Judgment : 1. As these two Writ Petitions filed by the same petitioner, raised issues, which are intricately connected with each other, they are heard and being disposed of by this common judgment. I. Background facts:- Nuziveedu Seeds Private Limited, which filed both these Writ Petitions, is a company incorporated under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 and inter alia, engaged in the business of production, marketing and sale of seeds. Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Limited is also a company registered under the said Act with its registered office at Mumbai, engaged in the same business as Nuziveedu Seeds is. For convenience, the Maharashtra Hybrid Seeds Company Limited (respondent Nos.4 and 2 in W.P.Nos.16892/2010 and 20326/2010, respectively) is hereinafter referred to as “the private respondent”. 2. With a view to provide for a separate legislation for protection of plant varieties, the Parliament enacted the Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Act, 2001 (for short, “the Act”). Feeling dissatisfied with the procedure being followed by respondent No.1 and its Registrar, who is impleaded as respondent No.2 in Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010, hereinafter referred to as “respondent No.2”, in issuing advertisements inviting oppositions for registration of plant varieties by some of the seed breeders/producers, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010 for a Mandamus to declare the action of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in not implementing the provisions of the Act and Protection of Plant Varieties and Farmers’ Rights Rules, 2003 (for short, “the Rules”), in not causing proper and detailed publication of advertisement, as stipulated under the Act, in not carrying out ‘DUS’ test prior to inviting objections and in not bringing clarity with regard to essentially derived varieties at their registration prior to registration of new varieties, as illegal, arbitrary, unconstitutional and violative of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The petitioner sought for a consequential direction to respondent Nos.1 to 3 to strictly insist on the compliance of the various conditions as specified in the Act and the Rules with regard to the ‘DUS’ testing and advertising of full details in the publication. 3. The petitioner sought for a consequential direction to respondent Nos.1 to 3 to strictly insist on the compliance of the various conditions as specified in the Act and the Rules with regard to the ‘DUS’ testing and advertising of full details in the publication. 3. After filing Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.20326 of 2010 on 16.08.2010 for a Mandamus to declare the action of respondent Nos.1 and 2 in causing the advertisement of the applications of the private respondent in the Plant Varieties Journal of India by not following the procedure specified under the provisions of the Act and in not disclosing the particulars of the parental lines while issuing the advertisement, as illegal, unconstitutional and contrary to the provisions of the Act. The petitioner also sought for a consequential declaration that the advertisement issued by respondent No.1 in the Plant Variety Journal of India, Volumn No.4, Book No.5, dated 03.05.2010 in relation to the varieties applied for by the private respondent, as illegal and set aside the same and consequential direction to respondent No.1 to only cause proper advertisement in accordance with Sections 19, 20 and 21 of the Act and Rules 29 and 30 of the Rules by giving full particulars of the parental lines and after conducting the ‘DUS’ test to verify the characteristics. 4. Along with the Writ Petition, the petitioner filed WPMP.No.25803 of 2010 for stay of all further proceedings in pursuance of the private respondent’s application made in respect of about 8 varieties referred to therein as advertised and notified in the Plant Varieties Journal of India, Volumn No.4, Book No.5, dated 03.05.2010. On 17.08.2010, this Court granted stay as prayed for, for a period of four weeks. The said order was extended on 08.09.2010 until further orders. 5. The petitioner did not implead the private respondent in W.P.No.16892/2010. WPMP.No.28109 of 2010 was filed by the private respondent for its impleadment, which was ordered by this Court on 29.12.2010. II. The preliminary objection:- 6. Separate counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the official respondents and also the private respondent. Both the counter affidavits dealt with the various averments made by the petitioner on merits, besides the preliminary objection raised by the private respondent to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and adjudicate the Writ Petitions. 7. The preliminary objection:- 6. Separate counter affidavits have been filed on behalf of the official respondents and also the private respondent. Both the counter affidavits dealt with the various averments made by the petitioner on merits, besides the preliminary objection raised by the private respondent to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and adjudicate the Writ Petitions. 7. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the private respondent advanced extensive arguments both on the preliminary objection and also on merits. As the preliminary objection pertains to the very jurisdiction of this Court, both the learned counsel agreed that the necessity for this Court to adjudicate upon the various contentions raised on merits on behalf of the petitioner will depend upon the findings rendered on the preliminary issue. If this Court sustains the preliminary objection raised by the private respondent, the need for considering the cases on merits is obviated. Therefore, it is not necessary at this stage to refer to the various contentions advanced by both the learned counsel on merits. They will be referred to and dealt with, if need be after disposal of the preliminary objection. 8. The objection to the territorial jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and adjudicate the cases is based on clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The learned Senior counsel for the private respondent submitted that neither respondent Nos.1 and 2 function within the territories in relation to which this Court exercise its jurisdiction nor any cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within the territories in relation to which this Court exercise its jurisdiction. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as a part of cause of action arose within the State of A.P., this Court can exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petitions and grant the reliefs claimed therein. III. Submissions:- 10. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the petitioner argued that as a part of cause of action arose within the State of A.P., this Court can exercise its jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petitions and grant the reliefs claimed therein. III. Submissions:- 10. Sri C.V. Mohan Reddy, learned Senior counsel, submitted that respondent No.2 functions from New Delhi and it has no branches, the private respondent has its corporate office in Maharastra, applications for registration were made from Maharastra and the advertisement calling for opposition was issued from the office of respondent No.2 at New Delhi, the oppositions will be considered and a decision will be taken thereon by respondent No.2 at the registered office at New Delhi. The learned counsel therefore submitted that neither of the sub-clauses (1) and (2) of Article 226 of the Constitution of India is attracted for the petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court. In support of his submissions, the learned Senior counsel relied upon the following judgments: Alchemist Limited and another vs. State Bank of Sikkim and others ( AIR 2007 SC 1812 ), Oil and Natural Gas Commission vs. Utpal Kumar Basu and others ( (1994) 4 SCC 711 ), State of Rajasthan and others vs. M/s. Swaika Properties and another ( (1985) 3 SCC 217 ), Union of India and others vs. Adani Exports Ltd., and another ( AIR 2002 SC 126 ), Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd., vs. Union of India and another (2004) 6 SCC 254 , Kiran Singh and others vs. Chaman Paswan and others ( AIR 1954 SC 340 ) and Shree Subhlaxmi Fabrics (P) Ltd., vs. Chand Mal Baradia and others ( (2005) 10 SCC 704 ). 11. Sri S. Niranjan Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, while opposing the above submissions argued that the petitioner has seed processing plant at Hyderabad, right to file objections was available to the petitioner from the date of receiving Plant Varieties Journal in Hyderabad and that if the applications of the private respondent are accepted and its proposed plant varieties are registered that would seriously affect the petitioner’s business, which is being carried on within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. The infringement or threat of infringement of the petitioner’s rights, submits the learned counsel, is likely to take place within the territory of this Court. The infringement or threat of infringement of the petitioner’s rights, submits the learned counsel, is likely to take place within the territory of this Court. He further contended that as a Writ Petition even against threatened and violation of a person’s legal or constitutional rights is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and there is every threat of violation of the petitioner’s rights in the event of registration of the plant varieties proposed by the private respondent, the cause of action has accrued within the territories of this Court. Alternatively, the learned counsel submitted that having regard to the nature of the relief claimed, which is general in nature and not with reference to any specific action of respondent No.2, this Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate at least Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010, if not Writ Petition No.20326 of 2010. The learned counsel sought to fortify these submissions by placing reliance on the following judgments: Kusum Ingots (5 supra), Patel Roadways Limited, Bombay vs. Prasad Trading Company ( (1991) 4 SCC 270 ), Om Prakash Srivastava vs. Union of India and another ( (2006) 6 SCC 207 ), S.M.D. Kiran Pasha vs. Government of A.P., and others ( (1990) 1 SCC 328 ) and Godrej Sara Lee Limited vs. Reckitt Benckiser Australia Pty., Limited and another ( (2010) 2 SCC 535 ). IV. Consideration:- 12. There is no serious dispute that the facts of these cases do not satisfy the requirements of clause (1) of Article 226, because none of the respondents function within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Indeed, the circumstance of the petitioner carrying on its business activities within the State of Andhra Pradesh is not pressed into service, as that is hardly relevant for the purpose of clause (1) of Article 226. The whole emphasis of the learned counsel for the petitioner is on clause (2) of Article 226 based on the purported cause of action. i) The legislative history of Article 226:- 13. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the powers of issuing prerogative writs could be exercised in India only by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and that too within very rigid and defined limits. i) The legislative history of Article 226:- 13. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution, the powers of issuing prerogative writs could be exercised in India only by the High Courts of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay and that too within very rigid and defined limits. The writs could be issued only to the extent that the power in that respect was not taken away by the Codes of Civil and Criminal procedure and they could be directed only to persons and authorities within the original civil jurisdiction of these High Courts. The Constitution introduced a fundamental change of law in this respect. While dealing with this change, the Supreme Court in Election Commission, India vs. Saka Venkata Rao ( AIR 1953 SC 210 ) held that while Article 225 of the Constitution refers to the existing High Courts’ powers and jurisdictions which they had obviously, Article 226 confers on all the High Courts, new and very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs, which they never possessed before. 14. Article 226 of the Constitution, prior to its amendments, did not contain the concept of cause of action. It empowered every High Court to pass orders or issue writs including the writs in the nature of Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, Prohibition, Quo-warranto and Certiorari throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to any person or authority including, in appropriate cases, any Government within those territories. In Election Commission (12 supra) the petitioner applied to the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution for a writ of Prohibition restraining the Election Commission having its office permanently located at New Delhi from enquiring into the alleged disqualification of the petitioner from membership of the Madras Legislative Assembly. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. The High Court of Madras issued a writ. While reversing the said judgment in the appeal filed by the aggrieved party, speaking for the Court, Patanjali Sastri, C.J. observed as under: “The makers of the Constitution, having decided to provide for certain basic safeguards for the people in the new set up, which they called fundamental rights, evidently thought it necessary to provide also a quick and inexpensive remedy for the enforcement of such rights and, finding that the prerogative writs which the Courts in England had developed and used whenever urgent necessity demanded immediate and decisive interposition, were peculiarly suited for the purpose, they conferred, in the States' sphere, new and wide powers on the High Courts of issuing directions, orders, or writs primarily for the enforcement of fundamental rights, the power to issue such directions, etc., "for any other purpose" being also included with a view apparently to place all the High Courts in this country in somewhat the same position as the Court of King's Bench in England. But wide as were the powers thus conferred, a two-fold limitation was placed upon their exercise. In the first place, the power is to be exercised "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", that is to say, the writs issued by the court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction. Secondly, the person or authority to whom the High Court is empowered to issue such writs must be "within those territories", which clearly implies that they must be amenable to its jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories.” (Emphasis added) 15. While dealing with cause of action, the Supreme Court held: “As to the cause of action, the Court stated: "The rule that cause of action attracts jurisdiction in suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issuable under Article 226 which makes no reference to any cause of action or where it arises but insists on the presence of the person or authority 'within the territories' in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction". 16. A Bench of seven judges in Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India ( AIR 1961 S.C. 532 ) examined the correctness of the judgment in Election Commission (12 supra), and the majority reaffirmed and approved the view taken by the Supreme Court in the said case. 17. 16. A Bench of seven judges in Khajoor Singh vs. Union of India ( AIR 1961 S.C. 532 ) examined the correctness of the judgment in Election Commission (12 supra), and the majority reaffirmed and approved the view taken by the Supreme Court in the said case. 17. As these judgments has lead to a situation where no Writ Petition against the Union of India would lie except in the High Court of Punjab (as Delhi High Court was not established by that time) the Parliament amended Article 226 under the Constitution (15th Amendment) Act, 1963 by inserting clause (1-A) after clause (1) which reads as under: “(1-A) The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories.” 18. The Constitution (42nd amendment) Act, 1976 renumbered clause (1-A) as clause (2). 19. The object of the amendment was stated as under: “Under the existing Article 226 of the Constitution, the only High Court which has jurisdiction with respect to the Central Government is the Punjab High Court. This involves considerable hardship to litigants from distant places. It is, therefore, proposed to amend Article 226. So that when any relief is sought against any Government, authority or person for any action taken, the High Court within whose jurisdiction the cause of action arises may also have jurisdiction to issue appropriate directions, orders or writs.” (Emphasis added) 20. As a result of the abovementioned constitutional amendment brought out in the year 1963, the High Courts are empowered to issue writs to a person or authority even outside the territories, provided the cause of action either wholly or in part arose within the territories of such High Courts. ii. Cause of action:- 21. This phrase is not defined either in the Constitution or in any other statutory enactment including the Code of Civil Procedure. As long ago as 1873, Lord Brett in Cooke vs. Gill ((1873) 8 CP 107) lucidly described “cause of action”. ii. Cause of action:- 21. This phrase is not defined either in the Constitution or in any other statutory enactment including the Code of Civil Procedure. As long ago as 1873, Lord Brett in Cooke vs. Gill ((1873) 8 CP 107) lucidly described “cause of action”. He observed: “‘Cause of action’ means every fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court.” 22. Every fact pleaded will not constitute cause of action. But it is only the bundle of facts, taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant, constitutes cause of action. For every action, there has to be a cause of action. If there is no cause of action, the plaint or petition has to be dismissed. It must include some act done by the defendant since in the absence of such an act no cause of action can possibly accrue. It is not limited to the actual infringement of the right sued on but includes all the material facts on which it is founded. The facts, which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the Court concerned. (see: Oil and Natural Gas Commission (2-supra), State of Rajasthan (3-supra), and Alchemist Limited (1-supra). iii. Whether circulation of Plant Varieties Journal and publication of advertisement constitute cause of action:- 23. Let me consider this aspect in the light of the relevant case law. 24. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission (2 supra), the Oil and Natural Gas Commission issued an advertisement in leading newspapers of the country inviting tenders for setting up of a Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit at ONGC’s Hazira complex in Gujarat. As per the said advertisement, the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to the EIL at New Delhi. A company called NICCO, having its registered office in Calcutta, read and became aware of the tender notice printed in the Times of India circulated within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The tenders were to be scrutinized by the Tender Committee and the final decision was to be taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the Chairman of the ONGC. The tenders were to be scrutinized by the Tender Committee and the final decision was to be taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi presided over by the Chairman of the ONGC. NICCO, along with others, submitted their bids in response to the tender notice. All the bids were scrutinized by EIL at New Delhi. NICCO’s bid was rejected on the ground that it did not fulfill the requisite experience criteria stipulated in the tender. The tender committee eventually accepted the recommendation of the EIL and a final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi in pursuance of which the contract was awarded to M/s. CIMMCO Limited. NICCO filed a Writ Petition in the Calcutta High Court for an order to restrain the ONGC from awarding the contract to any other party and if awarded, to cancel the same. The objection taken by M/s. CIMMCO with regard to the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the ground that no cause of action has arisen within its territories, notwithstanding, the Calcutta High Court passed an order directing the ONGC to consider the offer of NICCO along with others in the event the petitioner’s offer is otherwise found to be valid and the lowest. On an appeal filed by the ONGC under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court upheld the ONGC’s objection on the territorial jurisdiction of Calcutta High Court and rejected the plea of NICCO that as it has read the advertisement at Calcutta, submitted the offer from Calcutta, made representations from Calcutta and sent fax messages from Calcutta apart from receiving a reply thereto at Calcutta, by holding that they would not constitute facts forming integral part of cause of action. 25. In State of Rajasthan and others (3 supra), which was referred to and relied upon by the Supreme Court in Oil and Natural Gas Commission (2 supra), the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur at the instance of the Improvement Trust, Jaipur issued a notice intimating that the State Government proposed to acquire a large part of the lands situated on the outskirts of Jaipur for public purpose, namely; implementation of a development scheme. The said notice was served on the owners of the land at their Calcutta office. After holding enquiry, a final notification was issued for acquisition of the land. The said notice was served on the owners of the land at their Calcutta office. After holding enquiry, a final notification was issued for acquisition of the land. The attempt of the land owners to seek exemption under the provisions of Section 20 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 went in vain. Thereupon the land owners filed a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution in the High Court of Calcutta. The ex parte ad interim relief granted by the Calcutta High Court was questioned before the Supreme Court. Setting aside the interim order of the High Court, the Supreme Court held that mere service of notice under Section 52(2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 on the respondents at their registered office at 18-B, Brabourne Road, Calcutta could not give rise to a cause of action within that territory, unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. It was further held that the entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the said Act arose within the State of Rajasthan i.e., within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court of the Jaipur Bench. 26. In Alchemist Limited (1 supra), the appellant is a company having its registered and corporate office at Chandigarh. Respondent No.1 is the State Bank of Sikkim and respondent No.2 is the State of Sikkim. Respondent No.2, desirous of disinvesting 49% of its equity capital in the first respondent bank to a strategic partner with transfer of management in the first respondent bank, issued an advertisement in Economic Times and invited offers for strategic partnership. It was stipulated in the advertisement that the offers made by the parties would be subject to scrutiny by the Board of Directors of the first respondent bank with the right reserved by the Board of Directors to accept or reject the offer without assigning any reason. The appellant submitted its formal proposal for the strategic business partnership vide its offer dated 03.02.2004. After short-listing the offers, the Board of Directors in its meeting held negotiations with the appellant. The Chairman and the Managing Director of the first respondent bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. On being asked, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs.4.50 crores to show its bona fides with the State Bank of India Chandigarh. After short-listing the offers, the Board of Directors in its meeting held negotiations with the appellant. The Chairman and the Managing Director of the first respondent bank visited Chandigarh for further negotiations. On being asked, the appellant deposited a sum of Rs.4.50 crores to show its bona fides with the State Bank of India Chandigarh. Respondent No.1 bank informed the appellant company that its proposal was accepted in principle subject to consideration and approval of the Government of Sikkim. 27. However, the appellant received a communication at Chandigarh on 23.02.2006 by which the first respondent bank informed the appellant company that the Government of Sikkim has not approved the proposal submitted by the appellant and sought to withdraw the communication, dated 20.02.2004. Thereupon the appellant filed a Writ Petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana challenging the letter-cum-order dated 23.02.2006. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana dismissed the Writ Petition on the sole ground that it did not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition, as no cause of action has arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the case, the High Court has dismissed the Writ Petition granting liberty to the appellant to seek appropriate remedy before an appropriate Court. The said decision was challenged by the appellant in a civil appeal before the Supreme Court, wherein it has advanced the following submissions in support of its plea that the Punjab and Haryana High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain and decide the Writ Petition on merits. “i) The Appellant-Company has its Registered and corporate office at Chandigarh; ii) The Appellant- Company carries on business at Chandigarh; iii) The offer of the Appellant-Company was accepted on February 20, 2004 and the acceptance was communicated to it at Chandigarh; iv) Part performance of the contract took place at Chandigarh inasmsuch as Rs.4.50 crores had been deposited by the Appellant-Company in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh as per the request of the first respondent; v) The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the Appellant-Company; vi) Negotiations were held between the parties in the third week of March, 2005 at Chandigarh; vii) Letter of revocation dated February 23, 2006 was received by the Appellant-Company at Chandigarh. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant-Company is aggrieved.” 28. Consequences of the revocation ensued at Chandigarh by which the Appellant-Company is aggrieved.” 28. After exhaustive reference to the case law on cause of action, the Supreme Court held: “From the aforesaid discussion and keeping in view the ratio laid down in catena of decisions by this Court, it is clear that for the purpose of deciding, whether facts averred by the petitioner-appellant, would or would not constitute a part of cause of action, one has to consider whether such fact constitutes a material, essential or integral part of the cause of action. It is no doubt true that even if a small fraction of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit/petition. Nevertheless it must be a ‘part of cause of action’, nothing less than that. 29. In the present case, the facts which have been pleaded by the Appellant company, in our judgment, cannot be said to be essential, integral or material facts so as to constitute a part of ‘cause of action’ within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore was not wrong in dismissing the petition.” (Emphasis added) 30. From the precedents discussed above, the ratio that could be culled out is that the facts pleaded must constitute a material, essential or integral part of cause of action. Unless the advertisement or any publication constitutes such material, essential or integral part of cause of action, the Court within whose territories such publication is made will not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the dispute. As noted above, even though in Alchemist Limited(1 supra)not only that the appellant company applied in pursuance of the advertisement published in press from Chandigarh, but also the acceptance of offer was communicated to it at Chandigarh. Part performance of contract took place at Chandigarh with the deposit of Rs.4.50 crores in a fixed deposit at Chandigarh. The Chairman and Managing Director of the first respondent visited Chandigarh to ascertain the bona fides of the appellant company and negotiations were held between the parties at Chandigarh and also the letter of revocation was received by the appellant at Chandigarh. The Supreme Court has not considered all these facts as material, essential or integral part of cause of action for the Punjab and Haryana High Court to exercise its jurisdiction. 31. The Supreme Court has not considered all these facts as material, essential or integral part of cause of action for the Punjab and Haryana High Court to exercise its jurisdiction. 31. In comparison, the pleas raised by the petitioner in these cases are far weaker, as they are based on the mere fact that the Plant Varieties Journal and the advertisement were circulated within the State of Andhra Pradesh. By no means, these facts constitute material, essential or integral part of cause of action, as they do not have any bearing on the outcome of the dispute to be adjudicated by the Court, namely, whether respondent No.2 has complied with the mandatory provisions of the Act in dealing with the applications filed by the private respondent for registration of plant varieties. Accordingly, I hold that by mere circulation of the journal and advertisement, no part of cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. iv. Whether there exists threatened violation of petitioner’s rights giving rise of cause of action within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court: 32. To recapitulate, the alternative contention advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the relief claimed in Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010 questioning the procedure being followed by respondent No.2 is general in nature, while dealing with the applications received by him for registration of plant varieties and not with particular reference to any specific application and that as this procedure is threatening violation of petitioner’s rights in connection with its business carried on within the State of Andhra Pradesh, this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition. In fortification of his submission, the learned counsel relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in 33. S.M.D. Kiran Pasha (10 supra) and Om Prakash Srivastava (9 supra). 34. In S.M.D. Kiran Pasha (10 supra), as the appellant was summoned to the police station on 13.11.1987 for taking his photograph as was done in case of criminals, he moved this Court by filing Writ Petition No.79038 of 1987 and this Court issued directions as prayed for. Subsequently, the Excise authorities have registered some cases against the appellant who was granted bail on 10.05.1988. Subsequently, the Excise authorities have registered some cases against the appellant who was granted bail on 10.05.1988. Apprehending that the respondents may detain him by invoking the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Boot Leggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders And Land Grabbers Act, 1986, the appellant filed Writ Petition No.8610 of 1988 on 06.06.1988 in this Court inter alia by pleading that the successive actions initiated against him were a part of political vendetta. A learned Single Judge granted interim direction to the respondents on 08.06.1988 not to take the appellant into preventive custody for a period of 15 days on the basis of the cases already registered. On 10.06.1988, the appellant was served with the detention order dated 03.06.1988 as well as the grounds of detention. On 25.06.1988, the appellant filed miscellaneous application supported by an additional affidavit, wherein he assailed the grounds of detention as vague, stale, non-existent etc. On a reference being made by the learned Single Judge, a Division Bench heard the Writ Petition and disposed of the same by holding that as an order of detention was made even before the Writ Petition was filed, the prayer in the Writ Petition has become infructuous and that there was no extraordinary or special reasons to depart from the normal rule, namely; that in such a case the appellant should first surrender and move for a writ of Habeas Corpus. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant filed the civil appeal with leave before the Supreme Court. In these background facts, the Supreme Court formulated the following questions: 35. The right to life and personal liberty has been guaranteed as a fundamental right and for its enforcement one could resort to Article 226 of the Constitution for issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction. Precisely at what stage resort to Article 226 has been envisaged in the Constitution? When a right is so guaranteed, it has to be understood in relation to its orbit and its infringement. Conferring the right to life and liberty imposes a corresponding duty on the rest of the society, including the State, to observe that right, that is to say, not to act or do anything which would amount to infringement of that right, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Conferring the right to life and liberty imposes a corresponding duty on the rest of the society, including the State, to observe that right, that is to say, not to act or do anything which would amount to infringement of that right, except in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. In other words, conferring the right on a citizen involves the compulsion on the rest of the society, including the State, not to infringe that right. The question is at what stage the right can be enforced? Does a citizen have to wait till the right is infringed? Is there no way of enforcement of the right before it is actually infringed? Can the obligation or compulsion on the part of the State to observe the right be made effective only after the right is violated or in other words can there be enforcement of a right to life and personal liberty before it is actually infringed? What remedy will be left to a person when his right to life is violated? 36. While answering these questions, the Supreme Court held that resort to Article 226 after the right to personal liberty is already violated is different from the pre-violation protection, that post-violation resort to Article 226 is for remedy against violation and for restoration of the right, while pre-violation protection is by compelling observance of the obligation or compulsion under law not to infringe the right by all those who are so obligated or compelled and that to surrender and apply for a writ of Habeas Corpus is a post-violation remedy for restoration of the right, which is not the same as restraining potential violators in case of threatened violation of the right. 37. On a careful consideration of this judgment, it is quite apparent that the issue relating to the cause of action never arose in that case. There is no dispute in that case that even the pleaded threat of violation was within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In contrast, in this case, the petitioner failed to make out a case of threatened violation of its rights. In its affidavit in Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010, it is inter alia stated as under: “It is respectfully submitted that respondents 1 and 2 authorities are constituted under the Act the provisions of which have a pan India operation. In contrast, in this case, the petitioner failed to make out a case of threatened violation of its rights. In its affidavit in Writ Petition No.16892 of 2010, it is inter alia stated as under: “It is respectfully submitted that respondents 1 and 2 authorities are constituted under the Act the provisions of which have a pan India operation. The Plant Varieties Journal of India is published and circulated throughout the country of India for disseminating information about the advertisement. Notice of opposition can be sent from part of India including from within the State of Andhra Pradesh by registered post. The petitioner has its corporate office at Hyderabad and has seed processing plants in the State of Andhra Pradesh. The petitioner largely conducts its business and operations from within the State of Andhra Pradesh. Regulation 4 of Regulations also specifies that the jurisdiction of the Registrar shall be through out India. The petitioner is therefore entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Hon’ble court and this Hon’ble court has the power to deal with the issues raised in the Writ Petition.” (Emphasis added) 38. In the reply affidavit filed to the counter-affidavit of the private respondent, the petitioner reiterated that it is fully entitled to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court, as the cause of action available to the petitioner for challenging the action of respondent Nos.1 and 2 has directly arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court “as elaborated in the writ affidavit” and that even if a part of cause of action arises outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, such Court would have jurisdiction to decide the entire issue. 39. In para 29 of the affidavit filed in Writ Petition No.20326 of 2010, it is averred as under: “The petitioner has its corporate office in the State of Andhra Pradesh and has its major seed processing facilities within the State of Andhra Pradesh and largely conducts its business within the State of Andhra Pradesh. The registration of any variety would result in grant of indefeasible rights to the applicant eclipsing the rights of others to use the said varieties. The consequences of infringement, violations would visit the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble court. This Hon’ble court therefore has appropriate territorial jurisdiction to deal with the present issue in view of the Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.” (Emphasis added) 40. The consequences of infringement, violations would visit the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of this Hon’ble court. This Hon’ble court therefore has appropriate territorial jurisdiction to deal with the present issue in view of the Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India.” (Emphasis added) 40. Even construing the above-noted averments in the most liberal manner, they do not refer to the threatened violation of the petitioner’s rights, but at best they reflect the petitioner’s apprehension of threatened violation of its rights. It is pertinent to note in this context that so far the petitioner has filed objections to some of the applications of the private respondent and they are yet to be considered by respondent No.2. Passing of an order by respondent No.2, after considering the petitioner’s objections, has not yet taken place. Till such an order is passed, the petitioner cannot presuppose that respondent No.2 may register the plant varieties proposed by the private respondent. Even if the registration takes place that may by itself not violate the petitioner’s rights and if at all the threat of violation of petitioner’s rights may arise at that stage. Till that stage emerges, all the fears expressed by the petitioner of threat of violation of its rights can be termed only as mere apprehensions. No Court would entertain a dispute raised on mere apprehensions. Probably, when the petitioner files a case in this Court at post-registration stage if any, the further question would arise whether even in such an event any cause of action has arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court based on the plea of threat to violation of petitioner’s rights. But, surely, at this stage, the petitioner cannot invoke the jurisdiction of this Court on the purported threat to violation of its rights as the whole process before respondent No.2 is at embryonic stage. 41. The Judgment of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Srivastava (9 supra) does not advance the petitioner’s cause either. In the case arising before it, the Delhi High Court has declined to adjudicate the Writ Petition on merits by holding that it may have jurisdiction to entertain the case, if the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of Uttar Pradesh can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. In the case arising before it, the Delhi High Court has declined to adjudicate the Writ Petition on merits by holding that it may have jurisdiction to entertain the case, if the issues relating to conditions of prisoners in the State of Uttar Pradesh can be more effectively dealt with by the Allahabad High Court. Disapproving the approach of the Delhi High Court, the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court and remitted the same for fresh hearing on merits. In this process, the Supreme Court observed: “The question whether or not cause of action wholly or in part for filing a writ petition has arisen within the territorial limits of any High Court has to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In order to maintain a writ petition, a writ petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has prima facie either been infringed or is threatened to be infringed by the respondent within the territorial limits of the Court’s jurisdiction and such infringement may take place by causing him actual injury or threat thereof.” 42. Until the petitioner is able to establish that its legal right has been infringed or threatened to be infringed within the territorial limits of this Court’s jurisdiction, it cannot invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. As already held, the petitioner failed to establish the threatened violation of its rights by respondent Nos.1 and 2. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Patel Road Ways Limited, Bombay (8 supra) cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner was mainly concerned with the interpretation to be given to the latter part of explanation to Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the explanation to Section 20 enables a person to bring action in a Court within whose jurisdiction the subordinate office of the defendant is located and also the cause of action has arisen notwithstanding the fact that its principal office is somewhere else. In my opinion, this judgment has no relevance to these cases. 43. In my opinion, this judgment has no relevance to these cases. 43. In Godrej Sara Lee Limited (11 supra) a Writ Petition was entertained by the Delhi High Court on the plea that even though the registered design of the petitioner therein was cancelled in the State of West Bengal, within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court, on the ground that the impact of cancellation was suffered by the petitioner within the territorial jurisdiction of the Delhi High Court. The Supreme Court while reversing the judgment of the Delhi High Court held that the cause of action in that case has arisen on account of cancellation of the registration of the design and not on account of the impact thereof in any particular State. The learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on this judgment by contending that the Supreme Court has impliedly recognized the theory that where the impact of an impugned action is felt at a particular place, the Writ Petition lies to the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the impact is felt. Having regard to the foregoing discussion, this judgment also does not help the petitioner’s cause. v. Judgment in Writ Petition No.8031 of 2010:- 44. On an earlier occasion, the petitioner’s request for extending time for filing opposition to the applications filed by the private respondent for registration of two cotton varieties was rejected by respondent No.2. Questioning the said decision, the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.8031 of 2010. As in this case, the private respondent raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the Writ Petition in this Court. Upon considering the respective submissions of the parties and the case law, the learned Single Judge upheld the preliminary objection by holding that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the Writ Petition. The learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the said judgment is the subject matter of a writ appeal, which is pending before a Division Bench of this Court. 45. On a careful reading of the said judgment, I agree with the conclusions of the learned Judge even though I am unable to find myself in agreement with the finding of the learned Judge that the Tribunal whose order is sought to be quashed or the authority from whose custody the record is called for must be within the jurisdiction of the High Court before which Certiorari is sought. V. The contentions on merits:- 46. Having regard to the findings rendered on the preliminary question on the maintainability of the Writ Petition, it is not necessary for this Court to refer to and adjudicate on various contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties. VI. Conclusion:- 47. For all the aforementioned reasons, I hold that this Court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain these two Writ Petitions and they are accordingly dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to approach the appropriate High Court for redressal of its grievances. 48. As a sequel to dismissal of the Writ Petitions, interim order dated 08.09.2010 is vacated and all the miscellaneous applications pending in these Writ Petitions are dismissed. 49. Before parting with these cases, I place on record my deep appreciation for the pains taken in the preparation and presentation of the case by the learned Senior counsel Sri C.V.Mohan Reddy, learned counsel Sri S. Niranjan Reddy and respective learned counsel, who ably assisted them.