1. This appeal has been preferred against the order dated 19-08-2010 passed by the Dy. Commissioner, Sales Tax (Appeals) Appellate Authority, Jammu, in an appeal filed under section 72 of the Jammu and Kashmir Value Added Tax Act, 2005. From the perusal of the memorandum of appeal it is clear that it has been presented by the Learned Advocate on 14-01-2011. This works out to be a period of more than four months from the date of the order after excluding the day from which such period is to be reckoned and the time taken for obtaining the copy of the order. The appeal, as such, has been filed after the statutory period as provided in Section 73 sub section (1), of the Jammu and Kashmir Value Added Tax Act, which, for the convenience of ready reference, is reproduced herein below verbatim:- Section 73(1):- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by an order passed under section 72 may within three months from the date of such order prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. 2. The Section makes it abundantly clear that an appeal should be filed within a period of three months. The appellant has not done so, nor has he filed any application for the condonation of this delay. Section 76 Jammu and Kashmir Value Added Tax Act which assumes significance here reads as under:- Section 76:- the provisions of Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act, Samvat 1995, shall apply to the appeals and revisions filed under this Act before the Appellate, Reviewing Authorities or the Tribunal. Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides as under:- Extension of prescribed period in certain cases:- Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period" 3. On the plain reading of Section 5 supra it becomes clear that if an appeal is filed after the period provided for such filing, the appellant must seek condonation of delay and it is he who has to prove the existence of a sufficient cause, to the satisfaction of the Court, a condition precedent, for the court to exercise its discretion in the matter of condoning the delay. This discretion is a judicial discretion and not an arbitrary one. Where sufficient cause is not shown, to the satisfaction of the Court, no question of condonation of delay arises. Nothing further has to be done in such an eventuality and the appeal has to be dismissed on that ground alone, irrespective of whether limitation is, or, is not, set up as a ground of attack or defence. The Court can suo motto look into that aspect also. The law of limitation has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds as has been held in P.K. Rama v. State of Kerala and Anr. reported in AIR 1998 S.C. 2276 . 4. The law laid down in AIR 1962 S.C. 361 is also as sacred as a command for us and the relevant excerpts there of are enumerated below:- "In construing S. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties and this legal right which has accrued to the decree holder by lapse of time should not be light heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the court to condone delay and admit the appeal." 5. There is no evidence to suggest that the appellant was prevented, by any cause, to file the appeal within the prescribed time under section 73 of the J&K Value Added Tax Act, 2005. No Application has been filed, by the appellant, even on that count. In the memo of appeal also nowhere has it been explained that any circumstance or cause prevented the appellant to file the appeal within time. No Application has been filed, by the appellant, even on that count. In the memo of appeal also nowhere has it been explained that any circumstance or cause prevented the appellant to file the appeal within time. Absolutely no attempt has been made by the appellant to suggest, even by a whisper of evidence, that he had a bona fide cause in filing the appeal after the statutory period. The appellant has not stated anywhere in the appeal that the copy of the order passed by the Ist Appellate Authority has not been communicated/ conveyed to him. Therefore a valuable right to treat the order passed by the Appellate Authority as binding has accrued to the other side after the determination of the period prescribed for filing the appeal. 6. Viewed in the context of what has been premised above, the appeal of the appellant is barred by limitation and merits dismissal on this score alone. Accordingly, the appeal of the appellant is dismissed. Record, summoned, if any, be returned forthwith. File be consigned to records after its due completion. Announced.