JUDGMENT Hon’ble Imtiyaz Murtaza, J.—Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment and order dated 14.5.2009 passed by Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Kushinagar at Padrauna in S.T. No. 260 of 2000 whereby the appellant No. 1 Keshav Shukla has been convicted under Section 304-B I.P.C. and sentenced to imprisonment for life attended with sentence of fine of Rs. 10,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further imprisonment for one year. Appellant Nos. 2 to 4, namely, Vyas Shukla, Smt. Vimla Devi and Smt. Hemlata Devi alias Subhawati have been convicted under Section 304-B I.P.C. and sentenced to ten years’ R.I. attended with sentence of fine of Rs. 10,00/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further one year’s imprisonment. All the appellants have also been convicted under Section 498-A I.P.C. and sentenced to two years imprisonment. All the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. A brief resume of the events leading to lodging of FIR is that the informant Bhola Nath had married his daughter Reena about two years back with Keshav Shukla. The marriage, it is alleged, was performed with all fan-fare and he gave dowry according to what he could offer within his means. To be precise, he had given a Rajdoot Motorcycle and jewellery items and also incurred the expenses of the Barat. Prior to the marriage Keshav, his father Vyas Shukla, his mother Smt. Hemlata, his sister-in-law Smt. Vimla Devi and Nand Pushpa had come to see his daughter and her daughter was approved. Send off (Bidai) of his daughter took place alongwith the marriage but after sometime of the marriage, the in-laws put forth further demand which included Chain, Colour T.V. and Fridge. It is further alleged that the complainant being unable to meet the demands, shrugged off the demand upon which the in-laws of his daughter started torturing his daughter but she persevered with it for sometime. On 16.4.2000, Keshav Shukla, his father Vyas Shukla, mother-in-law and sister-in-law asked her to go back to her parental house as she was mismatch in their family and she was repeatedly pushed out of the house by catching hold of her bunched hairs It is further alleged that his daughter gave them to understand that she would not leave her matrimonial house even if it cost her life. It is further alleged that in the night of 16/17.4.2000, the in-laws had tortured her by tying her hands and legs and also by piercing nails in between the fingers of her both the legs and assaulted her with rod on her back below her waist and on her thighs. The nails of her fingers were also pulled and she was brutally assaulted. It was per chance that the complainant happened to be there to meet his daughter in village Damvatiya on 20.4.2000 in the morning but the in-laws initially did not allow him to meet his daughter but subsequently on his repeated requests and also on the intervention of villager people, his daughter was pushed before him in critical condition. Seeing her condition, it is alleged, he took her daughter for medical treatment at Kasiya where she was administered treatment. Ultimately, it is alleged, after leaving his daughter at home, he went to the police station and lodged the report at the police station on 22.4.2000 under Section 498-A, 323 and 325 I.P.C. 3. It would transpire from the record that Smt. Reena expired on 6.5.2000 and the case was altered to one under Section 304-B I.P.C. 4. After completing investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet nominating the accused persons. In due course, the case was committed to the Court of Sessions and the charges were framed against the accused persons under Sections 304-B and 498-A I.P.C. 5. The prosecution, in order to prop up its case examined in all seven witnesses out of whom PW 1 is Gajar Dubey, PW 2 is Kaushalya Devi are the witnesses vouching for the circumstances incriminating to the accused persons. 6. The case of the defence was one of denial attended with the version that the deceased at the time of her death was living with her parents. They pleaded that they have been falsely implicated in the case and claimed to be innocent. No witness was examined in support of defence version by the accused persons. The Sessions Judge relying upon the prosecution evidence convicted the appellants as aforesaid. Hence this appeal. 7. We have elaborately heard Shri D.K. Dewan, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri D.R. Chaudhary, learned Government Advocate assisted by Shri Arunendra Singh, A.G.A. and Shri I.N. Mulla, learned A.G.A. 8. The Sessions Judge relying upon the prosecution evidence convicted the appellants as aforesaid. Hence this appeal. 7. We have elaborately heard Shri D.K. Dewan, learned counsel for the appellants and Shri D.R. Chaudhary, learned Government Advocate assisted by Shri Arunendra Singh, A.G.A. and Shri I.N. Mulla, learned A.G.A. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants mounted onslaught on the prosecution case contending that the evidence produced in the case is not adequate and convincing to warrant the conviction. He also challenged the findings recorded by the trial Court submitting that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case attended with the submission that the First Information Report is also not proved; that the injuries sustained by the deceased were two years old and they were not connected with the death; that the deceased did not die on account of ante-mortem injuries; rather she died on account of starvation; that the allegations of demand of dowry are wholly false; that the charge in the trial has not been properly framed and it resulted in vitiation of the trial. The argument forcibly advanced is that the testimony of P.W. 2 Kaushalya Devi cannot be read in evidence inasmuch as the Sessions Judge did not record the evidence in language of the witness attended with further submissions that the Sessions Judge did not affix his signatures on the deposition.. Lastly, it is argued that sentence awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case errs on the side of severity. 9. Per contra, learned A.G.A. has canvassed for the correctness of the view taken by the trial judge attended with the submission that sufficient evidence was adduced by the prosecution and the Sessions Judge rightly convicted the appellants relying on the prosecution evidence. 10. In order to appreciate the aforesaid rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties, we have to independently scrutinise the oral and documentary evidence brought on record by the prosecution. 11. P.W. 1 Gajar Dube deposed that the dead body of Reena was sealed in his presence. Inquest was also done in his presence. He also deposed that the deceased had given beating to the deceased as their demand for golden chain, T.V. and Fridge could not be met and she was so badly beaten that she was not able to take food for days together. Inquest was also done in his presence. He also deposed that the deceased had given beating to the deceased as their demand for golden chain, T.V. and Fridge could not be met and she was so badly beaten that she was not able to take food for days together. He also deposed that at that time, the head of the deceased was facing north while her legs were facing south; her neck was leaning towards left side. Her left hand was placed on her chest while the other hand was lying curved on the ground. Inquest was prepared by the Lekhpal and his statement was recorded by Daroga. 12. In the cross-examination, he stated that by virtue of kinship of village, the deceased was his niece. The name of his father was Indrasen who was the son of Jamuna. He stated that he had no knowledge how many sons were born to Jamuna. He also stated that the deceased was the daughter of Bhola Dube. However, he stated that Dhanush Dhari Dube was father of Bhola Dube. However he could not tell whether both Dhanush Dhari and Jamuna were full blooded brothers. He also could not tell the distance between his village and Damvatiya. He also stated that he was intimated about the death by his family members and thereafter, he, Sharda Pathank, Bhola Dube and wife of Bhola Dube left immediately on the break of dawn. He also stated that dead body was lying in the hospital and thereafter it was brought to the police station. The dead body kept lying at the police station during night and inquest was conducted next day between 7- 8 a.m. The dead body was taken in Jeep to Kasia from Kuber. He also stated that no queries were made from him by the Investigating officer. He also stated that his statement in the Court was the first statement and prior to it, his statement was recorded nowhere. He also stated that they arrived at Kasia alongwith the dead body between 2-2/30 p.m. After the post-mortem had been completed the body was taken for cremation. He also stated that he had never seen the deceased prior to the occurrence. He also stated that they arrived at Kasia alongwith the dead body between 2-2/30 p.m. After the post-mortem had been completed the body was taken for cremation. He also stated that he had never seen the deceased prior to the occurrence. He however stated that the deceased was good figured and very talented girl and she was chosen for marriage by the accused on account of her beauty and that the marriage was performed with all pomp and show. He also stated that Bhola Dube had given dowry to the best of his means. He however denied as to who was the intermediary in arranging marriage. He also stated that he was told by Bhola that he had settled the marriage of his daughter. He also stated that he was not involved in checking the antecedents of the accused persons before marriage. He also stated that the deceased had received only elementary education. He also stated that he had not given anything in her marriage. He expressed his ignorance about what was given in dowry by Bhola Dubey. He also stated that he had no talk with deceased Reena. He also stated that he had not gone to police station when the report was handed out at the police station. He stated that he could not distinguish between case and report. He denied the suggestion that he was deposing falsely on account of his kinship. 13. P.W. 2 Kaushalya Devi is the mother of the deceased. She deposed that her daughter was married to Keshav about ten months back. She further deposed that the occurrence took place about 18 months back. She also deposed that dowry and gifts were given in the marriage attended with the deposition that her send off to her in-laws house coincided with her marriage. She also deposed that her in laws namely, Keshav Shukla, Vyas Shukla, Hemlata Devi, Smt. Vimla Devi and Pushpa Devi used to mal-treat her and she was repeatedly tortured to enforce their demand for chain, finger ring, fridge and colour T.V by driving nail and they also used to give her thrashing on account of non-fulfilment of demand. She also deposed that about 20 days prior to her (deceased) death, informant (her husband) happened to be there to take welfare of her daughter and seeing her condition, he brought his daughter with him. She also deposed that about 20 days prior to her (deceased) death, informant (her husband) happened to be there to take welfare of her daughter and seeing her condition, he brought his daughter with him. On return to her parental house, she disclosed that she was beaten severely by the accused persons putting pressure on her to bring in more dowries. She further deposed that the deceased was taken to the hospital at Kasiya for treatment. While she was being taken back to the village, she breathed her last in the way and therefore her dead body was taken to Kubersthan police station. From Police station, her body was sent for post-mortem examination to Kasiya. She also deposed that her statement was recorded by the Sub Inspector at the police station and thereafter C.O. had also recorded her statement. She explained that her statement was recorded by the C.O. after ten days of the occurrence. 14. In the cross-examination, she deposed that she had two daughters and her eldest daughter Manti was married to Nagendra Tiwari who was a teacher in Montessori School of Kasya. She further stated that one Tiwariji of Kasya had arranged marriage of her daughter Reena and prior to marriage, her husband had gone to the house of Keshav Shukla. After the approval of the boy by her husband, it was turn of the family members of the boy to approve the girl. The girl was shown at Kasiya in the house of her son-in-law about 10 days prior to the marriage. She further stated that her daughter was 18 years old at the time of marriage. She also stated that she had a house with thatched roof in the village. He also stated that her daughter’s father in law (Samdhi) namely Vyas Shukla had four sons and he had represented to her that Keshav Shukla was in service. She further stated that Vyas Shukla was a native of village Damvatiya and he used to earn his livelihood by preaching being Pandit by profession. She further stated that the dowry given to her daughter consisted of a motor cycle, six items of jewellery and cash. On being queried as to from where the motor cycle was purchased she stated that she was not aware from where it was purchased as it was her husband who had purchased the motor cycle. She further stated that the dowry given to her daughter consisted of a motor cycle, six items of jewellery and cash. On being queried as to from where the motor cycle was purchased she stated that she was not aware from where it was purchased as it was her husband who had purchased the motor cycle. On being further queried as to when the investigating officer had recorded her statement, she could not tell the exact date when her statement was recorded. She did state that her signatures were obtained on her statement. She also stated that at the time of lodging of the report she had gone to the police station alongwith her husband and one more person. 15. The witness was also cross-examined by the Court and in her cross-examination; she stated that the marriage of her daughter was performed on 30th of Aasarh of Shukla Paksha. She further stated that her daughter had, for the fist time, lived at her in-laws house for about five months. It was also stated that her husband used to go occasionaly to take welfare of her daughter and that her daughter had studied upto 4-5 standard. She further stated that when her daughter was brought to the village, she had injuries on her body. On being asked she could not tell the date of occurrence. However, she stated that she was brought in the night and in the morning she was taken to the Hospital where she was treated for about 19 days and she succumbed on 20th day. She asserted that it was her daughter who told her that she was on the verge of death on account of beating done by her husband and family members. She could not tell whether the doctor attending on her daughter had called for any Magistrate for recording her statement. She however stated that the in-laws of her daughter had driven nails as a result of which her injuries aggravated and escalated into cancer and she ultimately died of cancer. She could not tell how many nails were driven in between the fingers of her legs. She however stated that the nails were more than one. She conceded that she had not seen any nails anywhere in her body. She denied the suggestion that her daughter accidentally pricked her feet with some nails. She could not tell how many nails were driven in between the fingers of her legs. She however stated that the nails were more than one. She conceded that she had not seen any nails anywhere in her body. She denied the suggestion that her daughter accidentally pricked her feet with some nails. She also denied the suggestion that the nails got dug into her hands accidentally on account of her keeping hand on some place (where the nails were lying strewn). She also denied the suggestion that her daughter was of woman of easy virtue and for that reason she was thrown out of the house. She also denied the suggestion that the deceased was tortured on account of her questionable characteristics and as a result, she suffered injuries and died and that in order to screen them, a false case had been concocted and FIR was lodged naming her in laws. She further stated that her daughter breathed last while she was being carried to her house from Kasiya Hospital. She also stated that in-laws of her daughter had not taken her life nor did they burn her (which means that they inflicted injuries and as a result she died). The accused did not get her daughter treated. She further denied the suggestion that the deceased did not sustain injuries while she was living in the house of her in-laws and, therefore, there was no question of her being taken for treatment by her in-laws She further stated that when the deceased was brought by her father from her in-laws house, she had mark of injuries over her bodies and it is in this backdrop that her husband had reported the matter to the police. She also stated that initially an application was given at the police station Kubersthan informing the police of torture committed on the deceased. She explained that first report was lodged when her daughter came in injured condition from the house of her in-laws and second report was given when she died. The doctor had referred her to Gorakhpur Medical College and while preparations were being made for carrying her to Gorakhpur, she died on way to the village. She denied the suggestion that on account of enmity, a false case has been foisted on the in-laws of the deceased. 16. P.W. 3 Dr. The doctor had referred her to Gorakhpur Medical College and while preparations were being made for carrying her to Gorakhpur, she died on way to the village. She denied the suggestion that on account of enmity, a false case has been foisted on the in-laws of the deceased. 16. P.W. 3 Dr. A.K. Prasad conducted the post-mortem examination on the person of the deceased on 7.5.2000. The dead body was brought by constable Rama Nand Rai and constable Brij Kishore and following ante-mortem injuries were noted: 1. New healed scar mark 5 cm. x 5 cm. on the right side scapular. 2. New healed scar mark 4 cm. 4 cm. on the left side scapular. 3. Lacerated wound 4 cm. x 2 cm. on the joint of left shoulder. New healed tissues and pus cells present. 4. Bed sore 10 cm. x 10 cm. pus cells on the middle of both buttocks. 5. Lacerated wound 6 cm. x 3 cm. on lateral aspect of left thigh. Soft tissues and pus cells present. 6. Lacerated wound 3 cm. x 1.5 cm. on lateral aspect right thigh, pus cells , new healed soft tissues. 7. Lacerated wound 1.5 cm. x 1 cm. foul smell wound in the right middle finger and pus present 8. Lacerated wound in the size of size of 1 cm. x 1 cm. on the left foot in the middle of each toe, great foul smell, pus and decomposed tissues present. 9. Lacerated wound in the size of size of 1 cm. x 1 cm. on the right foot in the middle of each toe, great foul smell, pus and decomposed tissues present. 17. In the cross-examination he deposed that in the post-mortem examination, he had probed into the injuries both externally and internally. At the time when he examined the body both eyes of the deceased were closed. He also deposed that the eyes had sunk in and there were marks on the thighs and muscles were yellow. The colour of hand was also yellow. He had not mentioned whether the ligament connected with the intestines were missing. The duration of the death was mentioned about one and half day and there could be variation of one or two hours. 18. P.W. 4 Dr. A. K. Srivastava had medically examined Smt. Reena Shukla on 30.101998 and noted following injuries: 1. He had not mentioned whether the ligament connected with the intestines were missing. The duration of the death was mentioned about one and half day and there could be variation of one or two hours. 18. P.W. 4 Dr. A. K. Srivastava had medically examined Smt. Reena Shukla on 30.101998 and noted following injuries: 1. A contused traumatic swelling of size upper portion of both sides of face, just below lower eye lids of both eyes, in ending the nose (Bluish in colour KUO (advised X-ray) 2. A contused traumatic swelling of size 3 cm. x 2 cm. on the upper and posterior seen, face of pinna of left ear (Blackish in colour) 3. Healed burn wound mark of size 5 cm. x 3 cm. on the external and mid portion of the left arm. 4. A contused traumatic swelling of size 3 cm. x 3 cm. .... medial aspect and mid portion of right fore arm (Blackish in colour. 5. A new healed scar mark of size 2.5 cm. x 2 cm. on the ....... lateral face of upper portion of left arm 8 cm. below left shoulder joint (Hard stab present). 6. Multiple, new healed scar mark in the area of 40 cm. x 35 cm. on both sides of back (hard scab present around the scar seen) 7. Contused traumatic swelling of size 30 cm. x 10 cm. on the middle of the leg on lateral face (X-ray advised) 8. Old healed wound of size 3 cm. x 2 cm. on the lateral aspect and lower portion of left leg (pus cell, soft tissues present) surrounded by traumatic swelling and X-ray advised. He also examined Smt. Reena on 20.4.2000 and noted following injuries: 1. Abraded traumatic swelling of size 5 cm. x 4 cm. on the left side of face, 1.5 cm. below left lower eye-lid (hard scab) 2. An abraded contusion of size 2.5 cm. x 2 cm. on front of nose (Reddish Blue in colour with hard scab) 2 cm. below root of the nose. KUO and advised X ray) 3. Multiple abraded contusion of size in the area of 12 cm. x 10 cm. on anterior lateral aspect of right side neck (hard scab) 4. An abrasion of size 2.5 cm. x2 cm. on left shoulder, including left shoulder tip (hard scab) 5. An abraded contusion of size 2.5 cm. x 2 cm. KUO and advised X ray) 3. Multiple abraded contusion of size in the area of 12 cm. x 10 cm. on anterior lateral aspect of right side neck (hard scab) 4. An abrasion of size 2.5 cm. x2 cm. on left shoulder, including left shoulder tip (hard scab) 5. An abraded contusion of size 2.5 cm. x 2 cm. on the dorsal surface of right elbow joint (hard scabbed) 19. In his opinion, all the injuries were simple in nature except injury No. 2 which was kept under observation till final report of X ray. All the injuries caused by some blunt and hard object and duration of injuries was about three days. 20. P.W. 5 HCP Uma Shanker Singh deposed that on 6.5.2000 he was posted as Head Constable at police station Kubersthan vide report No. 19 at 4.30 p.m. case crime No. 239 of 2000 under Section 485, 498-A, 323, 325 I.P.C. and 3/4 of D.P. Act was registered. On the application of Bhola Nath Dube, later-on Section 304-B was also added. Copy of the G.D. entry is Ext. Ka-10. 21. P.W. 6 Rajesh Sahni deposed that on 6.5.2000, he was posted as C.O. Khadda. On 22.6.2000, he started investigation of the case and recorded the statement of the inquest witnesses, Naib Tehsildar Ajit Kumar Singh, Constable Rajendra Kumar, Bhola Dube, Gajar Dube, Sharda Pathak, Vikram Prasad, Ram Vasant Shukla and Kaushlya Devi. Thereafter investigation was transferred to C.O. Kailash Upadhyay and after concluding the investigation he submitted the charge-sheet. He further deposed that he had recorded the statement of Kaushlya Devi on 2.7.200 and thereafter, charge-sheet No. 10 of 200 was filed. He also proved the charge-sheet, Ext. Ka-11 filed by Kailash Upadhyay. In the cross-examination, he stated that he investigated the case from 6.5.2000 to 8.5.2000. He had issued Parcha No. 1 and Parcha No. 5. Parcha Nos. 1 to 3 were prepared by S.O. Kubersthan. He admitted that he recorded the statement of inquest witnesses only. Earlier the investigating officer had recorded the statement of witnesses regarding dowry and when the victim died case was converted under Section 498-A, 304-B I.P.C. He could not tell whether investigating officer who had investigated the case subsequent to him, had recorded any statement in connection with the dowry or not. On 6.5.2000, statement of the mother of deceased was recorded. On 6.5.2000, statement of the mother of deceased was recorded. In the opinion of the inquest witnesses, nothing had been mentioned about dowry. He explained that in the inquest report, only cause of death is to be mentioned, as per the opinion of the inquest witnesses. He had not recorded the statement of the personnel who had taken Chik F.I.R to the Court on 13.12.2000. 22. P.W. 7 constable Hridya Narain Tripathi deposed that constable Hridya Narain Yadav was known to him. He was posted as constable Moharrir at police station Kubersthan. He could not tell his present place of posting. He had seen him writing and thus he proved chik No. 21 of 2000 registered at Case Crime No. 39 of 2000 under Section 498-A, 304-B, 323, 325 I.P.C. and 3/4 of D.P. police station Kubersthan against Keshav Shukla, Vyas Shukla. The chik F.I.R. is Ext. Ka -12. He had also proved paper No. 9 of case crime No. 39 of 2000, site plan No. 22 of 2000 which according to him was in the hand writing of S.I. Shiv Mangal Singh, marked as Ext. Ka-13. He had also proved inquest report in the handwriting of Mangal Singh, which is Ext. Ka-14. In the cross-examination, he stated that he could not tell the dates during which constable Hridyanarain Yadav was posted at the police station. He also could not tell the dates during which he was posted in Taria. He stated that he was acquainted with the signature of Hridya Narain and Shiv Mangal. 23. As stated supra, the defence did not examine any witness in their defence and their case was of simple denial and false implication. 24. Before we embark on reviewing the evidence on record and considering the rival submissions of counsel for the appellants, we feel called to say that it is a case of dowry death and therefore, different principles of appreciation of evidence and legal provisions will have to be called in aid. 25. The first case on the point is State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram, (2008) 12 SCC 51 , in which the Apex Court laid down that with a view to curbing the growing menace of dowry deaths, Parliament amended the Penal Code and the Evidence Act and inserted Sections 304-B and 113-B respectively in the two statutes. 25. The first case on the point is State of Rajasthan v. Jaggu Ram, (2008) 12 SCC 51 , in which the Apex Court laid down that with a view to curbing the growing menace of dowry deaths, Parliament amended the Penal Code and the Evidence Act and inserted Sections 304-B and 113-B respectively in the two statutes. This was done keeping in view the recommendations made by the Law Commission of India in its 21st Report. Section 304-B IPC being relevant may be referred to and it substantially lays down that where the death of a woman is caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation appearing below sub-section (1) of Section 304-B envisages that for the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Sub-section (2) of Section 304-B prescribes the minimum punishment for dowry death as seven years which can be extended up to imprisonment for life. It is further held that the ingredients necessary for the application of Section 304-B IPC are: 1. that the death of a woman has been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances; 2. that such death has been caused or has occurred within seven years of her marriage; and 3. that soon before her death the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband in connection with any demand for dowry. 26. In connection with the above, Section 113-B of the Evidence Act may also be referred to and it lays down that if soon before her death a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person, who is accused of causing her death then the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. The presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law and once the prosecution establishes the essential ingredients mentioned therein it becomes the duty of the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. 27. From a conjoint and punctilious reading of Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B, Evidence Act it would boil down that in order to prove the charge of dowry death, prosecution has to establish that the victim died within 7 years of marriage and she was subjected to cruelty or harassment soon before her death and such cruelty or harassment was for dowry. The expression “soon before her death” has not been defined in either of the statutes. Therefore, in each case, the Court has to analyse the facts and circumstances leading to the death of the victim and decide whether there is any proximate connection between the demand of dowry, the act of cruelty or harassment and the death. 28. To begin with, learned counsel for the appellants mounted onslaught on the charge submitting that the charge in the case had not been properly framed and it occasioned prejudices to the appellant, and by this reckoning, it is further submitted, the trial of the appellant is grossly vitiated. In order to properly appreciate the submission of the counsel, we have independently examined the charges framed against the appellant. 29. The main grievance regarding charge is that in the charge, it is mentioned that ‘’you did intentionally cause death of Reena by tying her limbs and crucifying her and assaulting with rods as a result of which injuries died subsequently.’’ It was further argued that there is no evidence on record to substantiate the allegations in the charge. We have considered the submission made across the bar by the counsel and we are irresistibly of the view that there is no illegality in framing the charge. A perusal of both the charges clearly spell out the ingredients of the offence and no prejudice had been caused to vitiate the trial. The trial Court had framed charges under Section 498A and 304B IPC and also convicted the appellants in the same sections. A perusal of both the charges clearly spell out the ingredients of the offence and no prejudice had been caused to vitiate the trial. The trial Court had framed charges under Section 498A and 304B IPC and also convicted the appellants in the same sections. Section 464 of the Cr.P.C. in very clear terms envisages that no finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge unless a failure of justice in fact has been occasioned. 30. In connection with the above, we would like to refer to the decision of the Apex Court In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy and others, (1998) 6 SCC 554 . In this case, the Apex Court considered the issue of failure to frame the proper charges and observed herein as under: “10. Sub-section (1) of Section 464 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (‘’the Code’, for short) expressly provides that no finding, sentence or order by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be deemed invalid merely on the ground that no charge was framed or on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge including any mis-joinder of charges, unless in the opinion of the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. Sub-section (2) of the said section lays down the procedure that the Court of appeal, confirmation or revision has to follow in case it is of the opinion that a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. The other section relevant for our purposes is Section 465 of the Code; and it lays down that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the proceedings, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned. It further provides, inter alia, that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” 31. It further provides, inter alia, that in determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.” 31. The Court further held that in judging a question of prejudice, as of guilt, the Court must go into the substance of the matter and not be swayed by technicalities, and its main concern should be to see whether the accused had a fair trial, whether he knew what he was being tried for, whether the main facts sought to be established against him were explained to him fairly and clearly and whether he was given a full and fair chance to defend himself. In the said case this Court ultimately came to the conclusion that despite the defect in the framing of charges, as no prejudice had been caused to the accused, no interference was required. 32. Yet another case on the point is a Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1956 SC 116 , in which the Apex Court was seized of the issue of failure to frame charges properly and the conviction of an accused for the offences for which he has not been charged. In this case, the Apex Court arrived at the following conclusion:- “86. ... In such a situation, the absence of a charge under one or other of the various heads of criminal liability for the offence cannot be said to be fatal by itself, and before a conviction for the substantive offence, without a charge, can be set aside, prejudice will have to be made out. .... 87. ... If it is so grave that prejudice will necessarily be implied or imported, it may be described as an illegality. If the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of justice will have to be established.” 33. .... 87. ... If it is so grave that prejudice will necessarily be implied or imported, it may be described as an illegality. If the seriousness of the omission is of a lesser degree, it will be an irregularity and prejudice by way of failure of justice will have to be established.” 33. In Gurpreet Singh v. State of Punjab, (2005) 12 SCC 615 , the Apex Court referred to and relied upon its earlier judgments and held that unless there is a failure of justice and thereby the cause of the accused has been prejudiced, no interference is required if the conviction can be upheld on the evidence led against the accused. The Court should not interfere unless it is established that the accused was in any way prejudiced due to the errors and omissions in framing the charges against him. In the instant case counsel for the appellant could not point out any prejudice. The appellant was throughout represented by lawyer and had full opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses and all the witnesses were extensively cross-examined. The specific allegation levelled against them was that they had subjected the deceased to cruelty for or in connection with demand for dowry and she had died unnatural death within seven years of her marriage. Thus, the appellant knew that he was to defend himself against the allegation of cruelty. The cross-examination of prosecution witnesses unmistakably shows that the defence had made concerted effort to discredit the testimony of mother, of the deceased in the context of allegation of cruelty. Not only had this, in his statement under Section 313 of the Code, the appellant denied the allegation that he had subjected his wife to cruelty. It is thus evident that the appellants were not only aware of the charge of cruelty but he got and availed the opportunity to defend himself with reference to that charge. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the submission of the counsel for the appellants that they were prejudiced in their defence. It is worthy of notice here that at no point of time any grievance was raised in this regard. In ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion that there is no illegality or irregularity in framing of the charges and he was not prejudiced in his defence. It is worthy of notice here that at no point of time any grievance was raised in this regard. In ultimate analysis, we are of the opinion that there is no illegality or irregularity in framing of the charges and he was not prejudiced in his defence. The submission of the counsel for the appellant that on account of wrong framing of charges the trial of the appellant is vitiated has no substance and is rejected. 34. Next submission of the counsel for the appellant raised across the bar is that the first informant in this case had not been examined and First Information Report is not proved by the prosecution thereby resulting in vitiation of the trial. In order to consider the submission of the learned counsel, we have traversed upon the evidence on record. It brooks no dispute that the first informant could not be examined in this case as he was no more in this mortal world at the time when evidence commenced in this case. It is well enunciated in law that even if First Information Report is not proved it cannot have any adverse impact on the prosecution inasmuch as firstly, the First Information Report is not a substantive piece of evidence and secondly, the contents of the F.I.R could have been used only for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting the first informant and it can, by no means be utilized or taken aid of for contradicting or discrediting the other witnesses. 35. In connection with the above, the case on the point is Hasib v. State of Bihar (1972) 4 SCC 773 , in which the Apex Court has held that ‘’The legal position as to the object, value and use of First Information Report is well-settled. The principal object of the First Information Report from the point of view of the informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of view of the investigating authorities is to obtain information about the alleged criminal activity so as to be able to take suitable steps for tracing and bringing to book the guilty party. The First Information Report, we may point out, does not constitute substantive evidence though its importance as conveying the earliest information regarding the occurrence cannot be doubted. The First Information Report, we may point out, does not constitute substantive evidence though its importance as conveying the earliest information regarding the occurrence cannot be doubted. It can, however, only be used as a previous statement for the purpose of either corroborating its maker under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act or for contradicting him under Section 145 of that Act. It cannot be used for the purpose of corroborating or contradicting other witnesses.’’ 36. Next submission of the counsel for the appellants revolves around the admissibility of testimony of P.W.2 Smt. Kaushaliya Devi. It is contended that P.W.2 Smt. Kaushaliya Devi is an illiterate lady while her deposition has been recorded in English. The learned counsel also placed before us the notification No 8585/XXI-3 (I)-74 dated March 30, 1974 published in U.P. Gazette (Extra) dated 30th March 1974 whereby the Governor was pleased to determine the language of Courts other than the High Court for purposes of the said Code as follows. The aforesaid notification being relevant is quoted below. “In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 272 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Act No. 2 of 1974) and in supersession of all existing notifications in this regard, the Governor is pleased to determine the language of Courts other than the High Court for purposes of the said Code as follows, viz.- (i) in respect of judgments and orders passed or made by a Court of Magistrate in all cases in which a sentence of imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year can be passed- Hindi (in Devnagri script), (ii) in respect of judgments and orders passed or made by any Court in any case other than a case referred to in para (i) above-HIndi (in Devnagri script) and English, (iii) in respect of all proceedings other than judgments and orders in any Court- Hindi (in Devnagri script). 37. Per contra the learned AGA counteracted the submission arguing that the Sessions Judge has noted the statement of P.W.2 in English in accordance with the provisions of Cr. P C and no illegality has been committed in the matter. In order to appreciate the submissions of the counsel for the parties we have to examine the Section 277 Cr.P.C. which provides as herein under. “277. P C and no illegality has been committed in the matter. In order to appreciate the submissions of the counsel for the parties we have to examine the Section 277 Cr.P.C. which provides as herein under. “277. Language of record of evidence.—In every case where evidence is taken down under Section 275 or Section 276,— (a) if the witness gives evidence in the language of the Court, it shall be taken down in that language; (b) if he gives evidence in any other language, it may, if practicable, be taken down in that language, and if it is not practicable to do so, a true translation of the evidence in the language of the Court shall be prepared as the examination of the witness proceeds, signed by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, and shall form part of the record; (c) where under clause (b) evidence is taken down in a language other than the language of the Court, a true translation thereof in the language of the Court shall be prepared as soon as practicable, signed by the Magistrate or presiding Judge, and shall form part of the record: Provided that when under clause (b) evidence is taken down in English and a translation thereof in the language of the Court is not required by any of the parties, the Court may dispense with such translation.” 38. In the instant case evidence is recorded in English by the Sessions Judge. A copy of the testimony was simultaneously prepared in Hindi and both statements bear the thumb marks of the witness. 39. It would be eloquent from a perusal of the record that ADGC had moved an application under Section 313 Cr.P.C before the trial Court for summoning P.W.2 Kaushalya Devi and P.W.3 Dr. A.K.Prasad on the premises that the statement of the P.W.2 is not signed by the presiding judge and that the evidence of P.W.3 was not yet complete. The Sessions judge after hearing parties counsel on 12.2.09 rejected the prayer of the ADGC for recalling P.W.2 on the ground that the evidence was recorded by presiding judge Sri D.P.Varshney in his own hand writing and that he had also recorded the cross-examination and Hindi translation of the evidence is also on the record. The appellants did not challenge the order of the trial judge whereby the prayer of ADGC for recalling P.W.2 had been rejected. The appellants did not challenge the order of the trial judge whereby the prayer of ADGC for recalling P.W.2 had been rejected. In our considered view, the said order attained finality and now it is not open for the counsel for the appellants to raise any objection in this regard. Even if for the sake of argument it be assumed that the Sessions Judge should not have recorded the evidence in English when the witness was deposing in the language of Court i.e. Hindi, no deeper meaning could be attached to it except that it could only be an irregularity and not illegality. The counsel for the appellant could not pinpoint any prejudice or failure of justice occasioned to them on this count. Section 465 Cr.P.C is also worthy of notice here which envisages that no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code. Being germane to the point at issue, Section 465 provides as herein under: 465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity.—(1) Subject to the provisions herein before contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a Court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 40. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the Court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings. 40. The upshot of above discussion is that there is no illegality in recording the testimony of P.W.2 and consequentially, we find no measure of substance in the submission of the counsel for the appellants that the testimony of PW 2 Kaushaliya cannot be read in evidence. 41. Next thorny question raised by the counsel for the appellants is that deceased did not die on account of injuries sustained by the deceased attended with arguments that in the post-mortem report, large number of injuries were mentioned which in fact were about two years old and were not the causative factor of death. To rephrase it, the submission of the counsel for the appellant is that the appellants are not responsible for causing the death of the deceased. We have given our anxious consideration to the submission of the counsel for the appellants and we are afraid, we do not find any substance for the reason that death occasioned by starvation is not natural death. We may notice here that one of the ingredients of the offence under Section 304B I.P.C. is that the death of a woman has been caused by burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances. In the instant case death by starvation is fully covered within the provisions of Section 304B IPC. There is no dispute that large numbers of injuries were found all over the body in the post-mortem examination report which according to the prosecution case were sustained in the house of appellants. The counsel for the appellant argued that large number of injuries mentioned in the post-mortem report were two years old and they were not caused soon before her death. P.W.4, Dr A.K. Srivastava, stated that he had examined the deceased on 30.10.1998 and as many as eight injuries were found by him as were noted in injury report. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the submission is not loaded with any substance. P.W.4, Dr A.K. Srivastava, stated that he had examined the deceased on 30.10.1998 and as many as eight injuries were found by him as were noted in injury report. In this view of the matter, we are of the view that the submission is not loaded with any substance. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry attended with submission that the injuries on the persons of the deceased amply prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty. It is immaterial if some of the anti mortem injuries mentioned in the post-mortem report relate back to the year 1998. What is worthy of notice is that at the time of lodging of the report, deceased was also examined by Dr A.K Srivastava P.W.4 on 20 4 2000 and number of freshly caused injuries were found all over the body of the deceased. No doubt, the injuries found on the body were of different duration but it would not inure to the advantage of the appellants. Rather, the different durations of the injuries mentioned in the medical examination reports lend support to the prosecution case that the deceased was continuously subjected to cruelty on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry. 42. It is worthy of mention here that even suicide is also death otherwise than under normal circumstances within the definition of Section 304 B IPC. Section 113-B of the Evidence Act lays down that if soon before her death a woman is subjected to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with any demand for dowry by the person who is accused of causing her death then the Court shall presume that such person has caused the dowry death. The presumption under Section 113-B is a presumption of law and once the prosecution establishes the essential ingredients mentioned therein it becomes the duty of the Court to raise a presumption that the accused caused the dowry death. In the instant case prosecution has fully proved all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC. To cap it all, the defence did not examine any witness to rebut the presumption and the case of all the appellants is of simple denial. 43. In the instant case prosecution has fully proved all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC. To cap it all, the defence did not examine any witness to rebut the presumption and the case of all the appellants is of simple denial. 43. Learned counsel also argued that according to prosecution case deceased was living with her parents for about twenty days and there is no allegation that during this period she was subjected to cruelty studded with submission that under Section 304B IPC the burden of proving cruelty “soon before her death’’ falls on the prosecution and in the instant case admittedly there is no iota of evidence that about twenty days prior to her death she was subjected to cruelty. Again we are afraid to say that we are not disposed to countenance this submission also. 44. In connection with the above submission, we may refer to the decision of the apex Court in the case of Deen Dayal v. State of U.P., (2009) 11 SCC 157 , in which it was observed that the words “soon before her death” occurring in Section 304-B of the Penal Code are to be understood in a relative and flexible sense. Those words cannot be construed as laying down a rigid period of time to be mechanically applied in each case. Whether or not the cruelty or harassment meted out to the victim for or in connection with the demand of dowry was soon before her death and the proximate cause of her death, under abnormal circumstances, would depend upon the facts of each case. There can be no fixed period of time in this regard. In the light of the observations made in the above case we have carefully examined the evidence qua submission of the counsel for the appellants. 45. From the evidence on record, it would crystallize that there was an unabated and unrelenting demand for dowry and Reena was persistently subjected to cruelty and harassment for and in connection with the demand. The evidence of P.W.3 Dr A.K.Srivastava clearly shows that she had sustained serious injuries in the year 1998. P.W.2 Smt Kaushaliya Devi also stated that immediately after twenty days of her marriage, the deceased had complained about harassment and cruelty in regard to demand of dowry. The evidence of P.W.3 Dr A.K.Srivastava clearly shows that she had sustained serious injuries in the year 1998. P.W.2 Smt Kaushaliya Devi also stated that immediately after twenty days of her marriage, the deceased had complained about harassment and cruelty in regard to demand of dowry. It is also stated that last time when she was brought from the house of appellants she was in serious condition and was consequently admitted in the hospital. From the evidence on record it is clear that she was continuously subjected to cruelty and for the last twenty days before her death she was deserted by the appellants and by this reckoning, the conduct of the appellants is fully covered within ‘’soon before her death’’ under Section 304B IPC. 46. We have independently examined the evidence on record to ascertain whether there is sufficient evidence to hold appellants guilty of offences punishable under Sections 304B and 498A IPC or not? 47. P.W. 2 Kaushalya Devi, mother of the deceased, deposed that deceased was married with Keshav Shukla about ten months prior to the occurrence. This fact is not disputed by the defence. The prosecution has proved that deceased died within seven years of marriage. The Sessions Judge has also held that marriage took place within seven years of marriage and this finding is also not challenged before us. 48. The second finding is regarding cruelty meted out to the deceased due to non-fulfilment of dowry. In this connection, the evidence of P.W. 2 Kaushalya is relevant and it is in no Delphic terms deposed by her that deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of non-fulfilment of dowry. She also deposed that the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of Sikri (Har) Ring, Fridge and Colour T.V. She was assaulted and was brought to Kasya by her father and was taken to hospital for treatment. The injuries are not disputed. It was suggested to her that they had assaulted her on account of her being of dissolute character. She has been subjected to extensive cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to discredit her testimony. In our considered view, her testimony withstood gruelling cross-examination and by this reckoning, it is reckoned to be truthful and one which inspires full confidence. The Sessions Judge has placed full credence on her testimony. She has been subjected to extensive cross-examination but nothing could be elicited to discredit her testimony. In our considered view, her testimony withstood gruelling cross-examination and by this reckoning, it is reckoned to be truthful and one which inspires full confidence. The Sessions Judge has placed full credence on her testimony. We also do not find any plausible reason to differ from the finding recorded by the Sessions Judge. 49. Next question that crops up for consideration is that whether the death is soon before she was subjected to cruelty and whether death of Reena was under normal circumstances. The testimony of P.W. 2 Kaushalya Devi in unequivocal terms shows that immediately deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of non-fulfilment of demand of dowry and it was unabated and continued twenty days prior to her death. The testimony finds corroboration from the testimony of P.W. 4 Dr. R. K. Srivastava who medically examined deceased on 30.10.1998 and 20.4.2000 and according to the post-mortem examination her death was on account of starvation which is death “otherwise than under normal circumstances”. The death by starvation is possible either if she in order to commit suicide stopped taking food and water or it be on account of injuries and cruelty meted out to her. In any case, death of Reena is otherwise than under normal circumstances and is squarely covered under Section 304B IPC. The prosecution has fully proved all the ingredients of Section 304-B I.P.C. and there is presumption of dowry death under Section 113-B of Evidence Act. The defence did not lead any evidence to discharge the burden and we do not find any infirmity in the findings recorded by the trial Court which we also affirm. 50. We have independently scrutinized the evidence on record and we are of the opinion that Sessions Judge has rightly convicted the appellants under Section 304-B and 498-A I.P.C. 51. Last submission of counsel for the appellants is that sentence awarded to the appellants is much too excessive. 52. The sentence awarded to the appellant No. 1 Keshav Shukla is imprisonment for life under Section 304-B I.P.C. He is husband of the deceased. At the altar, he had taken vow to protect his wife. Last submission of counsel for the appellants is that sentence awarded to the appellants is much too excessive. 52. The sentence awarded to the appellant No. 1 Keshav Shukla is imprisonment for life under Section 304-B I.P.C. He is husband of the deceased. At the altar, he had taken vow to protect his wife. From the evidence on record, it clearly transpires that he was not only mute spectator but was privy to the cruelty and harassment inflicted on the deceased and by this reckoning, it is he who is to be mainly blamed for the death of the deceased. The acts of the accused are not only beastly but ghastly enjoined by greediness. The Sessions Judge awarded imprisonment for life on account of his relationship with the deceased and in the facts and circumstances of the case we do not find anything mitigating to warrant lenient view at the crudest form of bestiality shown by the accused. Therefore, his conviction and sentence under Section 304-B I.P.C. and 498-A I.P.C. is maintained. 53. However, considering the relationship of appellants Vyas Shukla, Smt. Vimla Shukla and Smt. Hemlata Devi alias Subhawati who are father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law of the deceased respectively, we are of the view that their conviction under Section 304-B I.P.C. is maintained but the sentence is pared down to imprisonment for seven years. In so far as the sentence under Section 498-A is concerned, it is maintained. 54. In view of the discussions made above, the appeal of appellant Keshav Shukla is dismissed. His conviction and sentences under Section 304 -B and 498-A I.P.C. are upheld. He is languishing in jail. He shall continue to be there to serve out the sentences awarded by the trial Court and affirmed by us. 55. The appeal of Vyas Shukla, Smt. Vimla Devi and Smt. Hemlata Devi alias Subhawati is partly allowed. As stated supra, their conviction and sentences under Section 498-A I.P.C. is upheld. However, their conviction under Section 304-B is upheld but the sentence of imprisonment for ten years is reduced to imprisonment for seven years. They are languishing in jail. They shall continue in jail to serve out the sentences as awarded by the trial Court and as modified by us. Office is directed to send a copy of this order to the Court concerned for compliance. —————