Judgment Smt. Abhilasha Kumari, J.—Rule. Mr. J.K. Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader waives service of notice of Rule on behalf of respondents. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, and with the consent of the learned Counsel for the respective parties, the petition is being heard and finally decided, today. 2. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order dated 14.03.2011 passed by the Chief Revenue Controlling Authority (Respondent No. 2), as well as order dated 17.02.2000, passed by the Deputy Collector (Respondent No. 3). 3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the petitioner, which is a Company incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, entered into a Sale Deed dated 10.11.1997 for land admeasuring 7315 sq.mtrs. situated at Block No. 471, Village Dalpura, Taluka Prantij, District Sabarkantha. According to the petitioner, by inadvertence, the Sale Deed was executed between the same parties, as the name of the petitioner-Company had been changed on 24.05.1993. The Sale Deed came to be presented to the Sub-Registrar, Prantij vide Document No. 992/1997 on 11.10.1997 for the purpose of registration. The Sub-Registrar forwarded the same to Respondent No. 3 for proper determination of duty under Section 31 of the Bombay Stamp Act, 1958 (“the Act”, for short). Respondent No. 3 passed order dated 17.02.2000 under Section 32(A) of the Act determining the market value of the property at Rs. 35,35,400/- and demanding payment of Rs. 1,25,040/- as stamp duty and Rs. 250/- as penalty from the petitioner, to be paid within 90 days. The petitioner challenged this order by filing a Civil Suit before the Court of 4th Additional Senior Civil Judge, Banaskantha at Himmatnagar. The Civil Suit was filed on 26.04.2000 and remained pending upto 31.01.2011, on which date it was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. After dismissal of the Civil Suit, the petitioner approached Respondent No. 3 under the provisions of Section 53(1) of the Act, by filing an appeal. The appeal of the petitioner has been rejected by impugned order dated 14.03.2011, passed by Respondent No. 2. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4. Mr. After dismissal of the Civil Suit, the petitioner approached Respondent No. 3 under the provisions of Section 53(1) of the Act, by filing an appeal. The appeal of the petitioner has been rejected by impugned order dated 14.03.2011, passed by Respondent No. 2. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition. 4. Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that Respondent No. 2 has not granted an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner before passing the impugned order dated 14.03.2011. That, it ought to have been appreciated by the said respondent that after passing of the order dated 17.02.2000 by Respondent No. 3, the petitioner had been pursuing the wrong remedy of a Civil Suit, therefore, as per the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 the period spent between the filing of the suit and the date of order in the suit, could not have been counted for the purpose of calculating the period of 90 days for preferring an appeal, as per Section 51 of the Act. Restricting his contentions to the above, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the interest of justice would be met, if the matter is remanded to Respondent No. 2 for fresh hearing, and the petitioner is permitted to raise his contentions regarding exclusion of the period spent while pursuing a wrong remedy, before the said authority. In support of the above submissions, reliance has been placed upon the following judgments: (1) Gulbarga University vs. Mallikarjun S. Kodagali and Anr. reported in AIR 2009 Supreme Court (Supp.) 1281. (2) Metro Hospital & Research Institute, Vadodara vs. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in (2009) 2 GLR 1537 . 5. Mr. J.K. Shah, learned Assistant Government Pleader has brought to the notice of this Court judgment dated 5.2.2010 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2007/2009 in Special Civil Application No. 3902/2009, wherein the Division Bench has considered Section 14 of the Limitation Act. He has submitted that in view of the law laid down by the Division Bench, appropriate orders be passed. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition and the judgments cited at the Bar. 7. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of proceedings pursued bona fide in a Court without jurisdiction. 6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the respective parties, perused the averments made in the petition and the judgments cited at the Bar. 7. Section 14 of the Limitation Act provides for exclusion of time of proceedings pursued bona fide in a Court without jurisdiction. The said section reads as below : “14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction–(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 2 of Order XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), the provisions of Sub-section (1) shall apply in relation to a fresh suit instituted on permission granted by the Court under Rule 1 of that Order where such permission is granted on the ground that the first suit must fail by reason of a defect in the jurisdiction of the court or other cause of a like nature. Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, (a) in excluding the time during which a former civil proceeding was pending, the day on which that proceeding was instituted and the day on which it ended shall both be counted; (b) a plaintiff or an applicant resisting an appeal shall be deemed to be prosecuting a proceeding; (c) misjoinder of parties or of causes of action shall be deemed to be a cause of a like nature with defect of jurisdiction.” 8. Reference may now be made to the legal position. Reference may now be made to the legal position. In the case of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises vs. Principal Secretary, Irrigation Department and others reported in (2008) 7 SCC 169 , the Supreme Court has held that : “21. Section 14 of the Limitation Act deals with exclusion of time of proceedings bona fide in a court without jurisdiction. On analysis of the said section, it becomes evident that the following conditions must be satisfied before Section 14 can be pressed into service: (1) Both the prior and subsequent proceedings are civil proceedings prosecuted by the same party; (2) The prior proceedings had been prosecuted with due diligence and in good faith; (3) The failure of the prior proceeding was due to defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like nature; (4) The earlier proceeding and the latter proceeding must relate to the same matter in issue and; (5) Both the proceedings are in a Court.” “22. The policy of the section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded.” 9. The Division Bench has considered the above judgment of the Supreme Court while passing judgment dated 05.02.2010 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 2007/2009 and has held as below : “In the present case, we find that the petitioner could not get any opportunity to bring before the aforesaid Authority the reference under Section 14B of the Act. We are of the view that learned Single Judge instead of dismissing the case ought to have referred the matter allowing the petitioner to deposit the amount of reference fee and 25% of the determined amount by directing the Authority to issue challan and thereby allowing the Authority under reference to decide the question whether the petitioner was entitled for exclusion of time during which he was prosecuting the civil proceedings before the Civil Court at Rajkot and thus, whether the reference was within time or time barred. For the reasons aforesaid, while we set aside the order of rejection dated 2.2.2009 issued by the Deputy Collector, Rajkot, the order dated 17.7.2009 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 3902 of 2009 is also set aside. The respondents are directed to provide the petitioner with challan as per his application dated 12.1.2009 within 15 days. The petitioner in his turn will deposit the requisite pre-deposit amount along with reference fee within 7 days thereof. In such case, the Authority will determine the reference and consider whether the petitioner is entitled for the benefit under Section 14 of the Act and therefore, the application for reference is within time or barred by limitation. Petitioner may bring to the notice of the Authority that he will fulfill all the five conditions enumerated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. The appeal is allowed.” 10. Petitioner may bring to the notice of the Authority that he will fulfill all the five conditions enumerated by the Supreme Court in the above judgment. The appeal is allowed.” 10. In view of the principle of law enunciated in the above-quoted judgment and the facts of the present case and as the petitioner was pursuing a wrong remedy before the Civil Court, therefore, in my considered view, the matter is required to be remanded to Respondent No. 2 in order to consider and decide the question whether the petitioner can avail of the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The appeal of the petitioner has been summarily rejected by Respondent No. 2 without hearing, and the petitioner has not been given a chance to deposit the amount of 25%, as per Section 53(1)(b) of the Act. 11. Mr. S.P. Majmudar, learned Counsel for the petitioner undertakes that the said amount shall be deposited before Respondent No. 2 within a period of ten days from today. 12. Accordingly, the following order is passed : Order dated 14.03.2011 passed by Respondent No. 2 is quashed and set aside. The matter is remanded to Respondent No. 2, for fresh decision, in accordance with law. Respondent No. 2 shall hear the appeal of the petitioner, after the petitioner deposits the requisite amount. The question whether the petitioner is entitled to exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act shall also be decided by Respondent No. 2. The petition is partly-allowed, to the above extent. Rule is made absolute, accordingly. There shall be no orders as to costs. Direct Service of this order is permitted. P P P P P