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2011 DIGILAW 495 (KER)

Sreedharan v. Bharathan

2011-05-26

N.K.BALAKRISHNAN, PIUS C.KURIAKOSE

body2011
ORDER : Pius C. Kuriakose, J. All these Criminal Miscellaneous Applications are before us pursuant to a reference order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court Sri.V.K.Mohanan (J) on 18.01.11 in separate Criminal M.As in Criminal R.P. Nos. 1629/10,2542/10, 2664/10 and 2138/10 and by subsequent reference orders in other cases. The issue which requires to be resolved is whether the High Court will be justified in enlarging the time already fixed for payment of fine while disposing of Criminal R.Ps in exercise of its revisional powers under Sections 397, by resorting to its inherent powers under Sections 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code Incidentally the question to be decided is whether invocation of the powers under Sections 482 for the purpose of enlarging the time fixed under a judgment passed in revision is permissible in view of the limitations prescribed by Sections 362 of the Cr. P.C. which is to the effect that no court when it has signed its judgment or final order of disposal of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. 2. The Criminal Revision Petitions in all these cases were filed by accused persons challenging their conviction and sentence by the trial court and the appellate court for offences under Sections 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This Court while disposing of the Criminal Revisions would confirm the conviction recorded by the Trial Court and the appellate court, yet would set aside the sentence and direct the accused to pay fine amounts with default sentence providing that on realisation of the fine amount, the same shall be paid to the complainant as compensation under Sections 357(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court had appointed firm dates under the orders passed in the Criminal Revision Petitions for appearance of the accused for payment of the fine amount and had also ordered that on failure to pay the fine amount, the trial court had the power to initiate coercive steps for securing the presence of the accused for the purpose of undergoing the default sentence of imprisonment. In all these cases, applications seeking enlargement of time were filed obviously as payment of fine was not made on or before the stipulated date. In all these cases, applications seeking enlargement of time were filed obviously as payment of fine was not made on or before the stipulated date. V.K. Mohanan (J) has in the reference order noticed the conflict between judgments of two learned Single Judges of this Court in A. C.Anwar v. State of Kerala (2007(2) KLD 646) and in Beena v. Balakrishnan Nair & Anr. ( 2010 (2) KLT 1017 ). It was noticed that while the judgment in A.C.Anwar's case (cited supra) takes the view that Sections 362 of the Cr. P. C. does not operate as a bar to the exercise of inherent powers under Sections 482, the latter decision in Beena's case (cited supra) rules clearly that inherent powers under Sections 482 of the Cr. P.C. are controlled by express powers of the court including the powers under Sections 362 and hence, while a revision has been disposed of finally on merits the High Court cannot have the power of reviewing the same except for the limited purposes stated in Sections 362 of the Cr. P. C. even under Sections 482 of the Cr. P.C. The Honourable V.K. Mohanan (J) in the reference order has stated that he shares the latter view but wants the issue to be resolved by a Bench of greater strength on considerations of propriety and the importance of the issue. 3. Very extensive submissions were addressed before us by the learned counsel for the applicants/revision petitioners Sri.Sunny Mathew, Sri.Alexander George, Sri.George Mathew, Sri.S.Krishna Kumar, Sri.K.C.Sudheer, Sri.A.P.Subhash, Sri. T.P.Pankajakshan, Sri.S.Santhosh Kumar, Sri .V.R.K.Kaimal, Sri. P.Bani, Sri.P.K.Mohanan, Sri. Sajan Varghese, Sri.Santhosh P. Poduval, Sri.K.Anand and Sri. P.V.Dileep. It was Sri.Sunny Mathew who piloted the arguments on behalf of the applicants/revision petitioners. He would draw our attention to various precedents and firstly to the two Single Bench judgments referred to in the reference order namely A.C. Anwar v. State of Kerala (cited supra) and Beena v. Balakrishnan Nair and another (cited supra). He referred also to various judgments of the Supreme Court including the judgment in Moti Lal v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1994 SC 1544 ), Mostt. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990 (2) KLT SN 22 (C.No.32) SC : (1990) 2 SCC 437 ), Smt.Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (1981 KLT SN 21 (C.No.38) SC : (1981)1 SCC 500 ), Dr.Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar & Anr. Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (1990 (2) KLT SN 22 (C.No.32) SC : (1990) 2 SCC 437 ), Smt.Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (1981 KLT SN 21 (C.No.38) SC : (1981)1 SCC 500 ), Dr.Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar & Anr. ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ), Raj Kapoor and Others v. State (Delhi Administration) & Ors. ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ), Puran v. Rambilas & Anr. (2001(2) KLT SN 80 (C.No. 102) SC : (2001) 6 SCC 338 ), Mary Angel & Ors. v. State of T. N. (1999 (2) KLT SN 70 (C.No. 76) SC : (1999) 5 SCC 209 ), Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan (2001) 8 SCC 570 ), State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003 (2) KLT SN 101 (C.No.132) SC : (2003) 6 SCC 641 ), Mahendra Singh and others v. State of Bihar ((2002) 10 SCC 678), Sankatha Singh & Ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1962 SC 1208 ), Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Krishan Rohtagi (AIR 1983 SCC 67 ), Roshanali v. State of Gujarat (AIR 1982 SCC 784) and Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa ( AIR 2001 SC 43 ). The learned counsel also referred to the judgment of this Court in Dharmarajan v. State of Kerala ( 1995 (1) KLT 732 ). The key point canvassed by Sri.Sunny Mathew and other learned counsel for the applicants/revision petitioners was that power should be conceded to the High Court for doing justice in most deserving situations as otherwise j ustice would become casualty. The learned counsel also argued that granting further time to obey an order will not amount to reviewing the order itself and hence, Sections 362 cannot be a hurdle for granting time at least once in a case where the inability of the accused to comply with the order is on account of very genuine reasons. The submissions of the learned counsel for the applicants/revision petitioners were answered in an equally learned manner by the Additional Public Prosecutors particularly Sri.S.U.Nazar. The learned counsel for the complainants in some of the cases mainly Advocate Sri.R.Bindu Sasthamangalam would resist the submissions of the counsel for the applicants. The submissions of the learned counsel for the applicants/revision petitioners were answered in an equally learned manner by the Additional Public Prosecutors particularly Sri.S.U.Nazar. The learned counsel for the complainants in some of the cases mainly Advocate Sri.R.Bindu Sasthamangalam would resist the submissions of the counsel for the applicants. According to them it is the correct view which has been expressed by the Honourable Thomas P. Joseph (J) in Beena's case (cited supra) and as that judgment is supported by judgments of the Supreme Court we ought to approve the same. 4. For answering the issue referred, it will be profitable to extract the two provisions of law which are relevant. "Section 362 of the Cr. P.C. - Court not to alter judgment - Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error." "Section 482 Cr. P.C. -- Saving of inherent power of High Court - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice." 5. It is now necessary to examine the ratio of some of the decisions which were cited at the Bar. The issues that arose in Beena's case (cited supra) decided by Thomas P. Joseph (J.) was whether the High Court by invoking inherent powers under Sections 482 Cr. P.C can accept a post revision composition entered between the accused and the complainant and whether such acceptance of post revisional composition by the court would amount to review of its own judgment. The case was one where the High Court confirmed the order or conviction entered under Sections 138 of the N.I. Act by the trial court and the Appellate Court but modifying the sentence of imprisonment which had been passed by the trial court and the appellate court as one of imprisonment till rising of the court and payment of fine. The case was one where the High Court confirmed the order or conviction entered under Sections 138 of the N.I. Act by the trial court and the Appellate Court but modifying the sentence of imprisonment which had been passed by the trial court and the appellate court as one of imprisonment till rising of the court and payment of fine. It was directed by the High Court in the final order passed in the Criminal Revision Petition that if fine is realised the same will be paid to the complainant as compensation under Sections 357(1)(b). Thereafter, probably after the period fixed by the High Court for payment of fine, the parties filed petition for acceptance of the composition entered between them reporting that instead of depositing the fine amount in the court, the amount was directly paid by the accused to the complainant. It was invoking the powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. and under Sections 147 that the above petition was filed. The learned Single Judge has taken the view relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh's case (cited supra) that inherent powers of the High Court are not to be exercised for doing what the Code specifically prohibits the court from doing. For taking such a view, the learned Single Judge relied also on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Yaseen v. State of U.P. ( (2007) 7 SCC 49 ) and in R. Rajeshwari v. H.N.Jagadish (2008 (2) KLT SN 41 (C.No. 50) SC : (2008) 4 SCC 82 ). It was noticed by specifically referring to Rajeshwari's case that exercise of jurisdiction under Sections 482 resulting in review or alteration of a judgment finally passed by a High Courtis permissible only in rare cases where the final judgment of the High Court itself was secured by play of fraud on the court. In this context the learned Single Judge would rely on the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.S.P.S.B.C.I.D., Chennai v. K.V.Rajendran & Ors. ( AIR 2009 SC 46 ) and observe that even though Sections 482 enables the High Courtto make such orders as may be necessary for giving effect to any order or to prevent the abuse of process, the inherent power is controlled by express provisions of the court. ( AIR 2009 SC 46 ) and observe that even though Sections 482 enables the High Courtto make such orders as may be necessary for giving effect to any order or to prevent the abuse of process, the inherent power is controlled by express provisions of the court. In the above view of the matter the learned Single Judge would answer the first issue taking the view that by invoking the inherent powers under Sections 482 Cr.P.C. a post revisional composition entered into between accused and the complainant cannot be accepted. Though not in so many words the learned Single Judge has also taken the view that accepting such post revisional composition would amount to review of its own judgment. It is important to notice that notwithstanding the above view the learned Single Judge did mete out justice to the parties by regularising their action by directing the complainant to file a statement before the Magistrate Court within one month regarding receipt of the fine amount ordered to be paid as per the final order disposing of the Revision Petitions and directing the learned Magistrate to accept such statement as sufficient compliance of the directions contained in the final order disposing of the Revision Petition and to make necessary entries in the fine register as if fine is realised and paid to the complainant and to close the matter accordingly. It was also ordered that arrest warrant, if any, issued against the accused should be kept in abeyance during the above period of one month or till statement is filed in the court concerned and necessary entry in the fine register is made. According to us, the above direction has been issued by the learned Single Judge invoking the inherent powers saved under Sections 482 for rendition of justice. 6. The Supreme Court in Sinzrikhia v. Dolley Mukheriee (1990 (2) KLT SN 22 (C.No. 32) SC : (1990) 2 SCC 437 ), even while stating that inherent powers of the High Court under Sections 482 is intended for preventing the abuse of process of court and for securing the ends of justice has reiterated that such powers are as such controlled by principles and precedents as are its express powers and statutes and cannot be exercised to do something which is expressly barred under the Code. It has been stated that the powers under Sections 482 cannot be invoked for overriding a bar of review under Sections 362. However, it has been observed by the Supreme Court in the same judgment that if there has been changes in the circumstances of the case (obviously after the final order was passed by the High Court in the main case) it would be in order, for the High Court to exercise its inherent powers in the prevailing circumstances and pass appropriate orders to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of court. Jurisdiction was declined in that case as it was found that there was no change in circumstances and the decision has to be arrived at on the facts that existed as on the date of the earlier order. We will immediately notice that there is no comparison between the facts in Simrikhia's case (supra) and the present facts. In Simrikhia's case the learned Magistrate took cognizance of a private complaint alleging offence under Sections 452 and 323 against the accused and after examining witnesses issued process against the accused. The accused challenged the order of issuing process by filing applications before the High Court under Sections 482 mainly on the ground that the Magistrate before whom the complaint was filed, transferred the case to another Magistrate without formally taking cognizance of the offence and hence, the subsequent proceedings were illegal. The High Court considered the case on its merits and dismissed the petition under Sections 482. Later a fresh petition was filed before the High Court under Sections 482 on the same set of allegations which was allowed by the High Court. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the subsequent order of the High Court. 7. In Smt.Sooraj Devi v. Pyare Lal (1981 KLT SN 21 (C.No. 38) SC : (1981) 15CC 500), the Supreme Court has laid down that the scope of review under Sections 362 Cr. P.C. is limited to correcting clerical or mathematical errors and that inherent powers under Sections 482 cannot be exercised for doing something which is specifically prohibited by the code as under Sections 362 Cr. P.C. Here again, there is no comparability between the facts. P.C. is limited to correcting clerical or mathematical errors and that inherent powers under Sections 482 cannot be exercised for doing something which is specifically prohibited by the code as under Sections 362 Cr. P.C. Here again, there is no comparability between the facts. The subject matter of the dispute in Sooraj Devi's case was a house and the High Court dismissed a Criminal miscellaneous Application filed by the appellant in that case invoking Sections 482 Cr. P.C. seeking a declaration that the appellant was in possession and that the order of the Magistrate already confirmed by the High Court in an earlier order did not bind the appellant. The High Court dismissed the petition under Sections 482. The question which was argued before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court could have invoked Section 482 for annulling its own earlier order which question was rightly answered against the appellant by the Supreme Court. 8. The judgment of the three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dr.Raghubir Saran v. State of Bihar ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ) which has no direct application in these cases deals with the inherent powers of the High Court for expunging objectionable remarks in the judgment or order of a subordinate court against a stranger after it became final. The judgment certainly lays down that inherent powers under Sections 482 is to be exercised very sparingly. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Raj Kapoor & Ors. v. State (Delhi Administration) ( AIR 1980 SC 258 ) only draws the distinction between the revisional powers under Sections 397 and the inherent powers under Sections 482 and rules that inherent power under Sections 482 does not stand repelled even when revisional power under Sections 397 overlaps. This judgment also does not have much to do directly with the issue that is referred to us. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Puran v. Rambilas & Anr. (2001 (2) KLT SN 80 (C.No.102) SC : (2001) 6 SCC 338 ) and connected cases also takes the same view and does not deal directly with the issue that we are called upon to answer. 9. The Supreme Court in Mary Angel & Ors. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Puran v. Rambilas & Anr. (2001 (2) KLT SN 80 (C.No.102) SC : (2001) 6 SCC 338 ) and connected cases also takes the same view and does not deal directly with the issue that we are called upon to answer. 9. The Supreme Court in Mary Angel & Ors. v. State of T.N. (1999 (2) KLT SN 70 (C.No. 76) SC : (1999) 5 SCC 209 ) has dealt with the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the High Court saved and recognised by Sections 482 of the Cr.P.C. Their Lordships held that Sections 482 Cr. P.C stands independently from the other provisions of the Code and it expressly saves the inherent powers of the High Court. Therefore, to prevent abuse of the process of court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, the High Court is empowered to pass "such order" which may include order to pay costs to the informant (complainant) and the language of the section does not in terms place any fetter. This power is not conditioned or controlled by any other section is curtailed by any provisions which empower the court to award costs. After noticing Sections 148(3), 342 and 359 of the Cr.P.C the specific provisions relating to award of costs and Sections 59 provision for award of costs in non-cognizable offences as well as Sections 357 which provides compensation to the victim out of the fine imposed on the accused, the Supreme Court held that in appropriate cases where it is necessary to pass such on order, the Court may award costs for the purposes mentioned in Sections 482 also. Even though this judgment does not specifically deal with the issue referred to us, it is noticeable that in this judgment their Lordships have relied on the following passages of the Supreme Court in Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar, ( AIR 1964 SC 1 ) which in our opinion throw light on the nature and scope of the powers under Sections 482 Cr. P.C. "When we speak of the inherent powers of the High Court of a State we mean the powers which must, by reason of its being the highest court in the State having general jurisdiction over civil and criminal courts in the States, inhere in that court. P.C. "When we speak of the inherent powers of the High Court of a State we mean the powers which must, by reason of its being the highest court in the State having general jurisdiction over civil and criminal courts in the States, inhere in that court. The powers in a sense are an inalienable attribute of the position it holds with respect to the courts subordinate to it. These powers are partly administrative and partly judicial. They are necessarily judicial when they are exercisable with respect to a judicial order and for securing the ends of justice. When we speak of ends of justice we do not use the expression to comprise within it any vague or nebulous concept of justice, nor even justice in the philosophical sense but justice according to law, the statute law and the common law. Again, this power is not exercisable every time the High Court finds that there has been a miscarriage of justice. For, the procedural laws of the State provide for correction of most of the errors of subordinate courts which may have resulted in miscarriage of justice. These errors can be corrected only by resorting to the procedure prescribed by law and not otherwise. Inherent powers are in the nature of extraordinary powers available only where no express power is available to the High Court to do a particular thing and where its express powers do not negative the existence of such inherent power. The further condition for its exercise, insofar as cases arising out of the exercise by the subordinate courts of their criminal jurisdiction are concerned, is that it must be necessary to resort to it for giving effect to an order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or for preventing an abuse of the process of the court or for otherwise securing the ends of justice." In Dinesh Dutt Joshi v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 8 SCC 570 ) their Lordships of the Supreme Court state that Sections 482 Cr.P.C. confers upon the High Court inherent powers and goes on to say that such power is conferred as every court has the inherent power to act ex debitojustitiae - to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists. The Supreme Court states the principle embodied in the section is based upon the maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedere videturer id sine quo res pisae esse non potest i.e., when the law gives anything to anyone, it gives also all those things without which the thing itself would be unavailable. According to the Supreme Court the Section has been embodied to cover the lacunae which are sometimes found in the procedural law and cautions that use of extraordinary powers conferred under the section are required to be reserved as far as possible to extraordinary situations. In State v. Navjot Sandhu (2003 (2) KLT SN 101 (C.No. 132) SC : (2003) 6 SCC 641 ) also the Apex Court lays down that inherent power under Sections 482 overrides other provisions of the Cr.P.C. including Sections 397/ and states that 482 cannot override a statutory bar and cannot be exercised when remedy under Cr.P.C. and statute is available. Mahendra Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar,((2002)10 SCC 678) was a case where successive applications under 5.482 for extension of time for payment of fine imposed by the court were filed before the High Court. These applications were dismissed by the High Court even as the Supreme Court endorsed the action of High Court in dismissing these applications, the Supreme Court ultimately granted relief to the appellant. The consideration of the issue which is relevant to our case by the Supreme Court is by the following sentence. "There cannot be any dispute that the accused were not entitled to file so many applications before the High Court invoking jurisdiction under Sections 482." 10. We are sure that the Supreme Court did not under that judgment decide on a situation where just one application for extension of time was filed by the accused before the High Court. At any rate, the interplay between Sections 482 and Sections 361 was never considered by the Supreme Court in Mahendra Singh's case. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (cited supra) in our view is not of much assistance in answering the issue referred to us. At any rate, the interplay between Sections 482 and Sections 361 was never considered by the Supreme Court in Mahendra Singh's case. The judgment of the Supreme Court in Sankatha Singh (cited supra) in our view is not of much assistance in answering the issue referred to us. In the judgment in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Rain Krishnan ( AIR 1983 SC 67 ) also by a three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court lays down that the scope, ambit and grant of inherent powers under Sections 482 is quite different from the revisional powers conferred the provisions of.S. 397. Their Lordships held that the powers under Sections 482 can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute, and also that being an extra ordinary power the same has to be exercised sparingly. 11. R.Basant (J), a learned Judge of this Court has in his judgment in K.G.Girish Kumar v. Muthoot Capital Service Pvt. Ltd. (2007 (1) KLT 16) laid down, referring Sections 68 and 69 of Indian Penal Code that the stipulations in a judgment fixing a date for payment of the fine amount and providing for default sentence of imprisonment on failure to pay fine are not to be read or understood to imply that thereafter even if the amount of fine is paid in full the default sentence will have-to be undergone. Having regard to the nature of the offence under Sections 138, we feel that in situations where the accused is ready to pay the compensation amount to the satisfaction of the complainant and the complainant is willing to receive the compensation amount from the accused the endeavour of the court should be to facilitate such payment and receipt albeit a little delay as the same will result in extinction of all causes of action and grant full and final relief to both sides. 12. 12. The interplay between Sections 482 and 362 of the Cr.P.C. was again considered by the Supreme Court in Hari Singh Mann v. liarbhajan Singh Bajwa ( AIR 2001 SC 43 ) and while deprecating the practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court, the Supreme Court has observed that Sections 362 is based on the principle that once a matter is finally disposed of by a court the said court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Courtof competent jurisdiction in a mannerprescribed by law. (underlining supplied). The question which we may therefore have to consider is whetherby granting time to the party to comply with a direction in the original order to pay the fine on a stipulated date the High Court is granting the prayer which was declined under the original order. 13. We now notice the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Sudheer Kumar v. Kunhiraman (2008 (1) KLT 168) wherein Their Lordships of the Bench have referred to Sections 362 of the Cr.P.C. and held that the statutory bar of review created by Sections 362 cannot be overreached by filing clarification petitions, modification petitions or a petition under Sections 482 or by resorting to any other innovative methods. Mandate of Sections 362 has to be obeyed in letter and spirit. Incidentally in Sudheer Kunmar's case the Division Bench answering the reference take the view that the view of the learned Single Judge taken in Sabu George v. The Home Secretary, Union of India ( 2007 (1) KLT 982 : 2007 (1) KLJ 579) that offence under Sections 138 of the N.I. Act can be compounded even after confirmation of the conviction by the High Court in revision andconsidering the subsequent effect of compromise is incorrect Their Lordships who state very clearly that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge in Sabu George's case upon an observation of the Supreme Court in Simrikhia v. Dolley Mukherjee (cited supra) was not justified. According to the learned Division Bench the Single Bench was not justified in Sabu George's case in taking out a sentence from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mostt. Simrikhia's case out of context and in using the same for laying down the proposition that if there is change in circumstances the bar under Sections 362 can be got over by using inherent powers under Sections 482. 14. It is time now, having seen the law from the statutory provisions and from the various judicial precedents discussed above to answer the reference. It is very clear to our mind that the inherent powers of the High Court saved under Sections 482 of the Cr.P.C are to be invoked very sparingly and only in exceptional circumstances. It is also clear that when there are statutory provisions providing expressly for granting the reliefs sought for, it is those provisions which are to be invoked and not the inherent powers recognised under Sections 482. We also notice that preponderance of judicial authority is to the effect that inherent powers under Sections 482 cannot be invoked for overreaching clear interdicts created by statutory provision. Above all we notice that inherent powers are conceded to the High Court under Sections 482 with the object of securing ends of justice and for giving effect to orders passed under the Code of Criminal Procedure and also for preventing abuse of process of any court including the High Court. We are sure that the inherent powers under Sections 482 are not to be invoked successively in the same case and on the same set of facts. For answering the issue it will be necessary to consider whether by allowing an application for enlargement of time, for payment of the fine, fixed under the original order passed by the High Court, the High Court is altering orreviewing the original order to the extent of having are-look at the substantive decision taken under the original order. According to us, the substantive decision taken by the High Court in the original orders passed in these cases was to confirm the order of conviction entered under Sections 138 of the N.I. Act against the accused by the trial court and by the First Appellate Court and to modify the sentence as one for payment of fine with default sentence. It is clear to our mind that the reasoning which led to the original orders passed by this Court was that the same will give full and final relief to the complainant, the holder of the negotiable instrument in question as the same would facilitate the recovery of the debt covered by the instrument even without resorting to the long winding process of the Civil Court or other recovery modes allowed by law. True, when under the original order the High Court has fixed a firm date for payment of the fine to be paid to the complainant as compensation, the accused is expected to make payment on the stipulated date and not to aspire for further indulgence. But situations can arise where due to pressing reasons completely beyond the control of the accused he may not be able to make the payment on the stipulated date. He will be all willingness to make the payment (together with some additional payment as compensation for belated payment to the complainant) within the extended time sought for and the complainant may be all willingness to receive such payment. We feel that at least in such situations by granting the extension of time sought for the High Court will be securing the ends of justice by giving relief to both the litigating parties and by facilitating full and final settlement of all the issues between them. We do not think that by granting such enlargement of time the High Court will be reviewing its substantive decision to confirm the conviction and to modify the sentence as one of fine. It will definitely amount to alteration of the original order in a literal sense. But according to us, the alterations which are prohibited are only such alterations which have the effect of recalling or reviewing the substantive decision taken under the original order. We do not think that the alteration which is being brought forth by extending the time for payment of fine once and for all, will be an alteration offending the spirit of Sections 362 which is certainly founded on the principle that the Criminal Court even if it be the highest court of the State has no power to review its own judgments and orders. We believe that the essential purpose for which courts are established is rendition of justice to the parties on the disputes that come up before them for decision. The policy of the court shall be to achieve the constitutional goal of promoting equal justice and we believe that such goal is best achieved by facilitating a settlement of all the issues between the parties fully and finally. According to us, all issues between the parties to a proceeding under Sections 138 of the N.I. Act will stand settled fully and finally only when the complainant instrument holder realises the debt due to him from his debtor the drawer of the dishonoured instrument. As already noticed by us, Thomas P. Joseph (J) himself after taking the view that the inherent powers under Sections 482 cannot be invoked to overreach the statutory bar under Sections 362 has ensured justice to both sides by issuing directions which have the effect of bringing forth a complete quietus on issues between the parties. 15. We have also no doubt in our mind that post revisional composition is not permissible even by invoking Sections 482 Criminal Procedure Code for, that will have the effect of setting aside the conviction and sentence passed by the Court, confirmed or modified in revision and would invite the interdiction contained in Sections 362 Cr.P.C. 16. Similarly the argument advanced in support of the invocation of the power u/S.482 Cr.P.C that since Sections 482 Cr.P.C starts with the words, "Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to have..... " has the overriding effect on Sections 362 Criminal Procedure Code because Sections 482 comes after Sections 362, also appears to be reasonable. But at the same time in order to meet or harmonise the situation and to secure the ends of justice, in very exceptional circumstances, without having the effect of altering the conviction or sentence passed by the Court, (which would invite the inhibition contained in Sections 362 Cr.P.C.), we think it would be reasonable to hold that by extending the time for payment of fine/ compensation this Court would not be offending Sections 362 Cr.P.C. but would only be securing the ends of justice. But it can be exercised only in very exceptional circumstances. Since such circumstances can occur only rarely, may be only once in a case, no successive petitions can be entertained. 17. But it can be exercised only in very exceptional circumstances. Since such circumstances can occur only rarely, may be only once in a case, no successive petitions can be entertained. 17. Such very exceptional circumstances may occur in a situation like the one which is stated below as an example. The petitioner-convict could raise the full amount to pay fine/compensation amount but suddenly an unanticipated event occurs, his father happened to be hospitalised for immediate surgery, he had no other alternative but to spend that money for the treatment of his father and because of that unfortunate and unanticipated event he could not pay the entire fine amount on time. In such circumstances when he offers to pay the entire fine amount within a particular time and the Court is convinced of the same from the reliable documents produced, by denial of the time sought for, the Court would not be securing the ends of justice. By granting time Court would be only securing the ends of justice. Therefore, only in such very exceptional circumstances the time for payment of fine/compensation amount can be extended and not for the mere asking of it. 18. We may reiterate again that the preference that we have given to the view of V. Ramkumar (J) expressed in Anwar's case does not mean that we are approving the oft noticed practice of accused in cheque cases filing successive petition for enlargement, petitions for clarifications and such other innovative petitions as are indicated by the learned Division Bench which decided Sudheer Kumar's case (supra). We reiterate that the powers under Sections 482 can be invoked by filing extension/enlargement of application like the one filed by the revision petitioners in these cases only on genuine and pressing reasons and the power should be invoked only when the High Court is convinced that the inability of the concerned accused to make the payment was due to reasons beyond his control. Relief should be granted only after ensuring that the same will result in rendition of justice to both sides and will bring forth complete and final quietus on the issues between the parties. 19. All the references are answered as above.