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2011 DIGILAW 466 (AP)

Karusala Nageswara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Secretary, Industries & Commerce (M. II) Department, Secretariat

2011-06-28

C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY

body2011
Judgment At the interlocutory stage, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. This writ petition pertains to a dispute with regard to grant of Prospecting Licence (PL) in favour of respondent No.4 by respondent No.1 to the extent of Hc.2.585 of land in Survey No.58 of Budawada Village, Chimakurthy Mandal, Prakasam District. For disposal of this writ petition, a few facts need to be mentioned. One M/s.Hemanth Mines & Minerals was granted mining lease for black granite over Hc.4.000 of land in Survey No.58/P of Budawada Village, Cheemakurthy Mandal, Prakasam District on 03.12.1994. The said lease was terminated by respondent No.2 on 24.02.2000. The revision petition filed by M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals against the order of termination was dismissed by respondent No.1 by order, dated 03.01.2001. Aggrieved by the said order, M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals filed W.P.No.496 of 2001 and in W.P.M.P.No.580 of 2001, this Court suspended the order of termination by interim order, dated 19.01.2011. While the revision petition of M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals was pending before respondent No.1, respondent No.4 made his application for grant of PL on 05.06.2000 before respondent No.2. Following a show-cause notice issued by respondent No.2, the application of respondent No.4 was rejected on 01.03.2005 on the ground that as the termination order was suspended by this Court, which was subsisting, the application of respondent No.4 cannot be granted. A few days before the said rejection order, the petitioner filed an application on 17.02.2005 for grant of mining lease over Hc.3.000 of land in the same survey number. The petitioner also got impleaded himself in W.P.No.496 of 2001, which was eventually dismissed on 31.10.2007. While the petitioner’s application for grant of mining lease was pending, respondent No.4 has filed a revision before respondent No.1 on 16.10.2006 against order, dated 01.03.2005, rejecting his application for grant of PL. By the impugned order, dated 29.05.2009, respondent No.1 has allowed the revision petition filed by respondent No.4 and directed grant of PL in his favour to the extent of Hc.2.585 of land. Assailing this order, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. By the impugned order, dated 29.05.2009, respondent No.1 has allowed the revision petition filed by respondent No.4 and directed grant of PL in his favour to the extent of Hc.2.585 of land. Assailing this order, the present writ petition is filed by the petitioner. At the hearing, Sri B.Adinarayana Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, advanced the following contentions – (1) the revision petition filed by respondent No.4 under Rule 35A of the A.P.Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1966 (for short ‘the Rules’) is barred by limitation, as neither the said revision was filed within the stipulated time of 90 days nor a request was made for condonation of delay nor respondent No.1 has specifically condoned the delay in filing the revision petition; (2) after the petitioner and another agency, by name, M/s.Yak Granites Industries Private Limited, got themselves impleaded in the writ petition filed by respondent No.4, respondent No.1 held hearings, the last of which was on 08.02.2008, during which, a report was called for from respondent No.2 on the issue of the alleged overlapping of the mining areas with M/s.Yak Granites Industries Limited, that after receipt of the report, a copy of the same was not supplied to the petitioner nor a further hearing was held, that respondent No.1 has taken an affidavit from respondent No.4 surreptitiously to the effect that he will be satisfied if he is granted PL over Hcs.2.585 of land and that therefore, the order passed by respondent No.1 suffers from serious procedural illegality, apart from being in violation of principles of natural justice; (3) by the time, the impugned order was passed on 29.05.2008, the Ministry was constituted, following general elections and a new Minister has taken charge and the said Minister has not held fresh personal hearing before the revision was disposed of; and (4) the mining lease having already been granted in favour of M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals, which presupposes availability of mineral, there is absolutely no need for grant of PL and that respondent No.1 has completely overlooked this aspect even though it was specifically raised before it by the petitioner. Opposing these contentions, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Mines & Geology representing respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri V.L.N.G.K.Murthy, learned counsel for respondent No.4, submitted that the Rules do not prescribe any stipulation for filing a separate application for condonation of delay. Opposing these contentions, the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Mines & Geology representing respondent Nos.1 to 3 and Sri V.L.N.G.K.Murthy, learned counsel for respondent No.4, submitted that the Rules do not prescribe any stipulation for filing a separate application for condonation of delay. The learned counsel for respondent No.4 drew my attention to column No.7 of Form-J filed by his client, wherein it is indicated that the revision is filed with a delay of one year and that the reasons are mentioned in the grounds of revision. The learned counsel relied on the grounds of revision and submitted that even though no specific request was made for condonation of delay, the purport of the grounds of revision indicates that all those facts were mentioned with a view to seek condonation of delay. The learned counsel further submitted that even assuming that technically respondent No.1 was not justified in passing the order on merits without condoning the delay, the very rejection of respondent No.4’s application by respondent No.2 being patently illegal, if the order of respondent No.1 is set aside, that would result in revival of a patently illegal order. I have carefully considered the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. As regards the first submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, I find merit therein. Rule 35-A of the Rules prescribes filing of revision within 90 days of passing of the order. Under proviso to Rule 35-C, if the revisional authority is satisfied that the petitioner had made out sufficient cause for not filing the revision within the specified time, it can entertain the same by condoning the delay and dispose of the revision. As noted above, even though column No.7 of Form-J referred to delay of one year and with the further statement that the reasons for such delay were mentioned in the grounds of revision, no specific reasons were given, except the plea that respondent No.4 shifted his family from Nellore to Bangalore and that the order under revision passed by respondent No.2 was not served on him. On its part, respondent No.1 also failed to address this aspect even though the petitioner has raised specific objection, which was religiously incorporated by respondent No.1 in paragraph-18 of the impugned order. On its part, respondent No.1 also failed to address this aspect even though the petitioner has raised specific objection, which was religiously incorporated by respondent No.1 in paragraph-18 of the impugned order. Therefore, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent No.1 has committed a procedural illegality in disposing of the revision on merits before condoning the delay occurred in filing the revision petition by respondent No.4. I also find merit in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that having called for a report from the Director of Mines & Geology in the hearing held on 08.02.2008, as evident from paragraph-13 of the impugned order, the same was not put to any of the objectors, including the petitioner. None of the respondents have denied the plea of the petitioner that no opportunity was given to the petitioner before respondent No.4’s affidavit stating that he will be satisfied with the grant of lease over Hc.2.585 was accepted and acted upon by respondent No.1. While contention No.3 advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is perhaps too technical, which need not be considered having regard to the finding rendered on contention Nos.1 and 2. Contention No.4 of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the very purpose of filing PL application is redundant as mining lease earlier granted in favour of M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals was subsequently cancelled, need not be adjudicated on merits in the view this Court is proposing to take. In ordinary course, in the light of the findings rendered on contention Nos.1 and 2 supra, the order under revision should have been set aside. In the instant case, it cannot be disputed that the order of respondent No.2 rejecting respondent No.4’s application on 01.03.2005 on the ground that the order terminating the lease in favour of M/s.Hemanth Mines and Minerals was the subject matter of W.P.No.496 of 2001 and interim order, dated 19.01.2001, was subsisting, is patently unsustainable. That perhaps would have been a ground for keeping the application of respondent No.4 pending till disposal of the writ petition by this Court. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent No.4, if the order under revision is set aside that would result in revival of a patently illegal order. The admitted situation that emerges is that the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease is pending before respondent No.2. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for respondent No.4, if the order under revision is set aside that would result in revival of a patently illegal order. The admitted situation that emerges is that the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease is pending before respondent No.2. Therefore, even if the order under revision is set aside and respondent No.1 is directed to re-consider the revision petition filed by respondent No.4, the scope of the said revision being limited to the rejection of his application only on the ground of subsistence of an interim order, respondent No.1 may at the most remit the matter to respondent No.2 for fresh consideration of the application for PL filed by respondent No.4. As such, I am of the considered opinion that it would be in the interests of justice that respondent No.2 is directed to re-consider the application of respondent No.4 ignoring his earlier order of rejection made on 01.03.2005. It is also in fitness of things that the said application has to be considered simultaneously with the application of the petitioner for grant of mining lease because there are conflicting interests between the petitioner and respondent No.4 with respect to grant of mining lease/PL, along with the applications filed by others, if any, pending before respondent No.2. For the above-mentioned reasons, the writ petition is disposed of in the following terms: (1) respondent No.2 is directed to re-consider respondent No.4’s application for PL ignoring his earlier order, dated 01.03.2005, along with the petitioner’s application and other applications, if any pending, for grant of mining lease; (2) respondent No.2 shall issue notices to the petitioner, respondent No.4 and other applicants whose applications may be pending for grant of mining lease/PL, and give an opportunity of personal hearing to all the parties; and (3) respondent No.2 shall consider all the objections raised by the parties, including the objection raised by the petitioner that the application of respondent No.4 for PL itself does not lie and pass a comprehensive order, after hearing the parties; and (4) this exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.16632 of 2009 and W.V.M.P.No.3872 of 2009 are disposed of as infructuous.