V.K. Shukla, J.;- Present writ petition in question has been filed by petitioner questioning the validity of the order passed by Prescribed Authority dated 15.05.2006 allowing application for release of premises in question under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972 moved by landlord and order of its affirmance in Appeal dated 24.08.2006, by Additional District Judge, Court No. 8 Varanasi. 2. Brief background of case as is reflected that Narain Krishna Bhagwat and others, respondents 2nd set filed release application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act being PA Case No. 41 of 2002 Narain Krishna Bhagwat and another Vs. Bhairo Prasad and others for the release of the shop in question situated in House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi. Aforesaid release application was filed with the allegations that applicants-opposite party-2nd set are owner and landlord of House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi and in Gali, there is one shop wherein Late Mukund Sardar was tenant at the rate of Rs. 15/- per month which subsequently enhanced to Rs. 17/- per month with effect from 01.06.1975; that after the death of Mukund Sardar opposite party 1st set became joint tenant whereas in the shop only Bhairo Prasad, opposite party no. 1 is sitting and only he is in possession; that since the application no. 2 Subhash Narain Bhagwat, is about 21 years old but on account of his being unemployed, he is not getting married, inasmuch as he wants to do business and for that he has experience that the need of the applicants is bonafide and pressing and O.P. Set no. 1 has got two shops in House No. K19/1-A Mohallah Uchawa Gali, Varanasi City wherein they can do business that repeatedly opposite party 1st set were told to vacate the shop but they refused to do so hence release application is filed. In the said proceeding petitioner filed his objection, (paper no. 19/Ga dated 10.03.2003, denying the contents made in the release application except ownership landlord ship and his tenancy. In the said proceeding petitioner filed his objection, (paper no. 19/Ga dated 10.03.2003, denying the contents made in the release application except ownership landlord ship and his tenancy. The aforesaid objection was filed with the allegations that he is doing business as sole tenant of the shop in question and the opposite party 2nd set and 4th set have got no concern with the tenancy of the shop in question nor they claimed tenancy right and he is paying rent to the landlord; that the release application was not filed with the consent of the opposite party 2nd set, as such it is defective; that no rent is due against the opposite party no. 1 and notice dated 28.06.2002/01.07.2002 was given with totally incorrect facts against which reply was sent through counsel; that the applicants with the malafide intention have filed suit no. 76 of 2002 Narain Krishna Bhagwat and another Vs. Bhairo Prasad and others in the Court of Judge, Small Cause, Varanasi with totally incorrect allegations wherein opposite party no. 1 deposited entire amount alongwith the interest cost of the suit, as required under Section 20(4) of the Act before first date of hearing; that since the applicant no. 2 is not unemployed, rather he is carrying of General Merchant in the shop situated in Ground floor of House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi in the name and style Prakash Stores, and apart from that he also does the computer work of Janma Kundali etc. besides he carries on business of Pitambari Super Shining Powder which he himself supplied and also got it done, gets handsome amount and he himself refused to marriage for the reasons best known to him that since the applicant no. 2 is already doing business, hence there is no need to start the business; that the need of the applicants is neither urgent pressing or bonafide that the House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi does not belong to opposite parties nor they have any concern with that; that the present case is not the first case rather prior to that in respect of the shop in question, another P.A. Case No. 90/85 Krishna Vinayak Bhagwat Vs. Bhairo Prasad and others filed in the Court of Additional Civil Judge/Prescribed Authority Varanasi with totally incorrect allegation and upon contest by the O.P. No. 1 the said P.A. Case was dismissed that the applicants filed present case concealing the aforesaid case; that there are three three shops in House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi, first 2-door shop is under the tenancy of Ram Nihore, Halwai and the 3rd shop is in possession of Narain Krishna Bhagwat, wherein he carries on the business of General Merchant and at present applicant no. 2 is doing business therein; that behind the aforesaid shop of the applicant no. 2 there is big hall and dallan, which they used for Tent House in the name and style Firm Subh Mangal Company and they are giving tent, utensils, Dari, Chandani etc. on rent that on the first floor also, there is a big dallan where Sita Ram Charan Bhagwat, Kundaliq Bhagwat were running Sri Krishna Sangeet Maha Vidyalaya which is now closed and the said accommodation is vacant, which is available to the applicants. It was further alleged that the shop in question is the only source of income of the opposite party No. 1 and his family members; that between Opposite party No. 1 and Opposite Party No. 4 Smt. Chameli Devi it has been agreed that the opposite party no. 1 shall remain tenant and from his income, the family members will be looked after and in House No. K 19/1-A, Smt. Chameli Devi, opposite party no. 2 shall keep tenant and she also reside therein; that she will take the rent which will be their source of livelihood; that the shop in the ground floor of said house, one Munni Lal is tenant, opposite party no. 4 is residing in the first floor and in the second floor, Satya Dev and Nathu Sardar are tenants apart from said house, uncle of O.P. No. 1 does business of Halwai by keeping the Chowki, as such no vacant accommodation is available to the opposite party no. 4 is residing in the first floor and in the second floor, Satya Dev and Nathu Sardar are tenants apart from said house, uncle of O.P. No. 1 does business of Halwai by keeping the Chowki, as such no vacant accommodation is available to the opposite party no. 1 in the said house; that either Smt. Chameli Devi or Anno Yadav has got no concern with the tenancy of the shop in question or its income; that the applicants have neither got bonafide, pressing and genuine need nor the release application has been filed with the correct allegations, as such the release application is liable to be rejected. In support of their respective cases, both the parties filed affidavit evidence and documentary evidence. The respondents-landlords filed affidavit of applicant no. 1 (paper no. 29/Ga) dated 20.08.2004, affidavit (paper no. 30/Ga) of applicant no. 2 dated 20.08.2004 against which petitioner filed his counter affidavits (paper no. 46/Ga) dated 04.11.2004 and (paper no. 47/Ga) respectively, against which applicant no.1 field his affidavit (paper no. 52-C) dated 01.12.2004 and applicant no. 2 filed his affidavit (paper no. 53-C) dated 01.12.2004 respectively. The petitioner also filed his own affidavit dated 02.12.2004 (paper no. 50/Ga) in support of his case, against which Narain Krishna Bhagwar, landlord filed his affidavit (paper no. 63/Ga) dated 03.12.2004. In support of his case, petitioner got affidavit of witness Sri Raj Kumar Yadav filed as affidavit evidence (paper No. 51/Ga) dated 02.12.2004 agaisnt which Narain Krishna Bhagwat filed his affidavit (counter)- dated 03.12.2004 (paper no. 64/GA). Against which, petitioner filed his affidavit (rejoinder) dated 10.01.2005. The petitioner filed his own affidavit dated 22.08.2005 (paper no. 70/GA) alongwith the agreement entered into between Smt. Chameli Devi and Bhairo Prasad, petitioner dated 20.06.1977, alongwith affidavit dated 22.08.2005. Petitioner-tenant already filed 12 documents alongwith list (paper no. 39/Ga) on 04.11.2004, which were duly proved by the petitioner through his own affidavit dated 29.08.2005. Against the aforesaid affidavit of the petitioner dated 29.08.2005; Narain Krishna Bhagwat also filed his affidavit (counter) dated 04.02.2006 against which petitioner filed his affidavit (rejoinder) dated 19.04.2006. During the pendency of the case before the Prescribed Authority petitioner moved application (paper no. 39/Ga) on 04.11.2004, which were duly proved by the petitioner through his own affidavit dated 29.08.2005. Against the aforesaid affidavit of the petitioner dated 29.08.2005; Narain Krishna Bhagwat also filed his affidavit (counter) dated 04.02.2006 against which petitioner filed his affidavit (rejoinder) dated 19.04.2006. During the pendency of the case before the Prescribed Authority petitioner moved application (paper no. 58/Ga) for issue of Commission for local inspection of the House No. 17/10 Mohallah Laxman Joshi Gali Ratan Phatak Varanasi for ascertaining the availability of the accommodation to landlord and against which landlord filed their objection (paper no. 59/Ga) but the Prescribed Authority wrongly and illegally rejected the said application vide its order dated 17.02.2005. Thereafter release application in question was considered and allowed by the Prescribed Authority finding need of the landlord to settle his son to be bonafide one and on comparative hardship front also finding has been returned in favour of landlord. Aggrieved against the same petitioner preferred appeal. Said appeal in question has been rejected vide order dated 24.08.2006. At this juncture present writ petition in question has been filed. 3. Pleadings inter se parties have been exchanged and thereafter present writ petition in question has been taken for final hearing and disposal with the consent of the parties. 4. Sri Ajay Kumar Singh, Advocate contended with vehemence that in the present case both the courts below have erred in law while deciding the question of bonafide need and even on comparative hardship front there was perversity and the application for spot inspection ought to have been allowed in the facts of the case, as such writ petition in question deserves to be allowed. 5. Countering the said submission Sri C.K.Parekh, Advocate representing landlord on the other hand contended that in the present case categorical finding of fact has been returned on the question of bonafide need and same is the pure question of fact based on appreciation of evidence and similar is the situation qua comparative hardship front also as such this Court should not interfere in exercise of its authority of judicial review. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced factual position in the present case is that petitioner is tenant of the premises in question and the landlord had filed suit for eviction requiring the shop in question for settling his unemployed son. 6. After respective arguments have been advanced factual position in the present case is that petitioner is tenant of the premises in question and the landlord had filed suit for eviction requiring the shop in question for settling his unemployed son. Both the courts below have found that son of the landlord has no place to carry on his business and under compelling circumstances in order to sustain himself he has been carrying on his business from the premises whereon his father is carrying on his business. 7. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Akhileshwar Kumar and others v. Mustaqim, reported in AIR 2003 SC 532 , took the view that simply because educated unemployed son was provisionally assisting his father in family business same does not mean that he should not start his own independent business. Relevant paragraphs 3 and 4 are being extracted below: "3. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court cannot be countenanced and has occasioned a failure of justice. Overwhelming evidence is available to show that the plaintiff No. 1 is sitting idle, without any adequate commercial activity available to him so as to gainfully employ him. The plaintiff No. 1 and his father both have deposed to this fact. Simply because the plaintiff No. 1 is provisionally assisting his father in their family business, it does not mean that he should never start his own independent business. What the High Court has overlooked is the evidence to the effect, relied on by the trial Court too, that the husband of plaintiff No. 4, i.e. son-in-law of Ram Chandra Sao, was assisting the latter in his business and there was little left to be done by the three sons. 4. So is the case with the availability of alternative accommodation, as opined by the High Court. There is a shop in respect of which a suit for eviction was filed to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2. The suit was compromised and the shop was got vacated. The shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and utilized. The shop is meant for the business of plaintiff No. 2. There is yet another shop constructed by the father of the plaintiffs which is situated over a septic tank but the same is almost inaccessible inasmuch as there is a deep ditch in front of the shop and that is why it is lying vacant and utilized. Once it has been proved by a landlord that the suit accommodation is required bona fide by him for his own purpose and such satisfaction withstands the test of objective assessment by the Court of facts then choosing of the accommodation which would be reasonable to satisfy such requirement has to be left to the subjective choice of the needy. The Court cannot thrust upon its own choice on the needy. Of course, the choice has to be exercised reasonably and not whimsically. The alternative accommodation which have prevailed with the High Court are either not available to the plaintiff No. 1 or not suitable in all respects as the suit accommodation is. The approach of the High Court that an accommodation got vacated to satisfy the need of plaintiff No. 2, who too is an educated unemployed, should be diverted or can be considered as relevant alternative accommodation to satisfy the requirement of plaintiff No. 1 another educated unemployed brother, cannot be countenanced. So also considering a shop situated over a septic tank and inaccessible on account of a ditch in front of the shop and hence lying vacant cannot be considered a suitable alternative to the suit shop which is situated in a marketing complex, is easily accessible and has been purchased by the plaintiffs to satisfy the felt need of one of them. 8. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ragavendra Kumar v. Firm Prem Machinery & Co. [ 2000(1) SCC 679 ] has held as follows : "It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, [ (1996)5 SCC 353 ]. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted." 9. (See: Prativa Devi (Smt.) v. T.V. Krishnan, [ (1996)5 SCC 353 ]. In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted." 9. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Yadvendra Arya and another v. Mukesh Kumar Verma, 2008 (1) ARC 256 has taken the view that it is landlord who is the best judge of his requirement. He has complete freedom in the matter and the landlord has got every right to file release application for settling his unemployed son in independent business, and the son cannot be accommodated with the father in his business. 10. Once this is the factual scenario that categorical finding of fact has been returned and recorded that landlord's son has been under compelling circumstance sharing the business premises alongwith his father and in this background his need has been found to be genuine and bonafide one then there is no occasion for this Court to take different view as has been prayed for. Finding of fact on question of bonafide need is affirmed. 11. Much emphasis has been laid by the petitioner on the fact that application for spot inspection was made and same ought to have been allowed in the facts of present case. Allowing of said application was not going to change verdict for the simple reason that as already noted above, it is choice of landlord to decide as to from which place should he carry on his business and which place would be suitable for settling his business. Application made for spot inspection was to suggest for other place also being available for carrying on his business. 12. The two places suggested were (i) Behind the shop there is one hall and dalan wherein goods pertaining of marriage etc. were kept (ii) Dalan on the first floor, where earlier music institution was being run. Categorical averment made by landlord qua property no. 1, so suggested was that activity carried out from said premises was purely charitable and not at all commercial activity. Qua premises situated at first floor it was categorically mentioned, that there was temple and was being used as temple. Categorical averment made by landlord qua property no. 1, so suggested was that activity carried out from said premises was purely charitable and not at all commercial activity. Qua premises situated at first floor it was categorically mentioned, that there was temple and was being used as temple. Once landlord has given cogent reason, that said places were not of his choice to carry on business, then landlord could not have been compelled to choose the said places. Appellate Court has objectively considered and recorded finding that in the facts of the case, there was no requirement for commission being issued. 13. Once landlord indicated his choice to carry on his business from particular place then in the garb of application for spot inspection tenant could not have insisted the landlord's son to carry on his business from other place as suggested by the petitioner. In the facts of case as admittedly landlord's son has been compelled to share accommodation used by his father and has clearly decided to carry on business from a particular shop then in this background in the facts of the case rejection of application for spot inspection is neither here nor there and in no way effects the decision taken by both the Court below/Prescribed Authority. 14. Petitioner at last contended that he has no alternative accommodation and the opinion formed by the appellate forum qua alternative accommodation is neither here nor there. 15. Even on the comparative hardship front it is the landlord who is suffering irreparable loss as his son is being forced to share business premises and it would be much more unreasonable not to provide shop to unemployed son to establish himself and run his own business freely and independently and specially in the circumstances when no attempt has been made by tenant to search out alternative accommodation for all these years of ongoing litigation. 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mst. Begam Begum & Ors. V. Abdul Ahad Khan (d) by Lrs & Ors. ( 1979(1) SCC 273 ) Hon'ble Apex court had occasion to deal in detail with the comparative hardship's aspect as follows: "Moreover Section 11(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. V. Abdul Ahad Khan (d) by Lrs & Ors. ( 1979(1) SCC 273 ) Hon'ble Apex court had occasion to deal in detail with the comparative hardship's aspect as follows: "Moreover Section 11(h) of the Act uses the words 'reasonable requirement' which undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire as the High Court has done in this case. It seems to us that the connotation of the term 'need' or 'requirement' should not be artificially extended nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for one landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such a course would defeat the very purpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general scheme of all the Rent Control Acts, prevalent in other State in the country. This Court has considered the import of the word requirement and pointed out that it merely connotes that there should be an element of need. In this connection our attention was drawn to the evidence led by the defendants that the main source of their income is the hotel business carried on by them in the premises and if they are thrown out they are likely to get any alternative accommodation. The High Court has accepted the case of the defendants on this point, but does not appear to have considered the natural consequences, which flow from a comparative assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant if a decree for eviction follows. It is no doubt true that the tenant will have to be ousted from the house if a decree for eviction is passed, but such an event would happen whenever a decree for eviction is passed and was fully in contemplation of the legislature when Section 11(1)(h) of the Act was introduced in the Act. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. This by itself would not be valid ground for refusing the plaintiffs for eviction. Thus, on careful comparison and assessment of the relative advantage and disadvantages of the landlord and the tenant it seems to us that the scale is titled in favour of the plaintiff. The inconvenience, loss and trouble resulting from denial of a decree for eviction in favour of the plaintiffs far outweight the eviction from that point of view." 17. Judgement quoted above has been followed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Badrinarayan Chunnilal Bhutda v. Govind Ram Munada, 2003 (2) SCC 320 , and apart from the same in paragraph 13 mentioned as follows: "13. In Piper v. Harvey, (1979) 1 SCC 273 the issue as to comparative hardship arose for the consideration of the Court of Appeal under the Rent Act, 1957. Lord Dennining opined: (All ER p. 457E-F) "When I look at all the evidence in this case and see the strong case of hardship which the landlord put forward, and when I see that the tenant did not give any evidence of any attempts made by him to find other accommodation, to look for another house, either to buy or to rent, it seems to me that there is only one reasonable conclusion to be arrived at, and that is that the tenant did not prove (and burden is on him to prove) the case of greater hardship." Hodson, L.J. opined: (All ER p. 458) "The tenant has not been able to say anything more than the minimum which every tenant can say, namely, that he has in fact been in occupation of the bungalow, and that he has not at the moment any other place to go to. He has not, however, sought to prove anything additional to that by way of hardship, such as unsuccessful attempts to find other accommodation, or, indeed, to raise the question of his relative financial incompetence as compared with the landlord." 18. Hon'ble Apex Court in recent judgment of Ganga Devi v. District Judge Nainital, 2008 (7) ADJ 501 , where tenant has not made any effort to search accommodation, has not accorded any relief to the tenant. Paragraph s 15, 16 and 19 of the said judgment are being extracted below: "15. Hon'ble Apex Court in recent judgment of Ganga Devi v. District Judge Nainital, 2008 (7) ADJ 501 , where tenant has not made any effort to search accommodation, has not accorded any relief to the tenant. Paragraph s 15, 16 and 19 of the said judgment are being extracted below: "15. There is also nothing on record to show that for the last so many years the appellant had made any effort to find out a tenanted premises for herself so that she can continue with her business. No such material at least has been brought on record. Any subsequent event as regards thereto has neither been pleaded nor proved. The provisions of the statutory rules must be interpreted so as to give effect to the object and purport of the Act. It cannot be applied in a vacuum, as the statute requires comparison of the hardship of both the tenant as also the landlord. It is, therefore, not a case where Rule 16 has any application. 16. The court would not determine a question only on the basis of sympathy or sentiment. Stricto sensu equity as such may not have any role to play. 19. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion, that six months' time should be granted to the 1st respondent to vacate the premises, which should serve the ends of justice. It is directed accordingly. Subject to the aforementioned directions, this appeal is dismissed. In the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall beno order as to cost." 19. Even on the comparative hardship front, it is landlord's son who is suffering an irreparable loss as in spite of fact that he has proved his bonafide need, he has been deprived to carry on his business in independent manner. Litigation in question has been drawn in the year 2002 and 8 years period have elapsed, in such situation petitioner cannot be permitted to take advantage specially when he has failed to search out alternative accommodation. Six months time is accorded to the petitioner to vacate the premises in question from today and hand over peaceful possession to the landlord subject to the condition that undertaking is furnished within one month before Prescribed Authority that peacefully possession would be handed over. In the event of failure to furnish undertaking interim protection accorded shall come to an end. 20. In the event of failure to furnish undertaking interim protection accorded shall come to an end. 20. In term of aforesaid, present writ petition is dismissed. 21. No order as to cost.