Judgment :- 1. This appeal is by the revenue challenging the order passed by the Tribunal that the demand of differential tax both on merits and on limitation and accordingly has set aside the order passed by the assessing officer as well as the first Appellate Authority. 2. M/s Scott Wilson Kirkpatrick (India) Private Limited – the assessee is providing taxable services under the category of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’ and are duly registered under the Finance Act, 1994. The assessee entered into a contract agreement captioned as ‘Project Coordinating Consultancy Services for Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project’. In pursuance of the said agreement, the assessee provided services like project preparation which includes feasilbility study, screening of the roads, identify analysis and developmental proposals for institutional measures and such other engineering consultancy services which are more descriptively mentioned in the Appendix A of the said agreement. In terms of the said agreement, the assessee billed/charged goes amount of Rs.30,02,26,393/- from their clients both in local currency and in foreign currency. The value of taxable service rendered i.e., an amount of Rs.22,15,54,047/- in local currency and an amount of Rs.7,86,72,346/- in foreign currency for the period from 1.3.1999 to 31.3.2004. The assessee was required to pay service tax of Rs.1,57,03,274/- on the above value of taxable service at the rate of 5% till 13.5.2003 and 8% from 14.5.2003. However, the assessee had paid only a sum of Rs.43,21,264/-. There was a short payment of service tax to the extent of Rs.1,13,82,010/-. Therefore, a show cause was issued on 11.8.2004 requiring the assessee to show cause why7 action should not be taken as mentioned in the said notice being the value of taxable service escaped assessment or has been under assessed, short payment of service tax, interest, penalty, etc., 3. The assessee filed a reply denying those claims, Over-ruling the objections of the assessee, the assessing officer passed an order on 17.5.2005 holding that the claim is well within time demanding service tax of Rs.1,13,82,010/- and appropriated an amount of Rs.30,13,450/- paid towards the service tax liability, demanded interest under Section 75 of the Act and imposed penalty equal to that of the tax payable. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Appeals who dismissed the appeal upholding the order of the assessing officer. 4. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal to the Commissioner of Appeals who dismissed the appeal upholding the order of the assessing officer. Aggrieved by the said order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the Tribunal. The Tribunal on re-appreciation of the entire material on record held that the lower authorities have passed their orders without proper scrutiny of the information contained in the ST3 returns and, therefore, it is very clear that the longer period could not be invoked and, therefore, a major portion of the demand would be hit time bar. On merits the Tribunal held that the entire amount of receipts cannot be subject to service tax as part of the amount is on account of reimbursable expenses. The lower authorities have not followed the DGST circular according to which the taxable services for which the payment is received in India is convertible foreign exchange is exempted from the whole of service tax under Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994. Therefore, the demand of differential tax is unsustainable both on merits and on the ground of limitation. Therefore, it set aside the order passed by both the lower authorities and granted relief to the assessee. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the revenue is in appeal. 5. The appeal is admitted by this Court on 17.9.2007 to consider the following substantial questions of law.- 1. Whether the Tribunal was right in holding that the major portion of the demand is time barred? 2. Whether the order of the Tribunal in regard to deduction of reimbursable expenses is legally tenable, in the facts and circumstances of the case? 3. Whether for the purpose of levying service tax, the contract made has to be read in toto or has to be bifurcated for other various services? 4. Whether the Tribunal is justified in applying the notifications Nos. 2/1999-ST dated 28.2.1999, 06/1999-ST dated 9.4.1999. 21/2003-ST dated 20.11.2003 and granting exemption in favour of the assessee without verifying the conditions prescribed therein wherein it is stated that foreign exchange received was repatriated from or sent outside India? 6. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee raised an objection regarding maintainability of this appeal before this Court. He contended that this appeal is field under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for short hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. 6. At the time of hearing, the learned counsel for the assessee raised an objection regarding maintainability of this appeal before this Court. He contended that this appeal is field under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944, for short hereinafter referred to as “the Act”. In view of Section 83 of the Finance Act, 1994. He contended that, as is clear from the questions of law raised in this case as well as the order of the Tribunal, this appeal involves among other things determination of question relating to the rate of duty of service tax as well as to the value of taxable service for purposes of assessment. Under Section 35G of the Excise Act, the High Court has no jurisdiction to decide the said questions as under Section 35(L)(b) of the Act it is the Supreme Court which is conferred the jurisdiction to decide such questions and, therefore, the appeal is not maintainable and is liable to be rejected at the threshold. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the revenue submitted that, under the service tax, law irrespective of the nature of service rendered, tax payable is the same and, therefore, this appeal does not relate to the determination of rate of tax payable under the Act. As such, the jurisdiction of this Court to decide the substantial questions of law framed in this appeal is not ousted and, therefore, he submits there is no merit in the preliminary objection. 8. Unless the maintainability of the appeal is decided one way or the other, the question, of going into the merits of the appeal does not arise. Therefore, the preliminary point that arise for consultation in this appeal is as under: “whether the appeal preferred by the Revenue against the impugned order is maintainable u/s.35 G of the Act before the High Court.” FINANCE ACT 1994: 9. Chapter V of the Finance Act 1994 for the first time provided for law of service tax. The said chapter was made applicable to taxable services provided on or after the commencement of the said chapter. Service tax was defined as tax chargeable under the provisions of this chapter as per Section 65(95). Section 65(105) defines what ‘taxable service’ means. Chapter V of the Finance Act 1994 for the first time provided for law of service tax. The said chapter was made applicable to taxable services provided on or after the commencement of the said chapter. Service tax was defined as tax chargeable under the provisions of this chapter as per Section 65(95). Section 65(105) defines what ‘taxable service’ means. Section 65(121) made it clear that words and expressions used but not defined in this chapter and defined in the Central Excises and Salt Act 1944 or Rules made thereunder shall apply, so far as may be, in relation to service tax as they apply in relaxation to the duty of excise. 10. Section 66 is the charging section. It provides that they shall be levied tax at the rate of 12% of the value of the taxable service referred to in various sub-clauses mentioned therein Section 83 with which we are concerned reads as under:- “83. Application of certain provisions of Act 1 of 1994: The provisions of the following sections of the Central Excises and Salt Act. 1944 as in force from time to time, shall apply, so far as may be in relation to service tax as they apply in relation to duty of excise.” Therefore, Section 35F and 35L of the Central Excise and Salt Act. 1944 are mutatis mutandis made applicable to the Finance Act. 1994. That is how the present appeal is filed by the revenue under Section 35G of the Central Excise and Salt Act, 1944 before this Court. 11. In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, firstly it is necessary to see the statutory provisions as contained in Sections 35G and 35L which reads as under: “35G. Appeal to High Court- (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from every order passed in appeal by the Appellate Tribunal on or after the 1st day of July, 2003 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment), if the High Court is satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law. 35L. 35L. Appeal to the Supreme Court – An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from – (a) any judgment of the High Court delivered (i) in an appeal made under Section 35G; or (ii) on a reference made under Section 35G by the Appellate Tribunal before the 1st day of July, 2003; (iv) on a reference made under section 35H, in any case which, on its own motion or on an oral application made by or on behalf of the party aggrieved. Immediately after passing of the judgment, the High Court certifies to be a fit one for appeal to the Supreme Court; or any order passed before the establishment of the National Tax Tribunal by the Appellate Tribunal having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment.” A bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear what are the matters which are cognizable by the High Court and as well as by the Supreme Court. Any order passed by the Appellate Tribunal other than the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of duty of goods for the purpose of assessment falls within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Section 35L(b). In other words, the determination of any question relating to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purpose of assessment, cannot be agitated in bo0th the forums. Expressly the statute has excluded the jurisdiction of the High Court in appeal under Section 35G and exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Supreme Court in these matters. The language employed in these two sections read together is clear and there is no scope for any doubt or confusion in this regard. While applying these provisions to the Finance Act, 1994, We have to substitute for the word “Goods” the word “Service”. 12. It is argued as the wordings of the section stands, it is only in respect of the two types of cases the jurisdiction of the High Court is denuded. They are:- 1) Where the assessment relates to the determination of the rate of duty: 2) The question relates to the determination of the value of the service. 12. It is argued as the wordings of the section stands, it is only in respect of the two types of cases the jurisdiction of the High Court is denuded. They are:- 1) Where the assessment relates to the determination of the rate of duty: 2) The question relates to the determination of the value of the service. Any question relating to or in relation to these two aspects alone, the High Court has no jurisdiction and in respect of other things it has jurisdiction. 13. In order to appreciate this contention, we have to carefully see the wordings employed by the legislature. The relevant words are as under:- “Not being an order relating, among other things, to the determine action of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of Service “for the purposes of assessment.” The key word in the said provision is “for the purpose of assessment”. That means the order referred to therein is an order passed in the course of assessment. Therefore, all orders passed in the course of assessment involving the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of service or to the value of Service, cannot be the subject matter of appeal before the High Court. By the use of the word ‘among other things’ it is made clear, even order which may not be directly related to the rate of duty of service or the value of Service, however which are intermingled with those maters are also excluded. In other words those are not the only orders contemplated by the legislation. In order to understand the width and depth of the orders covered under these words. It is necessary to know the meaning of “assessment”. WHAT IS ASSESSMENT? 14. The word “assessment” is used as meaning sometimes the computation of rate of duty, sometimes the assessable value of Service and sometimes the whole procedure laid down under the Act for imposing duty liability upon the manufacturer or imported. The word assessment is, thus, capable of bearing a very comprehensive meaning; in the context, it can comprehend the whole procedure for ascertaining and imposing duty liability. 15. The word assessment is, thus, capable of bearing a very comprehensive meaning; in the context, it can comprehend the whole procedure for ascertaining and imposing duty liability. 15. The Privy Council in the case of COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX – VS – KHEMCHAND RAMDAS has observed as under:- “One of the peculiarities of most Income-tax Acts is that the word ‘assessment’ is used as meaning sometimes the determination of the amount of tax payable and sometimes the whole procedure laid down in the Act for imposing liability upon the taxpayer. The Indian Income-tax Act is no exception in this respect…..” 16. In HIRJIBHAI TRIBHUVANDAS vs INCOME TAX OFFICER RAJNANDGAON AND ANOTHER [1958 33 ITR 448] it was held as under:- “In the normal sense “to assess” means to fix ‘the amount of tax due or to determine such amount”. The process of re-assessment is to the same purpose and would thus be included in the connotation of the term “assessment.” “The words levy, assessment and collection as we understand them include all the processes by which the tax is ascertained, demanded and realized and “re-assessment” being one of those process comes within the ambit of the phraseology employed.” It will be observed that section 34 of the Income-tax Act contemplates four different cases in which the power to assess escaped income has been give. Where there has been no assessment at all, the term ”assessment” would be appropriate and where there was an assessment at too law a rate or with unjustified exemptions, the term “reassessment” would be appropriate. It was thus necessary to resort to the use of two different terms to cover with clarity the different cases dealt with in that section. This does not mean that the terms should be treated as mutually exclusive. In interpreting the te4rm “assessment” as used in Section 7 of the Taxation Laws Act, it should be given its plain meaning. It should not be understood in any restricted or special sense in which it may have been used in the Indian Income-tax Act in a particular context. 17. The Apex Court in the case of INCOME TAX OFFICER, BANGALORE vs K.N.GURUSWAMY [1958 ITR VOL. It should not be understood in any restricted or special sense in which it may have been used in the Indian Income-tax Act in a particular context. 17. The Apex Court in the case of INCOME TAX OFFICER, BANGALORE vs K.N.GURUSWAMY [1958 ITR VOL. 34 601] explaining the meaning the word assessment arising under the Income Tax Act has held as under:- “Total income means the total amount of income, profits and gains computed in the manner laid down in the Act, and there are no good reasons why the word “assessment” occurring in the saving provisions should be restricted in the manner suggested so as to exclude proceedings for assessment of escaped income or under assessed income. ……. In its normal sense, “to assess” means “to fix the amount of tax or to determine such amount”. The process of re-assessment is to the same purpose and is included in the connotation of the term “assessment”. The reasons which led us to give a comprehensive meaning to the word “assessment” in section 13(I) of the Finance Act, 1950, operate equally with regard to the saving provisions under present consideration.” 18. The Supreme Court in the case of C.A.ABRAHAM – VS – INCOME – TAX OFFICER, KOTTAYAM, AND ANOTHER explaining the meaning of the word assessment in the context of the Income Tax Act held as under:- “A review of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act sufficiently discloses that the word “assessment” has been used in its widest connotation in that chapter. The title of the chapter is “Deductions and Assessment”. The section which deals with assessment merely as computation of income is section 23; but several sections deal not with computation of income, but determination of liability, machinery for imposing liability and the procedure in that behalf. Section 18A deals with advance payment of tax and imposition of penalties for failure to carry out the provisions therein. The section which deals with assessment merely as computation of income is section 23; but several sections deal not with computation of income, but determination of liability, machinery for imposing liability and the procedure in that behalf. Section 18A deals with advance payment of tax and imposition of penalties for failure to carry out the provisions therein. Section 23A deals with power to assess individual members of certain companies on the income deemed to have been distributed as dividend, section 23B deals with assessment in case of departure from taxable territories, section 24B deals with collection of tax out of the estate of deceased persons, section 25 deals with assessment in case of discontinued business, section 25A with assessment after partition of Hindu undivided families and sections 29, 31, 33 and 35 deal with the issue of demand notices and the filing of appeals and for reviewing assessment and section 34 deals with assessment of incomes which have escaped assessment. The expression “assessment” used in these sections is not used merely in the sense of computation of income and there is in our judgment no ground for holding that when by section 44, it is declared that the partners or members of the association shall be jointly and severally liable to assessment, it is only intended to declare the liability to computation of income under section 23 and not to the application of the procedure for declaration and imposition of tax liability and the machinery for enforcement thereof. Nor has the expression, “all the provisions of Chapter IV shall so far as may be apply to such assessment” a restricted content; in terms it says that all the provisions of Chapter IV shall apply so for as may be to assessment of firms which have discontinued their business. DETERMINATION – MEANING 19. Similarly the meaning of the word “determination” also has to be kept in mind. In JASWANT SUGAR MILLS LTD. MEERUT –VS- LAKSHMI CHAND AND OTHERS, reported in AIR 1963 SUPREME COURT 677 (V 50 C 104), it is held as under:- “10. The expression “determination’ in the context in which it occurs in Art.136 signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression “determination’ in the context in which it occurs in Art.136 signifies an effective expression of opinion which ends a controversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted under a valid law for disposal. The expression “order” must have also a similar meaning, except that it need not operate to end the dispute. Determination or order must be judicial or quasi-judicial; purely administrative or executive direction is not contemplated to be made the subject-matter of appeal to this Court. The essence of the authority of the Court being judicial, this Court does not exercise administrative or executive powers i.e. character of the power conferred upon this Court original or appellate, by its constitution being judicial, the determination or order sought to be appealed from must have the character of a judicial adjudication. MEANING OF “RATE OF DUTY” 20. It is in this background we have to interpret the words “rate of duty”. The question is, what is the meaning attached to the ‘rate of duty’ as mentioned under these provisions. In order to understand the word ‘rate of duty’ and the dispute relating to that, it is useful to refer to the meaning assigned to the said word by the Parliament by way of an explanation to sub-section (5) of Section 35G by amendment Act 29/1988. The said amendment was intended to be brought into force from the date to be notified. However, it was not brought into force at all. Notwithstanding the same, in order to understand the meaning assigned to the word ‘rate of duty’ by the Parliament as per the aforesaid intended amendment, the same could be looked into in order to appreciate the phrase ‘rate of duty’ used in Sections 35G and 35L of the Act which reads as under:- “Explanation: For the purposes of this sub-section, the determination of a rate of duty in relation to any goods or valuation of any goods for the purposes of assessment of duty includes the determination of a question. a) relating to the rate of duty of excise for the being in force, whether under the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or under any other Central Act providing for the levy and collection of any duty of excise, in relation to any goods on or after the 28th day of February, 1986; or b) relating to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment of any duty in cases where the assessment is made on or after the 28th day of February, 1986, or c) whether any goods are excisable goods or whether the rate of duty of excise on any goods is nil, or d. whether any goods fall under a particular heading or sub-heading of the Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, or the Additional Duties of Excise (Goods of Special Importance) Act, 1957 or the Additional Duties of Excise {Textiles and Textile Articles) Act, 1978, or that any goods are or not covered by a particular notification or order issued by the Central Government or the Board, as the case may be, granting total or partial exemption from duty; or e. whether the value of any goods for the purposes of assessment of duty of excise shall be enhanced or reduced by the addition or reduction of the amounts in respect of such matters as are specifically provided in this Act.” A perusal of the explanation makes it clear that determination of the “rate of duty” means whether any Service are excisable goods and whether the rate of duty of excise on any Service is nil, whether the said service are or are not covered under a particular notification or order issued by the Central Government or the Board, as the case may be, granting total or partial exemption form duty and whether the value of any service for the purpose of assessment of duty of excise shall be enhanced, or reduced by addition or reduction of the amounts in respect of such matters as are specially provided under the Act. Though the determination of the word duty may not include all those questions, the explanation makes it clear the aforesaid expanded meaning is to be attributed to the aforesaid phrase for the purpose of this section only. Though the determination of the word duty may not include all those questions, the explanation makes it clear the aforesaid expanded meaning is to be attributed to the aforesaid phrase for the purpose of this section only. It is because the said explanation is added to Section 35E which deals with the power of revision of Board or Commissioner of Central Excise in certain case. In other words what is sought to be conveyed by the explanation is that the authorities while exercising the revisional jurisdiction shall not go into those questions. That is no way comes in the way of understanding the meaning of the phrase ‘rate of duty’. On the contrary it clearly sets out the intention of the legislature in so far as the meaning to be attributed to the said phrase. Therefore, the said meaning could be red into the phrase wherever it is used in the other parts of the statute, as held by the Apex Court in Navin Chemicals case. It also would be in conformity with the interpretation placed on the said phrase by the Apex Court as well as the High Court, as is clear from the following decisions. 21. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the meaning of the word ‘rate’ in SUNDARAM AND COMPANY (PRIVATE) LIMITED vs COMMISIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS (1967 vol. 66 ITR 604) where it was held as under:- “The assumption that the expression “rate” has been used in Section 34(1) as meaning a fraction of total income is, in our judgment not warranted. By the use of the expression “rate” in the context in which it occurs, undoubtedly a relation between the taxable income and the tax charged is intended, but the relation need not be of the nature of proportion of fraction. The expression “rate” is often used in the sense of a standard or measure. Provided the tax is computable by the application of a prescribed standard or measure, though not directly related to taxable income, it may be called tax computed at a certain rate. We agree with the High Court that the rebate of tax and the reduction of such relate are essentially matters of measure or standards of rate.” 22. Provided the tax is computable by the application of a prescribed standard or measure, though not directly related to taxable income, it may be called tax computed at a certain rate. We agree with the High Court that the rebate of tax and the reduction of such relate are essentially matters of measure or standards of rate.” 22. A Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of CRAGE BETEL NUT POWDER WORKS – VS – COMMISSIONER REPORTED IN 2006 (5) ALD (NOC104) held that the determination of the rate of duty in relation to any goods includes determination of a question whether any goods are excisable or not. Again, a Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of COMMISSIONER OF C.EX., HYDERABAD-IV VS. SRIRAM REFRIGERATION INDUSTRIES reported in 2009(240) ELT 201(AP) held that the question whether the process if any undertaken in the service centre of the respondent amounts to manufacture of starters by the respondent or not, and if the goods produced during the process are excisable goods or not would fall within the meaning of the expression ‘determination of the rate of duty of excise or the value of the goods for the purposes of assessment of duty’ used in Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(b) of the Act. 23. Following the said judgment a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of COMMISISONER OF SERVICE TAX VS. DELHI CYMKHANA CLUB rendered in 2009 (16) STR 129(Del.) held that if the question of determination relates to the rate of duty of excise or the value of goods for the purpose of assessment, appeal lies to the Supreme Court. 24. The Bombay High Court in the case of COMMR. OF C.EX., NAGPUR Vs. UNIVERSAL FERRO AND ALLIED CHEMICALS LTD, reported in 2009(234) ELT 220 (Bom.) at para 6 held as under: “We have considered the rival contentions made on behalf of parties and also perused the provisions of Sections 35G and 35L(b) of the Act of 1944, an appeal against the order passed by the Appellate Tribunal would lie to the High Court except an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purpose of assessment. Section 35L(b) provides that an appeal against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal relating among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment would lie to the Supreme Court. It is, thus, clear from the aforesaid proviso that an appeal against an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purposes of assessment would lie to the Supreme Court and not the High Court.” 25. The Apex Court in the case of I.T.C.LTD. – VS – COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE, PATNA REPORTED IN 1997(94) E. L.T.456 (S.C.) DEALING WITH Section 35L(b) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 has held as under:- “A perusal of the said clause shows that an appeal lies to this Court against an order passed by the Tribunal relating to the determination of any question relating to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment Sri.Ravinder Narain as submitted that the impugned order passed by the tribunal relates to the value of goods. The said question relating to value of goods has however, arisen on the claims for refund of excise duty submitted by the appellant before the Assistant Collector, In our opinion the question of valuation of goods in the context of a refund cannot be regarded as a question having relation to the value of the goods for the purposes of assessment. The assessment had been completed in the present case and the assessment orders had already been passed. It is only when the goods were returned, the question of refund arose. We are therefore, unable to accept the contention Sri.Ravinder Narain that the appeals are maintainable under clause (B) of the Section 35L of the Act and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.” 26. The DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF PREMIER INRRIGATION EQUIPMENT LTD. We are therefore, unable to accept the contention Sri.Ravinder Narain that the appeals are maintainable under clause (B) of the Section 35L of the Act and the appeals are liable to be dismissed.” 26. The DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF PREMIER INRRIGATION EQUIPMENT LTD. – VS – UOI REPORTED IN 1998(100) ELT (Kar) interpreting Section 35 L of the Act held as under:- From the reading of the above provisions contained in Section 35L of the Act, it seems clear to us that even if one of the questions raised before the Tribunal for determination relate to a rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment, then the remedy by way of appeal against the order of the Tribunal can be only before the Supreme Court and such question cannot be subjected to the Advisory jurisdiction of the High Court. Keeping in view the specific bar contained in Section 35G of the Act which specifically provides that on the said questions pertaining to rate of duty and value of goods neither any reference can be made by the Tribunal nor can be called for by the High Court.” CUSTOMS ACT 27. Section 35G(1) and 35L(b) of the Act are in paramateria with Section 130 and 130E of the Customs Act. The Supreme Court had an occasion to interpret the said Section 130 and 130E in number of decisions. However, though not in an identical matter, but almost near to the said matter, interpreting the powers of the Appellate Tribunal, with reference to the jurisdiction of a special Bench and an ordinary Bench, the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the very same words used in both the sections in the case of NAVIN CHEMICALS MFG. & TRADING CO. LTD Vs. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS reported in 1993(68) ELT 3 SC under the Customs Act. The Apex Court held as under: “The controversy, therefore, relates to the meaning to be given to the expression ‘determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of the goods for purposes of assessment’. LTD Vs. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS reported in 1993(68) ELT 3 SC under the Customs Act. The Apex Court held as under: “The controversy, therefore, relates to the meaning to be given to the expression ‘determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of customs or to the value of the goods for purposes of assessment’. It seems to us that the key lies in the words ‘for the purpose of assessment’ therein, Where the appeal involves the determination of any question that has a relation to the rate of customs duty for the purposes of assessment that appeal must be head by a Special Bench. Similarly, where the appeal involves the determination of any question that has a relation to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment, that appeal must be heard by a Special Bench. Cases that relate to the rate of customs duty for the purposes of assessment and which relate to the value of goods for the purpose of assessment are advisedly treated separately and placed before Special Benches for decision because they, more often than not, are of importance not only to the importers who are parties thereto but also to many other importers who import or propose to import the same or similar goods. In the decisions of CEGAT in such matters would have wide application they are, by the terms of the statute, to be rendered by Special Benches. The phrase “relation to” is, ordinarily, of wide import but, in the context of its use in the said expression in Section 129C, it must be read as meaning a direct and proximate relationship to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for the purpose of assessment.” Further at para 11 they held as under: “It will be seen that sub-section (5) uses the said expression ‘determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty or to the value of goods for the purpose of assessment’ and the Explanation thereto provides a definition of it ‘for the purposes of this sub-section’. The Explanation says that the expression includes the determination of a question relating to the rate of duty, to the value of goods for the purposes of assessment, to the classification of goods under the Tariff and whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification; and whether the value of goods for the purposes of assessment should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters that the said Act provides for. Although this Explanation expressly confines the said definition of the said expression to sub-section (5) of Section 129D, it is proper that the expression used in the other parts of the said Act should be interpreted similarly. The statutory definition accords with the meaning we have given to he said expression above. Questions relating to the rate of duty and to the value of goods for purposes of assessment are questions that squarely fall within the meaning of the said expression. A dispute as to the classification of goods and as to whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification relates directly and proximately to the rate of duty applicable thereto for purposes of assessment. Whether the value of goods for purposes of assessment is required to be increased or decreased is a question that relates directly and proximately to the value of goods for purposes of assessment. The statutory definition of the said expression indicates that it has to be read to limit his application to cases where for the purposes of assessment, questions arise directly and proximately as to the rate of duty or the value of the goods.” 2. At para 12 they concluded as under: “This, then, is the test for the purposes of determining whether or not an appeal should be heard by a Special Bench of CEGAT, whether or not a reference by CEGAT lies to the High Court and whether or not an appeal lies directly to the Supreme Court from a decision of CEGAT: does the question requires determination have a direct and proximate relation, for the purposes of assessment, to the rate of duty applicable to the goods or to the value of the goods.” 28. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,. CHENNAI VS. JAYATHI KRISHNA AND COMPANY REPORTED IN 2000(119) ELT 4 (SC), the question involved was whether the assessee is liable to pay interest under Section 61(2) of the Customs Act. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,. CHENNAI VS. JAYATHI KRISHNA AND COMPANY REPORTED IN 2000(119) ELT 4 (SC), the question involved was whether the assessee is liable to pay interest under Section 61(2) of the Customs Act. When the imposition of interest under the aforesaid provision was challenged before the Tribunal, the Tribunal held that DEEC Scheme having been made applicable to the goods in question, the question of payment of interest would not arise at all. Against the said order, the revenue preferred an appeal directly to the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Act, which came to be dismissed. 29. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (EX), MIMBAI VS. NICCO BATTERIES LIMITED, REPORTED IN 2001(129) ELT 292 (SC), the benefit of exemption notification was granted to earlier four consignments and at the stage of clearance of the fifth consignment, the said benefit was denied under the orders of the superior officer without assigning reasons. The Tribunal found fault with the said action and extended the benefit to the fifth consignment also. Aggrieved by the said order of the Tribunal, the revenue preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court directly under Section 130E of the Act. 30. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI VS. PUNJAB STAINLESS STEEL INDUSTRIES, REPORTED IN 2001(132) ELT 10 (SC), the allegation against the assessee was the goods exported under the export obligation were mis-declared. In as much as he used the material of inferior grade to the one required in the manufacture of utensils. The said charge was held to be proved on the basis of the report of the expert and therefore the goods were confiscated. The said order was challenged by the assessee before the Tribunal. The Tribunal set aside the said order, Aggrieved by the same, the revenue directly preferred an appeal under Section 130E of the Act before the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and restored the order of the Commissioner of Customs. 31. In the case of JINDAL DYE INTERMEDIATE LIMITED VS. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MUMBAI REPORTED IN 2006(197) ELT 471(SC), the Tribunal had upheld the order of the authorities and denied the exemptions. The assessee preferred an appeal under Section 130E of the Act to the Supreme Court. 31. In the case of JINDAL DYE INTERMEDIATE LIMITED VS. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS, MUMBAI REPORTED IN 2006(197) ELT 471(SC), the Tribunal had upheld the order of the authorities and denied the exemptions. The assessee preferred an appeal under Section 130E of the Act to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court set aside the order of the Tribunal and held that the assessee is entitled to the benefit of exemption. 32. In the case of COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS NEW DELHI VS. PHOENIX INTERNATIONAL LIMITED REPORTED IN 2007(216) ELT 503(SC), the question involved was whether the assessee has imported in violation of the Exim Policy and consequently liable to pay customs duty. The Tribunal held that there is violation of Exim Policy. In an appeal preferred against the order of the Tribunal under Section 130E of the Act, the Supreme Court reversed the finding of the Tribunal by holding that assessee is guilty of violating Para 156(A) of the Exim Policy 1992-97 and therefore, they are liable to be assessed under Tariff Heading 64.04 and accordingly, they were liable to pay duty of customs at 50% + CVD at 15% ad valorem and the assessee was not entitled to concessional rate of duty under Notification No.45/94-Cus. Dated 1.3.1994 and the department was right in invoking Rule 8 of the Customs Valuation Rules. 33. In COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, TUTICORN VS, EDHAYAM FROZEN FOODS, REPORTED IN 2008 (230) ELT 225(MAD), objection was taken regarding the maintainability of the appeal before the High Court under Section 130 of the Customs Act. It was held that the determination of question involved in this case does not have a relation to the rate of duty or the value of the goods for the purpose of assessment and therefore, the appeal was maintainable. The question involved therein was whether Prawn/shrimp is also fish and liable to export cess under Agricultural Produce Cess Act 1940. In coming to the conclusion they relied on the judgment of the apex Court in NAVIN CHEMICALS case wherein an observation was made that the case did not have a direct or proximate relation for the purpose of assessment either to the rate of duty applicable to the said goods or to the value thereof. All that the Additional Collector’s order did was to confiscate the said goods allowing the assessee option of redeeming them upon payment of a fine of Rs.10,000/-. All that the Additional Collector’s order did was to confiscate the said goods allowing the assessee option of redeeming them upon payment of a fine of Rs.10,000/-. That the assessee might avail of the option, pay the fine and clear the said goods. When question as to the rate of duty and value for the purpose of assessment might possibly arise is far too remote a contingency to satisfy the test that is laid down. Therefore it was held that the principle laid down in the said case squarely apply to the facts of this case, where question involved as stated earlier, was whether fish includes Molluscs and Crustaceans and as such the Crustaceans would otherwise mean and include Prawns/shrimps and hence Prawns and Shrimps should be regarded as a fish for the purpose of assessment and such meaning should be given to the expression “fish” incorporated as item No.7 to the Schedule to the Act. 34. In the case of COMMISISO9NER OF CUSTOMS, NEW DELHI VS. SONY INDIA LIMITED, REPORTED IN 2008(231) ELT 385 (SC), the question involved was whether the assessee had committed breach of Exim Policy. Ultimately, the Tribunal held that there is no breach of Exim Policy and consequently, no duty was paid. The revenue aggrieved by the said judgment preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court under Section 130E of the Act. The Supreme Court upheld the order of the Tribunal. CONCLUSION 35. Therefore, the expression ‘rate’ is often used in the sense of a standard or measure. ‘Rate’ generally is an impost, usually for current or recurrent expenditure, spread over a district or other local area and is distinct from an amount payable for work done upon or in respect of particular premises. ‘Rate is defined by Webster to be the price or amount stated or fixed for anything. The word ‘rate’ includes any toll, due, rent, rate or charge. It means the scale or amount of any other charges. The word ‘rate’ is used with reference both to a percentage or proportion of taxes, and to a valuation of property. ‘Rate is used in an Act declaring that the Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of taxation and assessment, applies to the percentage of fixation, as used in connection with ‘taxation’ and to the valuation of the property, as used in connection with ‘assessment’. ‘Rate is used in an Act declaring that the Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of taxation and assessment, applies to the percentage of fixation, as used in connection with ‘taxation’ and to the valuation of the property, as used in connection with ‘assessment’. It is a valuation of every man’s estate or setting down how every one shall pay, or be charged with, to any tax. By the use of the expression ‘rate’ a relation between the taxable income and the tax charged is intended, but the relation need not be of the nature of proportion of fraction. The Explanation to sub-section (5) of Section 35E of the Central Excise Act, the expression includes the determination of a question relating to the rate of duty, to the value of Service for the purposes of assessment; to the classification of Service under the Tariff and whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification; and whether the value of Service for the purposes of assessment should be enhanced or reduced having regard to certain matters that the said Act provides for. Questions relating to the rate of duty and to the value of Service for purposes of assessment are questions that squarely fall within the meaning of the said expression. A dispute as to the classification of Service and as to whether or not they are covered by an exemption notification relates directly and proximately to the rate of duty applicable thereto for purposes of assessment. Whether the value of Service for purposes of assessment is required to be increased or decreased is a question that relates directly and proximately to the value of Service for purposes of assessment. Determination of rate of duty in relation to any Service or not, whether the process if any undertaken in the service centre amounts to taxable Service or not, and if the Service rendered during that process are excisable goods or not would fall within the meaning of the expression ‘determination of the rate of duty of excise or the value of the goods for the purposes of assessment of duty’ used in Section 35G(1) and Section 35L(b) of the Act. Therefore, the phrase ‘rate of tax’ does not mean fraction of tax payable because what is the tax payable i.e., fraction payable is decided by the legislature. Therefore, the phrase ‘rate of tax’ does not mean fraction of tax payable because what is the tax payable i.e., fraction payable is decided by the legislature. Once that is prescribed by the legislature in the Act, the Court cannot sit in judgment and alter or modify the said rate of tax. The Court has no jurisdiction to go into the correctness or otherwise of the rate of tax payable in the sense the rate prescribed by the legislature. In the case of Finance Act 1994, the rate of service tax payable is uniform to all the services. IF rate of tax is to be understood in the sense it is suggested, section 35G and 35L, has not application at all to the Finance Act. Such an interpretation would render Section 83 in so far as applying the provisions of Section 35G and 35L redundant. Then there is no provision in the Finance Act, 1994 for determination of the aforesaid disputes. That was not intendment of the Parliament. Therefore, the argument that the rate of tax means only the rate at which tax is payable or a fraction is unsustainable. 36. Broadly the following disputes do not fall within the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 35(g) of the Act:- (a) Dispute relating to the service tax payable on any service/taxable service. (b) The value of the taxable service for the purposes of assessment. (c) A dispute as to the classification of services. (d) Whether those services are covered by an exemption notification or not. (e) Whether the value of services for the purposes of assessment is required to be increased or decreased. (f) The question of whether any services are taxable services or not. (g) Whether an activity is a service rendering activity or not, so as to attract levy of service tax. (h) Whether a particular services fall within which heading, sub-heading of Section 65 (105) of the Service Act, 1994 which defines “taxable Service”. 37. From the aforesaid discussion, it is clear that an order passed by the Appellate Tribunal relating to the determination of any question having relation to the rate of service taxes or to the value of services for the purposes of assessment lies to the Supreme Court Section 35L(b) of the Act and not to the High Court under Section 35 (G). 38. 38. The intention behind this bifurcation of jurisdiction between the Apex Court and the High Court seems to be that more often than not, any decision on these aforesaid aspects not only affects the interest of the parties rendering services who are parties to a dispute, but also to the parties rendering those services throughout the country. In a country governed by Parliamentary legislation because of the territorial bifurcation in forming states and because of the divergent opinion which is possible, the service tax payable would vary from place to place. In order to bring uniformity in the levy of service tax throughout the country and consequently to see that the country’s finance is not affected, the Parliament has vested the jurisdiction to decide the disputes with the Apex Court. Therefore, we see a policy underlining this bifurcation of the jurisdiction between the Apex Court and the High Courts. All other matters other than what is set out above, which relates to the individual service providers and all disputes based on assessment orders which have attained finality, such as the benefits to which they entitled to, refunds, duty drawbacks, rebates, etc., which relate to a particular manufacturer falls within the jurisdiction of the High Courts. In other words all disputes emanating from the orders determining the rate of service tax and value of service, which has reached finality are to be determined by the High Court and not disputes arising prior to the stage of determining the rate of service tax and value of service. ON FACTS 39. The assessee is providing taxable services under the category of ‘Consulting Engineer Service’. Which includes feasibility study, screening of the roads, identify analysis and developmental proposals for institutional measures and such other engineering consultancy services. In terms of the agreement captioned a ‘Project Coordinating Consultancy Services of Karnataka State Highways Improvement Project, the assessee billed/charged gross amount of Rs.30,02,26,393-00 from their clients both in local currency and in foreign currency. The value of the taxable service rendered. i.e., an amount of Rs.22,15,54,047-00 in local currency and an amount of Rs.7,86,72,346-00 in foreign currency for the period from 01.03.1999 to 31.03.2004. The assessee was required to pay service tax of Rs.1,57,03,274-00. However, he paid only a sum of Rs.43,21,264-00. The short payment of service tax was to the extent of Rs.1,13,82,010-00. A show cause notice was issued claiming the said amount. The assessee was required to pay service tax of Rs.1,57,03,274-00. However, he paid only a sum of Rs.43,21,264-00. The short payment of service tax was to the extent of Rs.1,13,82,010-00. A show cause notice was issued claiming the said amount. The assessee contended that the entire amount receipts cannot be subjected to service tax, as part of the amount is on account of reimbursable expenses. According to the DGST circular, the taxable services for which the payment is received in India in convertible foreign exchange is exempted from the whole of service tax under Section 66 of the Finance Act, 1994. The demand of differential tax is unsustainable both on merits and on the ground of limitation. The objection of the assessee was over-ruled and demand was issued. The first appellate authority, i.e., the commissioner of Appeals up held the demand and dismissed the appeal. 40. The Tribunal accepted the case of the assessee and set aside the same. 41. As is clear from the questions of law framed, the question that is to be decided by this Court in this appeal is whether for the purpose of levying service tax, the contract made has to be read in to or has to be bifurcated for other various services and whether the assessee is entitled to exemption from payment of service tax in pursuance to the notification Nos.2/99 dated 28.02.1999, 6/99 dated 09.04.1999 and 21/2003 dated 20.11.2003, apart from other issues. 42. All these questions relate to determination of rate of duty payable, entitlement of exemption under notification. They have to be decided by the Apex Court in an appeal to be preferred under Section 35-L of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and not by the High Court in an appeal preferred under Section 35-G of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore the learned Counsel for the assessee is justified in contending that this appeal preferred by the Revenue challenging the order passed by the appellate Tribunal holding that the assessee is not liable to pay service tax, interest and penalty and setting aside the levy of duty and demand notice is not maintainable before this Court. 43. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the present appeal preferred under Section 35-G of the Act is not maintainable before this Court. The appeal is to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35-L of the Act. 43. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the present appeal preferred under Section 35-G of the Act is not maintainable before this Court. The appeal is to be preferred to the Supreme Court under Section 35-L of the Act. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed. No costs.