Ammanpalayam Sree Mariamman Devasthana Trust Rep. by its President, A. E. Shanmugam v. Arulmigu Sree Mariamman Thirukoil, Ammanpalayam, Paruvachi, Rep. by its Hereditary Trust
2011-11-30
K.VENKATARAMAN
body2011
DigiLaw.ai
Judgment 1. The First Defendant in O.S.No.45 Of 2010 before the learned Principal District Munsit, Bhavani aggrieved over the order of dismissal of its Application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has filed the present Civil Revision Petition. 2. The Respondents herein are the Plaintiffs in the said Suit. They have laid the said Suit against the Petitioner and few others for declaration that they alone are entitled to manage, administer and conduct festival of the Suit temple as lawful trustees and for other incidental reliefs. 3. In the said Suit, the Petitioner has filed an Application under Order7, Rule 11, for rejecting the Plaint on the ground that (i) As per Section 63(b) of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act,1959 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’), the question of hereditary trustee can be decided only by the Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner under the Act and not by a Civil Court, (ii) for deciding the nature of administration of the temple Suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act, and (iii) the Suit could be laid only before a Subordinate Court where the temple is situated as defined under Section 6(7) of the Act. 4. On the other hand, the Respondents contended that (a) no ingredients as per Order 7, Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure is found in the Application preferred by the Petitioner, (b) The subject matter in the present Suit is in respect of management of the temple which is Civil in nature and hence the Suit is perfectly maintainable before the Court where it has been laid, and (c) the dispute is between two private parties and the temple is also a private property and hence the Act would not apply and the Civil Court has got jurisdiction to decide the same. 5. As stated already, after considering the rival submissions made by the parties, the Application filed by the Petitioner under Order 7, Rule 11, was dismissed by the learned Trial Judge and the present Revision is directed against the said order. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner strenuously contended that the filing of the Suit by the Respondents before the Civil Court is not maintainable and the remedy to the Respondents lies only before the authorities under the Act.
6. The learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner strenuously contended that the filing of the Suit by the Respondents before the Civil Court is not maintainable and the remedy to the Respondents lies only before the authorities under the Act. He would further add that in view of the embargo made under Section 6(7) of the Act, even if the Suit has to be laid by the Respondents the same has to be laid only before the Subordinate Court and not before the District Munsif Court. He would further contend that the Suit is barred under Section 108 of the Act. 7. On the other hand, Mr. D. Pradeep Kumar learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents would contend that the dispute is between private parties and hence there is nothing wrong in adjudicating the matter before the Civil Court. He would further add that the Act has no play in the matter. Relying on the decisions reported in S. Rangayya Goundar v. Karuppa Naickrer, 1971 (1) MLJ 358 ; Sri Venkataramanaswamy Deity v. Vadugammal, 1974 (1) MLJ 431 ; and Estate of B. Kanniah Naidu and Varsdammal, etc. v. P.G. Kuppan, 2006 (4) CTC 237 ; 2006 (3) LW 484 , the learned Counsel contended that the issues raised by the Petitioner is a farce and hence, the same has been rightly considered by the learned Trial Judge and dismissed the Application filed under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. 8. I have carefully considered the Submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents. 9. The Suit has been filed by one Arulmigu Sree Mariamman Thirukoil, Ammanpalalyam, Paruvachi represented by its Hereditary Trustees. Mr. Sitha Gounder and three others against Ammanpalayam Sree Mariamman Devasthana Trust represented by its President Mr. A.E. Shanmugam and few others. The Revenue Divisional Officer, Gobiehetipalayam and the Tahsildar, Bhavani Taluk were also added as parties. The relief that has been sought for by the Respondents in the said Suit is extracted hereunder; “(a) Declaring that the Plaintiffs are alone entitle to manage administer and conduct festival of the suit Temple as Lawful Trustees. (b) Declaring that the Ammanpalayam Sree Mariamman Kovil Devasthana Trust has nothing to do with the Administration and management of the Suit Temple.
(b) Declaring that the Ammanpalayam Sree Mariamman Kovil Devasthana Trust has nothing to do with the Administration and management of the Suit Temple. (c) Granting a permanent injunction restraining the Defendants 2 to 14 from interfering with the Plaintiff’s management, administration of the suit Temple and conducting festival, other religious function such as Ammasai, Pournami Poojas as ever before. (d) Restraining the Defendants 15 to 16 not to violate the caste, customs and conventions is conducting Mariamman Temple festival by the Ammpalayam Vanniyar Kula Khastriya through the Hereditary Trustees (Oor Gounder, Kothukkarar, Pattakkarar) as ever before. (e) Directing the Defendants 15 to 16 to comply with the promise made by them to the Plaintiff’s by handing over the locker key and steel Beero key to the Plaintiff’s.” 10. The entire pleading made in the Plaint and the relief that has been sought for by the Respondents herein shows that it is only a dispute between two private parties. In such circumstances, the Respondents herein cannot be driven to agitate the matter before the authorities mentioned in the Act. That apart, the temple is a Private Temple. 11. In fact a Written Statement has been filed on behalf of the Revenue Divisional Officer wherein it is clearly stated that the HR & CE Department had several times attempted to interfere with the suit temple administration but could not succeed due to the Suit filed in O.S. No. 18 Of 1983 challenging the order of the Department in nominating the Executive Officer for the temple. The said Suit was decreed holding that the HR & CE Department does not have the power to appoint trustees, Executive Officers, etc. 12. Thus Prima facie it has to be held that the dispute between the two parties is a Private one which do not require the interference by the Department. The dispute is between two private parties and the temple is a Private Temple and the provisions mentioned under the Act would have no play on the relief that has been sought for by the Respondents. 13. The dispute, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents Pertains to who among them are the trustees of the Temple. 14.
13. The dispute, as rightly contended by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents Pertains to who among them are the trustees of the Temple. 14. Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure contemplates that the Courts have jurisdiction to try all Suits of a Civil nature excepting Suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Thus, a litigant having a grievance of a Civil nature has a right to institute the Suit in a Civil Court unless is barred either expressly or impliedly. 15. In this connection, it would be useful to consider whether the Respondents herein could have invoked Section 63 of the Act to seek redressal before the authorities mentioned thereunder. Section 63 of the Act contemplates that a Joint Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner, as the case may be, has power to inquire or decide the dispute pertaining to (a) Whether an institution is a religious institution; (b) whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee; etc. 16. In the given case on hand, as stated already, the dispute is between two parties and the temple is also Private Temple, which findings the Trial Court has prima facie held so. Thus under Section 63 of the Act, the authorities mentioned thereunder can only decide as to the status of the office of the trusteeship, namely, whether it is a hereditary trust or not. However, he is not competent to go into the further question as to which of the competing claimants is a hereditary trustee or whether both are joint hereditary trustees. This has been held so in the decision reported in Krishnaswami Raja V. Krishna Raja, 1966 (79) LW 672 . Section 57(b) of the old Act corresponds to Section 63 of the new Act came for consideration in the said decision. It is useful to extract the observations made thereunder: “The jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner under Section 57(b) is confined to a decision whether a trustee holds or held office as a hereditary trustee. In other words, the Deputy Commissioner can only decide as to the status of the office of the trusteeship, namely, whether it is hereditary. He is not competent to go into the further question as to which of the competing claimants is a hereditary trustee or whether both are joint hereditary trustee.
In other words, the Deputy Commissioner can only decide as to the status of the office of the trusteeship, namely, whether it is hereditary. He is not competent to go into the further question as to which of the competing claimants is a hereditary trustee or whether both are joint hereditary trustee. That is a matter not covered by Section 57 of the Act and has to be decided only by a separate Suit.” 17. In yet another decision relied upon by the learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents reported in Sri Venkataramanswamy Deity v. Vadugammal, 1974 (1) MLJ 431 , a Division Bench of this Court has held as fallows in Paragraph 4: “4. The expression “except under, and in conformity with, the provisions of this Act” has been construed by the Supreme Court in V.L.N.S. Temple v. I. Pattabhiram, as meaning that Section 93 will apply only to matters for which provision has been made in the Act. It does not bar suits under the general law which did not fall within the scope of any of the Section of the Act” 18. In yet another decision reported in Estate of B. Kanniah Naidu and Varadammal, etc. v. P.G. Kuppan, 2006 (4) CTC 237 : 2006 (3) LW 484 , this Court has held as under in paragraph 9 as follows: “9. Moreover, the definition “Courts” as per Section 6(7) of Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowment Act relates to the Courts competent to try the disputes referred in the HR & CH Act and whether the suits filed toy the Plaintiffs against the Defendant for declaration and permanent injunction, is such kind of a Suit as referred to in under HR & CE Act is a question that has to be determined during the trial on the basis of the evidence that may be adduced, that too after necessary pleadings are pleaded and appropriate issues are framed.” 19. Thus I am of the considered view that the learned Trial Judge has prima facie held that the Suit that has been filed by the Respondents before it is perfectly maintainable and the Act has no application to the case on hand. Even after holding so, the learned Trial Judge has rightly held that the said issue can be decided during the full fledged trial. 20.
Even after holding so, the learned Trial Judge has rightly held that the said issue can be decided during the full fledged trial. 20. Thus I am of the considered view that the learned Trial Judge was right in holding that the Suit is perfectly valid and maintainable before the Civil Court. I am conscious of the fact that the said finding arrived at by the learned Trial Judge as well as by this Court is only while deciding the Application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the C.P.C. and as rightly held by the learned Trial Judge the entire issue can be gone into by the Trial Court at the time of final disposal of the matter when the parties can let in evidence. 21. As regards the other contentions, I am of the considered view that the ingredients as envisaged under Order 7, Rule 11 of C.P.C. was not put forth by the Petitioner while indicating the said provision to strike out the Plaint. A Plaint can be rejected (a) if there is no cause of action (b) if the Suit is not valued properly and the Plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time fixed by the Court, fails to do so (c) Suit is barred by any law. As far as the third ground is concerned, it has been dealt with in detail by me. As regards the other two grounds are concerned, I am of the considered view that the same has not been raised by the Petitioner. 22. Thus, considering the overall circumstances referred to above, I am of the considered view that the learned Trial Judge has rightly dismissed the Application Preferred by the Petitioner which does not warrant any interference by this Court in this Revision. 23. Before Parting with the matter, I feel that it may not be justifiable, if I do not appreciate the well – placed arguments made by Mr. D. Pradeep Kumar, learned Counsel appearing for the Respondents, who by his excellent submissions, placed the correct position of law by relying on the various provisions of HR & CE Act. He deserves to be appreciated. 24. In fine, the Revision stands dismissed. Consequently, the Connected Miscellaneous Petition is closed. However, no order as to costs.