JUDGMENT U.B. Saha, J. 1. The instant writ petition is filed by the Petitioner for quashing the order dated 7th March, 1997 as well as the order dated 6th November, 2003 passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Appellate Authority whereby and whereunder the Petitioner was dismissed from service by the WP(C) 16(K) of 2007 Page 2 of 15 Disciplinary Authority and the order of the disciplinary authority was upheld by the appellate authority. 2. Heard Mr. CT Jamir, learned Counsel appearing along with Mr. Wati Jamir, learned Counsel for the Petitioner as well as Mr. TB Jamir, learned CGC for the Respondents. 3. Pleaded case of the Petitioner is that he was initially appointed as Constable in the Central Reserve Police Force (for short, 'CRPF') on 14.06.1981 and thereafter he was promoted to the post of Naik in the year 1996. While the Petitioner was coming back after completion of his training of Naik Quarter Master Court to 66 BN CRPF on 31.12.1995 the Petitioner reached Delhi and after that he started his journey by Brahmaputra Express but when he reached Mughal Sarai Station there was a pain in his stomach and he became unconscious in the train and ultimately some persons who were in his compartment, seeing his condition informed the GRP and accordingly the GRP brought him to the Gazipur Govt. Hospital where he was given treatment. It is also stated by the Petitioner that from 02.01.1996 to 26.08.1996 the treatment of the Petitioner was going on in the said hospital and after resuming the health he was given a sickness certificate (Annexure-I to the writ petition) by the Dy. CMO of the said hospital which he submitted with the authority. He assumed his duties on 31.08.1996 in 66 BN CRPF but the Respondents herein, particularly Respondent No. 2 suspended him on 04.10.1996 for his unauthorized absence from duty and consequent there to a disciplinary proceeding was also initiated. 4. On 25.10.1996 a memorandum was issued by the Respondent No. 2 for holding inquiry against the Petitioner under Rule 27 of CRPF Rules, 1955 and Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 on the following charges: - Article-I: That the said No. 810706369 NK/GC Ibrar Khan (under suspension) of A/66 while functioning WP(C) 16(K) of 2007 Page 3 of 15 as NK/GC in A/66 Bn. CRPF committed an act of gross misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force Under Section 11(I) of CRPF Act 1949 in that after attending QMC course w.e.f. 04.10.1995 to 29.12.1995 at CTC-I CRPF. Neemuch he left for unit Hqr. On 29.12.1995 but remained absent without leave w.e.f. 29.12.1995 to 31.09.1995 without permission from the competent authority. Article-II: That the said No. 810706369 NK/GC Ibrar Khan (u/s) of A/66 while functioning as NK/GC in A/66 Bn. CRPF committed an act of gross misconduct in his capacity as a member of the force Under Section 11(I) of CRPF Act 1949 in that after completion of QMC Course at CTC-I on 29.12.1995, he did not report for duty at his unit Hqr nor responded/obeyed the official correspondence sent to him at his declared home address directing him to rejoin duty vide his office letter No. C-IX.1/96-66 EC-I dated 12.03.1996 and letter No. P.VIII-1/96-EC-II dated 13.04.1996. (BK Kamath) Commandant, 66 Bn. CRPF 5. The Commandant, Respondent No. 2 also appointed one Sri Anil Kumar, Assistant Commandant as inquiry officer on 07.111.1996 for conducting the inquiry relating to the absence of the Petitioner without leave. Ultimately the said inquiring officer conducted the inquiry wherein the Petitioner on 27.11.1996 submitted his representation to the Respondent No. 2 highlighting the reasons of his absence from his service wherein he stated that on 01.01.1996 reached the Mughal Sarai Station and due to acute pain in his stomach became unconscious and ultimately he was taken to the Gazipur Govt. Hospital wherein he was under treatment from 02.01.1996 to 26.08.1996. As he could not admit himself in the hospital due to non-payment of Rs. 2,000/- required for admission and demanded by the authorities. Being ill and disturbed the Petitioner went to report in Mariyani without taking the prescriptions and Bills etc. with him. 6. On 11.12.1996 the Petitioner appeared before the inquiring officer and submitted his statement (Annexure-VI to the writ petition). After following the procedure the inquiring officer submitted his report to the authority wherein he stated that the charges against the Petitioner have been proved and the Petitioner was also asked to submit his reply and accordingly the Petitioner on 24.02.1997 submitted his reply to the Respondent No. 2 and Respondent No. 2 was not satisfied with the reply of the Petitioner and ultimately passed the impugned order of dismissal on 07.03.1997. 7. 7. Being aggrieved by the order of the Disciplinary Authority the Petitioner preferred a writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 19423/1999 before the Allahabad High Court and the Allahabad High Court considering the facts and circumstances of the case held that the writ petition of the Petitioner is not maintainable on the ground of alternative remedy available which has admittedly not been filed by the Petitioner. Thereafter, the Petitioner preferred an appeal before the statutory appellate authority which was also dismissed upholding the order of disciplinary authority. The Petitioner again preferred a writ petition being Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 5955/2004 before the Allahabad High Court and the Allahabad High Court again dismissed the said writ petition holding that the Allahabad High Court has no territorial jurisdiction for deciding the issue as no part of the cause of action has arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that court. In view of the above, the Petitioner preferred the instant writ petition for quashing the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the Appellate Authority. 8. The Respondent No. 1, Union of India and the Respondent No. 2, Commandant, the Disciplinary Authority as well as the Respondent No. 3, the Appellate Authority filed their affidavit-in-opposition wherein the Respondents contended that the Petitioner failed to produce any document in support of his contention that he was in the Govt. Hospital, Gazipur and more so, the instant writ petition is not maintainable on the ground that the Petitioner, no where in his petition stated inter alia, that the disciplinary proceeding is bad for non-observance of any particular procedure as prescribed. It is also stated in their affidavit-in-opposition that the claim of the Petitioner that he was sent to the Gazipur Govt. Hospital by the GRP is not convincing since Mughal Sarai is a very big and important Railway junction having its district hospital near the Railway Station, sending the Petitioner to Gazipur Govt. Hospital, which is about 70 Kms away from Mughal Sarai district hospital, is not tenable. Not only that, the Petitioner in no time had informed his authority regarding his sickness till the issue of the warrant of arrest by the appropriate authority against him for his non-joining of duty. 9. According to the authority, the Petitioner deliberately absented himself from duty and being a resident of Gazipur district, managed an out door ticket of Gazipur Govt. 9. According to the authority, the Petitioner deliberately absented himself from duty and being a resident of Gazipur district, managed an out door ticket of Gazipur Govt. Hospital, to cover up his unauthorized absence period. 10. Mr. CT Jamir, learned Counsel for the Petitioner mainly attacked the order of dismissal on the ground that the statement of the delinquent officer before the inquiring authority has not been considered and also the finding of the inquiring authority which is ultimately accepted by the Disciplinary Authority is not based on evidence on record, particularly the authority failed to consider the sickness certificate (Annexure-I to the writ petition) produced by the Petitioner wherein he was suggested for taking rest from 02.01.1996 to 26.08.1996. He also contended that the contentions of the Petitioner has not been considered by the inquiring authority. 11. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., (2006) 4 SCC 713 would contend that the inquiry officer cannot base his findings on mere hypothesis. Mere ipse dixit on his part cannot be a substitute of evidence and in the instant case the inquiring authority without considering the evidence on record gave his findings on mere hypothesis. In support of his aforesaid contention he also placed reliance on another decision of the Apex Court in Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank and Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 570 wherein the Apex Court stated inter alia, that the inquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a finding after taking into consideration the materials brought on record by the parties and the materials brought on record pointing out guilt are required to be proved. Suspicion, however high may be, under no circumstances can be held to be a substitute for legal proof. In the instant case, according to him, the authority without any proof that the Petitioner had intentionally absented from his duty passed the impugned order of dismissal. 12. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also again raised his voice on proportionality of the punishment. According to him, the order of dismissal is a dis-proportionate punishment for the alleged misconduct committed by the Petitioner and in support of his aforesaid contention he has placed reliance on State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 12. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also again raised his voice on proportionality of the punishment. According to him, the order of dismissal is a dis-proportionate punishment for the alleged misconduct committed by the Petitioner and in support of his aforesaid contention he has placed reliance on State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Ram Daras Yadav, (2010) 2 SCC 236 wherein the Apex Court taking note of the facts of that case stated inter alia, "We are quite conscious of the fact that we are dealing with a disciplined police organization. Discipline is the backboned of the police force. Highest degree of discipline is imperative for the smooth functioning of a police force. Both the Respondent and Gajendra Kumar Singh have stated that in fact the incident had not taken place and they were coerced to file complaints at the instance of the superior officials. It is difficult for us to examine the veracity of this allegation by the Respondent and Gajendra Kumar Singh. Without arriving at any definite conclusion regarding veracity of allegation and counter-allegations, we are clearly of the opinion that the punishment of dismissal awarded in the facts and circumstances of the case is clearly disproportionate". The Apex Court while modifying the order of the High Court set aside the order of termination and directed the Respondent to withhold two increments and for making payment of 50% of the back wages. 13. Learned Counsel for the Petitioner also took this Court to the report of the inquiring authority wherein the Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the article of charges and contended that the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order ignoring the said recording of the inquiring authority recorded inter alia, that the charges have been admitted in toto. Therefore, the charge in Article-II is also proved beyond any shadow of doubt, as revealed by disciplinary authority is contrary to record, he contended. He further contended that such wrong recording of fact proved that the disciplinary authority failed to apply its mind on the matter. 14. Mr. Therefore, the charge in Article-II is also proved beyond any shadow of doubt, as revealed by disciplinary authority is contrary to record, he contended. He further contended that such wrong recording of fact proved that the disciplinary authority failed to apply its mind on the matter. 14. Mr. TB Jamir, learned CGC while resisting the prayer of the Petitioner and the submissions of the learned Counsel for the Petitioner would contend that the power of the writ court is very much limited so far the disciplinary proceeding is concerned and the writ court does not have the power to re-examine or re-appreciate the evidence laid before the inquiring authority or officer for the simple reason that it is exercising its power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, not the appellate power. He further contended that in the instant case the Petitioner admittedly did not submit any record showing that he was hospitalized for a long period of 247 days to justify his unauthorized absence, rather he tried to rejoin with the battalion in question when the authority issued the warrant of arrest. 15. In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision of Apex Court in State Bank of India and Ors v. Ramesh Dinkar Punde, (2006) 7 SCC 212 wherein the Apex Court while considering the order of dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as the order of the High Court, noted that the High Court has acted as an Appellate Authority despite the consistent view taken by this Court that the High Court and the Tribunal while exercising the judicial review do not act as an Appellate Authority: "Its jurisdiction is circumscribed and confined to correct error of law or procedural error, if any, resulting in manifest miscarriage of justice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication on merit by reappreciating the evidence as an Appellate Authority." The Apex Court also noted that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence which had been considered by the inquiry officer, a disciplinary authority and the Appellate Authority. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record. 16. The finding of the High Court, on facts, runs to the teeth of the evidence on record. 16. He also contended that in the case Ramesh Dinkar Punde (supra) in paragraph 15 of the aforesaid law report, the Apex Court specifically stated that a disciplinary proceeding is not a criminal trial. The standard proof required is that of preponderance of probability and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case the authority considered the evidence on record and came to the findings that the Petitioner failed to furnish any cogent reason for his unauthorized absence. 17. It is also contended by him that the Petitioner nowhere in his petition contended that the disciplinary authority passed the impugned order without any evidence. According to the CGC, this is a case of some evidence and when there are some evidence from which the authority can come to a finding that the delinquent officer committed misconduct and imposed penalty in that case the high court should not exercise its power of judicial review when the Petitioner mainly in his writ petition took a ground that he was not given proper opportunity to prove his case which is totally contrary to the records. 18. In support of his contention that there is a difference between the admission of fact and admission of guilt he placed reliance on paragraph 28 and 29 of the judgment of Division Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Mohanlal Das, 2008 (3) GLT 812. Paragraphs 28 and 29 are reproduced herein under: 28. The very fact that the Petitioner remained unauthorisedly absent from duty for months together itself speaks of his desertion of duty. In such circumstances, there was nothing wrong in declaring him a deserter with consequential dismissal from service. As has been held by the Apex Court in Channabasappa Happali v. State of Mysore, reported in AIR 1972 SC 32 , there is no distinction between admission of fact and admission of guilt. As in the instant case, in that case also the police officer remained absent without leave. His prayer for extension of leave was not granted. Thereafter, charge was framed against him. From the materials on record, it appeared that the Petitioner did not take part in the enquiry. It was contended that the enquiry was in breach of the principles of natural justice. His prayer for extension of leave was not granted. Thereafter, charge was framed against him. From the materials on record, it appeared that the Petitioner did not take part in the enquiry. It was contended that the enquiry was in breach of the principles of natural justice. The Apex Court noticing that the fact of remaining unauthorisedly absent being an admitted one, held that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. It was observed thus: ...we do not see any distinction between admission of facts and admission of guilt. When he admitted the facts, he was guilty. The facts speak for themselves. It was a clear case of indiscipline and nothing else. If a police officer remains absent without leave and also resorts to fast as a demonstration against the action of a superior officer, the indiscipline is fully established. The learned Single Judge in the High WP(C) 16(K) of 2007 Page 10 of 15 Court was right when he laid down that the plea amount to a plea of guilty on the facts, on which the Petitioner was charged and we are in fully agreement with the observations of the learned Single Judge. 29. In the instant case also, the fact speaks for itself. At the first instance, the Petitioner deserted his unit without any authority and/or leave and thereafter, all throughout remained absent. This being the position, nothing more was required to be established that he deserted the unit of BSF. The plea of violation of principles of natural justice will have to be considered in that context. Needless to say that natural justice is not based on any straightjacket formula. It cannot be stretched that far, in which, nothing could be established beyond what has been established even without any notice. 19. This Court has gone through the fact of Channabasappa Happali (supra) as referred to by the Division Bench in its judgment from which it appears that the Petitioner of that case did not take part in the inquiry and it was contended that the inquiry was in breach of the principles of natural justice and ultimately the Apex Court noticing that the fact of remaining unauthorizedly absent being an admitted one, held that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice. In the instant case, the Petitioner appeared in the inquiry proceedings and placed his evidence which was also considered by the inquiring authority and the Disciplinary Authority. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Petitioner was not provided opportunity to place his case. 20. He further contended that the writ court can interfere with the departmental proceeding only when there are some procedural defects in the departmental proceeding like the proceeding is without jurisdiction or functioning of the Disciplinary Authority is perverse and without any evidence. But in the instant case the Petitioner nowhere in his writ petition pleaded that the inquiring authority acted beyond his jurisdiction or his findings are perverse. He only raised the question that his contention before the inquiring authority was considered and the authority failed to consider the sickness certificate issued by the Dy. CMO, of the Gazipur Govt. Hospital wherein the said CMO suggested the Petitioner for taking complete rest and proper care. 21. His further contention is that the Petitioner being the member of a disciplinary force could have filed a representation before the authority informing the said suggestion of the medical officer but he did not do so. A person cannot be asked to take complete rest for restoration of his health without admitting the person in the hospital and in the instant case on perusal of the certificate it cannot be said that the Petitioner even attended the OPD for the whole period. He placed the relevant documents to show that the inquiring authority not only considered the sickness certificate submitted by the Petitioner, rather the same was also exhibited as a defence document as Exhibit-1 and 2. Therefore, the contention of the Petitioner that the evidence produced by him was not considered is not correct. 22. He has taken this Court to the statement of the Petitioner wherein the Petitioner stated that for nearly two months he was at hospital itself accommodating him in the verandah and taking regular medicines from the hospital/market and contended that the Petitioner even did not place any of the prescriptions regarding his treatment and bills regarding purchase of medicine. He also took this Court to the statement of the Petitioner that he sent replies through ordinary post as none of these replies have been received by the unit. 23. He also took this Court to the statement of the Petitioner that he sent replies through ordinary post as none of these replies have been received by the unit. 23. Learned CGC while resisting the submission of the Petitioner that the Disciplinary Authority has recorded, inter alia, that the charge has been admitted in toto would mean not the charge but admitted the fact of his unauthorized absence and rightly held that the charge in Article-II has been proved. 24. He further contended that when the inquiring authority as well as the Disciplinary Authority considered all the evidences on record and ultimately came to the findings that the unauthorized absence of the Petitioner is a misconduct under Section 11(1) of the CRPF Act, 1949 read with Rule 27 of the CRPF Rules, 1955 and punishable, the authority rightly passed the order of dismissal of the Petitioner. 25. Learned CGC while answering to the contention of learned Counsel for the Petitioner, inter alia, that quantum of punishment is disproportionate, would contend that if the misconduct is proved Court cannot interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the same is shocking to the mind of the court. In support of his aforesaid contention, he placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in State of Meghalaya and Ors. v. Mecken Singh N. Marak (2008) 7 SCC 580 particularly paragraph 14 and 15 of the said judgment. Paragraphs 14 and 15 are reproduced herein under: 14. In the matter of imposition of sentence, the scope for interference is very limited and restricted to exceptional cases. The jurisdiction of the High Court, to interfere with the quantum of punishment is limited and cannot be exercised without sufficient reasons. The High Court, although has jurisdiction in appropriate case, to consider the question in regard to the quantum of punishment, but it has a limited role to play. It is now well settled that the High Courts, in exercise of powers under Article 226, do not interfere with the quantum of punishment unless there exist sufficient reasons there for. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority unless shocking to the conscience of the court, cannot be subjected to judicial review. In the impugned order of the High Court no reasons whatsoever have been indicated as to why the punishment was considered disproportionate. Failure to give reasons amounts to denial of justice. The mere statement that it is disproportionate would not suffice. 15. While considering the question of proportionality of sentence imposed on a delinquent at the conclusion of departmental enquiry, the court should also take into consideration, the mental setup of the delinquent, the type of duty to be performed by him and similar relevant circumstances which go into the decision-making process. If the charges employee holds the position of trust where honesty and integrity are inbuilt requirements of functioning, it would not be proper to deal with the matter leniently. Misconduct, in such cases has to dealt with iron hands. 26. There is no doubt that when an order of dismissal is passed by the Disciplinary Authority after proper inquiry and upheld by the appellate authority that cannot be interfered with by the High Court reappreciating the evidence as the power of the High Court is very much limited and restricted to the exceptional cases. It is also settled that if the charged employee fails to explain reasons for his unauthorized absence by way of submitting proper documents and the inquiring authority in absence of the documents came to a conclusion that the charges leveled against the delinquent officer is proved, cannot normally be interfered by either the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority. In the instant case, admittedly the Petitioner belong to a disciplined force and he was supposed to maintain the discipline of the battalion and if he is for any reason not in a position to attend his office he is to inform his authority well ahead the reasons for his absence and even if it is not possible to inform well ahead then he should have produced the necessary documents in support of his case which is totally absent in the instant case except a sickness certificate. 27. 27. When the legislature enacted the particular statute providing the administrative authority to deal with the disciplinary proceedings of its employees and ultimately the said administrative authority acted in the terms of the prescription of the rules and regulations, the scope of judicial review would remain very limited. In a case where the punishment imposed by a Disciplinary Authority is found to be very shocking to the conscience of a court normally the Court should set aside the order and remit the matter to the authority for reconsideration. But in the instant case the Petitioner was provided with all the opportunities as required under law and there is no procedural defect committed by the authority concerned while conducting the disciplinary proceeding. 28. How the authority will maintain discipline in the force is always with them, court cannot rewrite the procedure for maintaining discipline while exercising its power of judicial review. Court can only interfere when the Petitioner can establish on the basis of record that the authority did not provide him the opportunity which he is entitled to according to the law covering the field and also the Disciplinary Authority proceeded beyond its limits and acted beyond the prescription of law. In the instant case, there is no such allegation made by the Petitioner. 29. This Court has also perused the records produced by Mr. TB Jamir, learned CGC in terms of the earlier order of this Court and from such record this Court does not find any procedural error committed either by the inquiring authority or the disciplinary authority while conducting the disciplinary proceeding. For maintaining discipline in the force if the authority dismisses a delinquent officer, upon establishment of his misconduct that should not be interfered by the Court unless the imposed punishment is in excess of the requirement and it shocks the mind of the court. In the instant case, according to this Court, the punishment imposed is not in excess of the requirement. 30. Learned CGC also referred to other judgments to show that the court can interfere only on quantum of punishment when such order of punishment shocks its mind. In the instant case, according to this Court, the punishment imposed is not in excess of the requirement. 30. Learned CGC also referred to other judgments to show that the court can interfere only on quantum of punishment when such order of punishment shocks its mind. The power of the court to interfere on the quantum of punishment is extremely restricted and only when the relevant facts are not considered the court may remit the matter back to the authority but in the instant case it cannot be said that the relevant facts are not considered either by the Disciplinary Authority or by the Appellate Authority. 31. Therefore, according to this Court, the writ petition is wholly devoid of merit and no interference is called for. 32. In the result the writ petition is dismissed. No costs.