Judgment :- THE CHIEF JUSTICE & T.S.SIVAGNANAM, J. 1. This contempt petition has been filed to punish the first respondent Mr.S.Srinivasan, for having committed comtempt of Court for willfully disobeying the order and direction issued by this Court in W.A.No.1031 of 2004, dated 30.04.2004. 2. The writ appeal was filed by the first respondent, contemnor and M/s.Kilburn Electrical Limited against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.14028 of 2002, dated 23.12.2003, wherein a direction was issued to the respondents 2 to 4 therein including the first respondent/first contemnor, to implement the award of the Industrial Tribunal in complaint No.17 of 1999, dated 9.08.2001. The writ petitioner was Macneil and Magor Kilburn Group Companies Employees Union, represented by its Secretary. The petitioner in this contempt petition is the Secretary of the said employees Union. 3. Before we examine the issue relating to the disobedience alleged in this petition, it would be necessary to taken note of certain facts, which led to the present situation. 4. A complaint was filed under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (I.D. Act) by the M/s.Macneil and Magor Kilburn Group Companies Employees Union against the Macneil and Magor Ltd., Kuilburn Electrical Ltd., Kilburn Control Systems Ltd., Kilburn Starters Ltd., and Kilburn Fabrication Ltd. In the said industrial dispute, the issue relating to transfer of undertaking of its employees from Macneil and Magor Ltd., to the other four companies was referred for adjudication. In the complaint, the employees Union contended that during the pendency of the dispute, the management of the other four companies altered the service conditions of the employees without obtaining prior permission from the Industrial Tribunal. From June 1991 to 16th August 1992 except for 75 employees, the four companies denied employment to 134 employees. On a dispute raised by the Union, they agreed to provide employment with effect from 17.08.1992 for 15 days work every month. Once again, there was denial of employment without permission from the Tribunal to all the 209 employees. Subsequently, a settlement was arrived at on 07.02.1994 and another settlement on 24.03.2005 and the management agreed to provide employment for six days a week, however both the settlements were not implemented. The sum and substance of the allegations is that the four companies violated the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act and deprived the workmen work and wages. The sum and substance of the allegations is that the four companies violated the provisions of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act and deprived the workmen work and wages. It is further stated that this Court in W.P.No.12987 of 1991, filed by the Union passed an interim order on 13.03.1992, directing the first respondent herein who was managing the companies to pay the employees contribution to the Provident Fund Department into a separate account pending disposal of the writ petition. The first respondent did not comply with the order and the respondent antedated a notice dated 31.10.1999, on the companys notice board at Ambattur Factory on 08.11.1999, informing the suspension of operations of Kilburn Starters Ltd., with effect from 1.11.1999. Further allegation is that the respondent was moving the employees from one unit to another and one location to another to evade liability. Therefore, it was contended that the action of the four companies is an unfair labour practice and amounts to victimization. Further, it was stated that the respondent denied settlement benefits like uniforms, shoes, spectacles, etc. Therefore, a prayer was made before the Industrial Tribunal to hold that the action of the respondent laying of and suspending operation and declaring lock out of the units as illegal and in contravention to Section 33 of the I.D. Act and to direct the four companies to pay the employees arrears of backwages and lay off compensation etc. 5. Before the Tribunal, Kilburn Electrical Limited and Kilburn Starters Ltd., the respondents 2 & 4 before the Tribunal filed counter affidavit. It is contended that the first respondent herein, Mr.S.Srinivasan acted as per the instructions of the Macneil and Magor Ltd., who are lawful owners and employers including himself and denied that he could be the management. It is further stated that the first respondent herein sought for retirement from Macneil and Magor Ltd., and he as well as other senior executives were all placed as Directors of Macneil and Magor Ltd., ceased to be Directors in the said companies. 6. The fourth respondent company before the Tribunal, denied the allegations made by the Union and contended that the first respondent herein Mr.S.Srinivasan ceased to be Managing Director of Kilburn Electrical Ltd., on 28.12.1999, when his period of appointment ended and therefore, it was contended that he cannot be held responsible and prayed for dismissal of the complaint. 7. 6. The fourth respondent company before the Tribunal, denied the allegations made by the Union and contended that the first respondent herein Mr.S.Srinivasan ceased to be Managing Director of Kilburn Electrical Ltd., on 28.12.1999, when his period of appointment ended and therefore, it was contended that he cannot be held responsible and prayed for dismissal of the complaint. 7. Before the Tribunal, the Secretary examined himself on behalf of the workmen and 32 documents were marked and the first respondent/first contemnor was examined as MW-1 and three documents were marked. The Tribunal by award dated 09.08.2001, held that the action of the four companies, referred above in laying off/suspending operations, declaring lock out are illegal and the four companies were directed to reinstate the workers with effect from 02.11.1999 and pay backwages. 8. The petitioner Union filed a writ petition in W.P.No.14028 of 2002, to implement the award of the Tribunal dated 09.08.2001. The said writ petition was disposed of on 23.12.2003, observing that since the award has not been questioned by the respondents, more particularly, the respondents 2 to 6 therein, and the sixth respondent therein, the first respondent herein Mr.S.Srinivasan, the awards need to be implemented and issued a direction as prayed for in the writ petition excluding 43 employees, whose names were mentioned in an additional affidavit filed in the writ petition and granted two months time for compliance of the direction. As against the order and direction issued in W.P.No.14028 of 2002, the first respondent/first contemnor and Kilburn Electrical Ltd, filed W.A.No.1031 of 2002. The Division Bench, by order dated 30.04.2006, dismissed the appeal. At this stage, we may quote the operative portion of the order and direction issued by the Division Bench:- 7. The only point urged before us, by the learned counsel for the appellants is, that the appellants were never a party to the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and in this view, directing them to comply with the terms of the award, is not maintainable. The first appellant is a party to the award in complaint No.17/99, and therefore, the direction issued cannot be questioned. As for as the second appellant is concerned, he was not shown as a respondent either in complaint No.17/99 or in I.D.No.108/93. But, the fact remains, as the Managing Director, he alone represented respondents 2 to 5 in I.D.No.108/93, as well as in complaint No.17/99. As for as the second appellant is concerned, he was not shown as a respondent either in complaint No.17/99 or in I.D.No.108/93. But, the fact remains, as the Managing Director, he alone represented respondents 2 to 5 in I.D.No.108/93, as well as in complaint No.17/99. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents, in I.D.No.108/93, he had admitted that he was filing the counter statement, in his capacity as one of the Directors of the said company. It is further conceded by Mr.Srinivasan that he ceased to be the Managing Director of Kilburn Electricals Limited as on 28.12.1999, when his period of appointment ended, thereby showing, admittedly, on the date of violation of Section 33 of the Act, he was the Managing Director. When the employees Union had filed W.P.No.1411/2003, to pass an order on the complaints under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, a direction was given by this Court to the Government, to consider the petitioners representation and in pursuance of the said order, a G.O. was passed for non implementation of the award and settlement, holding Srinivasan is a person concerned as per the Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 8. Section 32 of the Act fixes the responsibility, if any offence is committed by company. Under this provision, every Director shall be responsible, subject to other conditions. As aforementioned and even as admitted by Srinivasan, the second appellant, he was the Managing Director of respondents 2 to 4 companies, and in that capacity alone, he entered into the settlement under Section 12(3) of the Act, agreeing to abide by the decision of the Industrial Tribunal in I.D.No.108/93. The award in I.D.No.108/93 was pronounced on 26.11.1999, which came into force with effect from 28.05.2000. In view of these admitted facts, despite Mr.Srinivasan has not been shown as party by name, he is responsible as contemplated under Section 32 of the Act, and he is bound by the award. Ass the workers in this writ appeal are concerned in dispute, in I.D.No.108/93, and the action of Srinivasan, in not taking prior permission from the Tribunal when I.D.108/93 was pending and for the violation committed, the workers are entitled to the full relief, for which purpose complaint No.17/99 was filed. Ass the workers in this writ appeal are concerned in dispute, in I.D.No.108/93, and the action of Srinivasan, in not taking prior permission from the Tribunal when I.D.108/93 was pending and for the violation committed, the workers are entitled to the full relief, for which purpose complaint No.17/99 was filed. In the light of the above discussion, the appellants could not escape from their liability, under the guise, they are not parties to the award. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the cae, considering the status of the second appellant, a direction was issued by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.14028/2002, to implement the orders, in which we are unable to find any error of law or any other reason to interfere. In the light of the above observation, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.P.Nos.1863 & 1864 of 2004 are closed. 9. The present contempt petition has been filed, alleging disobedience of the order passed by the Division Bench on 30.04.2004. It is contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that the award was not challenged and a direction was issued by the learned Single Judge of this Court, to implement the award and the first respondent/first contemnor and Kilburn Electrical Ltd., filed Writ appeal, which was dismissed by the Division Bench and the Special Leave Petition filed by the first respondent herein in S.L.P.(C).No.9187 of 2004, which was filed along with petition to condone the delay was withdrawn and the award having become final, the first respondent is liable to be punished for committing contempt. 10. The first respondent/first contemnor in his counter affidavit has stated that he has been made a scapegoat because of the reason that he was the Managing Director of Kilburn Electricals Ltd., and he is a victim as M/s.Macneill and Magor Ltd., abandoned the workmen, and it is a Kolkatta based Company and since the first respondent is residing at Chennai, he has become an easy target and has been suffering and facing many difficulties. 11. 11. It is further submitted that the Contempt Petition is not maintainable either against the first respondent/first contemnor or against others, who have been impleaded, as the parent Company was segregated, which was impleaded as the first respondent in W.A.No.1031 of 2004, W.P.No.14028 of 2002 and in the award in Complaint No.17 of 1999 and the parent company has not been made a party in this Contempt Petition. 12. It is further submitted that as per the directions given by a Division Bench of this Court, the award has to be implemented by the Macneill and Magor Ltd., Further, in the counter affidavit, the first respondent has stated that he was the Vice President of one of the factories at Kolkatta and another factory at Ayanavaram and he cannot be penalised by filing this Contempt Petition. 13. Further, it is contended that the violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, as alleged, would not arise due to certain facts, which have been set down in Paragraph No.25 of the counter affidavit. It is further submitted that the first respondent was placed as a Non-Executive Director in the said Company and was not required to manage the affairs of the Company and the other Executives of M/s.Macneill and Magor Ltd., placed them as a whole time Directors, who were managing its operations. Therefore, the first respondent/first contemnor contended that the Contempt Petition is not maintainable and may be dismissed. 14. The first respondent/first contemnor also filed a separate counter affidavit on behalf of the Kilburn Electricals Ltd., which was impleaded as the second respondent in Sub Application No.269 of 2006. After denying the allegations made in the Contempt Petition, it is stated that no workman was employed by Kilburn Electricals Ltd., and there is no direction to reinstate any workman listed in the award passed in Complaint No.17 of 1999, under the said respondent and it deserves to be discharged from the proceedings. 15. The Contempt proceedings initially came for admission before the First Bench on 22.03.2006 and notice was issued to the first respondent to show cause as to why they should not be proceeded under the Contempt of Courts Act for not complying with the judgment passed in W.A.No.1031 of 2004. Subsequently, the matter was adjourned on several occasions. 15. The Contempt proceedings initially came for admission before the First Bench on 22.03.2006 and notice was issued to the first respondent to show cause as to why they should not be proceeded under the Contempt of Courts Act for not complying with the judgment passed in W.A.No.1031 of 2004. Subsequently, the matter was adjourned on several occasions. When this matter came up before this Bench on 17.02.2011, this Court passed the following order:- "It appears that the matter is pending since 2006 and several adjournments to have been allowed at the instance of the respondent. Today too, a prayer is made to adjourn the case to 21.02.2011. Put up this case on 21.02.2011. If on that said date, the respondent does not appear, this matter will be heard" 16. Pursuant thereto, the first respondent appears to have realised the seriousness and consequences which may follow filed affidavits. At this stage, it would be relevant to refer to the order passed by this Bench on 03.08.2011, which reads as follows:- "This Court on 06th July, 2011, prima facie came up to the conclusion that the case of contempt has been made out against the respondent. Hence, notice was issued to the respondent to show cause as to why appropriate order may not be passed for committing contempt of Court. No show cause has been filed. But, on the contrary, learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that he wants to file affidavit and additional documents to show that the award is not binding on the respondent. We reject such a submission made by the learned counsel. It is pertinent to note the SLP filed by the respondent was withdrawn at his instance, and thus, the award has attained its finality. Learned Counsel appearing for the respondent prays for only one indulgence to enable the respondent to file show cause. The prayer is allowed, subject to the condition that the respondent shall disclose all his assets, both movable and immovable acquired after he became the Managing Director/Director of all the four Companies. Learned counsel shall also furnish the list of properties, both movable and immovable, standing in the name of his wife and children. Adjourned by two weeks. The Contemnor is directed to be present in Court on the adjourned date." 17. Learned counsel shall also furnish the list of properties, both movable and immovable, standing in the name of his wife and children. Adjourned by two weeks. The Contemnor is directed to be present in Court on the adjourned date." 17. On 22.11.2011, we have finally heard the learned counsel for the parties and the first respondent/first Contemnor was also present in Court. 18. The short issue which falls for consideration is as to whether the first respondent herein is liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of the order and direction issued by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.1031 of 2004 dated 30.04.2004. 19. As noticed above, the first respondent/first Contemnor and Kilburn Electricals Ltd., filed a Writ Appeal against the order and direction issued in W.P.No.14028 of 2002, wherein the Learned Single Judge, directed the implementation of the award of the Industrial Tribunal passed in Complaint No.17 of 1999. Before the Division Bench, the first respondent/first Contemnor raised an issue stating that he was not a party to the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and therefore, directing him to comply with the terms of the award is not tenable. This contention was rejected by the Division Bench, holding that the first respondent/first Contemnor alone represented the parties in I.D.No.108 of 1993, as well as in Complaint No.17 of 1999, he filed a counter statement in his capacity as the Director of the Company and admittedly, on the date of violation of Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act, he was the Managing Director. Further, the Division Bench held that in view of the admitted facts, despite, the first respondent/first Contemnor having not been shown as party by name, he is responsible, as contemplated under Section 32 of the Act and he is bound by the award. At this stage, it would be useful to refer to the findings rendered by the Division Bench, while dismissing the Writ Appeal :- "The only point urged before us, by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the appellants were never a party to the award passed by the Industrial Tribunal and in this view, directing them to comply with the terms of the award, is not maintainable. The first appellant is a party to the award in Complaint No.17 of 1999, and therefore, the direction issued cannot be questioned. The first appellant is a party to the award in Complaint No.17 of 1999, and therefore, the direction issued cannot be questioned. As far as the second appellant is concerned, he was not shown as a respondent either in Complaint No.17 of 1999 or in I.D.No.108 of 1993. But, the facts remains, as the Managing Director, he alone represented respondents 2 to 5 in I.D.No.108 of 1993, as well as in Complaint No.17 of 1999. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents in I.D.No.108 of 1993, he had admitted that he filing the counter statement, in his capacity as one of the Directors of the said Company. It is further conceded by Mr.Srinivasan, that he ceased to be the Managing Director, of K. as on 28.12.1999, when his period of appointment ended, thereby showing admittedly, on the date of violation of Section 33 of the Act, he was the Managing Director when the employees Union had filed W.P.No.1411of 2003, to pass an order on the complaints under Section 29 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, a direction was given by this Court to the Government, to consider the petitioners representation and in pursuance of the said order, a G.O. was passed for non implementation of the award and settlement, holding Srinivasan is a person concerned as per the Section 32 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 32 of the Act fixes the responsibility, if any offence is committed by Company. Under this provision, every Director shall be responsible, subject to other conditions. As aforementioned and even as admitted by Srinivasan, the second appellant, he was the Managing Director of respondents 2 to 4, companies, and in that capacity alone, he entered into the settlement under Section 12( 3) of the Act, agreeing to abide by the decision of the Industrial Tribunal in I.D.No.108 of 1993. The award in I.D.No.108 of 1993 was pronounced on 26.11.1999, which came into force with effect from 28.05.2000. In view of these admitted facts, despite Mr.Srinivasan, has not been shown as party by name, he is responsible as contemplated under Section 32 of the Act, and he is bound by the award. The award in I.D.No.108 of 1993 was pronounced on 26.11.1999, which came into force with effect from 28.05.2000. In view of these admitted facts, despite Mr.Srinivasan, has not been shown as party by name, he is responsible as contemplated under Section 32 of the Act, and he is bound by the award. All the workers in this Writ Appeal are concerned in dispute, in I.D.No.108 of 1993, and the action of Srinivasan, in not taking prior permission from the Tribunal when I.D.No.108 of 1993, was pending and for the violation committed, the workers are entitled to the full relief, for which purpose Complaint No.17 of 1999, was filed. In the light of the above discussion, the appellants could not escape from their liability, under the guise they are not parties to the award. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, considering the status of the second appellant, a direction was issued by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.14028 of 2002, to implement the orders, in which we are unable to find any error of law or any other reason to interfere. In the light of the above observation, we find no merit in the appeal and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, connected W.A.M.P.No.1863 and 1864 of 2002, are closed." 20. Thereafter, the first respondent/first Contemnor filed a Special Leave Petition against the above order of the Division Bench, which was subsequently, withdrawn. Thus, the entire matter attained finality and the first respondent/first contemnor was fully bound by order and direction issued by the Division Bench. In fact, we have noticed these facts while passing order dated 03.08.2011, which has been quoted hereinabove. In the said order, we have also rejected the contention raised by the first respondent/first contemnor that the award is not binding on the respondent. Yet again, the first respondent/first contemnor, while showing cause to the contempt notice issued, has filed counter affidavit virtually reiterating the same stand, which he had taken before the Division Bench. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the contention raised by the first respondent/first Contemnor is wholly untenable and liable to be outrightly rejected. 21. Yet again, the first respondent/first contemnor, while showing cause to the contempt notice issued, has filed counter affidavit virtually reiterating the same stand, which he had taken before the Division Bench. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that the contention raised by the first respondent/first Contemnor is wholly untenable and liable to be outrightly rejected. 21. By order dated 03.08.2011, we had directed the first respondent/first Contemnor to disclose all his assets, both movable and immovable acquired after he became the Managing Director/Director of all the four Companies and also to furnish the list of properties, both movable and immovable, standing in the name of his wife and children. 22. In compliance with the said direction, the first respondent/first Contemnor, his wife and children have filed affidavits. In the affidavits filed by the first respondent/first Contemnor, he has stated that he held interest in a landed property, being his ancestral house situate at Visweswarapuram Street, Mylapore, Chennai and he is no longer the owner of the property as on date, and the said property was originally purchased by his father and during the year 1976, his brothers relinquished their shares in the property in favour of the first respondent/first Contemnor for due consideration and registered a release deed dated 29.09.1986 and subsequently, a deed of partition was executed in the year 1998. Further, it is stated that he has not acquired any immovable property, after he became the Managing Director/Director of the said Companies. In the affidavit, he has also stated about his investments in the Companies. 23. The petitioners children have also claimed to hold a share in the said property, pursuant to a partition deed. The petitioner filed an affidavit on 08.09.2011, objecting to the plea raised by the first respondent/first Contemnor and his children inter allia contending that the attitude of the first respondent/first contemnor would go to show that he is traversing into the merits of the matter that have been already decided and he is making inconsistent and contradictory statements. 24. The petitioner filed an affidavit on 08.09.2011, objecting to the plea raised by the first respondent/first Contemnor and his children inter allia contending that the attitude of the first respondent/first contemnor would go to show that he is traversing into the merits of the matter that have been already decided and he is making inconsistent and contradictory statements. 24. So far as the property is concerned, it has been stated in Paragraph Nos.12 to 14, that the nomenclature of Hindu Undivided Family given to the said property is nothing but a shelter created by the first respondent/first Contemnor, for the purpose of escaping from the contempt proceedings and the partition deed executed during the year 1998, in order to evade from recovery proceedings. Further, it is stated that the Court must pierce the veil and see the exact reasons for transfer of the property. It is stated that when the Employees Provident Fund Authorities raised a demand, the first respondent/first Contemnor did not comply with the same, inspite of an interim direction issued by this Court in Writ Petition and therefore, he was arrested and detained in prison. It is further stated that the first respondent made a statement stating, as if, 56 acres of land belonged to the Company, which is situate at No.374, Kannur, High Road, Chennai - 600 012, and it is stated that on enquiry, the petitioner reliably understand that it belongs to a Trust and the Trust has given a letter to the Collector of Madras, that the property should not be attached under the revenue recovery proceedings, as the property does not belong to the first respondent/first Contemnor. Further in paragraph No.28, the petitioner has listed out various cases pending between the parties. 25. Having assessed the attitude of the first respondent/first Contemnor, it appears that the first respondent/first Contemnor does not have any respect for any of the orders passed by this Court and he has been a compulsive litigant by taking inconsistent stand before various Forums and making a mockery of judicial orders. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the first respondent/first Contemnor should be dealt with a firm hand. 26. Therefore, we are of the firm view that the first respondent/first Contemnor should be dealt with a firm hand. 26. It is brought to our notice that earlier the first respondent/first contemnor was detained in civil prison for flouting the orders passed by this Court in matter arising out under the Employees Provident Fund Act and there is an allegation that the interim order were obtained in Writ Petition, as if, the Company owned about 56 acres of land, which according to the petitioner is a false statement. However, at present, we need not traverse into these facts. 27. A faint attempt has been made by the petitioner to deny such allegations by way of an affidavit dated 27.09.2009. However, as we have already held that the award is binding on the first respondent/first Contemnor and his objections raised were already rejected. We therefore hold the first respondent/first Contemnor guilty of having committed contempt in not complying with the order and direction issued by this Court in Writ Petition, which was confirmed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.1031 of 2004 dated 30.04.2004. 28. In Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper Construction Co.(P) Ltd., [ (1996) 4 SCC 622 ], where a company was charged of committing deliberate disobedience of the orders of the Supreme Court, the Honble Supreme Court observed that the concept of corporate entity was evolved to encourage and promote trade, but not to commit illegalities or defraud people and the Court would ignore the corporate character and look at the reality behind the corporate veil so as to enable it to pass appropriate orders to do justice between the parties concerned. 29. The Honble Supreme Court in Supreme Court Bar Association vs. Union of India, [ (1998) 4 SCC 409 ], was dealing with a petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India, wherein a declaration was sought for, to declare that the Disciplinary Committees of the Bar Councils set up under the Advocates Act, alone have exclusive jurisdiction to inquire and suspend or debar an advocate from practising law and to further declare that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction has no power or authority in that regard. While considering the various legal issues raised in the said petition, the Honble Supreme Court after analyzing the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act summarised the recognised and accepted punishments for civil or criminal contempt of Court in English law, which have been followed and accepted by the courts in this country and incorporated in the Indian law and their Lordships held as follows:- 33. Thus, the recognised and accepted punishments for civil or criminal contempt of court in English law, which have been followed and accepted by the courts in this country and incorporated in the Indian law insofar as, civil contempt, is concerned are: (i)sequestration of assets; (ii)fine; (iii)committal to prison. 34. The object of punishment being both curative and corrective, these coercions are meant to assist an individual complainant to enforce his remedy and there is also an element of public policy for punishing civil contempt, since the administration of justice would be undermined if the order of any court of law is to be disregarded with impunity. Under some circumstances, compliance of the order may be secured without resort to coercion, through the contempt power. For example, disobedience of an order to pay a sum of money may be effectively countered by attaching the earnings of the contemner. In the same manner, committing the person of the defaulter to prison for failure to comply with an order of specific performance of conveyance of property, may be met also by the court directing that the conveyance be completed by an appointed person. Disobedience of an undertaking may in the like manner be enforced through process other than committal to prison as for example where the breach of undertaking is to deliver possession of property in a landlord-tenant dispute. Apart from punishing the contemner, the court to maintain the majesty of law may direct the police force to be utilised for recovery of possession and burden the contemner with costs, exemplary or otherwise. 35. Insofar as criminal contempt of court is concerned, which charge is required to be established like a criminal charge, it is punishable by’ (i) fine; or (ii) by fixed period of simple imprisonment or detention in a civil prison for a specified period; or (iii) both. 36. 35. Insofar as criminal contempt of court is concerned, which charge is required to be established like a criminal charge, it is punishable by’ (i) fine; or (ii) by fixed period of simple imprisonment or detention in a civil prison for a specified period; or (iii) both. 36. In deciding whether a contempt is serious enough to merit imprisonment, the court will take into account the likelihood of interference with the administration of justice and the culpability of the offender. The intention with which the act complained of is done is a material factor in determining what punishment, in a given case, would be appropriate. 37. The nature and types of punishment which a court of record can impose in a case of established contempt under the common law have now been specifically incorporated in the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 insofar as the High Courts are concerned and therefore to the extent the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 identifies the nature or types of punishments which can be awarded in the case of established contempt, it does not impinge upon the inherent powers of the High Court under Article 215 either. No new type of punishment can be created or assumed. 30. In Chhotu Ram vs. Urvashi Gulati, [ (2001) 7 SCC 530 ], while examining the objection of introduction of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, it has been held that it is for the purpose of securing a feeling of confidence of the people in general and for due and proper administration of justice in the country. 31. In Union of India vs. Subedar Devassy PV, [ (2006) 1 SCC 613 ], the Honble Supreme Court held that in a contempt petition, the Court cannot traverse beyond the order and it cannot test the correctness or otherwise of the order or give additional direction or delete any direction and that would be exercising review jurisdiction and the same is impermissible and indefensible. 32. 32. In Anil Kumar Shahi (2) vs. Prof.Ram Sevak Yadav and Others, [ (2008) 4 SCC 115 ], the Honble Supreme Court held that under the Contempt Courts Act, 1971 and under Article 129 of the Constitution of India, if it is alleged that a person has willfully violated its order, the Court can invoke its jurisdiction under the Act, whether the allegation is true or not and it is found to be true punish the offenders for having committed civil contempt and if need be can pass consequential orders for enforcement of execution of the order, as the case may be for violation of which, the proceeding for contempt was initiated. 33. As held by the Honble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments, the object of punishment in a contempt proceedings is both curative and corrective and the accepted punishments for civil contempt are securing sequestration of assets, fine and committal to prison. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal had already pierced the corporate veil and held respondent to be fully responsible. In the Writ appeal, the first respondent once again re-agitated the issue and the Division Bench rejected his contention and held him responsible for complying with the award and accordingly confirmed the direction issued in the writ petition to implement the award. 34. After we have heard the respondents elaborately on earlier occasions, we have also rejected the contention raised by the respondent by passing an order on 03.08.2007, quoted herein before. Therefore taking note of the conduct of the first respondent under normal circumstances, any Court would feel convinced that the appropriate punishment is to commit the first respondent to civil prison. However in our view, such order would not meet the ends of justice, moreso, when the employees are languishing without employment or wages and it is stated that some employees have died during the pendency of the litigation, which has been pending for over 20 years. Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the property in "Kumara Vilas", Old No.21, New No.15, Visweswarapuram St, Mylapore, Chennai, shall stand attached and be sold by way of public auction for the purpose of recovery of dues payable to the employees, who are represented by the petitioner Union. Therefore, we deem it appropriate that the property in "Kumara Vilas", Old No.21, New No.15, Visweswarapuram St, Mylapore, Chennai, shall stand attached and be sold by way of public auction for the purpose of recovery of dues payable to the employees, who are represented by the petitioner Union. Since the children of the 1st respondent/1stContemnor have also filed affidavits before this Court and are aware of the proceedings, we hold that the transaction done during the year 1998, whereby, the 1strespondent/1stContemnor relinquished his share in the property, as a sham transaction with a view to escape from any recovery proceedings, which may initiated against him while enforcing the award. Therefore, we reject the contention raised in the affidavits filed by the parties, and hold that the said property is the property of the 1st respondent/ 1st Contemnor and liable for attachment and sale. 35. In the result, the first respondent/first Contemnor is held guilty of having committed contempt of Court and willfully disobeying the judgment rendered in W.A.No.1031 of 2004. The property in "Kumara Vilas", Old No.21, New No.15, Visweswarapuram Street, Mylapore, Chennai, shall be sold by the Industrial Tribunal, who is the seventh respondent in the Writ Petition, by public auction and shall call for offers. The children of the first respondent/first Contemnor as well as the first respondent/first Contemnor and his wife, who have all filed affidavits shall vacate the premises and hand over vacant possession to the Officer nominated by the Industrial Tribunal within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 36. After taking possession of the property, the Industrial Tribunal shall advertise by way of public auction and bring the property for sale. The sale proceeds shall be remitted to the credit of Complaint No.17 of 1999 and after appropriate application is filed by the petitioner-Union, the Industrial Tribunal shall pass necessary orders for disbursement of the said amount to the workmen in accordance with law. 37. The sale proceeds shall be remitted to the credit of Complaint No.17 of 1999 and after appropriate application is filed by the petitioner-Union, the Industrial Tribunal shall pass necessary orders for disbursement of the said amount to the workmen in accordance with law. 37. As we have held that the first respondent/first Contemnor is guilty of contempt, we impose a fine of Rs.5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs only) on the respondent/Contemnor and he shall pay the same to the credit of Complaint No.17 of 1999 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, which shall be utilised for the settlement of the workers dues in addition to the sale proceeds realised by selling the property mentioned above.