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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 466 (MP)

Ramnarayan Soni v. Ajay and State of M. P.

2011-04-19

G.D.SAXENA

body2011
ORDER 1. By this petition under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the petitioner challenged the entire proceedings in connection with Criminal Complaint Case No. 329/08 pending before The Judicial Magistrate First Class, Aron District Guna (M.P.). 2. The facts, in brief as shown in the complaint filed before the Criminal Court at Aron, is that the daughter of petitioner-accused Ramnarayan, was married to Ajay Kumar Soni r/o Aron District Guna. After sometime of marriage, the relations between the couple became strained on account of illegal demand of dowry by the in-laws family. Consequently, wife Manish left her matrimonial house and lived in the house of her parents at Sihore (M.P.). Several criminal, maintenance and matrimonial proceedings initiated which are pending before the Courts. The respondent No. 1 filed the complaint dated 4th April 2008 before the Criminal Court stating that his father-in-law (i.e., the petitioner herein) who was in service of Forest Department asked him to arrange Rs. two lacs for his son-in-law's government job as he was an influential person, having sound backing. It is stated that then he demanded his share in the property from his father and got Rs. One lac and Fifty Thousand from his father. He sold out his agricultural land situated in village Vrindawan for a consideration of Rs. Fifty Five thousand and eight hundred on 18th June 2007. Thereafter, in the presence of his father, namely Shri Ambica Prasad Soni and other persons namely, Munna Lal Jain and Raghuveer Prasad Sharma, handed over Rs. Two Lacs to the accused/his father-in-law Ram Narayan Soni on 26th August 2007. On 15th November 2007, the petitioner-accused brought his daughter (wife of respondent No. 1) to her parental house for delivery of a child. It is alleged that after birth to a child, the petitioner did not send back his wife to his house. Several criminal, maintenance and matrimonial cases were filed against him and his family members in the Courts at Sihore. The accused also did not return the amount which he received for his Government service. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 filed the criminal complaint and trial is in progress against him. 3. The learned counsel on behalf of petitioner contended that the petitioner did not commit the offence as alleged in the complaint. Prima facie, no ingredients of offence under section 420 of IPC appears against petitioner. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 filed the criminal complaint and trial is in progress against him. 3. The learned counsel on behalf of petitioner contended that the petitioner did not commit the offence as alleged in the complaint. Prima facie, no ingredients of offence under section 420 of IPC appears against petitioner. The complainant had filed this complaint against him with an ulterior motive to create pressure on the petitioner and his daughter to file compromise in all criminal, matrimonial and maintenance cases, pending against him before the criminal/matrimonial Courts at Sihore. There is no cogent evidence to prove that the petitioner ever got any sum for government service of complainant. There is no chance of conviction of petitioner, therefore, in the light of the decision in the case of State of Haryana v. Chaudhari Bhajan Lal & others ( AIR 1992 SC 604 ) and the contentions put forth above, it is prayed that the petition be allowed and the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner before the Judicial Magistrate First Class Aron, be quashed. In support of the petition, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of the apex Court in the cases of State of Haryana v. Chaudhari Bhajan Lal (AIR 1992 SC (04). Reshma Bano v. State of U.P. (2008) 5 SCC 791 = 2008 AIR SCW 1998. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent No. 2/State opposed the prayer of the petitioner's counsel and contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 6. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1 and learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent No. 2/State opposed the prayer of the petitioner's counsel and contended that the petition deserves to be dismissed at the threshold. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 6. In the case of State of Haryana (supra), the Apex Court held that :- "In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelize and inflexible guidelines or rigid formula and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. 1. Where the ill legations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the, purview of section 155 (2) of the Code. 3. Where the controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR, do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. 4. Where the allegations in the FIR, do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under section 155 (2) of the Code. 5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar en-grafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking venge ace on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. (Para 108) 109. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the Court will not be justified in embarking upon an inquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinarly or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whim or caprice. 111. Reverting to the present case, the allegations made in the complaint in our considered opinion, do clearly constitute a cognizable offence justifying the registration of a case and an investigation thereon and this case does not fall under anyone of the categories of cases formulated above calling for the exercise of extraordinary or inherent powers of the High Court to quash the FIR itself. 7. In the case of Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri and Anr v. State of A.P and Anr. 7. In the case of Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri and Anr v. State of A.P and Anr. (AIR 200R SC 787), the Apex Court further held:- "The High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of any offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The people and the society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial. The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges mauls animus against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same. The High Court must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under S. 482, Cr.P.C." 8. On perusal of the photocopies of certified copies of the proceedings before the trial Magistrate, it appears that the First Additional Sessions Judge, Guna in Criminal Revision No. 319/09 vide order dated 24th April, 2009 while setting aside the order impugned directed the trial Magistrate to proceed further in compliance of the provisions contemplated under section 210 of CrPC and after considering the complaint as well as the police report shall pass the appropriate order for trial in complaint case. At present, the criminal case is pending on consideration of police report. On perusal of the complaint filed by the respondent No. 1, it appears that the learned Magistrate has already proceeded with trial. Hence, the facts of BhajanLal' case and Sanapareddy's case (supra) are not applicable to the present case. 9. Needless to say, in a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called for only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious or oppressive but where the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under section 482 of CrPC. On perusal of the facts of the present case and on consideration of the allegations in specific against the petitioner-accused disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, this Court finds no merit in the petition. However, looking to the delay in disposal of the criminal complaint case, it is directed that the trial Magistrate shall conclude the trial as per law within a period of one year from the date of the order of this Court. 10. However, looking to the delay in disposal of the criminal complaint case, it is directed that the trial Magistrate shall conclude the trial as per law within a period of one year from the date of the order of this Court. 10. Consequently, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed with above directions.