JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. In challenge is the judgment and order dated 30-4-2004 passed in W.P.(C) No.448 of 2003 upholding the appellant's assailment of the initiation of a departmental enquiry against him but denying him the back wages for the period of suspension involved though construing the same as on duty for the purpose of pensionary benefit. 2. We have heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. N. Majumder, learned State Counsel for the respondents. 3. The essential facts necessary for the disposal of the present appeal are that the appellant who had been appointed as a Peon in Grade-III (Group-D) in the office of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Government of Tripura was placed under suspension by order dated 16-4-94 with effect from 28-8-93 on the ground of his detention in connection with the two criminal cases registered against him. His period of detention in connection therewith was from 28-8-93 to 30-11-93. The Addl. Sessions Judge, West Tripura eventually after a full dress trial acquitted him of the charges in both the cases by judgment and order dated 30-1-97 whereafter the State's appeal against the same was dismissed by this Court on 12-7-02. It was thereafter that the appellant filed an application on 4-9-02 before the respondents for his re-instatement in service by treating the period of suspension to be on duty. 4. While expressing inability to consider his said prayer, the respondents intimated him of their decision to prefer a Special Leave Petition before the Apex court against the decision of this Court. The Special Leave Petition so filed was also dismissed on 8-1-03 whereafter the appellant again on 16-4-03 submitted a representation for revocation of his order of suspension and restoration in service together with all consequential benefits. As the respondents remained indifferent and apathetic on the issue, he approached this Court by filing a writ petition i.e., W.P.(C) No.380 of 2003. This writ petition was disposed of by this Court on 12-11-03 directing the respondents to decide the appellant's representation dated 16-6-03. As the respondents by memorandum dated 25-11-03 did so and by another memorandum dated 27-11-03 sought to initiate a departmental enquiry against him the appellant returned to this Court by filing another writ petition i.e., W.P(C) No.448 of 2003 impugning the said course of action. 5. As the respondents by memorandum dated 25-11-03 did so and by another memorandum dated 27-11-03 sought to initiate a departmental enquiry against him the appellant returned to this Court by filing another writ petition i.e., W.P(C) No.448 of 2003 impugning the said course of action. 5. The respondents in their affidavit while seeking to endorse the suspension of the appellant emphasised upon the gravity of the charges on which the departmental enquiry had been initiated and pleaded for the negation of the challenge laid before this Court. By the impugned judgment and order assailed herein, the learned Single Judge interfered with the departmental proceeding on the ground of undue delay observing that such step smacked of arbitrariness in State's action. The above notwithstanding, though by the impugned judgment and order, the appellant was directed to be re-instated to his post by treating the whole period of suspension as on duty for pensionary benefit, no back wages was accorded to him. Being dissatisfied by the denial of his back wages, the appellant seeks redress in the instant appeal. 6. Mr. Deb has insistently urged that as the appellant in any view of the matter after his acquittal from the criminal charges on 30-1-97 had persistently offered his services, the learned Single Judge having disapproved the initiation of the departmental enquiry against him ought to have directed his re-instatement with full back wages and other consequential service benefits. As the appellant cannot by any means be said to have withdrawn himself from his duty, the denial of the back wages to him is unjustified in law, he urged. According to Mr. Deb, in the teeth of the appellant's acquittal from the criminal charges as well as annulment of the departmental proceeding against him, denial of back wages would amount to penalty in absence of any proved misconduct/imputation contemplated by the relevant rules. To buttress his submission, Mr. Deb has placed reliance of the decision of the Apex court in Reetu Marbles v. Prabhakant Shukla (2010) 2 SCC 70 . 7. The learned State counsel in response has submitted that the invalidation of the disciplinary proceeding notwithstanding, the claim for back wages is not a matter of course and therefore no interference with the impugned judgment and order is warranted. 7. The learned State counsel in response has submitted that the invalidation of the disciplinary proceeding notwithstanding, the claim for back wages is not a matter of course and therefore no interference with the impugned judgment and order is warranted. As the disciplinary proceeding had not been interfered with on merits, considering the seriousness of the charges levelled against the appellant, even otherwise also, he is not entitled to back wages, he argued. To reinforce his submission, Mr. Majumder has placed reliance of the decision of the Apex court in Basanti Prasad v. The Chairman, Bihar School Examination Board AIR 2009 SCW 5069 and 21 U.P.S.R.T.C. v. Mitthu Singh AIR 2006 SC 3018 . 8. We have extended our anxious consideration to the rival pleadings and the arguments advanced. The facts involved are not in dispute. That the appellant was acquitted of the charges in the two criminal cases after a trial on 30-1-97 is a matter of record. Noticeably though the State of Tripura pursued the matter upto the Apex court, the acquittal remained uninterfered. The disciplinary proceeding against the appellant was sought to be initiated by the memorandum dated 27-11-03 i.e., after a decade of the registration of the criminal cases against him. There is no explanation worth the name for this undue, inordinate and inexplicable delay on the part of the State respondents, more particularly as the two proceedings are not exclusionary in nature. There is no denial of the fact as well that the appellant had been ready and willing to offer his services even before his acquittal on 30-1-97. 9. The learned Single Judge interfered with the departmental enquiry as is apparent in the impugned judgment and order, on the ground of delay alone observing however that such step was not bona fide and betrayed arbitrariness on the part of the State respondents. Logically, neither it was the stage nor was it feasible for the learned Single Judge to comment on the charges levelled against the appellant. Be that as it may, the appellant did not render his services from the date of his suspension i.e., 16-4-94 (though it was given effect to from 28-8-93) till 3-9-2004 (he having been re-instated on 4-9-2004). Logically, neither it was the stage nor was it feasible for the learned Single Judge to comment on the charges levelled against the appellant. Be that as it may, the appellant did not render his services from the date of his suspension i.e., 16-4-94 (though it was given effect to from 28-8-93) till 3-9-2004 (he having been re-instated on 4-9-2004). The Apex court in Reetu Marble (supra) while reiterating that full back wages need not automatically accompany an order of re-instatement had left it to the concerned court for an appropriate decision to that effect on an assessment of the facts and circumstances of each case. The decision in UPSRTC (supra) is clearly distinguishable from the facts in hand as amongst others in that case the respondent had, even though offered an opportunity of rendering improved services, failed to avail the chance. In Basanti Prasad (supra) the appellant had been dismissed following a departmental proceeding and his acquittal in a criminal case followed the same. Their Lordships noticing the above and also taking into account the fact that at the relevant point of time he stood superannuated denied back wages to him. In the instant case, not only the appellant has been acquitted of the charges in the criminal cases no misconduct could be proved as the departmental proceeding was intercepted by this Court. The fact however, that the appellant did not render his any service between 16-4-94 to 3-9-2004 is not a matter of dispute. The State respondents were pre-empted from taking the departmental proceeding against him and therefore no inquiry into the charge levelled against him could be pursued. 10. On a cumulative consideration of the above facts we are, thus, of the view that the appellant is entitled to a portion of back wages which we assess in the singular facts and circumstances to be fifty percent thereof for the period from 30-1-97 to 3-9-2004. We specify this period as in the course of arguments Mr. Deb had volunteered that the appellant seeks the relief for back wages for this period alone. This we direct as we find without any hesitation that though the appellant had been ever ready to render his service, it was the State respondents who did not accept the same. He thus cannot be wholly penalised for no fault of his. 11. The appeal is partly allowed. This we direct as we find without any hesitation that though the appellant had been ever ready to render his service, it was the State respondents who did not accept the same. He thus cannot be wholly penalised for no fault of his. 11. The appeal is partly allowed. The respondents would compute fifty percent of the back wages of the appellant for the period from 30-1-97 to 3-9-2004 and release the amount to the appellant within a period of two months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order. We leave the parties to bear their own costs.