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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2011 DIGILAW 497 (MP)

Yogesh Kumar Gulati v. Satya Prakash Dhingra

2011-04-26

ALOK ARADHE

body2011
ORDER Alok Aradhe, J. 1. In this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the Petitioner has challenged the validity of the order dated 10-9-2010 by which the application preferred by the Petitioner under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, has been rejected. 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the writ petition briefly stated are that the Petitioner/Plaintiff had filed a civil suit seeking a direction to the Defendant to execute the lease deed for a further period of six years commencing from 1-10-2008 to 30-9-2014. The claim in the suit was based on the ground that a lease deed dated 28-10-1993 was executed between the parties to the suit for a period of 15 years commencing from 1-10-1993 to 30-9-2008. Under the aforesaid lease deed, the Petitioner was permitted to establish and run a petrol/diesel pump, which was allotted to him by Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited. Clause 5 of the lease deed contained the renewal clause. Accordingly, the Petitioner set up the retail outlet in the name and style of "M/s. Bhavani Automobiles". Before expiry of period of lease, the Petitioner exercised the option of renewal for a further period of six years under Clause 5 of the lease deed. Accordingly, a notice Annexure P/2 dated 9-7-2008 was sent to the Respondent. The Respondent sent a reply to the aforesaid notice and informed the Petitioner that he is not inclined to renew the lease deed. The Petitioner accordingly filed the civil suit seeking the relief of renewal of the lease deed. 3. The Respondent filed the written statement. It is the case of the Petitioner that in paragraphs 5, 8 and 9 of the written statement, the Respondent has specifically admitted the execution of the lease deed and the fact that as per Clause 5 of the lease deed, the Petitioner is entitled to renewal of lease for a further period of six years. In view of categorical admission made by the Respondent in the written statement, the Petitioner filed an application under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") Annexure P/7 in which a prayer was made that a decree be passed directing the Defendant to execute the lease deed for a further period of six years. The Respondent filed the reply to the aforesaid application and opposed the prayer made in the application. The trial Court vide impugned order dated 10-9-2010 rejected the application submitted by the Petitioner. 4. Shri Sanjay Agrawal, learned Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that from perusal of Clause 5 of the lease deed, it is apparent that option of renewal of lease for a further period of six years is not dependent on fulfilment of any other terms and conditions of the lease deed. The Respondent/Defendant in unequivocal terms has admitted the execution of the lease deed and from perusal of para 3 of the written statement, it is apparent that Respondent/Defendant has admitted that Plaintiff is entitled to exercise the option as per lease deed for its renewal. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner in support of his submissions has placed reliance on decisions of Supreme Court in Charanjit Lal Mehra and Ors. v. Kamal Saroj Mahajan Smt. and Anr. (2005) 11 SCC 279 Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. v. Union Bank of India and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 2740 and Karam Kapahi and Ors. v. Lal Chand Public Charitable Trust, AIR 2010 SCW 2697. 5. On the other hand, Shri Rajesh Meindiratta, learned Counsel for the Respondent has submitted that the averments made in the written statement have to be read in its entirety. Since the Plaintiff had committed violation of the terms and conditions of the lease deed, therefore, the lease executed in favour of the Petitioner was cancelled. It has further been submitted that exercise of power under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code is a matter of discretion and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. It has further been submitted that the discretion in the facts and circumstances of the case has been exercised by the trial Court for cogent reasons. The order passed by the trial Court is perfectly just and legal and does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. I have considered the submissions made on both sides. The order passed by the trial Court is perfectly just and legal and does not call for any interference by this Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. I have considered the submissions made on both sides. In the statement of objects arid reasons mentioned in amending Act No. 104 of 1976 while amending the provisions of Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code, it has been stated that where a claim is admitted the Court has discretion to enter a judgment for a Plaintiff and to pass a decree on the admitted claim. The object of the Rule is to enable the party to obtain a, speedy judgment at least to the extent of the relief to which according to the admission of the Defendant the Plaintiff is entitled. See: Charanjit Lal Mehra, Uttam Singh Dugal and Co. Ltd. and Karam Kapahi and Ors. v. Lai Chand Public Charitable Trust and Anr. (2010) 4 SCC 753 (supra). It is equally well settled in law that an admission must be clear, unambiguous and unconditional. A judgment on admission by the Defendant under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code is not a matter of right, but is a matter of discretion of the Court. However, the said discretion has to be exercised judicially. 7. In the backdrop of well settled legal position, the facts of the case may be seen. The Defendant in his written statement has admitted the fact of execution of the lease deed, option of renewal available to the Plaintiff in Clause 5 of the lease deed as well as the fact that the Plaintiff had exercised the right of renewal under the lease deed. The question which arises for consideration is whether on the aforesaid admitted facts, the Plaintiff is entitled to a decree under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the averments made in the written statement in paragraphs 5 and 8 are read in entirety, it is apparent that the Defendant has pleaded that the Plaintiff has violated the terms and conditions of the lease deed and that vide reply dated 10-8-2008 it was communicated to the Plaintiff that the option of renewal exercised by the Plaintiff is not acceptable to the Defendant. In paragraph 9 of the written statement the Defendant has averred that the lease executed in favour of the Plaintiff has been terminated and the vacant possession has been demanded from the Plaintiff. Thus, in view of the pleadings of the parties, the question which is to be decided in the suit is that whether the Plaintiff is entitled to claim renewal of the lease deed. The trial Court has already framed an issue whether the Plaintiff has violated the terms and conditions of the lease and whether the lease deed dated 28-10-1993 has been terminated. The aforesaid issues have to be answered after the suit is tried on merits. A close scrutiny of the written statement reveals that the Defendant nowhere in unequivocal terms has stated that the Plaintiff is entitled to renewal of the lease. In order to seek a decree on admission under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, admission has to be unequivocal and unambiguous. There is no unambiguous and unequivocal admission on the part of the Defendants with regard to claim of the-Plaintiff. The trial Court has assigned the cogent reasons for rejection of the application under Order 12, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No case for interference is made out with the order passed by the trial Court in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even otherwise, it is well settled in law that power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised to correct all errors of judgment of a Court acting within limitation. It can be exercised where the orders passed in grave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law and justice. See: Jai Singh and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 385 . 8. For the aforementioned reasons, there is no merit in this petition. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed.