/2010. 22. Therefore, liberty is granted to the respondent to file revision against order dated 1/9/2010 passed by the Deputy Collector. Needles to mention that in the event the respondent choses to file such revision application before the State Government, the State Government shall deal with the same on its own merits and in accordance with law. 23. The petition stands disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.