ORDER : S.P. Wangdi, J. 1. By filing the present appeal, the Appellant Insurance Company seeks to assail the award dated 15.09.2010, passed by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, South and West Sikkim at Namchi, in MACT Case No. 03 of 2009, by which the claimants/Respondents have been awarded compensation of Rs.41,66,660.00 (Rupees forth one lakhs sixty six thousand six hundred and sixty) only, with interest @ 10% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition. 2. The grounds pressed on behalf of the Appellant at the time of hearing are the following : (i) That the ill-fated vehicle which met with the accident was carrying commercial materials when the vehicle was insured as a passenger vehicle, and therefore, the insured having violated one of the principle conditions of the policy, the award was not permissible. (ii) That one of the claims allowed being the agriculture income based on the certificate of income issued by the Block Development Officer (in short BDO) Exbt. 16 is erroneous as the competence of the BDO to issue such certificate has not been established. (iii) That the learned Tribunal awarding compensation against love and affection, pain and suffering deserves to be set aside as being impermissible under the law. 3. Mr. Tsewang Namgyal, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the claimants/Respondents, submits that the appeal is not maintainable since the grounds raised therein are alien to the provisions of Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, apart from the plea that the finding of the Claims Tribunal on the aspects that are being assailed in the present appeal have been arrived at correctly based on the evidence available on the records. 4. Mr. Ajay Kumar Debnath, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of the Appellant Insurance Company, seriously contended that the award is against the glaring evidence that the vehicle was carrying goods at the time of the accident, and, therefore, not covered under the Insurance Policy. It was submitted that in any case, provisions in the Motor Rules permitting carriage of goods by passenger vehicles was by itself illegal, and, therefore, the award of compensation by application of such impermissible rule was liable to be set aside. Mr. Debnath referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company v. Vimla Devi and Ors. Mr. Debnath referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company v. Vimla Devi and Ors. reported in Supreme 2 (2009) 231 particularly paragraph 4 thereof which is reproduced below: 4. The MACT and the High Court appear to have proceeded on erroneous premises that the premium was also paid in respect of goods and passengers. In the aforesaid circumstances we think it appropriate to remit the matter to the MACT to consider the original documents relating to payment of premium which have been summarized in the paper book the amount of premium paid, and determine the person from whom the recovery is to be made. Without expressing any opinion on the merits, we remit the matter to MACT for taking a decision. It shall permit the Appellant to produce such material or evidence which according to it has relevance. 5. Mr. Debnath also referred to the case of M/S National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. reported in (2004) 1 Supreme 3 , the relevant portion of which is reproduced below: 20. It is therefore, manifest that in spite of the amendment of 1994, the effect of the provision contained in Section 147 with respect to persons other than the owner of the goods or his authorized representative remains the same. Although the owner of the goods or his authorized representative would now be covered by the policy of insurance in respect of a goods vehicle, it was not the intention of the legislature to provide for the liability of the insurer with respect to passengers, especially gratuitous passengers, who were neither contemplated at the time the contract of insurance was entered into, nor any premium was paid to the extent of the benefit of insurance to such category of people. 21. The upshot of the aforementioned discussions is that instead and in place of the insurer the owner of the vehicle shall be liable to satisfy the decree. The question, however, would be as to whether keeping in view the fact that the law was not clear so long such a direction would be fair and equitable. We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh (supra). We do not think so. We, therefore, clarify the legal position which shall have prospective effect. The Tribunal as also the High Court had proceeded in terms of the decisions of this Court in Satpal Singh (supra). The said decision has been overruled only in Asha Rani (supra). We, therefore, are of the opinion that the interest of justice will be sub-served if the Appellant herein is directed to satisfy the awarded amount in favour of the claimant if not already satisfied and recover the same from the owner of the vehicle.... 6. In the light of the above position of law, it was submitted that the award passed by the Claims Tribunal was apparently illegal, and, therefore, liable to be rejected. 7. It is further contended that the certificate of income of agriculture issued by the BDO, Exbt. 16, could not be relied upon, since the competence of the BDO to issue such certificate was not established. 8. The last submission, made rather feebly, was that the award against loss of love and affection, pain and suffering being not contemplated under the Act, deserved to be set aside. 9. I have carefully considered the rival contentions made on behalf of the learned Counsel, but before we embark upon the merits of the case, we also need to consider the application for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the Appellant. It is an admitted case that there has been delay of 149 days in filing the memorandum of appeal. It is noticed that in the application for condonation of delay, the Appellants have given elaborate grounds to explain the delay in preferring the appeal. Although the explanation do not appear to be convincing, I am inclined to allow the application as No. serious objections have been raised against it by the other side. However, this shall not be treated as a precedence in cases that may follow. 10. On the merits of the appeal, I am of the view that the grounds which have been raised on behalf of the Appellant do not fall within the parameters of Section 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, save and except the first ground that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy. We may, therefore, deal with this aspect and see as to whether the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is acceptable or not. We may, therefore, deal with this aspect and see as to whether the contention raised on behalf of the Appellant is acceptable or not. 11. On perusal of the judgment of the learned Claims Tribunal, it is found that this issue has been directly dealt with under Issue No. 3 which reads as "Whether there was any violation of the terms and conditions of the insurance policy of the accident vehicle?". The relevant finding of the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal on this reads as under: 17. A careful perusal of the said Exhibit-14 the Insurance Policy for the vehicle No: SK-04/7468 shows interalia that it specifies that the total passengers is not to exceed 18. Then, there is a drivers clause while (sic read which) provides that a person who holds an effective driving licence including an effective learner licensee may also drive the vehicle provided such person satisfies the requirements of Rule 3 of the Central Motor Vehicles Rule 1989. The policy covers the use only for carriage of passengers in accordance with the permits issued within the meaning of M.V. Act. Perusal of the route permit Exhibit-13 allows the vehicle to carry a load of 6 quintals and at the relevant time there were only 5 occupants in the said vehicle, the weight of which could obviously 7 not go up to 6 quintals. In view of the said document I am of the opinion that there was No. violation of the terms and conditions of the Insurance Policy of the accident vehicle. 12. In this regard, Mr. Debnath submits that the policy clearly stipulates that it covers use of the vehicle only for carriage of passengers in accordance with the permits issued within the meaning of the Act. 13. I have perused the judgment further and apart from what appears in paragraph 17 extracted above, the answer to this also appears in paragraph 15 of the impugned judgment which reads as under: 15. ...That as per the route permit issued by the Transport Department, Government of Sikkim the vehicle can carry 6(six) quintals of goods in lieu of passengers.... He has placed reliance on Exhibit 13 of the claimant's document which is a route permit vide which it is recorded that the vehicle can carry 6 quintals load in lieu of its passengers. 14. He has placed reliance on Exhibit 13 of the claimant's document which is a route permit vide which it is recorded that the vehicle can carry 6 quintals load in lieu of its passengers. 14. Route permits are issued under the Sikkim Motor Vehicles Rules, 1991, framed u/s 111 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This clearly falls within the meaning of the terms "Permits issued within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act" provided in the Insurance Policy, Exbt. 14. Therefore, the contention stands rejected. 15. In so far as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Vimla Devi and Ors. referred by Mr. Debnath is concerned, I am afraid that it is not applicable in the facts of the present case. In that case claims for compensation was made for injury caused to the passengers as well as loss of goods carried on the vehicle that met with the accident and that since the goods were not covered under the policy, it was held that the claim was not permissible. 16. As regards the case of M/s. National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Baljit Kaur and Ors. referred to by the learned Counsel, the decision in that case was rendered on the question as to whether under the provisions of Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, persons other than owner of the goods or the authorised representatives, i.e., gratuitous passengers, would be covered in respect of a goods vehicle or not. In the present case, that is not the question. The only issue that requires consideration here is as to whether the articles carried in the accident vehicle which is a passenger vehicle, was permissible under the rules, and if so, whether the Insurance Policy covered that aspect. We have already answered the question in the affirmative and this Court does not find any reason to interfere with that finding. 17. In so far as other two grounds are concerned, it may be answered as under: 17.1 Income certificate issued by the BDO on agricultural income is a valid and accepted document in the State of Sikkim and the position is the same as regards validity while being presented to other authorities also. 17. In so far as other two grounds are concerned, it may be answered as under: 17.1 Income certificate issued by the BDO on agricultural income is a valid and accepted document in the State of Sikkim and the position is the same as regards validity while being presented to other authorities also. The BDO or the Block Development Officer in a State is a revenue authority and is competent under the State Government Rules to issue such certificates, a fact which this Court takes judicial notice of. In view of the above, the objection raised on this account is clearly sustainable and, therefore, stands rejected accordingly. 17.2 The claim awarded against pain and suffering has been fairly conceded by Mr. Tsewang Namgyal as not permissible, since the deceased had died instantaneously on the spot at the time of the accident. This being the correct position in law, as it would generally apply in cases of injuries causing permanent disability or when death occurs after an interval from the time of the accident, the amount awarded against the claim stands set aside. 18. Mr. Debnath also raised the question on the award against future prospects which as per him being on the higher side requires to be modified to a more reasonable quantum. 19. On careful consideration of the contentions raised by him, apart from the one which have been dealt with in detail earlier, in my view, they do not fall within the permissible limits u/s 149(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. For its proper appreciation we may reproduce Section 149(2) which reads as under: 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.... .... For its proper appreciation we may reproduce Section 149(2) which reads as under: 149. Duty of insurers to satisfy judgments and awards against persons insured in respect of third party risks.... .... (2) No. sum shall be payable by an insurer under Sub-section (1) in respect of any judgment or award unless, before the commencement of the proceedings in which the judgment or award is given the insurer had notice through the Court or, as the case may be, the Claims Tribunal of the bringing of the proceedings, or in respect of such judgment or ward so long as execution is stayed thereon pending an appeal; and an insurer to whom notice of the brining of any such proceedings is so given shall be entitled to be made a party thereto and to defend the action on any of the following grounds, namely: (a) that there has been a breach of a specified condition of the policy, being one of the following conditions, namely: (i) a condition excluding the use of the vehicle - (a) for hire or reward, where the vehicle is on the date of the contract of insurance a vehicle not covered by a permit to ply for hire or reward, or (b) for organised racing and speed testing, or (c) for a purpose not allowed by the permit under which the vehicle is used, where the vehicle is a transport vehicle, or (d) without side-car being attached where the vehicle is a motor cycle; or (ii) a condition excluding driving by a named person or persons or by any 11 person who is not duly licensed, or by any person who has been disqualified for holding or obtaining a driving licence during the period of disqualification; or (iii) a condition excluding liability for injury caused or contributed to by conditions of war, civil war, riot or civil commotion; or (b) that the policy is void on the ground that it was obtained by the non-disclosure of a material fact or by a representation of fact which was false in some material particular. 20. On a plain reading of the provision it becomes amply clear that the only defence that an insurer can take against a claim are on the grounds enumerated under Clause (a) and sub-clauses there-under and Clause (b) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 149 of the Act. No. ground is permissible. 20. On a plain reading of the provision it becomes amply clear that the only defence that an insurer can take against a claim are on the grounds enumerated under Clause (a) and sub-clauses there-under and Clause (b) of Sub-Section 2 of Section 149 of the Act. No. ground is permissible. We may in this regard usefully refer to the case of United India Insurance Company Ltd. v. Shai Sibaqtualla and Ors. (1992) 1 TAC 437, paragraph 10 of which reads as under: 10. It is now well-established that an insurer cannot take pleas beyond the scope of Section 96(2) of the Act. British India General Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Captain Itbar Singh and Others, AIR 1959 SC 1331 is an authority for this.It should be remembered that it is not open to the Insurance Company to question the quantum of compensation. Reddipilli Chinna Rao and Vs. Reddi Lorudu and Others, AIR 1980 AP 279 which is a Division Bench decision is an authority for this proposition. The case of Chinnama George and Others Vs. N.K. Raju and Another, AIR 2000 SC 1565 , may also be referred to in which the Apex Court re-emphasises the very same principle. 21. Under such circumstances, the grounds raised to assail the judgment of the learned Claims Tribunal are not sustainable and, therefore, stand rejected accordingly. 22. The appeal is dismissed, subject to the modification as a consequence of deletion of the award of Rs. 25,000/-against pain and suffering. 23. The interim payment made u/s 140 of the Act to the claimants/Respondents shall stand adjusted against the final award. The interest as directed by the Claims Tribunal in the impugned judgment shall remain unaltered at 10%. However, in the event of the payment not being made within six weeks as prayed for by Mr. Debnath, the Appellant shall be liable to pay an additional interest of 2% over and above the 10% awarded by the Claims Tribunal. 24. No. order as to costs. 25. Records of the learned trial Court be sent back forthwith.