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2011 DIGILAW 4805 (MAD)

Mohammed Ibrahim v. Annavasal Panchayat Union

2011-12-13

K.CHANDRU

body2011
Judgment 1. This review application is filed by the original writ petitioner seeking to review the order passed by this court in W.P.(MD)No.10038 of 2009, dated 28.02.2011. The petitioner filed the writ petition seeking to forbear the respondents from interfering with the his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property comprising in S.No.62/2 measuring to an extent of 0.07.0 ares. 2. When the writ petition came up for hearing on 28.2.2011, a memo was filed by the executive Officer of the Pudukkottai Temples offering to provide one shop on a monthly rent of Rs.500/- which is situated opposite to the Narthamalai Muthumariamman Temple belonging to the Pudukkottai Devasthanam for a period of two years. If the petitioner wanted renewal of the shop after two years, that will be considered. When this memo, dated 28.2.2011 was filed, the counsel appearing for the petitioner had accepted the proposal in addition to payment of compensation on the basis of the Award passed under the Land Acquisition Act. The third respondent had expressed his willingness to allot the shop and agreed to pay the award amount. Therefore, this court had directed the Executive Officer to execute necessary lease agreement in favour of the petitioner in respect of the shop constructed by them opposite to the Narthamalai Muthumariamman Temple coming under the Pudukkottai Devasthanam within a period of eight weeks. The writ petition was disposed of with the said direction by K.K.Sasidharan, J. It was also informed to this court that the petitioner was also present in court at the relevant time and his consent was obtained by the then counsel appearing for the petitioner Mr.T.S.Mohammed Mohideen. 3. After the order copy was sent to the original writ petitioner, he had second thoughts on the order. Therefore, claiming his ignorance about the proposal, he filed the review application with a delay of 23 days after engaging another counsel. He stated that the counsel who had appeared in the writ petition had accepted the offer made by the third respondent without his instructions. As he did not have funds immediately, he had mobilized funds and filed the review application on legal advise. This court without going into the merits of the averments condoned the delay and directed the review application to be numbered and be posted for hearing. 4. As he did not have funds immediately, he had mobilized funds and filed the review application on legal advise. This court without going into the merits of the averments condoned the delay and directed the review application to be numbered and be posted for hearing. 4. The grounds found in the review application particularly ground Nos.2,3 and 4 are material for this case and they read as follows: “2.The learned Judge ought to have seen that before passing an order the parties consent has obtained. 3. The learned Judge ought to have verify before passing an order written consent was given by the party. 4. The learned Judge ought to have seen before passing an order the concession given by the counsel without instruction from his client is not binding on the petitioner.” 5. Opposing these grounds, the Executive Officer had field a counter affidavit, dated 21.11.2011 which was served on the counsel for the petitioner. With reference to ground Nos.2,3 and 4 raised in the review application, in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the counter, it was answered as follows: “4.It is submitted the ground No.2 in the Review Petition is totally wrong. The Learned Judge before passing the order, enquired both the petitioner and the 3rd respondent present in the court on the date of the order. After both the parties given consent for the present order, the learned Judge subsequently directing the 3rd respondent to file the memo regarding the rent amount and the same was filed on the same day after recording the same, the Writ Petition was closed in the presence of the petitioner and the 3rd respondent. 5. It is submitted the ground Nos.3 & 4 in the Review Petition are totally wrong. The learned Judge made an enquiry to the parties directly. Hence, concession order given by the counsel of the petitioner without instruction from the review petitioner is not true for the sake of the review petitioner convenience raise false grounds by way of filing the Review Petitioner and mislead the Court.” (Emphasis added) 6. The present counsel in the review application argued the matter elaborately. Hence it is worthwhile to briefly recapitulate the lis between the parties. The petitioner was in possession of land in Survey No.62/2 in Narthamalai village, Kulathur Taluk, Pudukkottai District. The present counsel in the review application argued the matter elaborately. Hence it is worthwhile to briefly recapitulate the lis between the parties. The petitioner was in possession of land in Survey No.62/2 in Narthamalai village, Kulathur Taluk, Pudukkottai District. The land was acquired on the basis of a requisition made by the third respondent, who had proposal to build a Kalyana Mandapam (Wedding Hall) owned by Arulmigu Sri Muthumariamman Temple in Narthamalai village. The acquired land comprised in three survey numbers, I.e. In S.Nos.62/2, 62/3 and 62/4. The total extent of all the three lands put together comes to 0.24.00 ares. During the enquiry under Section 5A, the petitioner (land owner) sent a petition. He did not object to the proposal, but he sought for the allotment of 0.04.0 hectares out of the land proposed to be acquired. The other land owners did not have any objection. Insofar as the petitioner's objection, the same was recorded in the Award proceedings No.3/1988, dated 2.12.1988 by the Land Acquisition officer and it reads as follows: “Thiru Mohamed Ibrahim, a Land Owner for S.No.62/4 and 62/2 has sent a petition on 16.10.86 stating that the lands owned by himself and 4 brothers. There is no other properties other than the lands proposed for acquisition. He has therefore requested to allot an extent of 0.04.0 hec. of land out of the land proposed for acquisition for running a shop during festival season. This objection was communicated to the Executive Officer, Pudukkottai temples who is the requisitioning body in this acquisition. The Executive Officer, Pudukkottai temples has appeared in person on 24.11.86 and given statement agreeing to allot an alternative site belonging to the temple to Thiru Md.Ibrahim. On the assurance given by the Executive Officer, Pudukkottai temples, Thiru Md.Ibrahim has withdrawn his objection and given his consent for the acquisition of 0.03.0 hec. of land in S.No.62/4 owned by him and 0-07-0 hec. of land in S.No.62/2 owned by his deceased father Syed Ahamed....” (Emphasis added) 7. The Land Acquisition Officer after recording the objection made the following observations: “Tvl.S.MohamedIbrahim, S.Nagoor Gani, Landowners for SF.No.62/2 and 62/4 appeared for award enquiry and stated that the amount of compensation fixed to the acquisition land is very low and that higher rate of compensation may be paid. The Land Acquisition Officer after recording the objection made the following observations: “Tvl.S.MohamedIbrahim, S.Nagoor Gani, Landowners for SF.No.62/2 and 62/4 appeared for award enquiry and stated that the amount of compensation fixed to the acquisition land is very low and that higher rate of compensation may be paid. They have further stated that as agreed upon at the time of 5A enquiry, alternative site may allotted for running a shop before taking possession of the acquisition lands. In this connection, the Executive Officer, Devasthanam, Pudukkottai has been addressed separately to allot alternative site to the landowner for running a shop as agreed upon at the time of 5A enquiry. The landowner for S.No.62/3 is residing at Sri-lanka and she did not appear for award enquiry.” (Emphasis added) 8. The compensation amount was fixed by the Award. The land was reclassified as Arulmigu Muthumariamman Koil Kalyana Mandapam Poramboke in the village and taluk accounts. There was no challenge to the compensation ordered. No request for any enhanced compensation was made under Section 18. Therefore, the petitioner was not aggrieved by the rate of compensation awarded to him. The proceedings insofar as the Land Acquisition Act was concerned, it had attained finality. The petitioner resisted taking delivery of possession and complained to the Tahsildar, Keeranur. The Tahsildar informed the third respondent that the case of the petitioner for allotment of an alternative site should be first considered. The petitioner filed a suit in O.S.No.535 of 1989 before the District Munsif Court, Pudukkottai. But, the said suit was dismissed on 5.3.1993. Thereafter, the petitioner had filed a writ petition before the Principal Bench being W.P.No.19187 of 1996 seeking for a direction to forbear the respondents from interfering with the possession in respect of S.No.62/2 which had already been acquired at the behest of the temple and award proceedings were concluded. The writ petition came to be disposed of on 18.2.2004. In paragraph 6 of the order, the Court had observed as follows: “6.With the result, the respondents should either restore the land or should provide an alternative site to the satisfaction of the petitioner. The petitioner is permitted to file an application for withdrawal of the proceedings under Section 48-B of the Act. In paragraph 6 of the order, the Court had observed as follows: “6.With the result, the respondents should either restore the land or should provide an alternative site to the satisfaction of the petitioner. The petitioner is permitted to file an application for withdrawal of the proceedings under Section 48-B of the Act. On receipt of the said application, the respondents are directed to pass appropriate orders on merits and in accordance with law and in the event of the respondents not being agreeable for withdrawal of the proceedings shall allot an alternative site in the village. The said order shall be passed within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of copy of the representation by the petitioner under Section 48-B of the Act. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly....” 9. A reading of the above order showed that the petitioner has no right to challenge the acquisition proceedings as it had reached its finality. Only his application, if any, was directed to be considered on the basis of the assurance given during the award proceedings in the light of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act. Thereafter, there has been correspondence between the Tahsildar, Kulathur and the Executive Officer, Pudukkottai Temples (R-3) and the review petitioner with reference to providing land to the petitioner in lieu of his assurance given during the award proceedings. Certain meetings also took place before the third respondent. 10. In the meanwhile, the petitioner filed another suit in O.S.No.104 of 2009 seeking for grant of permanent injunction restraining the present respondents from interfering with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit property except by due process of law. It is not clear as to how such suit was maintainable in the light of the statutory declaration under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act. Though in the affidavit filed in support of the original writ petition, the petitioner in paragraph 8 (sworn to on 5.10.2009) had stated that the said suit is pending before the District Munsif-cum-Judicial Magistrate Court at Keeranur, but it transpires that the petitioner after filing of the writ petition withdrew the suit on 17.9.2010. In such circumstances, it is not clear as to how the writ petition on the same subject is valid. 11. In such circumstances, it is not clear as to how the writ petition on the same subject is valid. 11. As per the counter affidavit filed by the Executive Officer, Pudukkottai Temples that the Kalyana Mandapam (Wedding Hall) has been constructed and only the work relating to compound wall alone could not be finished due to the petitioner stalling the same with various proceedings. The entire edifice of the petitioner's case was the assurance given by the Tahsildar at the time of acquisition that an alternative site will be allotted to him. But the petitioner's request that out of 7 cents acquired, 4 cents should be allotted to him does not make any sense. The notification proposing to acquire lands for constructing the Kalyana Mandapam comprised of 24 cents covered by three survey numbers owned by three different individuals. If 24 cents are required for constructing a wedding hall, it goes beyond one's comprehension as to how a portion of the land acquired can be returned to the petitioner without damage to the purpose for which it was acquired. 12. Secondly, even assuming the petitioner had enforceable right on the basis of the award enquiry, it must be noted that the award enquiry was done by the Land Acquisition Officer and the promise given by him for any alternative site does not bind the State or the requisitioning body, i.e., third respondent Executive Officer. On the other hand, a perusal of the Award enquiry showed that a letter has been addressed to the Executive Officer to allot an alternative site to enable the petitioner for running a shop. But this does not give any cause of action to forestall the project for which the lands were acquired. The petitioner had moved the Principal Bench, where a learned Judge while disposing of the matter vide an order dated 18.2.2004 in the operative portion had only given liberty to file an application for withdrawal of proceedings in terms of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act. First of all, it is not clear as to how Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act is attracted when the requisitioning body, i.e., temple devasthanams through its Executive Officer, had specifically required the lands for public purpose of constructing a wedding hall and the land has also been utilized for the very same purpose. First of all, it is not clear as to how Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act is attracted when the requisitioning body, i.e., temple devasthanams through its Executive Officer, had specifically required the lands for public purpose of constructing a wedding hall and the land has also been utilized for the very same purpose. Therefore, the very invocation of Section 48-B to this case is a misnomer. 13. Application of Section 48-B will arise only if the requisitioning body did not use the land for the purpose for which it was acquired and if it was returned to the State which had used its machinery to acquire can also use it for any other public purpose. Only when such a contingency happen, the request of the original land owner may be considered for reconveyance of land. The said contingency never arose in the present case as admittedly the land had been put to use for the purpose for which it was acquired, i.e. for the construction of a wedding hall for the temple, so that the income derived from the wedding hall can be used for various religious purposes. 14. It is not the case of the petitioner that he had sent a representation to the State Government invoking its power under Section 48-B for reconveyance of the lands. The petitioner having secured an order for sending representation to the State Government under Section 48-B did not make use of the liberty given by this court. The petitioner's attempt was only to threaten the Executive Officer as well as the Block Development Officer for insisting to retain the land. His subsequent suit had also been withdrawn. The mere fact that he was having electricity supply in the premises to prove the alleged possession does not take his case any further. If the petitioner had physically retained possession of the land despite Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, then such possession is illegal and cannot be set up as defence. 15. Acquisition proceedings had reached its finality and an Award had been passed. Compensation was also quantified and no further challenge has also been made with reference to it. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in C.Padmav. 15. Acquisition proceedings had reached its finality and an Award had been passed. Compensation was also quantified and no further challenge has also been made with reference to it. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in C.Padmav. Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu reported in (1997) 2 SCC 627 and in paragraph 5, it was observed as follows: “5.Shri G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants, contends that when by operation of Section 44-B read with Section 40 of the Act, the public purpose ceased to be existing, the acquisition became bad and therefore, the GO was bad in law. We find no force in the contention. It is seen that after the notification in GOR 1392 dated 17-10-1962 was published, the acquisition proceeding had become final,....” (Emphasis added) 16. Merely because the Tahsildar during the acquisition proceedings had given assurance for an alternative land to be given to the petitioner, in the absence of fulfilling the requisition, the original acquisition will not become invalid. It is not a case where the District Collector had entered into an agreement under Section 11(2) of the Land Acquisition Act in which case necessary requirement of executing an agreement under Form C read with Rule 8 will have to be complied with. The agreement between an acquiring authority and the land owner can be enforced. Hence, the petitioner's continued resistance of the very constructing the wedding hall is unjustified. 17. The Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu v. Mahalakshmi Ammal reported in (1996) 7 SCC 269 in paragraph 9 had observed as follows: “9.It is well-settled law that publication of the declaration under Section 6 gives conclusiveness to public purpose. Award was made on 26-9-1986 and for Survey No. 2/11 award was made on 31-8-1990. Possession having already been undertaken on 24-11-1981, it stands vested in the State under Section 16 of the Act free from all encumbrances and thereby the Government acquired absolute title to the land. .............. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subject to Section 28-A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. .............. If compensation was accepted without protest, it binds such party but subject to Section 28-A. Possession of the acquired land would be taken only by way of a memorandum, Panchnama, which is a legally accepted norm. It would not be possible to take any physical possession. Therefore, subsequent continuation, if any, had by the erstwhile owner is only illegal or unlawful possession which does not bind the Government nor vested under Section 16 divested in the illegal occupant. Considered from this perspective, we hold that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the award.” (Emphasis added) 18. Similarly, the Supreme Court has also held that when compensation has been paid as per the market value, the question of the land owner seeking for restitution of land will not arise. In this context, it is necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Syed Akbar reported in (2005) 1 SCC 558 and in paragraphs 11 to 14, the Supreme Court had observed as follows: “11. ......it is clear that under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the acquired land should vest in the State free from all encumbrances and that any executive order inconsistent with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act was invalid. Further that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. ..... 12. In the case ChandragaudaRamgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra claim of the petitioner for restitution of the possession of the land acquired pursuant to the resolution of the State Government was rejected. In para 2, this Court observed thus: (SCC p. 406) “2. … We do not think that this Court would be justified in making direction for restitution of the land to the erstwhile owners when the land was taken way back and vested in the Municipality free from all encumbrances. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. We are not concerned with the validity of the notification in either of the writ petitions. It is axiomatic that the land acquired for a public purpose would be utilised for any other public purpose, though use of it was intended for the original public purpose. It is not intended that any land which remained unutilised, should be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of the notification. Under these circumstances, the High Court was well justified in refusing to grant relief in both the writ petitions.” 13. Yet in another recent decision, this Court in Northern Indian Glass Industries v. JaswantSingh referring to the case of ChandragaudaRamgonda Patil and other cases held that: (SCC p. 340, para 12) “12. If the land was not used for the purpose for which it was acquired, it was open to the State Government to take action but that did not confer any right on the respondents to ask for restitution of the land.” Paras10 and 11 of the said judgment read thus: (SCC p. 340) “10. In ChandragaudaRamgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra it is stated that the acquired land remaining unutilised was not intended to be restituted to the erstwhile owner to whom adequate compensation was paid according to the market value as on the date of notification. 11. Yet again in C. Padma v. Dy. Secy. to the Govt. of T.N. it is held that acquired land having vested in the State and the compensation having been paid to the claimant, he was not entitled to restitution of possession on the ground that either original public purpose had ceased to be in operation or the land could not be used for other purpose.” 14. From the position of law made clear in the aforementioned decisions, it follows that (1) under Section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, the land acquired vests in the Government absolutely free from all encumbrances; (2) the land acquired for a public purpose could be utilised for any other public purpose; and (3) the acquired land which is vested in the Government free from all encumbrances cannot be reassigned or reconveyed to the original owner merely on the basis of an executive order. 19. 19. The petitioner absolutely has no justification to seek for four cents of land from the original acquisition, for which he had no legal right. Secondly, the so called assurance given during the Award enquiry was only for an alternative land, whereas when he filed a writ petition after dismissal of the suit (details of which is not revealed), the court did not grant any positive direction. Merely on the basis of the promise made during the award enquiry enabling the petitioner to seek for reconveyance in terms of Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act, the petitioner cannot invoke the power of the State Government as ordered by this court by filing an application under Section 48-B. Even in such case, the Supreme Court has held that the power of the State Government is very limited and the said position of law has been clarified by the Supreme Court in its two decisions. 20. The Supreme Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal and Ors reported in 2007 (2) CTC 447 in paragraph 11 had observed as follows:- "...Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here." 21. This view was fortified by the Supreme Court in its subsequent decision inTamil Nadu Housing Board v. L.Chandrasekaran and Ors reported in 2010 (2) SCC 786 , wherein the Supreme Court had dealt with the scope of Section 48-B and had considered all the cases arising out of reconveyance. In paragraphs 28 and 29, it was observed as follows:- "28. It need no emphasis that in exercise of power under Section 48-B of the Act, the Government can release the acquired land only till the same continues to vest in it and that too if it is satisfied that the acquired land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose. To put it differently, if the acquired land has already been transferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercise power under Section 48-B of the Act and re-convey the same to the original owner. To put it differently, if the acquired land has already been transferred to other agency, the Government cannot exercise power under Section 48-B of the Act and re-convey the same to the original owner. In any case, the Government cannot be compelled to re-convey the land to the original owner if the same can be utilized for any public purpose other than the one for which it was acquired. 29. Before concluding, we may notice the judgment of this Court in Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. Keeravani Ammal (supra). The question considered in that case was whether the Division Bench of the High Court could direct release of the acquired land which had been transferred to the appellant-Board. While setting aside the impugned order, this Court observed: (SCC pp.261-62, paras 13-16) "13.It is clearly pleaded by the State and the Tamil Nadu Housing Board that the scheme had not been suspended or abandoned and that the lands acquired are very much needed for the implementation of the scheme and the steps in that regard have already been taken. In the light of this position, it is not open to the Court to assume that the project has been abandoned merely because another piece of land in the adjacent village had been released from acquisition in the light of orders of the Court. It could not be assumed that the whole of the project had been abandoned or has become unworkable. It depends upon the purpose for which the land is acquired. As we see it, we find no impediment in the lands in question being utilised for the purpose of putting up a multi-storied building containing small flats, intended as the public purpose when the acquisition was notified. Therefore, the High Court clearly erred in proceeding as if the scheme stood abandoned. This was an unwarranted assumption on the part of the Court, which has no foundation in the pleadings and the materials produced in the case. The Court should have at least insisted on production of materials to substantiate a claim of abandonment. 14. We have already noticed that in the writ petition, there are no sufficient allegations justifying interference by the Court. The Court should have at least insisted on production of materials to substantiate a claim of abandonment. 14. We have already noticed that in the writ petition, there are no sufficient allegations justifying interference by the Court. Mere claim of possession by the writ petitioners is not a foundation on which the relief now granted could have been rested either by the learned Single Judge or by the Division Bench of the High Court. On the materials, no right to relief has been established by the writ petitioners. 15. We may also notice that once a piece of land has been duly acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, the land becomes the property of the State. The State can dispose of the property thereafter or convey it to anyone, if the land is not needed for the purpose for which it was acquired, only for the market value that may be fetched for the property as on the date of conveyance. The doctrine of public trust would disable the State from giving back the property for anything less than the market value. In State of Kerala v. M.Bhaskaran Pillai (1997) 5 SCC 432 in a similar situation, this Court observed : (SCC p.433, para 4) "4.....The questionemerges whether the Government can assign the land to the erstwhile owners? It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the rest of the land could be used for any other public purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the Directive Principles of the Constitution. In the present case, what we find is that the executive order is not in consonance with the provision of the Act and is, therefore, invalid. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value." 16. Under these circumstances, the Division Bench is well justified in declaring the executive order as invalid. Whatever assignment is made, should be for a public purpose. Otherwise, the land of the Government should be sold only through the public auctions so that the public also gets benefited by getting a higher value." 16. Section 48-B introduced into the Act in the State of Tamil Nadu is an exception to this rule. Such a provision has to be strictly construed and strict compliance with its terms insisted upon. Whether such a provision can be challenged for its validity, we are not called upon to decide here. " 22. Therefore, the petitioner's attempt is to make the respondents to return the land on the basis of a so-called promise which has not been proved and accepted in any court decisions. In the present case, when once the property belonging to a Hindu religious institution, then the question of parting with the properties will not arise by any order of the execution officer either by way of exchange or sale or mortgage. Even the Executive Officer has no power to grant lease for a term exceeding 5 years for any immovable property. If the period of lease by a religious institution exceeds, it shall be null and void in terms of Section 34 of the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act. For entering into a lease beyond five years, it requires consideration by the Commissioner and prior approval by the State Government. When the Executive Officer had offered to provide a shop opposite to the temple on a rental basis for a period of two years, he had acted properly within his discretion. In fact, the memo by which such offer was made, he had stated that beyond two years, it will be subject to renewal and the petitioner can seek for its continuance. 23. Therefore, it is understandable in the light of these difficulties when the matter came up before this court and when the Executive Officer had offered to provide a shop immediately opposite to the temple on rental basis, the counsel lost no time to grab the opportunity only in the interest of his client. 23. Therefore, it is understandable in the light of these difficulties when the matter came up before this court and when the Executive Officer had offered to provide a shop immediately opposite to the temple on rental basis, the counsel lost no time to grab the opportunity only in the interest of his client. The fact that the client's signature was not obtained in the memo cannot invalidate the consent given by the counsel for the petitioner especially when the petitioner was very much present in the court. The counsel took time to explain to him the terms of offer. The counter affidavit filed by the Executive Officer states that the court had enquired with the petitioner. The said averment in the counter affidavit was not controverted by the petitioner by way of any reply. 24. The counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in RajenderSingh Vs. Lt. Governor, Andaman & Nicobar Islands and others reported in AIR 2006 SC 75 = (2005) 13 SCC 289 for contending that the power of the court to correct errors crept-in in a judgment to prevent miscarriage of justice in a review petition is intact. He relied on the following passage found in paragraph 16 of the judgment which reads as follows: “16.The power, in our opinion, extends to correct all errors to prevent miscarriage of justice. The courts should not hesitate to review their own earlier order when there exists an error on the face of the record and the interest of justice so demands in appropriate cases. The grievance of the appellant is that though several vital issues were raised and documents placed, the High Court has not considered the same in its review jurisdiction. In our opinion, the High Court's order in the review petition is not correct which really necessitates our interference.” 25. As to how far consent given by the counsel would bind the petitioner, reliance was placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court inDaily Partap Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Union Territory, Chandigarh reported in (1998) 8 SCC 90 . As to how far consent given by the counsel would bind the petitioner, reliance was placed upon a judgment of the Supreme Court inDaily Partap Vs. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Punjab, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh and Union Territory, Chandigarh reported in (1998) 8 SCC 90 . The following passage found in paragraph 8 relied on reads as follows: “8.However, it has to be kept in view that the Advocate General's concession was on a question of law as to whether the Scheme which was put forward by the appellants as Production Bonus Scheme was covered by Section 6 read with Section 2(b) or not. Such a concession on the question of law cannot bind the authorities for all time to come but even apart from this aspect of the matter, the said concession has to be considered as a whole. In the same breath, while conceding that the appellants were not required to contribute on production bonus amounts, the learned Advocate General made it clear that they have to deposit provident fund on the “wages” as defined under the Act meaning thereby the question whether the disputed amounts for which refund was to be claimed by the appellants from the authorities fell within the definition of “wages” under the Act or not. It was a live issue which had to be decided by the authorities in proposed refund applications. Learned Advocate General had not given an absolute concession that the appellants were not liable to contribute any part of the disputed amount towards provident fund and that it never fell within the definition of the word “wages”. Under these circumstances, when the applications for refund were moved by the appellants, they were required to be decided on their own merits. The statement of the learned Advocate General before the High Court had no adverse effect on such a statutory jurisdiction of the authorities. The merits of refund applications had to be decided by the authorities after hearing the appellants. The entire question whether the claim for refund was justified in law or not and the further connected question whether the amounts deposited were towards “basic wages” or otherwise were open for consideration of the authorities. It cannot be said that such an inquiry was not open to the authorities and was clearly shut out by the order of the High Court dated 19-7-1976 recording the concession of the learned Advocate General. It cannot be said that such an inquiry was not open to the authorities and was clearly shut out by the order of the High Court dated 19-7-1976 recording the concession of the learned Advocate General. The first point, therefore, is answered against the appellants and in favour of the respondent-authorities.” 26. It is not clear as to how the above passage will help the case of the petitioner. Hence, it will be necessary to refer to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Endowments v. Vittal Rao reported in (2005) 4 SCC 120 and in paragraphs 15,16,17 and 20, the Supreme Court had observed as follows: “15.The contention that the order passed by the learned Single Judge accepting the compromise when it was not in writing and not signed by the parties could not be accepted by the learned Single Judge, in our view, has no force for reasons more than one. 16. The decisions in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel3 and Banwari Lal v. ChandoDevi4 cited by the learned counsel for the appellants to contend that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the writ petition based on the consent statement made on behalf of the parties when the compromise was not reduced to writing and was not signed by the parties could not be accepted, do not advance the case of the appellants. These decisions dealt with the validity of the compromises arising out of suits. It is true that under Rule 24 of the Andhra Pradesh Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply to writ petitions or writ appeals. Section 141 CPC provides that procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any court of civil jurisdiction. But, the Explanation to Section 141 states that the expression “proceedings” does not include any proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. By virtue of Rule 24 of the A.P. Writ Proceedings Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be applied as far as possible. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition in terms of memorandum dated 27-10-1989 on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. By virtue of Rule 24 of the A.P. Writ Proceedings Rules, the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code could be applied as far as possible. The learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition in terms of memorandum dated 27-10-1989 on the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. The memorandum was issued by the Government at the instance of the Endowments Commissioner and the same was accepted by Respondent 1 though not initially but during the pendency of the writ petition in the High Court. Further, it is not the case of the appellants that the counsel did not have authority to make a statement before the Court to accept the compromise. In ByramPestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India5 in para 39, it is held thus: (SCC p. 47) “39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognise such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in court. If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated.” 17. The High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders. Such power can neither be controlled nor affected by the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. It would not be correct to say that the terms of Order 23 Rule 3 should be mandatorily complied with while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. Otherwise an anomalous situation would arise such as before disposing of the writ petition, issue should be framed or evidence should be recorded, etc. Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution stand on a different footing when compared to the proceedings in suits or appeals arising there from. 20. Otherwise an anomalous situation would arise such as before disposing of the writ petition, issue should be framed or evidence should be recorded, etc. Proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution stand on a different footing when compared to the proceedings in suits or appeals arising there from. 20. Thus, on the facts of the case, it is not possible to hold that the order of the learned Single Judge disposing of the writ petition was bad in law particularly when he exercised his jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. At any rate, when the findings recorded and the decision made in the first round of litigation between the parties being binding, the appellants cannot take advantage on the ground that compromise was not reduced to writing and not signed by the parties. Even otherwise, if this compromise is to be annulled accepting the contention of the appellants, it would be to their disadvantage in the light of the findings recorded earlier in the first round of litigation. (Emphasis added) 27. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Order 23 Rule 3 CPC may not strictly apply. But there are also contra view points. Yet the fact is that the client (petitioner) was present in the court on the day when the matter was called on 28.02.2011 which was reiterated in the counter affidavit filed by the third respondent Executive Officer. This court also asked Mr.T.S.Mohammed Mohideen as to the fact his client (the petitioner) was present in the court on that day in order to avoid any misconception. The learned counsel without hesitation confirmed that the petitioner was present during the hearing of the case and that he had apprised him about the terms of offer. This court took such an extraordinary step of asking the earlier counsel only because the truth should not be buried in the pleadings between parties and the earlier counsel should not be condemned without affording an opportunity. This court has no hesitation to accept the statement of the previous counsel of the petitioner and to reject to grounds raised by the review petitioner. 28. There is yet another factor which can also fortify this fact. This court has no hesitation to accept the statement of the previous counsel of the petitioner and to reject to grounds raised by the review petitioner. 28. There is yet another factor which can also fortify this fact. The petitioner in his affidavit filed in support of the delay condonation application, in paragraph 14 had averred as follows: “14.I submit that based on the 3rd respondent above submission this Hon'ble Court ask my earlier counsel whether the offer is accepted or not. At that time my earlier counsel accepted the 3rd respondent offer as if I have accepted the 3rd respondent offer. Based on the above submission this Hon'ble Court is disposed the writ petition. Immediately asked by earlier counsel without my instruction the 3rd respondent offer now to be accepted which is against my interest and to that effect I have expressed my unhappiness to my earlier counsel and I have obtained the case bundle from the earlier counsel.....” (Emphasis added) 29. In the underlined passage quoted above, the petitioner had used the term immediately. He had not stated as to when he had asked the counsel about his unauthorised consent. Therefore, the term “immediately” only refers to his immediate presence in the Court on that date. Though the review application was filed with 23 days' delay, there was nothing in the typed set to show that the petitioner had sent any protest letter to the counsel about the illegal consent given by him. On the contrary, he claims without indicating the date on which he took the bundle from the previous counsel. The vakalat filed in support of the review application also do not even any consent for change of vakalat. It is not clear as to how the Registry did not return the papers for obtaining the consent vakalat from the previous counsel before numbering the review petition. Therefore, the present allegation is made without any justification only with a view to resile from the commitment made on his behalf and go back to square one of his case. On the contrary, the petitioner by his own conduct had given up his original claim. He had no enforceable right especially after the order was passed by this court in the earlier writ petition dated 18.2.2004 in W.P.No.19187 of 1996. On the contrary, the petitioner by his own conduct had given up his original claim. He had no enforceable right especially after the order was passed by this court in the earlier writ petition dated 18.2.2004 in W.P.No.19187 of 1996. The only liberty given there was to file an application under Section 48-B of the Land Acquisition Act and that option was yet to be exercised. Hence, the petitioner cannot make all kinds of allegations. 30. Even an allotment of land or shop is not a condition precedent for acquisition and it cannot be done free of cost on the basis of any so-called assurance by an acquiring officer. If the temple devasthanam builds shops, they have to give it only on rental basis for a limited period on lease. It may be renewed depending upon the rules. In the present case, the shop offered is located exactly opposite to the temple. It does not prevent the petitioner to carry out his avocation from that shop on a rental basis. In the award proceedings, when compensation was fixed for the land acquired, the petitioner did not have any objection for the rate of compensation by taking the issue under Section 18 before a reference court. The petitioner cannot build castle over a statement made during the award enquiry and demand fulfilment of an obligation on the part of the requisitioning authority failing which to enforce it before the court in a matter relating to land acquisition. 31. Hence there is no case made out to entertain the review application. This court do not think any improper conduct on the part of the previous counsel in giving consent for securing an order which is in the best interest of the petitioner. The order itself was obtained with the full knowledge of the petitioner who was present in Court. 32. In the light of the above, the review application will stand dismissed. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition stands closed. Though this court could have ordered cost on the review petitioner for filing frivolous petition, yet under the facts and circumstances of the court, parties are directed to bear their own costs.