Hon'ble CHAUHAN, J.—Aggrieved by the judgment dated 22-3-2006, passed by Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Cases Sikar, both the appellants, Bhura Angrej @ Siraj Khan (`A-1', for short) and Sethi @ Mohammed Sharif (`A-2', for short) have approached this Court. The appellants have been convicted and sentenced as under:- U/s.376 (2) (g) IPC: To suffer rigorous imprisonment for ten years and fine of Rs. 5000/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for five months. U/s.363 IPC: To suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for one month. U/s.366 IPC: To suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for one month. U/s.3 (i) (xii) SC/ST (PA) Act: To suffer rigorous imprisonment for five years and fine of Rs. 1000/-, in default to further suffer simple imprisonment for two months. The substantive sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. In brief the facts of the case are that on 17.4.2005, the complainant Sita Ram (P.W.11) lodged a report at Police Station Kotwali, Sikar, wherein he claimed that on 16.4.2005, his daughter, Munni, aged 16 years, had left the house at 10.00 a.m. to answer the call of nature. However, she did not return to the house. He searched for his daughter in the neighbourhood. He was informed that A-1 and A-2 had kidnapped his daughter. He further claimed that his daughter had taken away Rs.13,000/-, four gold rings, two pairs of earring, two pairs of anklets (Paijeb), two nose-ring, and forehead ornament (Teeka), which he had prepared for her marriage. On the basis of this report, the police chalked out a formal FIR, for the offences under sections 363, 366, 380 IPC, and Section 3 of SC/ST (PA) Act. Both the appellants were arrested on 3.6.2005; they are behind the bars ever since then. The police eventually submitted a charge-sheet against the appellants for the offences under sections 363, 366, 376(2)(g), 380 IPC and Sec.3 (i)(xii) SC/St (PA) Act. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined as many as thirteen witnesses, and exhibited twenty-one documents. Although the defence has not examined any witness, but it did exhibit eight documents. After hearing both the parties, and having gone through the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants as aforementioned. 3. Mr. In order to buttress its case, the prosecution examined as many as thirteen witnesses, and exhibited twenty-one documents. Although the defence has not examined any witness, but it did exhibit eight documents. After hearing both the parties, and having gone through the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellants as aforementioned. 3. Mr. Rohan Jain, the learned counsel for the appellants, has raised following contentions: Firstly, a love affair between A-2 and the prosecutrix—an affair between members of two different communities—has been given a colour of rape. Secondly, the learned trial court has failed to appreciate the evidence in proper perspective. Thirdly, according to Mukesh (P.W.4) and Lal Chand (P.W.5), two independent witnesses, the prosecutrix and A-2 were in love with each other. According to them certain photographs of the prosecutrix and A-2 were the cause of tension between the families, and became the talk of the neighbourhood. According to them even a Panchayat—a meeting of elderly persons of the Communities—was called; a compromise was struck between the families. It was decided that A-2 would not repeat his mistake. According to learned counsel, the learned trial Judge failed to notice the fact that both these witnesses (P.W.4) and (P.W.5) have not been declared hostile, yet both of them knocked the bottom out of the prosecution case. Fourthly, that even according to complainant, Sita Ram (P.W.11), and according to the FIR, his daughter had left the house after taking cash and jewelery. Therefore, she had left the house out of her own free will. According to Ashraf (P.W.12), the Manager of Akhtar Hotel, another independent witness, the appellants had come to his hotel with a girl. He was informed that the girl happens to be the wife of A-2. Moreover, according to him, there were no signs that the girl had been kidnapped. Although the prosecutrix claimed that she was raped in the hotel by A-2, but according to Ashraf (P.W.12) the young couple had left the hotel happily in the morning of 17-4-2005. Fifthly, the prosecutrix was major, as she was 16 years old, on the date of occurrence. This is obvious from the fact that in the FIR itself, the complainant had stated that his daughter was 16 years old. In her statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix herself claimed that she was 16 years old. Fifthly, the prosecutrix was major, as she was 16 years old, on the date of occurrence. This is obvious from the fact that in the FIR itself, the complainant had stated that his daughter was 16 years old. In her statement, recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix herself claimed that she was 16 years old. It is only, subsequently, during the trial that both the complainant and the prosecutrix changed their version; suddenly they claimed that the prosecutrix was 15 years and 4 months old. However, according to Dr.Mahesh Sharma (P.W.1), and according to medical evidence, the prosecutrix was 18 years old. Therefore, the age given by the complainant, and the prosecutrix in her testimony, is contradicted by her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C., and by the medical evidence. Yet, the learned trial Judge has treated the prosecutrix as a minor. Sixthly, the prosecutrix is an unreliable witness. For, in her statement under section 161 Cr.P.C, she does not utter a word about the appellant A-1, of having committed any rape upon her. It is only in her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. that for the first time she alleges that she was ravished by both the appellants. Therefore, she has improved her story from her statements under section 161 Cr.P.C. to 164 Cr.P.C. and before the trial court. Her testimony is further contradicted by the testimony of Ashraf (P.W.12), who has clearly stated that while A-2 and the prosecutrix stayed in Room No.103, A-1 stayed in Room No.101. Moreover, Raj Kumar Yadav (P.W.15), the Manager of Chetan Hotel, Jaipur, in his cross-examination admitted that only a boy and a girl had come to his hotel in the morning of 17-4-2005, and stayed in a room. Thus, according to him, A-1 did not accompany the prosecutrix and A-2. Seventhly, the testimony of prosecutrix is not corroborated by the medical evidence. According to Dr.Mahesh Sharma (P.W.1) the hymen of the prosecutrix was broken a long back, she was habitual to sexual intercourse, there were no injury on her private parts or any other part of her body. Since the prosecutrix is untrustworthy witness, therefore, the learned trial judge has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellants on the basis of her testimony. Since the prosecutrix is untrustworthy witness, therefore, the learned trial judge has erred in convicting and sentencing the appellants on the basis of her testimony. Relying on the case of Dinesh Jaiswal vs. State of M.P. ( (2010) 3 SCC 232 = 2010(3) RLW 2734 (SC)), the learned counsel has contended that though the evidence of the prosecutrix is liable to be believed, but there is no universal principle that the prosecutrix must be believed irrespective of improbabilities in her testimony. 4. On the other hand, learned Public Prosecutor, has straneously contended that according to complainant Sita Ram (P.W.11) and according to prosecutrix herself, she was a minor on the date of occurrence. Secondly, in her testimony she has clearly stated that she was subjected to rape by both the appellants. Therefore, her testimony should be taken as the gospel truth. Hence, the learned Public Prosecutor has supported the impugned judgment. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties, examined the record, and perused the impugned judgment. 6. Undoubtedly, rape is a ghastly act which leaves the victim shattered for the rest of her life. Condemned to an oblivious existence, shunned by the society at large, ridiculed by the people, suspected by the family members, the victim invariably withdraws into herself; she becomes a mere shadow of herself. Rape is not only an offence against the society, as it threatens the members of the fairer sex, but is, most importantly, a crime against the victim. Therefore, repeatedly the courts have come heavily upon the accused. However, despite the gruesomeness of the crime, both Article 21 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, guarantee a fair trial to the accused. One of the aspects of fair trial is that the court should not be moved by the gruesomeness of the crime, it should not be swayed by emotions, and it should not be convinced by suspicion. Principles of criminal jurisprudence dictate and demand that the prosecution must establish its case by cogent and convincing evidence. It must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. While appreciating the evidence, the court cannot presume that a witness of a particular category is a witness of divine origin, or is ipso facto trustworthy and reliable. Although, generally a prosecutrix is to be believed, but even her testimony cannot be accepted blindly. It must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. While appreciating the evidence, the court cannot presume that a witness of a particular category is a witness of divine origin, or is ipso facto trustworthy and reliable. Although, generally a prosecutrix is to be believed, but even her testimony cannot be accepted blindly. A court of law is to scrutinise her testimony as objectively and minutely as it would examine the testimony of a sole eye-witness. The Apex Court in the case of Dinesh Jaiswal (supra) has held that though evidence of prosecutrix is liable to be believed save in exceptional circumstances, but to hold that a prosecutrix must be believed irrespective of improbabilities in her story is unacceptable. Test always is as to whether the given story prima facie inspires confidence or not. Moreover, a court is to appreciate the evidence in a holistic manner. It cannot chop up the evidence into minuscule pieces only to hand pick a few pieces of evidence in order to convict the accused. The court is to be alive to the fact that the more gruesome the crime, the greater the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and the greater the responsibility on the court in appreciating the evidence. The Apex Court in the case of State through Central Bureau of Investigation vs. Mahendra Singh Dahiya ( (2011) 3 SCC 109 ), has held that “but no matter how diabolical the crime, the burden remains on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused. Given the tendency of human beings to become emotional and subjective when faced with crimes of depravity, the courts have to be extra cautious not to be swayed by strong sentiments of repulsion and disgust. It is in such cases that the court has to be on its guard and to ensure that the conclusions reached by it are not influenced by emotion, but are based on the evidence produced in the court. Suspicion no matter how strong cannot, and should not be permitted to, take the place of proof. Therefore, in such cases, the courts are to ensure a cautious and balanced appraisal of the intrinsic value of the evidence produced in court”. Inter-community relationship, between man and woman, not only pose social embarrassment, but also create ticklish legal issues. Suspicion no matter how strong cannot, and should not be permitted to, take the place of proof. Therefore, in such cases, the courts are to ensure a cautious and balanced appraisal of the intrinsic value of the evidence produced in court”. Inter-community relationship, between man and woman, not only pose social embarrassment, but also create ticklish legal issues. At times, in order to save the honour of the family, in order to protect the reputation of the woman, cases of elopement are converted into cases of kidnapping and rape. It is not to say that every case of inter-community relationship is given this colour, but the courts have to be alive of the fact that such a possibility does exist in our country. 7. In the present case, Mukesh (P.W.4) and Lal Chand (P.W.5) clearly reveal a totally different story than the one projected by the prosecution. Mukesh (P.W.4), in his examination-in-chief, has stated that about ten months back he saw Sethi (A-2) standing under a water tank. At that time, Sethi was having a photograph in his hand. The photo was that of the prosecutrix. He further stated that he had informed this fact to A-2's mother. He told her that her son, by showing this photograph, would tarnish the reputation of others. He further stated that Sethi's mother not only beat up Sethi, but also gave the photograph to him. According to Mukesh, he and Sethi's mother went to return the photograph to Sita Ram, the prosecutrix's father. Sethi's mother not only apologised, but she also fell at the feet of Sita Ram. According to him, the photograph was burnt. Both Sethi and the prosecutrix were admonised and advised by their family members. According to him he told Sita Ram “to look after his daughter”. In his cross-examination, Sethi has stated that having looked at the photograph, they had realised that the prosecutrix and A-2 were “making a big mistake”. According to him, both of them were present in the photograph. According to him, not only the photograph, but other photographs were also burnt. Although, initially he claimed that even the love-letters were burnt, but subsequently, he denied it. He further stated that the prosecutrix and the appellants are neighbour in the same colony. Therefore, they knew each other. 8. According to him, both of them were present in the photograph. According to him, not only the photograph, but other photographs were also burnt. Although, initially he claimed that even the love-letters were burnt, but subsequently, he denied it. He further stated that the prosecutrix and the appellants are neighbour in the same colony. Therefore, they knew each other. 8. Lal Chand (P.W.5) has stated that about 10-11 months back there was a fight, which ensued between Sita Ram and Sethi's mother. The fight was about a photograph of their children. At that time it was alleged that the photograph of the prosecutrix was with Sethi. He further stated that five men of the community struck a compromise between the parties. At that time Sethi's mother assured the prosecutrix's family that her son will not commit any mistake. In his cross-examination, he has stated that the five persons were, he himself, Bhanwar Lal, Asgar, Mukesh and Mohan Lal. He further stated that at that time there was no discussion that the photographs were shot under duress. He has also stated that it was agreed between the parties that the prosecutrix and Sethi will not meet any more. 9. Surprisingly, the prosecution has not declared either of these witnesses as hostile. Yet, testimonies of these witnesses clearly reveal the fact that the prosecutrix and the appellants were neighbour and knew each other. There were certain photographs of the prosecutrix and A-2, which were acknowledged publicly, and which caused embarrassment and difficulties for both the families. Therefore, these photographs and “possibly some love-letters” were destroyed. The existence of photographs and “possible love-letters” clearly point out to the fact that there was some relationship between A-2 and the prosecutrix. 10. In defence, the appellants submitted certain photographs (Ex.D-2 to Ex.D-4). In the cross-examination, the prosecutrix admitted that photograph (Ex.D-2 to Ex.D-4) are her photographs. However, she claimed that these photographs were taken along with A-2 under duress, that, too, in a photo studio. She claimed that although these photographs are in different clothes, but she was forced to wear these clothes in the studio itself. But a studio is not a place which is isolated, or is uninhabited by human beings. In case, the prosecutrix were forced, she was free to raise hue and cry and to seek help from those persons who were working in the studio. But a studio is not a place which is isolated, or is uninhabited by human beings. In case, the prosecutrix were forced, she was free to raise hue and cry and to seek help from those persons who were working in the studio. Yet, she did not do so. Therefore, it cannot be said that these photographs were taken under duress. Considering the fact that even on an earlier occasion photographs were discovered, these photographs (Ex.D-2 to Ex.D-4) also point towards a relationship between the prosecutrix and A-2. Thus, it is amply clear that there was a close relationship between A-2 and the prosecutrix, who are members of two different communities. 11. The prosecutrix has narrated a story, which not only has contradictions and exaggerations, but is also highly improbable. According to her, about six months back while she was going to answer the call of nature, she met A-2. He offered her a Laddu (sweet). She took the Laddu as prasad. According to her, after eating the Laddu, she felt slightly dizzy. Therefore, she came back to her house. According to her, she was followed by both the appellants. At her house, they enquired about cash and jewelery. Subsequently, she claimed that she became unconscious. From her house, in village Ranoli, Tehsil Danta Ramgarh, she was taken to a hotel at Jaipur. According to her, at the hotel she was ravished by both the appellants. Next morning, she was taken to another hotel; from there, she was taken to a house, which was rented for Rs.450/-. She further claimed that she was taken to a photo studio; she was also forced to sign certain blank papers. She further claimed that she was taken back to Sikar by bus by both the appellants, where she was left off. In her cross-examination, she admitted that although she had told the police that she was offered a Laddu, but the same does not find mention in her statement (Ex.D-5) recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. She further claimed that she had informed the police that appellants had stolen money and jewelery from her house, but even this fact is not mentioned in her statement (Ex.D-5). She further claimed that she told the police that after eating Laddu, she had become unconscious. But, even this fact is not mentioned in her statement (Ex.D-5). She further claimed that she told the police that after eating Laddu, she had become unconscious. But, even this fact is not mentioned in her statement (Ex.D-5). She further claimed that she had informed the police that she was ravished by both the appellants. This fact is also conspicuously missing from her statement (Ex.D-5). Her testimony about being taken to studio, and being forced to be photographed is also missing from her statement (Ex.D-5). When the prosecutrix was confronted with these glaring contradictions between her statement (Ex.D-5), and her testimony, she merely claimed that she told the police, but the police did not record these facts. Similarly, the contradictions between her statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C. and her testimony, were pointed out to her, yet she does not give any reason why these facts were not recorded in her statement under section 164 Cr.P.C. Therefore, her testimony suffers from omissions and exaggeration amounting to contradiction. Hence, she is an untrustworthy witness. 12. According to Mukesh (P.W.4) and Lal Chand (P.W.5), the prosecutrix knew the appellants as they were in the same neighbourhood. However, the prosecutrix, in her cross-examination, totally denies that she ever knew A-2. It is rather surprising that she accepted Laddu from a total stranger. It is also surprising that she claimed that she was taken from her village to Sikar, and from Sikar to Jaipur in an unconscious state. It would, indeed, be difficult, if not impossible, for two men to carry a woman through the streets of a village, through the crowded roads of Jaipur to a hotel in Jaipur. Moreover, it is to be noted that according to Ashraf (P.W.12), when he asked the girl, she herself claimed that she was wife of A-2. Moreover, according to Ashraf (P.W.12), the young couple had come to the hotel happily, and had left the hotel happily on the next morning. Furthermore, the prosecutrix claimed that she stayed in two hotels in Jaipur. Curiously, she did not raise any hue and cry. Further, she was taken to a rented house in a crowded neighbourhood in Jaipur. Here also, she neither sought any help, nor protested, nor attempted to flee from the clutches of the appellants. Therefore, the testimony of prosecutrix is contradicted by independent witnesses. The conduct of the prosecutrix points to strong probability that it is a case of elopement, rather than a case of rape. Here also, she neither sought any help, nor protested, nor attempted to flee from the clutches of the appellants. Therefore, the testimony of prosecutrix is contradicted by independent witnesses. The conduct of the prosecutrix points to strong probability that it is a case of elopement, rather than a case of rape. 13. As far as the age of the prosecutrix is concerned, in the written report, the complainant, Sita Ram (P.W.11) claimed that his daughter was 16 years old. In her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., the prosecutrix gave her age as 16 years. Only subsequently, in their testimonies Sita Ram, and the prosecutrix claim that she was a minor. But, according to Dr.Mahesh Sharma (P.W.1) and Dr.Banwari Lal Chaudhary (P.W.9), the prosecutrix is between the ages of 17 years and 19 years. Since, the complainant Sita Ram, and the prosecutrix have changed their statements with regard to age, the learned trial court should have accepted the medical evidence, as indicating the correct age of the prosecutrix. Thus, it is clear that on the date of occurrence the prosecutrix was between 17 and 19 years. Hence, she was capable of consenting to sexual intercourse. 14. The initial version of the complainant was that his daughter had taken cash and jewelery with her. This version is also supported by the testimony of Mukesh (P.W.4), who was informed that the girl had eloped (Hkkx xbZ gS). In her statement (Ex.D-5), the prosecutrix clearly stated that A-2 had informed her that they will go to Jaipur, from where they will not return to their village. Therefore, she was asked to bring cash and jewelery. According to her, she had taken the cash and jewelery with her of her own free will. She further claimed that when she went to a Dharamshala neither of the appellants had physically abused her. In fact, she stayed in the Dharamshala, from the morning till 3.30 P.M. In the evening, both the appellants went to their houses and brought clothes. Thereafter, she and the appellants went in a tempo to the bus-stand. It is only subsequently in her statement, recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., that she changes the story. However, when she was asked about the contradictions about the facts narrated in her statement, she merely denied and stated that she did not state these fact to police. Thereafter, she and the appellants went in a tempo to the bus-stand. It is only subsequently in her statement, recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C., that she changes the story. However, when she was asked about the contradictions about the facts narrated in her statement, she merely denied and stated that she did not state these fact to police. However, according to Devendra Kumar (P.W.14), the Investigating Officer, he recorded the statements of the prosecutrix as given to him. Therefore, even on the point of taking jewelery and cash, the prosecutrix has changed her story from one given in the statement (Ex.D-5), to one given in the court. Hence, she is not a creditworthy witness. It would, indeed, be highly dangerous to convict the appellants on the basis of her testimony. 15. It is true that in the case of rape, generally the court need not look for corroboration of the testimony of prosecutrix. But, the court should look for corroboration when it finds the testimony of prosecutrix doubtful. As narrated above, this court does not find the prosecutrix of sterling worth. Therefore, it is necessary to look at the medical evidence to see, if her testimony finds any corroboration from the medical evidence. According to Dr. Mahesh Sharma (P.W.1), the hymen of the prosecutrix was torn long ago. Moreover, she was habitual to sexual intercourse. Further, despite the fact that the prosecutrix claimed that she was ravished by two men, there was not a single injury on her private parts, or on any other part of her body. Therefore, the medical evidence does not prove the commission of rape. Moreover, lack of injuries, old torn hymen, being habitual to sexual intercourse, these facts strengthen the case of elopement, and weaken the case of the prosecution. The story given by the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence. 16. For the reasons stated above, this appeal is allowed, and the judgment dated 22-3-2006 is, hereby quashed and set aside. The appellants, namely (1) Bhura Angrej @ Siraj Khan S/o Shri Mumtaj Khan, and (2) Sethi @ Mohammed Sharif S/o Shri Mohammed Shaukin, who are behind the bars, shall be set at liberty forthwith, if not wanted in any other criminal case.