Judgment :- 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner for issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, forbearing the respondent Bank from further proceeding with the charge sheet dated 3.10.89 as the time limit of 2 months prescribed by the Honble Division Bench in its order dated 16.7.2002 in W.A.No.1703 of 2002 has expired on 29.9.2002 and also the fresh enquiry in respect of charge sheet dated 3.10.89 is illegal, perverse, without jurisdiction and not in conformity with the principles of Natural Justice and consequently direct the respondent to grant the petitioner his full pension with effect from 31.7.95 and pay him all other benefits including the balance of P.F., gratuity and release the increments withheld by the respondent and also open the sealed cover relating to the promotion of the petitioner. 2. The case of the petitioner as given in the affidavit filed in support of this writ petition is as follows: The petitioner joined the respondent Bank in the year 1956 as a Clerk. Thereafter, he was promoted as an Officer Grade-II on 1.12.1970 and Officer Grade-I on 1.8.1978. The respondent Bank issued a charge memo dated 24.12.1988 alleging that the petitioner had sanctioned Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP) loans to ineligible persons, sanctioning DIR loans to a relative of an employee of the Bank, obtaining temporary loan of Rs.9,000/- from a borrower for purchase of VCR and providing credit facilities to the persons residing outside the area of operation of the branch of the Bank. None of the charges specify which rules he had violated. However, he gave an explanation denying the charges on 10.4.1989. A charge sheet was thereafter issued on 3.10.1989. The alleged misconduct related to the year 1986, but the charges were framed only in October 1989, i.e., after 3 years. The enquiry was held in July 1990. In the enquiry, he denied the charges. The enquiry was not conducted in a proper manner. However, the enquiry officer gave a finding that the charges (a), (b) and (d) were proved and charges (c) and (e) were partially proved. The other charges (f), (g) and (h) were held not proved and final order was passed on 5.5.1992 reducing his salary by five stages from Rs.4,390/- p.m. to Rs.3,780/-p.m. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, who by an order dated 5.8.1993 rejected his appeal. The other charges (f), (g) and (h) were held not proved and final order was passed on 5.5.1992 reducing his salary by five stages from Rs.4,390/- p.m. to Rs.3,780/-p.m. Thereafter, he preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority, who by an order dated 5.8.1993 rejected his appeal. In June 1995, he filed a writ petition in W.P.No.7988 of 1995 challenging the order dated 5.5.1992, reducing his basic pay by five stages. After completion of 60 years he retired from the service of the respondent Bank on 31.7.1995. On 28.3.2002, the writ petition filed by him in WP.No.7988 of 1995 was allowed but liberty was given to the bank to revive the disciplinary proceedings if they so desire and decide the matter afresh in accordance with law. Against that order of the learned Single Judge, he preferred a writ appeal in WA.No.1703 of 2002 before the Division Bench of this Court. On 16.7.2002, this writ appeal was disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court observing that the departmental enquiry should be concluded within two months from the date of receipt of the copy of that order and if the time frame was not adhered to, then the Disciplinary Proceedings would stand quashed. Even after the disposal of the above W.A.No.1703 of 2002, the respondent Bank did not conclude the enquiry within the stipulated period of two months. Only on 29.7.2003, he received the copy of the order dated 16.7.2002. Therefore, the departmental enquiry ought to have been concluded by 29.9.2002, which was not done in this case. According to the petitioner, the respondent Bank received the copy of the order dated 16.7.2002 only on 19.8.2002 and should have completed the enquiry by 19.10.2002, but which was not done by the respondent Bank too. Enquiry officer was appointed for fresh enquiry on 4.9.2002 and enquiry report was given on 31.10.2002 for which the petitioner gave his explanation on 11.12.2002. On 8.3.2003, notice was sent by the petitioner stating that the enquiry was not completed within two months. A reply dated 5.5.2003 was given stating that they have tentatively decided to reduce the basic salary by three stages. At that stage the W.P. has been filed for the aforesaid prayer. 3. On 8.3.2003, notice was sent by the petitioner stating that the enquiry was not completed within two months. A reply dated 5.5.2003 was given stating that they have tentatively decided to reduce the basic salary by three stages. At that stage the W.P. has been filed for the aforesaid prayer. 3. A counter affidavit has been filed by the respondent Bank wherein they have stated that enquiry was conducted on 19.9.2002, i.e., within one month from the date of receipt of the order on 19.8.2002. Thus they have completed within the time limit granted by the Division Bench directing to complete the enquiry within two months. It is admitted that final order remains to be passed by the Respondent Bank. 4. I have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and the learned counsel appearing for the first respondent Bank. I have also gone through the documents available on record including the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Bank. 5. The short point for consideration in this writ petition is whether the order passed on 16.07.2002 in the Writ Appeal No.1703 of 2002 has been duly complied with by the respondent Bank or not. 6. It is useful to refer to the operative portion of the order passed by the Division Bench on 16.07.2002 which reads as follows: "5. In that view of the matter, we are not inclined to quash the charges as propounded by Mr.N.G.R.Prasad, but, instead, direct the enquiry to be concluded after affording opportunity as indicated by the learned single Judge within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, and we make it clear that if this time frame is not adhered to, then the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant will stand quashed." 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would contend that when the Division Bench has said that the respondent bank should conclude the enquiry after affording opportunity to the petitioner it would only mean that they must conclude and pass final orders. If it is not done within the time frame given by this Court, the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant would stand quashed. 8. Though the respondent bank have received the order on 19.8.2002, they ought to have completed the enquiry and passed final orders on or before 19.10.2002 which was not done in this case. If it is not done within the time frame given by this Court, the disciplinary proceedings against the appellant would stand quashed. 8. Though the respondent bank have received the order on 19.8.2002, they ought to have completed the enquiry and passed final orders on or before 19.10.2002 which was not done in this case. Therefore, the respondent bank cannot proceed further, in view of the Division Bench order. Hence, the disciplinary proceedings against this petitioner would stand quashed. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent bank would contend that as per the direction of the Division Bench they have concluded the enquiry within the time limit and because of the conduct of the petitioner in not co-operating with the enquiry, they could not pass final order. 10. I have heard the rival submissions carefully on this point. 11. The facts are not in dispute that by the order dated 29.3.2002 a Learned Single Judge of this Court allowed the W.P.No.7988 of 1995 filed by the writ petitioner herein and consequently quashed the order of punishment dated 5.5.1992. However, the learned Judge gave liberty to the respondent/bank, if it so decides to revive the outstanding proceedings and decides the matter afresh in accordance with law. Aggrieved by the liberty given by the learned Single Judge, the writ petitioner filed W.A.No.1703 of 2002 and the Division Bench by order dated 16.7.2002, held that the respondent/bank to conclude the enquiry after affording an opportunity within a period of two months and if this time frame was not adhered to, then, the disciplinary proceedings against the writ petitioner would stand quashed. Thus, it is very clear that the Division Bench wanted the entire matter to be over within two months and if the time frame is not complied with, then, the entire disciplinary proceedings would stand quashed. 12. Now, it is not in dispute that the order of the Division Bench dated 16.7.2002 was received by the Bank on 19.8.2002 and the enquiry proceedings were concluded on 19.9.2002 i.e. within two months. But, the point that arises for consideration is, whether the entire disciplinary proceedings ought to be completed culminating into an order of punishment or otherwise within two months, is it sufficient to conclude the enquiry alone within two months. 13. But, the point that arises for consideration is, whether the entire disciplinary proceedings ought to be completed culminating into an order of punishment or otherwise within two months, is it sufficient to conclude the enquiry alone within two months. 13. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner that what was meant by the Division Bench is, to complete everything, which means passing of a final order and not the disciplinary proceedings within two months and not just concluding the enquiry alone. Therefore, he contends that once a final order is not passed within two months as stipulated by the Division Bench, then, the entire disciplinary proceedings would stand quashed automatically without further reference to the Division Bench. 14. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the Bank submits that what was meant by the Division is to complete the enquiry alone and not as submitted by the petitioner. 15. I have already extracted the operative portion of the order of the Division Bench. I am also aware that at the time of filing the writ petition on 30.10.2003, the writ petitioner was 69 years old as stated by him in the affidavit. Therefore, he should have been 68 years when the order was passed by the Division Bench. Further it is also relevant to consider that the Charge Memo was originally issued on 24.12.1988 and the charges were relating to the alleged misconduct of the petitioner during the period from 7.9.1985 to 8.1.1987. In the light of the above factual background, I am not inclined to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the order passed by the Division Bench on 16.7.2002, the Division Bench while directing the respondent bank to conclude the enquiry within two months actually meant that final order itself should have been passed within two months. As such an interpretation is reasonable, logical and correct considering the age of the petitioner and the period when the alleged misconduct took place. Therefore, I am of the considered view that though the enquiry was completed within two months as directed by the Division Bench, final orders have not been passed, which means, the default clause as contemplated in the order dated 16.7.2002 would come into operation immediately. Therefore, I am of the considered view that though the enquiry was completed within two months as directed by the Division Bench, final orders have not been passed, which means, the default clause as contemplated in the order dated 16.7.2002 would come into operation immediately. As per the default clause contained in the order dated 16.7.2002, if the disciplinary proceedings were not concluded within two months, then, the entire disciplinary proceedings would stand quashed automatically. 16. Thus, the disciplinary proceedings have not been completed within the time frame stipulated by the Division Bench and therefore, as per the orders of the Division Bench itself, the disciplinary proceedings which were initiated against the petitioner were quashed and consequently, the writ is allowed in the following terms: a) The time limit of two months prescribed by the Division Bench in the order dated 16.7.2002 in W.A.No.1703 of 2002 has expired on 29.9.2002 and no final order has been passed by the disciplinary authority either punishing or exonerating the writ petitioner. b) Consequently, the entire disciplinary proceedings are quashed as per the order of the Division Bench dated 16.7.2002 in W.A.No.1703 of 2002. c) The petitioner is entitled to all the monetary benefits including the full pension, balance PF, Gratuity and the withheld increments; d) The respondent bank is also directed to open the sealed cover relating to the promotion of the petitioner as it is only consequential to quashing the disciplinary proceedings. 17. Though the learned counsel for the respondent bank contends that they have complied with the order of the Division Bench dated 16.7.2002 by completing the enquiry within two months, it is not in dispute that the bank did not ask for any clarification or extension of time before the same Division Bench. If the Division Bench order is interpreted by the respondents themselves in one way, then it is held against them, if any interpretation is possible. It is not open to the bank to interpret an order of the Higher Judicial Forum in a way it likes it or it suits them and whenever any doubt arises and whenever more than one interpretation is possible, then, the respondents like the Bank in this case should approach the higher Judicial forum to clarify the order to avoid any misunderstanding in future. Atleast the bank ought to have approached the Division Bench for extension of time for passing the final order in the disciplinary proceedings. As nothing has been done in this regard, I am not inclined to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the Bank that concluding the enquiry alone within two months they have complied with the order of the Division Bench in full. 18. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in the above terms. No costs.