Judgment : 1. This Writ Petition is filed for a Mandamus to declare the action of the respondents in handcuffing the petitioner’s husband, by name, Karnekanti Veera Brahma Chary @ Chary, S/o.Veerabhadraiah, while taking him from District Jail/Central prison to the Court premises for the purpose of trial of cases, in which he was implicated as one of the accused, as illegal, unconstitutional and arbitrary. 2. The petitioner’s husband, named above, is stated to be an accused in some criminal cases involving offences of robbery and dacoity. The grievance of the petitioner is that her husband is being handcuffed every time when he is being taken to the Court from District jail and also from the Court to the jail without prior permission of the Court, which is dealing with the criminal cases. 3. At the hearing, Sri V.Venugopala Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that handcuffing of the petitioner’s husband while taking him from the jail to the court and vice versa is illegal and unconstitutional apart from undermining the human dignity.; and that in extraordinary cases, which require handcuffing, the respondents are bound to record the reasons therefor and obtain the permission of the presiding judge concerned. In support of his submission, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Prem Shankar Shukla Vs. Delhi Administration ( (1980) 3 SCC 526 ). The learned Assistant Government Pleader for Home, on instructions, submitted that since the petitioner is a dreaded criminal, who escaped from the custody of the Police while he was being taken from Jail to the Court and vice versa as many as three times, he is being handcuffed. He has, however, candidly admitted that permission of the Court concerned for this purpose has not been obtained. 4. In Prem Shankar Shukla (supra) the Supreme Court held as under: “22. Handcuffing is prima facie inhuman and, therefore, unreasonable, is over-harsh and at the first flush, arbitrary. Absent fair procedure and objective monitoring, to inflict 'irons' is to resort to zoological strategies repugnant to Article 21. Thus, we must critically examine the justification offered by the State for this mode of restraint. Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to be harmonised. To prevent the escape of an under-trial is in public interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself, be castigated. Thus, we must critically examine the justification offered by the State for this mode of restraint. Surely, the competing claims of securing the prisoner from fleeing and protecting his personality from barbarity have to be harmonised. To prevent the escape of an under-trial is in public interest, reasonable, just and cannot, by itself, be castigated. But to bind a man hand and foot, fetter his limbs with hoops of steel, shuffle him along in the streets and stand him for hours in the courts is to torture him, defile his dignity, vulgarise society and foul the soul of our constitutional culture. Where then do we draw the humane line and how far do the rules err in print and praxis? 23. Insurance against escape does not compulsorily require handcuffing. There are other measures whereby an escort can keep safe custody of a detenu without the indignity and cruelty implicit in handcuffs or other iron contraptions. Indeed, binding together either the hands or the feet or both has not merely a preventive impact, but also a punitive hurtfulness. Manacles are mayhem on the human person and inflict humiliation on the bearer. The Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. II (1973 Edn.) at p. 53, states 'Handcuffs and fetters are instruments for securing the hands or feet of prisoners under arrest, or as a means of punishment'. The three components of 'irons' force on the human person must be distinctly understood. Firstly, to handcuff is to hoop harshly. Further, to handcuff is to punish humiliatingly and to vulgarise the viewers also. Iron straps are insult and pain writ large, animalising victim and keeper. Since there are other ways of ensuring security, it can be laid down as a rule that handcuffs or other fetter shall not be forced on the person of an under-trial prisoner ordinarily. The latest police instructions produced before us hearteningly reflect this view. We lay down as necessarily implicit in Articles 14 and 19 that when there is no compulsive need to fetter a person's limbs, it is sadistic, capricious, despotic and demoralising to humble a man by manacling him. Such arbitrary conduct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The minimal freedom of movement which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19 cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. Such arbitrary conduct surely slaps Article 14 on the face. The minimal freedom of movement which even a detainee is entitled to under Article 19 cannot be cut down cruelly by application of handcuffs or other hoops. It will be unreasonable so to do unless the State is able to make out that no other practical way of forbidding escape is available, the prisoner being so dangerous and desperate and the circumstances so hostile to safe-keeping. 30. Even in cases where, in extreme circumstances, handcuffs have to be put on the prisoner, the escorting authority must record contemporaneously the reasons for doing so. Otherwise, under Article 21 the procedure will be unfair and bad in law. Nor will mere recording the reasons do, as that can be a mechanical process mindlessly made. and fetters. The minions of the Police establishment must make good their security recipes by getting judicial approval. And, once the court directs that handcuffs shall be off, no escorting authority can overrule judicial direction. This is implicit in Article 21 which insists upon fairness reasonableness and justice in the very procedure which authorises stringent deprivation of life and liberty. The ratio in Maneka Gandhi's case and Sunil Batra's case ( AIR 1978 SC 597 and AIR 1978 SC 1675 ) (supra) read in proper light, leads us to this conclusion”. (Emphasis added) 5. Following the aforesaid decision of the Supreme Court, I am of the opinion, that if the respondents are satisfied that handcuffing of the petitioner’s husband is necessary, it is incumbent upon the escorting authority to record the reasons for doing so, place the said reasons before the presiding Judge, before whom the criminal case/cases is/are pending, and get his approval. In the absence of such an approval, the unilateral act on the part of the respondents in handcuffing the husband of the petitioner cannot be permitted. 6. The Writ Petition is, therefore, disposed of with a direction to the respondents to record the reasons, if handcuffing of the petitioner’s husband is found inevitable, and get the approval of the presiding Judge concerned. If such an approval is not given by the concerned Judge, the respondents shall not continue handcuffing of the petitioner’s husband in transit from jail to court and vice versa. 7. As a sequel to disposal of the Writ Petition, WPMP No.23020 of 2011 is disposed of as infructuous.