ORDER : N. Kirubakaran, J. 1. Facts of this case remainds of this popular Tamil film song. This is a classic case as to how responsible people acted inhumanely, illegally while dealing with the service of their own "sick employee". It is very disheartening to note that a driver affected by "Epilepsy" was discharged from service unfairly and in a manner unknown to law consequently throwing his family with two minors to indigent circumstances. The case of the petitioners is that they are the legal heirs of one Muniyandi, who was employed as a driver by the second respondent Transport Corporation for more than 15 years. The said Muniyandi fell ill and took treatment as an inpatient in Government Rajaji Hospital armature and died on 18.3.1995 while he was in service. Subsequently the petitioners submitted an application for payment of service benefits from the second respondent, who paid only gratuity and provident fund and refused to pay other benefits viz, "Group insurance" and "Family pension" to the tune of Rs.2,47,000/-. A lawyer notice dated 26.7.1996 sent by the petitioners did not evoke any response. Therefore C.P. was filed u/s 33(c) (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, claiming the aforesaid amount. 2. The said claim petition was resisted by the second respondent on the ground that the workman was discharged from service on medical ground through order dated 27.2.1995 and that the gratuity amount of Rs. 22,341/- and provident fund amount of Rs.30,844/- were paid to the petitioners and that the amount under the "employees group insurance scheme" is payable, only, where an employee dies while he is in employment, whereas the said Muniyandi died after discharge from service. 3. It was further contended that there is no fund called as "Family Benefit Funds" and there is a "Social Security Scheme" which is also available only to those who die during employment, attain superannuation and avail voluntary scheme. Therefore, the petitioners cannot maintain a petition u/s 33(c) (2) of Industrial Disputes Act as Muniyandi was already discharged from service. 4. On appreciation of pleadings and evidence, the labour court found that the petitioners did not prove that the employee died during employment and that he was already discharged from service on 27.2.1995 before his death on 18.3.1995 and the same was admitted by the first petitioner in her letter Ex.R2 and that no relief could be granted tithe petitioner. 4. On appreciation of pleadings and evidence, the labour court found that the petitioners did not prove that the employee died during employment and that he was already discharged from service on 27.2.1995 before his death on 18.3.1995 and the same was admitted by the first petitioner in her letter Ex.R2 and that no relief could be granted tithe petitioner. The said order of the Labour Court is being challenged before this court in this writ petition. 5. Heard the rival contentions. Original file from the second respondent was summoned and perused. It is an admitted position that the said Muniyandi was employed byte second respondent Corporation. The only dispute is whether he died on 18.3.1995 while he was in service or not. It is the contention of the second respondent/corporation that the said Muniyandi was discharged from service on 27.2.1995 and thereafter only he died on 18.3.1995 and therefore no amount is payable to the petitioners. Though the main issue is as to whether the petitioners are entitled to benefits under Group Insurance and social security scheme, it directly depends upon the issue as to whether the workman died on 18.3.1995 while he was in service or not? 6. It is true that the party who approaches the court has to prove his/her case through pleadings and positive evidence. Where as in this case, it is the contention of the petitioners that the said Muniyandi (Workman) died while he was in service, which was denied by the second respondent Corporation. The learned counsel for the petitioners contended that there is no proof available on record to show that the discharge order dated 27.2.1995 (Exhibit-R3) was served upon the employee C. Muniyandi. When the second respondent corporation admitted that the said Muniyandi was in service and discharged from service on 27.2.1995, it is bounden duty of the second respondent to prove as to how the workman was discharged from service on 27.2.1995. That apart, the second respondent has to prove before the court that the workman was discharged after following due process of law. Further, the second respondent was in possession of documents regarding service of discharge order on Mainland to prove its contentions that he was validly discharged and intimated the same. How ever, a perusal of the evidence would reveal that the second respondent miserably failed to produce any proof regarding service of discharge order. 7. Further, the second respondent was in possession of documents regarding service of discharge order on Mainland to prove its contentions that he was validly discharged and intimated the same. How ever, a perusal of the evidence would reveal that the second respondent miserably failed to produce any proof regarding service of discharge order. 7. How ever the labour court found that the said Muniyandi died on 18.3.1995, after discharge from service on 27.2.1995, and for reaching the said conclusion, it relied upon evidence of RW1 and Ex.R2 letter. On the contrary, a perusal of evidence of RW1 would reveal that the discharge order was not communicated to the workman. The relevant portion of RW1 reads as follows: 9.3.1995, The following endorsement is found in the discharge order with regard to service on the employee. The aforesaid RW1's evidence and the endorsement make it very clear that no proof is available to show that the order was sent through registered post or certificate of posting, except the remark that the order was pasted in the notice board. Therefore, it is crystal clear that there was no service of discharge order dated 27.2.1995 on the workman. 8. Regarding service of notice, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab Vs. Amar Singh Harika, AIR 1966 SC 1313 , held that mere passing of order of dismissal would not make it effective, unless it was published and communicated to the concerned officer. Similarly in B.J. Shelat Vs. State of Gujarat and Others, (1978) 2 SCC 202 , it was held that it is incumbent on the government to communicate notice to the government servant before giving permission to retire. In Assistant Transport Commissioner, Lucknow and Others Vs. Nand Singh, (1979) 4 SCC 19 , held that mere writing order in the file kept in the office of the Taxation Office, is not an order in the eye of law and the order would be effective against the person affected by it, only when it comes to his knowledge. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Qimat Rai Gupta and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 309 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the communication of the order is a necessary ingredient for bringing end result status or to provide a person an opportunity to recourse of law if he is aggrieved thereby the order is required to be communicated. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Qimat Rai Gupta and Others, (2007) 7 SCC 309 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the communication of the order is a necessary ingredient for bringing end result status or to provide a person an opportunity to recourse of law if he is aggrieved thereby the order is required to be communicated. In Union of India vs. S. P. Singh reported in 2008 (3) SC 609, it was held that when the order was dispatched to a wrong address, it could not be deemed to have been communicated to the concerned person. 9. The above judgments make it very clear that the order should be communicated to the concerned party and then only it would take effect. In this case there was no service of discharge order on the employee so that the aggrieved party could have sought remedy and there was violation of principles of natural justice as he was not afforded fair and adequate opportunity. 10. Indrani Bai (Smt) Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (1994) 2 SCC 256 Supp, a government servant was dismissed form service without affording any opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the order was confirmed in the appeal. Meanwhile the delinquent officer died on 1.3.1985 and the widow made a representation for payment of gratuity, pension and other retirement benefits and sought for alternative employment, which was denied and therefore an application was filed before the Tribunal and was dismissed. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, while setting aside the order on the ground of violation of principles of justice held as follows: 6. Under these circumstances, it is a clear case that the delinquent had not been afforded a fair opportunity, much less a reasonable opportunity to defend himself. That has resulted in violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play offending Articles 41, 21 and 311(2) of the Constitution. The orders of dismissal as confirmed by the appellate authority are accordingly quashed. The respondents are directed to grant to the appellant the pensionary benefits according to rules and also to consider her case for suitable appointment on any post to which she may be eligible for rehabilitation, on compassionate ground. The orders of dismissal as confirmed by the appellate authority are accordingly quashed. The respondents are directed to grant to the appellant the pensionary benefits according to rules and also to consider her case for suitable appointment on any post to which she may be eligible for rehabilitation, on compassionate ground. The respondents are further directed to pay the full salary payable to the deceased delinquent to the appellant from the date on which he was kept under suspension till date on which he would have attained superannuation or 28-2-1985, the preceding date of his death whichever is earlier, with all consequential benefits after deducting the subsistence allowance already paid, right from the date of the suspension order till date of dismissal. The exercise should be done within three months from the date of the receipt of the order. " (Emphasis supplied) In this case also the order of discharge was not communicated to the workman in the manner known to law as evident from the records produced before this Court. In view of the settled position of law, regarding service of orders, the finding of the labour court the workman died after discharge from service is vitiated by error of law on the face of record. Therefore this court holds that the order of discharge dated 27.2.1995 did not take effect, as it was not communicated. In the absence of service of discharge order, it has to be held that the workman continued to be in service on the date of his death. 11. The Labour court in para 9 of the order observed that PW1 (the first petitioner herein) through Ex.R2 letter admitted that the second respondent corporation discharged her husband from service and rejected the contentions of the petitioners that due to ignorance, such a letter was given and upheld the contentions of the second respondent that the workman was discharged on 18.3.1995. Ex.R1 letter given by the first petitioner starts with the following words: A perusal of the aforesaid letter would reveal that the said Sundarammal, the first petitioner herein, affixed her thumb impression in Ex.R1 letter and it is clear that shies an illiterate lady who cannot read and write. No prudent/normal person would write such a letter with a preface describing herself as the wife of discharged driver on medical ground. No prudent/normal person would write such a letter with a preface describing herself as the wife of discharged driver on medical ground. That itself would only prove that the aforesaid letter was deliberately prepared by the officials of the second respondent and her thumb impression was obtained therein, taking advantage of her illiterate status, ignorance and economic conditions. The first petitioner as PW1, in her oral evidence, deposed that because of illiteracy and ignorance, such a letter was given. When such is the contention of the petitioners, the labour court should have examined the contents of the letter in which thumb impression of the illiterate lady was found. By no stretch of imagination, Ex.P2 notice and Ex.R2 letter can be deemed to be an admission on the part of the first respondent as erroneously found by the Labour court. The lower court cannot mechanically go by the words founding the documents and it should apply its Judicial mind or should have considered the said documents in Toto, especially when the petitioners pleaded and contended before the court that the workman died during employment. Therefore, the said letter is unreliable and therefore, the same cannot be put against the petitioners to deny them relief. Usually this Court under Article 226, cannot re-appreciate the evidence and finer details of the facts of the case warrant to do such an exercise. This court is not powerless when the court below gave erroneous and perverse findings contrary to law and evidence as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Nagendra Nath Bora and Another Vs. The Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam and Others, AIR 1958 SC 398 , which was followed by the Division Bench of this Court in Sivaprakasam vs. The Tahsildar (Jr) Ariyalur and 30 others reported in 2009 (5) CT 907 12. In para 7 of the award, the tribunal relying upon Ex.R3 discharge order concluded that after giving showcase notice and considering his reply, the workman was discharged from service before his death. However, no such show cause notice and reply is produced by the second respondent. Therefore, the finding of the tribunal in this regard is based on no evidence which is liable to be set-aside. Courts should be more considerate, sympathetic especially dealing with cases of weaker sections of the society. This court does not advocate that the court should depart from law. Therefore, the finding of the tribunal in this regard is based on no evidence which is liable to be set-aside. Courts should be more considerate, sympathetic especially dealing with cases of weaker sections of the society. This court does not advocate that the court should depart from law. However, this Court has to caution that mechanical approach on the part of the courts would definitely result in miscarriage of justice. 13. Assuming that on medical ground the workman was unfit to do his usual duties and he was validly discharged from service as per law, the second respondent is required to act as per G.O. No. 746 dated 2.7.1981, which deals with provisions of alternative employment for the employees who are discharged on medical grounds. Paragraph 2 of the G.O. reads as follows: The government accordingly directs that the workers in Transport undertakings, who are declared "unfit" for continuation in the same posts by Doctors while in service, because of Eye defect or any other ailment, be discharged on medical and other service benefits be settled. They should be subsequently provided with alternative employment in the posts like (Helpers) depending upon their qualification and experience and suitability for the new posts without consulting the employment exchange. When the above G.O., which was marked as Ex.R4, speaks about provision for alternative employment of medically discharged employee, the second respondent corporation ought to have given alternative employment to the workman. Admittedly no such employment, as per the above G.O., was granted in favor of the workman. 14. This court wonders as to whether the officials could behave unfairly without bothering about the workman and his family which includes two minors. If the officials found that the workman was suffering from epilepsy, they should have treated him with utmost compassion and should have offered him alternative employment on discharge as per the GO. The absence of above act only proves that the second respondent deliberately acted for the reasons best known to them to deny benefits to the workman. The second respondent was aware that the workman was the sole breadwinner of the family and he had two minor children. The death of the workman resulted in indigent condition and the poor illiterate widow would find it difficult to look after the family and to bring up minor children. 15. The second respondent was aware that the workman was the sole breadwinner of the family and he had two minor children. The death of the workman resulted in indigent condition and the poor illiterate widow would find it difficult to look after the family and to bring up minor children. 15. As this court finds that the workman died during employment, the impugned order of the Labour Court is set aside and consequently the petitioners are entitled for the amount payable under "employment group insurance scheme", "social security scheme", and other applicable benefits and the same shall be directed to be calculated and paid to the petitioners within 12 weeks from the date of the receipt of the copy of the order. As the employee is found to have died during employment, a family member of the Petitioner is entitled for compassionate appointment as per G.O. Ms. No. 680 Transport Department dated 28.12.1977. As far as the compassionate appointment is concerned, the petitioners are directed to give representation to the second respondent corporation, who shall consider their claim as if the application was during 1995 as the workman died on 18.3.1995. 16. Though the petitioners only sought for quashing of the award and payment of Rs.2,47,000/-, under the schemes the facts and circumstances of the case also compel this Court to grant more relief's to the petitioners by moulding the relief. In the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. R. Reddappa and Another, (1993) 4 SCC 269 , declares once the court is convinced that the parties were unjustly treated, the court is not only competent but has an obligation to act in a manner which may be just and fair. It is well settled law that in exercise of writ jurisdiction, this court may mould the relief having regard to the facts of the case and interest of justice as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Food Corporation of India Vs. S.N. Nagarkar, (2002) 2 SCC 475 , and recently in M. Sudakar vs. V. Manoharan and others reported in 2011 (1) SCC 484 and Para 14 of the later judgment reads as follows: 14. The power to mould relief is always available to the court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative writs. S.N. Nagarkar, (2002) 2 SCC 475 , and recently in M. Sudakar vs. V. Manoharan and others reported in 2011 (1) SCC 484 and Para 14 of the later judgment reads as follows: 14. The power to mould relief is always available to the court possessed with the power to issue high prerogative writs. In order to do complete justice it can mould the relief, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case. In the facts of a given case a writ petitioner may not be entitled to the specific relief claimed by him but this itself will not preclude the writ court to grant such other relief which he is otherwise entitled. Further delay and aches do not bar the jurisdiction of the court. It is a matter of discretion and not of jurisdiction. The learned Single Judge had taken note of the relevant facts and declined to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 17. Therefore, this court exercising judicial discretion holds that: (1) The Employee was not discharged as per law as the discharge order dated 27.2.1995 was not communicated to him. (2) The Employee was deemed to be in service till his death, (3) Therefore, the petitioners are entitled to salary payable to the Employee from the date of discharge on 27.2.1995 till his death. (4) The petitioners are entitled to all benefits which are available to the family of the driver who dies during employment within 12 weeks from the receipt of the copy of the order. (5) Even if the employee's discharge is valid on medical ground, the respondents should have given alternative employment to the workman as per G.O. Ms. No. 746 dated 2.7.1981. (6) The second respondent shall give a compassionate employment to any one member of the family of the deceased employee, as per G.O.Ms. No. 680 Transport Department dated 28.12.1977 treating the application, for such compassionate employment, was made during 1995, after getting necessary application within two weeks from the eligible family member of the workman. The act of discharge of the driver, in a manner unknown to law by the second respondent, a public transport corporation, lacked bonafides, fair play besides violating human rights of the workman's family. The act of discharge of the driver, in a manner unknown to law by the second respondent, a public transport corporation, lacked bonafides, fair play besides violating human rights of the workman's family. As the second respondent, unlawfully and unfairly discharged the workman before his death, failed to give alternate employment to the workman as per G.O. Which is in force and denied the benefits to the petitioners and made the petitioner to run pillar to post seeking relief, this court awards a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand only) as compensation payable by the second respondent corporation to the petitioner within four weeks from the date of the receipt of a copy of this order. Writ petition is allowed with costs.