JUDGMENT Amitava Roy, J. 1. The present round of the extra decade procrastinated legal tussle lays a challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 of the Meghalaya Urban Development Authority Bye Laws, 2001, (hereafter for short referred to as the Bye Laws) framed under the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning Act, 1973 (for short hereafter referred to as the Act) as well as orders dated 05.07.2010 adjudging the constructions raised by the addressees to be illegal and directing demolition thereof. Thereby the addressees have been held to be encroachers on Government land by raising constructions without any valid permission. The final orders are in the hand of the Secretary, Meghalaya Urban Development Authority, Shillong (for short hereinafter referred to as the MUDA). 2. By order dated 19.07.2010, this Court directed maintenance of status quo of the property involved. By order dated 23.07.2010 thereafter, certain clarifications, as recorded therein, were sought for from the parties. This is chiefly related to the particulars of (i) the members of the Petitioner Association in WP(C) No. 3963/2010 as well as of those who claim to have instituted writ proceedings from time to time, challenging the initiatives taken by the State Respondents to oust them from the land in their occupation as well as (2) the location of the plots to ascertain as to whether those are within the Master Plan area within the meaning of the Act and the Bye Laws. In response thereto, the parties exchanged pleadings. The interim relief granted as above, continues as on date. 3. We have heard Mr. GC Bharuka, Senior Advocate, Ms. B Goyal, Mr. K Paul, Mr. J Roy, Mr. AM Buzarbaruah and Mr. RKD Choudhury, Advocates for the Petitioners. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, Senior Advocate along with Dr. BP Todi, Addl. Advocate General, Meghalaya and Mr. N Sarma, A Nath, Advocates represented the State Respondents. Also heard Mr. SP Mahanta, Advocate appearing for MUDA. 4. The bare essentials from the otherwise profuse pleadings of WP(C) No. 3963/2010, have to be necessarily sieved to depict the rival portrayals. Factual projection of other individual cases wherever warranted have also been scripted. The Petitioner Association claims to be the successor entity of Polo Bazar Welfare Association, a registered body with the charter of aims and objectives, amongst others, to attend to the general welfare of its members who are the residents of the Greater Polo area. Factual projection of other individual cases wherever warranted have also been scripted. The Petitioner Association claims to be the successor entity of Polo Bazar Welfare Association, a registered body with the charter of aims and objectives, amongst others, to attend to the general welfare of its members who are the residents of the Greater Polo area. It has pleaded that following the issuance of the orders dated 05.07.2010, the Association in an emergent General Body meeting unanimously authorized its President and Secretary to act for and on behalf of its members for instituting legal proceedings as warranted. A list of its members has been furnished. It has pleaded that originally in the East Khasi Hill District of the State of Meghalaya, there existed two kinds of lands, i.e. i) Ri-Raid land - lands owned by the community and managed and administered by the Headman and his Durbar and ii) Ri Kynti land - lands owned and possessed by a particular Clan and managed and looked after by the youngest daughter of the family (Khadduh). According to the Petitioner, in the year, 1863, the then Syiem of Mylliem with the consent of his Myntries by an agreement dated 10.12.1863 relinquished certain rights in some lands at Shillong for establishment of Civil and Military Sanitaria and Cantonments etc. in favour of Her Majesty, the Queen of England. The agreement, however, stipulated inter alia that if the proprietor of any of the lands mentioned therein was unwilling to sell or part therewith to the British Crown he/she would continue fully to enjoy the same without any levy. 5. The Petitioner has asserted that the occupation of its members is of such private lands of the Kharkongor Clan which were neither transferred nor ceded to the British Crown and were not included in the agreement made by the then Syiem of Mylliem and the Queen of England. The Petitioner has averred that subsequent thereto, a map was drawn for the establishment of the Civil Station and the Cantonment in Shillong town in the year 1864, clearly demarcating the boundaries of the land(s) taken over by the British Government. The Petitioner has pleaded that in the map, the lands in occupation of its members, fall in between Pillar No. 16 and Pillar No. 17 and are, thus, totally outside the plot(s) taken over by the then British Administration. The Petitioner has pleaded that in the map, the lands in occupation of its members, fall in between Pillar No. 16 and Pillar No. 17 and are, thus, totally outside the plot(s) taken over by the then British Administration. According to the Petitioner, though certain lands were taken on lease by the British Government from various Ri-Kynti owners, and also on outright purchase and further some had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, those in possession of its members had never been ceded/leased to or purchase or encumbered by the British Government or Governments of Assam and Meghalaya at any point of time and that the same continue to be the absolute property of the Kharkongor clan. The Petitioner has claimed that the Respondent No. 5 being the Ing Khadduh of the Kharkongor clan family, she with the consent of the brothers and other family members sold some plots of the said lands by registered sale deeds to the members of the Petitioner Association as well as to their predecessors-in-interest and granted pattas therefore to them as well. It has averred that in the year 1973, following a dispute amongst the clan members regarding the ownership of clan properties, the Respondent No. 5 instituted Title Suit No. 40(T) of 1973 in the Court of the Assistant to Deputy Commissioner, Shillong for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was decreed on compromise adjudging that the lands, in question, in the instant proceeding along with other properties had been allotted to her share. Reference has also been made to other suits involving the Respondent No. 5 and others ending in determinations in favour of the purchasers of the respective plots of land from her. The Petitioner has thus emphatically asserted that its members are the rightful registered owners of their lands in occupation. 6. It has been alleged that inspite of the time tested legal status of its members, the Respondents have been being making repeated attempts to evict them therefrom by resorting to illegal and coercive measures without following the due process of law since 1996-1997. 6. It has been alleged that inspite of the time tested legal status of its members, the Respondents have been being making repeated attempts to evict them therefrom by resorting to illegal and coercive measures without following the due process of law since 1996-1997. It has been stated that being driven by eviction notices on earlier occasions issued against a few of its members as well as a massive demolition drive against others without any notice, several writ petitions were instituted by its affected members before this Court, which granted interim protection and also allowed some to reconstruct/re-erect their structures. Eventually, this batch of writ petitions was disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, interfering with the eviction process and the related impugned notices/orders, inter alia, recording the existence of a dispute between the parties pertaining to their right, title and interest over the land and leaving the State Government at liberty to establish its right, title and interest thereon before a competent court, if so advised. 7. The Petitioner has averred that the State Government, however, abstained from adopting such a course and instead, it, by its letter dated 16.10.2003, addressed, amongst others, to the MUDA, observed that the ownership of the land involved was disputed and that an appeal against the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 of this Court was in contemplation. Subsequent thereto, a public notice dated 30.05.2005 was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong to the effect that the land at Mc. Cabe Road, Polo, Shillong, was a disputed land and that anybody indulging in the sale and purchase of plots in that area would do so at his/her own risk. The members of the Petitioner's Association being apprehensive of encountering a fresh bout of eviction process, approached this Court with WP(C) No. 194 (SH)/2005. By order dated 27.06.2005, status quo with regard to the possession of their land was maintained. As the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong, by notice dated 12.07.2005 issued to four of its members sought to evict them under Section 3 of the Meghalaya Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1980, alleging that they were illegal occupants of the Government lands, an application was filed in WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005 incorporating the challenge to such notice. Individual notices dated 28.07.2005 were, thereafter, issued to some of the members of the Petitioner Association requiring them to demolish their constructions. As their representations to the effect that the structures were not fresh, but had been rebuilt/reconstructed in terms of the order dated 21.07.1994, passed by this Court in CR No. 2779/1994, remained unresponded, WP(C) No. 265 (SH)/2005 was instituted by them assailing those notices. Pending disposal of this writ petition, the notices impugned were kept in abeyance. As the applications by some members of the Petitioner Association with MUDA for granting building permission were turned down, representing that those were untenable in view of the direction to that effect from the Government of Meghalaya, the letter of refusal dated 12.09.2005 was assailed in WP(C) No. 419 (SH)/2005. Subsequent thereto, MUDA, vide its notice dated 16.01.2007 addressed to 'all concerned' alleged that the order dated 27.06.2005, passed in WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005, granting status quo of the land involved had been violated. Thereby, a direction was issued to dismantle, immediately, the unauthorized construction within 30 days. This notice, as well came to be challenged in this Court by the Petitioner Association in WP(C) No. 18(SH)/2007. 8. It has been stated that all these writ proceedings, being WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005, WP(C) No. 265(SH)/2005, WP(C) No. 419(SH)/2005 and WP(C) No. 18(SH)/2007 were disposed of by a Single Bench of this Court by common judgment and order dated 13.02.2007, reiterating that the questions involved embodied disputed questions of facts, which ought to be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court. Four separate writ appeals, being WA No. 12(SH)/2007, WA No. 16(SH)/2007, WA No. 17(SH)/2005 and WA No. 18(SH)/2007 were, thereafter, preferred against this judgment and order, which were disposed of on 25.05.2010, in essence, leaving the noticees to appear before MUDA and submit their reply to the notices. While observing that the notices ought to be construed as one for showing cause by the addressees, it was held that if, on making an inquiry, MUDA came to the conclusion that the constructions were illegal, then, after recording such a finding, it (MUDA) would be entitled to demolish the same. While observing that the notices ought to be construed as one for showing cause by the addressees, it was held that if, on making an inquiry, MUDA came to the conclusion that the constructions were illegal, then, after recording such a finding, it (MUDA) would be entitled to demolish the same. The noticees were granted 30 days time to appear and file their reply, and MUDA was restrained, till the final disposal of the dispute, from demolishing the constructions raised by the noticees, who, however, were prevented as well from proceeding with any further construction on the land in dispute. Liberty was also granted to the Appellants or the noticees, if aggrieved by the final orders passed by MUDA to challenge the same in an appropriate proceeding. 9. The Petitioner has pleaded that due to the vagueness of the notice dated 16.01.2007, it having been issued to 'all concerned', and as old records had to be consulted, it on 24.06.2010 in writing sought for extension of time by 10 days, so as to enable its members to submit their show cause in terms of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. The Petitioner has asserted that the extension of time, as prayed for, was granted by MUDA. Written information to this effect was also communicated to the Government of Meghalaya in the department of Urban Affairs, whereafter, representations/show causes were submitted before the Secretary, MUDA on 02.07.2010. The Petitioner's Association has maintained that while the representations of its members were thus pending consideration of MUDA, it (MUDA) in complete disregard to the directions contained in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, issued the impugned orders dated 05.07.2010 and got the same pasted on the walls of the houses/shops/structures of its members and immediately resorted to a demolition drive. The impeachment of the Bye Law 11 of the By Laws and the orders dated 05.07.2010 has been posted in this background. 10. The Petitioner through its additional pleadings has brought on record, the documents authorizing its President and Secretary to initiate the instant proceeding. One survey map of 1864 prepared pursuant to the instrument dated 10.12.1863 between the then Syiem of Mylliem and Her Majesty, the Queen of England, has also been laid before this Court thereby. According to the Petitioner Association, its members had never been served with the notice dated 14.12.2004 referred to in the impugned order dated 05.07.2010. One survey map of 1864 prepared pursuant to the instrument dated 10.12.1863 between the then Syiem of Mylliem and Her Majesty, the Queen of England, has also been laid before this Court thereby. According to the Petitioner Association, its members had never been served with the notice dated 14.12.2004 referred to in the impugned order dated 05.07.2010. It has asserted as well that all its members, though have not been served with the impugned order dated 05.07.2010, their shops were sought to be demolished. 11. The names and particulars of its members who have submitted representations before the MUDA, as required by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 as well as of those, who, it (Petitioner) claims had purchased different plots of land through registered sale deeds on several dates and had been issued patta and holding numbers by the Shillong Municipality, were furnished. The names of its members, who, according to it, have not been issued any impugned notice by MUDA were also brought on record. 12. The Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in their affidavit have questioned the maintainability of the writ proceedings. The answering Respondents have insisted that the members of the Petitioner Association having failed to submit their show cause within the time granted by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, they are estopped from challenging the orders dated 05.07.2010, which MUDA, was in the circumstances authorized in law to pass. They have repudiated the challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 of the By Laws as barred by the principle of res judicata, inasmuch, as the Petitioner had failed to project this challenge in the earlier writ petitions instituted to assail the notices issued by MUDA in the year 2005, requiring demolition of unauthorized constructions/structures made by the illegal occupants of the same land. According to them, even otherwise, no challenge to the vires of the Bye Laws having a statutory force being framed under the Act, is maintainable. 13. The answering Respondents have maintained that the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 having merged with the subsequent judicial pronouncements, it is bereft of any singular and predominant significance. Reference to the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 taking note of the earlier decision dated 10.10.2002 has been specifically made in this context. 13. The answering Respondents have maintained that the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 having merged with the subsequent judicial pronouncements, it is bereft of any singular and predominant significance. Reference to the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 taking note of the earlier decision dated 10.10.2002 has been specifically made in this context. The Respondents have endorsed the validity of the impugned orders dated 05.07.2010 contending that the members of the Petitioner Association having failed to submit their representations/show causes to MUDA within the time allowed by this Court vide its judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, they lost their right to do so after the lapse of the said period. According to them, MUDA rightly did not take cognizance of the request made on 24.06.2010 seeking extension of the time for filing the show cause/representation, as it was only this Court, which was competent to do so. They, therefore, contended that as the impugned orders dated 05.07.2010 are as a consequence of the failure of the members of the Petitioner Association to submit their show cause/representation in time, their challenge thereto is frivolous. The Respondents have also denied the Petitioner Association's assertion that extension of time had been granted by MUDA as requested. They reiterated that the land occupied by the noticees was within the Master Plan and identified as a Green Belt area, which by no means could be permitted to be put to any commercial use. The answering Respondents maintained that the show causes/representations, submitted on 02.07.2010 and thereafter being beyond the time permitted by this Court, those were rightly not taken entertained by MUDA. That the land in occupation of the members of the Petitioner Association is Government land as borne out by the out by the records maintained by the Registry at Shill-Book 1 Volume 1 at pages 223 to 226 No. 37 of 1902, has been asserted as well. The Respondents have underlined absence of sufficient materials to demonstrate that the Petitioner No. 2 claiming himself to be the President of the Petitioner Association had been authorized by it to initiate the instant proceeding. The ownership of the land in question by the Respondent No. 5, Smti. Bril Kharkongor has been denied as well. 14. The affidavit of the Respondent Nos. 3 & 4 offers an identical narrative. The ownership of the land in question by the Respondent No. 5, Smti. Bril Kharkongor has been denied as well. 14. The affidavit of the Respondent Nos. 3 & 4 offers an identical narrative. Additionally, they contended that in terms of the determinations made by a Full Bench of this Court rendered in Nongkhlaw Clan and Ors. v. Union of India 1997 (2) GLT 652 (FB), the entire European Ward comprising of three Wards of Shillong Municipality and Cantonment is unassailably Government land. As this determination has not been overturned by any higher forum, it has thus attained finality. While emphasizing that the land in dispute has been admitted by the Petitioner to be within the European Ward, MUDA has asserted service of the impugned orders either personally on the noticees or in case of refusal or absence, by pasting on the respective building/structure with a video recording in proof thereof. That the land is located within the limits of Shillong Municipality of ward No. 8, which is a part of the Master Plan Area, has also been asserted. MUDA has further averred that the area in which the land in dispute is situated has been earmarked as Green Belt Area for conservation of environment and protection of River Wahumkhrah. It reiterated that the letter dated 24.06.2010 filed by the Petitioner Association seeking extension of time for filing the show causes/representations was not attended to, it having been construed to be beyond its authority to do so in the face of the unambiguous direction contained in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. Similarly, the show causes/representations submitted after the expiry of 30 days were not taken cognizance of being beyond the time stipulated. It categorically denied grant of extension of time by it as claimed by the Petitioner. It alleged total non-cooperation by the members of the Petitioner Association and other occupants in the process of preparation of inventory by it in terms of the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 of this Court. The answering Respondent also referred to certain photographs in endorsement of their imputation of violation of the order of status quo granted on 27.06.2005. They adopted the pleas of the State Respondents bearing on the maintainability of the writ proceedings on the ground of estoppel and constructive res judicata. 15. The Petitioner in its rejoinder-affidavit to the counters filed by the Respondent Nos. They adopted the pleas of the State Respondents bearing on the maintainability of the writ proceedings on the ground of estoppel and constructive res judicata. 15. The Petitioner in its rejoinder-affidavit to the counters filed by the Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 4 have in particular emphasised that the land involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra), is different from the one in the instant proceeding and that therefore the reported decision is of no relevance. While reiterating that the land herein is not located within the 'European Ward', it has been clarified that in the State of Meghalaya there are various 'wombs' of the Kharkongor Clan enjoying ownership over different areas which are dissimilar from each other. According to them, as in the proceedings disposed of by the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, MUDA was not a party therein, it was thereby not left at liberty to take any decision against the Petitioners. Moreover, the notices of eviction in those cases had been issued by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hill Districts, Shillong, but those dealt with by the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007, had been by MUDA. The Petitioners, therefore, averred that the concept of merger of the two decisions is misconceived. While asserting that the decision in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra) did not establish that the land involved in the instant proceeding is Government land, it pleaded that the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 construing the notices impugned therein to be those to show cause signified interference with the decision dated 13.02.2007, which therefore, had been rendered non est. The Petitioner questioned the authenticity of the signatures in the Dak Book (extracts whereof have been appended as Annexure C to the affidavit-in-opposition of MUDA) to be those of its members. According to it, though its members were ready and willing to appear before the competent officer of MUDA and submit their replies in terms of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, they could not do so as, till 04.07.2010, its (MUDA) Secretary had been out on a foreign tour. According to it, though its members were ready and willing to appear before the competent officer of MUDA and submit their replies in terms of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, they could not do so as, till 04.07.2010, its (MUDA) Secretary had been out on a foreign tour. While denying the allegation that the members of the Petitioner Association and other occupants had not cooperated in the process of drawing up of the inventory, it has been asserted that the process undertaken in connection therewith was a mere eye-wash as the document prepared does not disclose the names of the land holders or the holding numbers or dag numbers of any of the plots involved. According to it, even assuming that the representations/show causes had not been submitted within the stipulated time fixed by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, such an omission, per se, did not entitle MUDA to pass demolition orders without making an inquiry and recording a finding warranting the same. The Petitioner has categorically stated that no construction has been made by any of its members since after the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 had been delivered and that they have complied with the direction contained therein in absolute terms. 16. The Respondent No. 5 in her affidavit claimed herself to be the Ing Khadduh of the Kharkongor clan of Nongthymmai of Shillong and insisted to have sold several plots of land to the individual members of the Petitioner Association. While reiterating that this land was beyond the purview of the agreement dated 10.12.1863 between the then Syiem of Mylliem and Her Majesty, the Queen of England, she averred that her predecessors-in-interest, who were in-charge of her land did not agree to sell, mortgage or in any other manner transfer or cede it to the British Crown and that the same continued to be their absolute property. She stated that the lands belonging to the Kharkongor Clan in the Polo/Wahumkhrah area are shown between Pillar No. 16 and Pillar No. 17 as referred to in the agreement dated 10.12.1863. She stated that being the Khadduh (youngest daughter) of the Kharkongor family, she with the prior permission and consent of her family members sold individual plots of the said land in Polo/Wahumkhrah to the members of the Petitioner Association and had also granted pattas to them. She stated that being the Khadduh (youngest daughter) of the Kharkongor family, she with the prior permission and consent of her family members sold individual plots of the said land in Polo/Wahumkhrah to the members of the Petitioner Association and had also granted pattas to them. She also, amongst others, referred to T.S. No. 40(T)/1973 instituted by her in the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong, following a dispute with regard to the ownership of the Kharkongor Clan properties, which eventually, was decreed on compromise by judgment and order dated 18.09.1989 to the effect that the lands, including those in dispute in the present proceeding, were her absolute property. 17. This Respondent, namely, Ka Brill Kharkongor having expired on 29.11.2010 during the pendency of the litigation, she was, vide order dated 22.12.2010 passed in MC No. 4065/2010 substituted by her youngest daughter Ka Armour Kharkongor, the present Ing Khadduh as per the khasi customary law. 18. The Respondent No. 2, Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hill Districts, Shillong completed the pleadings by his affidavit denying the Petitioner's claim that the land involved was private land. Not only this answering Respondent referred to the European Ward Map at Sheets I & II, he asserted also that as the State Government was absolutely certain about its right, title and ownership therein, it was considered unnecessary to have it confirmed by a Civil Court. The Respondent stated that the notice dated 30.05.2005 referring the land to be a disputed land did not, ipso facto, convey that it did not belong to the Government. He contended that the land is located within the jurisdictional limits of the Shillong Municipal Board. According to this Respondent, the Petitioner's admission regarding payment of municipal taxes for the holdings of its member clearly demonstrates that the land is located within the urban area of Shillong. 19. The salient features of the pleaded cases of the Petitioners in the other writ petitions also deserve to be recorded to complete the factual spectrum. According to this Respondent, the Petitioner's admission regarding payment of municipal taxes for the holdings of its member clearly demonstrates that the land is located within the urban area of Shillong. 19. The salient features of the pleaded cases of the Petitioners in the other writ petitions also deserve to be recorded to complete the factual spectrum. The Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3970/2010 (WP(C) No. 209 (SH)/2010) have claimed that Late Pyngrope Jumnud, predecessor-in-interest of Respondent No. 2, who had purchased a plot of land from Respondent No. 5 in 1966, instituted TS No. 41(T) of 1974 against the Shillong Gymkhana Races for declaration of his right, title and interest and that the suit was decreed on contest by the judgment and order, dated 31.05.1985, thereby holding that the Plaintiff was the legal and rightful owner, in possession and occupation of the suit land and that no appeal having been filed against the said judgment and decree, the same attained finality. 20. The WP(C) No. 4267/2010 (WP(C) No. 221(SH)/2010) has been filed by Sri H Nongrum, challenging the final order, dated 05.07.2010, issued by Secretary, MUDA in respect of his land situated at Unkhra Mc Cabe Road, Shillong. The writ Petitioner's case is that the said land was originally purchased by one Aireng Chang Ryngah and thereafter, the same was orally gifted to Smt. B Nongrul, who was his mother-in-law and after the death of the Smt. B. Nongrum, the land devolved on the Petitioner, being his son. 21. Mr. Airen Chand Rynjah approached the Respondent No. 4 i.e. Shillong Municipal Board seeking building permission in 1982 and as no building permission was granted, despite submission of reminders and representations, Mr. Airen Chand Rynjah commenced construction of building, under the provision of Section 174 of the Meghalaya Municipal Act (deemed provision) and completed the construction of a godown for storing materials etc. 22. By letter, dated 16.03.1987, the Respondent No. 3 directed the mother of the Petitioner to vacate the land within 15 days. This compelled her to file Civil Rule No. 320/1987 and this Court, by its order, dated 30.09.1987, disposed of the Civil Rule allowing the mother of the Petitioner to approach the Meghalaya Board of Revenue within a period of one month, with the direction that she shall not be evicted during the said period. This compelled her to file Civil Rule No. 320/1987 and this Court, by its order, dated 30.09.1987, disposed of the Civil Rule allowing the mother of the Petitioner to approach the Meghalaya Board of Revenue within a period of one month, with the direction that she shall not be evicted during the said period. Accordingly, though the Petitioner's mother submitted a representation before the Meghalaya Revenue Board, she failed to receive any response. In the meantime, Smt. B. Nongrum forwarded a copy of the order, dated 30.09.1987 aforesaid, to the Respondent No. 3 and submitted a representation for considering her prayer with regard to building permission. 23. The Respondent No. 3, on 25.07.1991, while issuing a notice to the mother of the Petitioner, for vacating the suit land, occupied by her, and to dismantle the structure raised thereon, informed that the Government had refused to settle the land with her. The said eviction notice was challenged in Civil Rule No. 3612 of 1991 and vide order, dated 28.07.1991, this Court was pleased to stay the order, dated 25.07.1991 aforesaid. During the said stay period, the mother of the Petitioner completed the construction of the building and obtained electricity connection thereto. 24. Vide order, dated 07.04.1995, the Respondent No. 3 i.e. the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hill District, Shillong, requisitioned the said building from the Petitioner's mother for accommodating two platoons of Central Reserve Police Force. As the compensation @ Rs. 9000/- per month towards the requisition was not paid, the mother of the Petitioner approached this Court, by filing Civil Rule No. 47(SH)/1997 and vide order dated 10.04.1997, the writ petition was closed with a direction to dispose of the application of the Petitioner, regarding demand of the rent. However, as the rent was not paid, the Petitioner filed a contempt petition being C.O.C. No. 1(SH)/1998. In the meantime, the mother of the Petitioner expired and she was substituted by the Petitioner, by order, dated 16.03.2000. 25. As the Respondent refused to pay the compensation towards the said requisition, the Petitioner filed another writ petition, being WP(C) No. 83(SH)/2001 and this Court, vide order, dated 02.01.2003, directed the State Respondents to pay compensation of Rs. 9,000/- (Rupees nine thousand only) w.e.f. 07.04.1995 to 30.09.2002. 25. As the Respondent refused to pay the compensation towards the said requisition, the Petitioner filed another writ petition, being WP(C) No. 83(SH)/2001 and this Court, vide order, dated 02.01.2003, directed the State Respondents to pay compensation of Rs. 9,000/- (Rupees nine thousand only) w.e.f. 07.04.1995 to 30.09.2002. In compliance with the said judgment and order, the State Government made payment of compensation in respect of the land and the building towards the requisition and thereafter, derequisitioned a part of the building. 26. The Secretary, MUDA i.e. Respondent No. 2, on 27.04.2004, issued a notice to the mother of the Petitioner, directing her to dismantle the building on the ground that the same was unauthorised. The representation, dated 05.05.2004, submitted by the Petitioner, to re-examine and reconsider the matter, despite receipt of the same in its office, was not attended to by MUDA. According to the Petitioner, without disposing the representation, dated 05.05.2004, and passing any final order in respect of the said representation, MUDA issued a final order, dated 05.07.2010, citing the order dated 25.05.2010, passed by this Court in W.A. No. 12(SH)2007, W.A. No. 169SH)2007, W.A. No. 17(SH)2007 and W.A. No. 18(SH)2007, declaring that the construction, raised by the Petitioner was without any valid permission and that he having encroached upon Government land was required to demolish the said construction forthwith. In response to the said order, the Petitioner, submitted representation, on 19.07.2010. According to the Petitioner, as the building was constructed under the deeming provision of the Meghalaya Municipal Act, the construction cannot be held to be unauthorised and the order, dated 05.07.2010, issued without disposing of the representation dated 05.04.2009, was grossly illegal and in violation of the principle of Article 21 of the Constitution of India. 27. To reiterate, the Petitioner in WP(C) No. 4267/2010 (221(SH)/2010), claimed that the land in his occupation was a purchased land. The Petitioner in WP(C) No. 4268/2010 (190(SH)/2010) asserted that the land in his occupation was taken on lease from the Shillong Municipal Board. The Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3970/2010 (209(SH)/2010) and WP(C) No. 4266/2010 (1204(SH)/2010), in categorical terms contended as well that the lands in their occupation were purchased by them as well as their predecessor-in-interests as the case may be from the Respondent No. 5 in WP(C) No. 3963/2010 and were duly granted pattas therefor. 28. In the backdrop of this monolith of pleadings, Mr. 28. In the backdrop of this monolith of pleadings, Mr. Bharuka has insistently urged that Bye Law 11 when tested in the context of the provisions of the Act is beyond the purview of Section 74and is thus, per se, invalid in law. As this provision of the Act apparently does not authorize MUDA to frame a bye law to define and penalize any offence independent of those accounted for by the enactment, Bye Law 11 is clearly beyond it's (MUDA) power of making regulations and thus is liable to be adjudged null and void. Referring to Section 51, 56 and 58, in particular, catalogued under Chapter 10 of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel has argued that those configure a complete scheme of penal provisions and as Bye Law 11 of the Bye Laws is clearly extraneous thereto and further repugnant to the legislative policy of the parent statute, it is void for all intents and purposes. The impugned clause of the Bye Laws being in outright breach of the permissible limits of subordinate legislation outlined by the Act, it is ultra vires the same, he urged. 29. Mr. Bharuka next urged that the presupposition of encroachment upon Government land by the noticees referred to in the impugned order dated 05.07.2010, being in apparent disregard to the findings recorded in the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, as the right, title and interest of the Government in the land involved is not yet proved in law, such an assumption is conjectural, rendering the impugned order a nullity. According to him, the constructions referred to in the impugned order having been raised before the year 1991, those were beyond the purview of the Bye Laws and thus the invocation of Clause-11 thereof is patently impermissible. Highlighting the vagueness of the notices referred to in the impugned order in all essential particulars vis-a-vis the land and the structures, the learned Senior Counsel contended that as the same had been served only on four occupants and not on all in possession of the land involved, the same (final orders dated 05.07.2010) are liable to be annulled. Mr. Bharuka argued as well, that the final orders being not inconformity with the directions contained in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 in its letter and spirit those are non est in law. Mr. Bharuka argued as well, that the final orders being not inconformity with the directions contained in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 in its letter and spirit those are non est in law. Without prejudice to the above, the learned Senior Counsel has argued that even assuming that Bye Law 11 was valid, the offences referred to therein are to be investigated into and tried under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 (as amended) and MUDA being not empowered to take any action therefor, the impugned order(s) dated 05.07.2010 are liable to be quashed on this count alone. 30. Ms. Goyal supplemented the above by contending that the Petitioner Association represents 63 persons inclusive of 10 land owners who had submitted representations before MUDA on behalf of the occupants of the land as permitted vide judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. She reiterated the pleaded assertion of ownership of the land in Kharkongor Clan and sale thereof to the individual occupants. The learned Counsel contended that the impugned final orders are, per se, invalid having been passed without disposing of the representations submitted by the members of the Petitioner Association as well as other occupants as allowed by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. Ms. Goyal questioned the tenability of the final orders also on the ground of absence of any imputation of contravention of the Master Plan in the notices dated 14.12.2004, 28.07.2005 and 16.01.2007, though, averred by MUDA in its affidavit in opposition. 31. Mr. Buzarbaruah learned Counsel for the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3970/2010 argued that Bye Law 11 (ii), can by no means be in super cession of or repugnant to Section 30A and 30B of the Act and that any action of MUDA contrary thereto would be palpably void. While contending that the conditions precedent for exercise of power under Bye Law II would logically extend to all the eventualities contemplated in Clause (i), (ii) and (iii) thereof, the learned Counsel maintained that as the land belongs to the occupants, if the structure thereon is adjudged to be illegal, the same at best can be demolished, but no action for their eviction therefrom as encroachers would be allowable. Mr. Bujarbaruah, however, assailed Bye Law 11 to be unconstitutional, as it seeks to confer uncanalized and unbridled power on MUDA. The learned Counsel emphatically urged that the land involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. Mr. Bujarbaruah, however, assailed Bye Law 11 to be unconstitutional, as it seeks to confer uncanalized and unbridled power on MUDA. The learned Counsel emphatically urged that the land involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra) is different from one in the present proceeding and, therefore, the said decision is not supportive of the plea of the Respondents that the Petitioners are in occupation of Government land. 32. In reply, Mr. Mukherjee appearing for the State Respondents maintained that Bye Law 11 was intra vires, the power to frame the same being traceable to the Act. Referring profusely to the provisions of the Act and in particular Section 73(2)(ii) and 74(vi), the learned Senior Counsel insisted that as MUDA is an authority established under the statute and in view of the plenary powers conferred on it, it could provide for demolition of illegal structures by framing Bye Laws. Mr. Mukherjee underlined that as the Bye Laws have been framed in exercise of the statutory power conferred on MUDA under Section 27 of the Act, it could not be equated with a delegated legislation envisaged under Section 73 of the Act. According to the learned Senior counsel, Bye Law 11 (ii) of the Bye Laws under which the impugned orders had been passed envisioned civil action only and, thus, is not in conflict with the statutory scheme adumbrated by Section 51, 56and 58. He thus dismissed the plea of usurpation of powers by MUDA on the hypothesis that the impugned action was penal in nature. Mr. Mukherjee without prejudice to this plea has urged that even if Section 51, 56 and 58 of the Act have application to the facts of the present case, on a conjoint reading of Section 4 & 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (for short hereafter referred to as the Code), the emerging offence can be tried by MUDA. The learned Senior Counsel referred to the provisions under Chapter II (A), II, IV and v. of the Act to contend that a cumulative reading thereof would demonstrate that MUDA as a creature of the statute was well within its rights to order demolition of the illegal structures on Government land. 33. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 clearly recognized this power of MUDA traceable under Section 8-D of the Act. 33. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 clearly recognized this power of MUDA traceable under Section 8-D of the Act. According to him, the caption 'Offences and Penalties' of Clause 11 of the Bye Laws would not, per se, evince that the actions permissible for the MUDA to take thereunder would essentially be punitive. He sought to plead that Clause (i), (ii) and (iii) thereof are mutually exclusive and the action contemplated under Clause (ii) is civil in nature. Charting a co-relation of Bye Law 11 (ii) with Section 30-B of the Act, Mr. Mukherjee urged that it would be apparent that the power of demolition is independent of one for initiating prosecution under Bye Law 11 (i). Referring to the litigational background involving the land and the occupants thereof culminating in the verdicts of this Court on 10.10.2002 and 13.02.2007, the learned Senior counsel argued in terms thereof that MUDA was authorized to clear the encroachment and the illegal constructions in accordance with law and that the plea to the contrary is clearly untenable. Mr. Mukherjee urged that the notice dated 14.12.2004, 28.07.2005 and 16.01.2007 taken cumulatively testify grant of adequate prior opportunity to the persons concerned. According to him, the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 not only is in recognition of the MUDA's authority in law to pursue the exercise initiated by these notices, the scope of inquiry on the representations/show causes, if filed, was also clearly delineated. The noticees having admittedly failed to avail this opportunity within the time stipulated, their assailment of these notices on the ground of vagueness and non-service thereof is wholly frivolous and is a afterthought, he urged. Drawing the attention of this Court to the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007, the learned Senior Counsel insisted that it having been recorded therein that the illegal constructions on the land involved had not been denied by the occupants, on their failure to represent against the notices referred to in the impugned order dated 05.07.2010 within the time granted by this Court, no remedial intervention of this Court in favour of the Petitioners is warranted. It being apparent on the fact of the record that none of the noticees/occupants had represented or shown cause as required of them by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 within the time granted, the impugned final order dated 05.07.2010 is unassailable, he insisted. It being apparent on the fact of the record that none of the noticees/occupants had represented or shown cause as required of them by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 within the time granted, the impugned final order dated 05.07.2010 is unassailable, he insisted. The learned Senior Counsel stoutly denied the Petitioner's claim that MUDA had granted extension of time on a request being made by them to that effect on 24.06.2010. The Petitioners having failed to avail the opportunity granted by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 to represent against the notices referred to in the order dated 05.07.2010, their plea of unfairness or of non-observance of the due process of law is also wholly unsustainable, he maintained. 34. He further urged by relying on Rule 31 of the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning (Constitution and Authority) Rules, 1973 (hereafter for short referred to as the Constitution Rules) that the impugned final order dated 05.07.2010 is beyond reproach, as thereby, the decision of MUDA only was only sought to be communicated, by the Secretary thereof having been delegated the power to do so under this provision of these Rules. In endorsement of his contention of authorization of the Secretary of MUDA, Mr. Mukherjee laid reliance on the minutes of the meeting held on 02.07.2010 in the office chamber of the Minister-in-Charge, Urban Affairs Department, Government of Meghalaya on issues relating to the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. 35. While contending that the Petitioners before this Court are rank encroachers on Government land and that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Senior Counsel maintained that they are not entitled to any protective insulation from the lawful initiations taken by MUDA in public interest. Referring profusely to the pleadings of the State Respondent and MUDA, the learned Senior Counsel has argued that the land involved is unmistakably located within the European Ward, a fact, otherwise, conclusively established by the rendering of this Court in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra). Mr. Mukherjee insisted that the challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 is only in furtherance of the ulterior motive of the illegal occupants of Government land to desperately hang on to their otherwise brazenly unauthorized possession. (Supra). Mr. Mukherjee insisted that the challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 is only in furtherance of the ulterior motive of the illegal occupants of Government land to desperately hang on to their otherwise brazenly unauthorized possession. In this view of the matter, the plea of the omission on the part of the State Respondents to obtain a declaration to this effect from a Civil Court is wholly vacuous, he maintained. The following decisions were cited to fortify the arguments advanced. HC Suman v. Rehabilitation Ministry Employees' Cooperative House Building Society Ltd. New Delhi and Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 485 , M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd. v. Radhey Shyam Sahu and Ors., (1999) 6 SCC 464 , OM Prakash and Ors. v. State Of UP and Ors., (2004) 3 SCC 402 , Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., (2003) 7 SCC 589 , Milk Producers Association, Orissa and Ors. v. State of Orissa AND ORS., (2006) 3 SCC 229 , Kumaran Silks Trade Pvt. Ltd. v. Devendra and Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 555 , Priyanka Estaes International Private Ltd. and Ors. State of Assam and Ors., 2006 (3) GLT 1 and PRIYANKA ESTAES INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LTD. and Ors. STATE OF ASSAM and Ors. (2010) 2 SCC 27 . 36. Mr. Mahanta while generally adopting the arguments advanced on behalf of the State Respondents has taken us through the pleadings of MUDA as well as a set of photographs produced to emphasise that the existing encroachments and the unabated construction works are not only grossly illegal, but also pose serious environmental hazards warranting immediate demolition thereof. While reiterating that the land involved is located within the European Ward and thus is indubitably a Government land, the learned Counsel with reference to the documents appended to the pleadings of MUDA has insistently submitted that the notices referred to in the impugned final order dated 05.07.2010 had been either personally served or in cases of refusal to accept or absence of the notices, pasted on the respective constructions. 37. Mr. K Paul, learned Counsel for the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3970/2010 and WP(C) No. 4266/2010 has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3963/2010. 38. Mr. 37. Mr. K Paul, learned Counsel for the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3970/2010 and WP(C) No. 4266/2010 has adopted the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3963/2010. 38. Mr. Bhattacharjee appearing for the Respondent No. 5 in WP(C) No. 3963/2010, has argued with reference to her pleadings that the land involved, which belong to her, as the Ing Khadduh of Kharkongor Clan had not ceded to the British Crown any point of time. While, underlining that the land involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra), is distinctly different from the one in the present proceedings, the learned Senior Counsel argued that as the issues therein were conspicuously different, the reliance of the Respondents thereon is wholly misconceived. Mr. Bhattacharjee to buttress his plea also produced and referred to the plaint in TS No. 18(SH) of 1985. The learned Senior Counsel also profusely relied upon the additional pleadings of the writ Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3963/2010, the sale deeds produced as well as the map appended to the affidavit-in-opposition of Respondent No. 5 to contend that it would appear therefrom that the land was situated within Pillar Nos. 16 and 17 thereof (map) and thus was apparently not vested in the Government. 39. Mr. Bharuka, in reply, has insisted that as the action under Bye Law 11 (ii) as represented by the impugned final order dated 05.07.2010 had to be essentially preceded by any of the violations enumerated therein tantamounting to an offence, the endeavour on the part of the Respondents to pass it of as a civil action is wholly misconceived. As any offence is triable in terms of the law of criminal procedure as engrafted in Entry No. 2 of the Concurrent List in Schedule VII to the Constitution of India, a legislation thereon, though permissible by a State legislature subject to the stipulations as contained in Article 254(2), such an exercise by no means is either contemplated or sanctionable for a delegated authority. Referring to Section 73(2) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel has urged that particularity of the topics enumerated therein notwithstanding, provisions by way of Rules beyond the contours specified may be valid, if, however, not in conflict with the general powers conferred for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Referring to Section 73(2) of the Act, the learned Senior Counsel has urged that particularity of the topics enumerated therein notwithstanding, provisions by way of Rules beyond the contours specified may be valid, if, however, not in conflict with the general powers conferred for carrying out the purposes of the Act. According to the learned Senior Counsel, Section 74 (1) (VI) does not, in any view of the matter, empower MUDA to frame Bye Law II. 40. While maintaining that the impugned action is beyond the purview of the Act and the Bye Laws, MUDA admittedly not being the owner of the land, the learned Senior Counsel has submitted that in absence of any statutory provision delegating its (MUDA) role and function to anybody, the order of Secretary is ab initio void and on that count alone the final order dated 05.07.2010 ought to be interfered with. Mr. Bharuka dismissed the plea of delegation of power of MUDA in favour of its Secretary under Rule 3 of the Constitution Rules contending that a bare perusal of the said provision belies the same. The learned Senior counsel urged that even assuming that the Petitioners are trespassers on Government land, the proposed demolition of their structures and their eviction cannot be on a executive fiat, but has to be essentially in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law. Referring to the minutes of the meeting dated 02.07.2010, Mr. Bharuka has emphasised that it would be apparent therefrom that the impugned action is a predetermined one vitiated by mala fide. 41. To reinforce his arguments, Mr. Bharucha placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Bharat Barrel and Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. and Anr. v. Employees State Insurance Corporation, AIR 1972 SC 1935 , Nasir Ahmed v. Assistant Custodian General Enacuse Property, UP, Lucknow and Anr., AIR 1980 SC 1157 , Ishwar Singh Bagga and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 628 , Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice and Ors. v. Bar Council of India and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 691 , Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516 and Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 250 . 42. Mr. v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1987 SC 628 , Indian Council of Legal Aid & Advice and Ors. v. Bar Council of India and Anr., AIR 1995 SC 691 , Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd., (1997) 5 SCC 516 and Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 250 . 42. Mr. Mukherjee rounded up his arguments by reiterating that the Act does not encroach upon Entry No. 2 of the Concurrent List and that no repugnancy with the Code of Criminal Procedure is discernible. While highlighting that the impugned final order is that of MUDA and that its Secretary had only signed it, having been delegated the power to that effect, the learned Senior Counsel urged that the minutes of the meeting dated 02.07.2010 read as a whole sharply testify to this effect. According to Mr. Mukherjee, MUDA being a body corporate created under the Act, it has to essentially function through an agency and its Secretary being amongst its staff as enumerated in Rule 14 of the Constitution Rules, he had every right under the Act and the Rules framed thereunder to communicate its (MUDA) decision as conveyed by the final order dated 05.07.2010. The learned Senior counsel has also referred to Rule 16, 18 and 20 of the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning (Management of Authority) Rules, 1973, (for short hereafter referred to as the Management Rules) also in this regard. He contended further that not only the Petitioner has failed to produce any proof of title of the occupants in the land, their admission that it is located within the boundary Pillars No. 16 & 17 substantiates that it is Government land as such pillars exists only in respect of revenue land. According to Mr. Mukherjee, having regard to the lay out of the reliefs sought for, the issue of ownership ought not to be examined in the instant proceeding and as the impugned action has been taken in committed compliance of the directions contained in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, no interference therewith is called for. 43. The highly contentious pleadings and the weighty arguments based thereon have received the anxious consideration of this Court. Before dealing with the formidable issues raised in succession, it would be expedient to reminisce the course of the adjudication briefly till the stage of the final hearing. 44. 43. The highly contentious pleadings and the weighty arguments based thereon have received the anxious consideration of this Court. Before dealing with the formidable issues raised in succession, it would be expedient to reminisce the course of the adjudication briefly till the stage of the final hearing. 44. On the date of the initiation of the proceedings in WP(C) No. 3963/2010, a Division Bench of this Court on 19.07.2010, directed maintenance of status quo of the property involved by the parties till 23.07.2010. On that date, this Court, having noticed from the pleadings then available, amongst others, that the facts and particulars pertaining to the members of the Petitioner Association, who claimed to have purchased lands from the Kharkongor family by registered sale deeds and of those who have filed writ petition earlier, were unavailable on record, required the Petitioner Association to furnish the same. The finding recorded in the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 referred to hereinabove that the Petitioners therein had, prima facie, title over the lands involved was noted. This Court, however, expressed its inability to ascertain the particulars of the lands involved in those proceedings as well as whether the members of the Petitioners Association and to whom the order dated 05.07.2010 (impugned herein) had been issued, were parties thereto or not. The letter dated 16.10.2003 of the Deputy Secretary, Government of Meghalaya, Urban Affairs, Department and the Secretary, MUDA to the effect that the ownership of the land concerned was disputed as well as the public notice dated 30.05.2005 of the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong intimating the general public as well to the said effect were referred to. The Petitioner Association, by this order dated 23.07.2010 was, therefore, directed to submit better particulars of its members, who had instituted WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005, as well as of those who had been the Appellants in the appeals preferred against the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007, rendered in the aforementioned batch of writ petitions including WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005. This Court also desired to be apprised in the face of the challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 (ii) as to whether the land involved was located within the Master Plan/Scheme Area. To this effect, in particular, the Court required the Respondents to furnish necessary clarifications. 45. This Court also desired to be apprised in the face of the challenge to the vires of Bye Law 11 (ii) as to whether the land involved was located within the Master Plan/Scheme Area. To this effect, in particular, the Court required the Respondents to furnish necessary clarifications. 45. In response to the above order, a series of pleadings followed, analysis whereof, in bare essentials, at the cost of some repetition though, is unavoidable. 46. In the additional affidavit dated 23.07.2010, the deponent therein in the capacity of the President of the Petitioner Association asserted that he had been authorized to represent it by the Secretary as well as the members thereof. The authority letters were also appended to the additional affidavit. Reiterating the averment made by it in the writ petition that the lands of its members and other occupants in the fray were not included in the instrument/agreement dated 10.12.1863 between the then Syiem of Mylliem and Her Majesty, the Queen of England, the Petitioner Association also appended to its additional affidavit a copy of the survey map of 1864 in buttress al of this plea. 47. In its further additional pleadings filed on 30.07.2010, the Petitioner Association clarified that it was a registered body detailing its aims and objectives. Apart from annexing a copy of its constitution, it asserted that all persons in the Greater Polo area were its members and it, as a composite unit, had been taking care of all the residents of inhabitant area since its inception. A list of its members was also furnished. A reference was made of an emergent General Body meeting of its members on 15.07.2010, where it was unanimously decided to authorize the President and Secretary thereof to act for and on behalf of its members. It was resolved further that the individual land owners including the members who have received any notice identical to the one impugned herein would also issue individual authorization letters to them for the same purpose. The names and particulars of the members of the Petitioner Association who have purchased lands from their respective vendors were stated as well and copies of the sale deeds were also furnished. Averments disclosing the holding and the ward numbers corresponding to the properties involved and the factum of payment of tax to the Shillong Municipality were also made. 48. The names and particulars of the members of the Petitioner Association who have purchased lands from their respective vendors were stated as well and copies of the sale deeds were also furnished. Averments disclosing the holding and the ward numbers corresponding to the properties involved and the factum of payment of tax to the Shillong Municipality were also made. 48. The State Respondents and MUDA in their affidavits in response to the direction contained in the order dated 23.07.2010, however, laid greater emphasis on the fact that the land in question was located within the Master Plan as well as Green Belt Area for consideration of environment and protection of River Wahimkhrah and that the Petitioners had encroached thereupon. Reference was made of records maintained by the Registry at Shill-Book 1 Volume 1 at pages 223 to 226 No. 37 of 1902. The claim of the Respondent No. 5, Smti. Bril Kharkongor to be the owner thereof was stoutly refuted. MUDA additionally asserted that the same land being involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra), the decision rendered therein was of binding effect testifying irrefutably that the same was within the European Ward and thus a Government land. According to MUDA, the land documents furnished by the Petitioners indicated the northern boundary to be Wahumkhrah River (European Ward) and that such a disclosure clinched this issue in favour of the Respondents. MUDA further asserted that all the occupants of the land involved, whether or not they were the members of the Petitioner Association, were served with the impugned order dated 05.07.2010 as well as notices mentioned therein personally or in case of their refusal or absence pasted in the respective buildings and that a video recording of the process was also undertaken. That the land was located within Ward No. 8 of Shillong Municipality and thus within Shillong Master Plan as well as Green Belt Area for conservation of environment and protection of river Wahumkhrah was reiterated. 49. In the context of the pleadings of the parties and the overall homogeneity of interest of the occupants of the land involved, we are inclined to assay the challenge made to the impugned action construing it to be of a representative character on their behalf as a whole. 49. In the context of the pleadings of the parties and the overall homogeneity of interest of the occupants of the land involved, we are inclined to assay the challenge made to the impugned action construing it to be of a representative character on their behalf as a whole. This course, we prefer to adopt in order to obviate the possibility of multiplicity of proceedings relatable to the already protracted controversy ensuing in continual confrontative orientations. Noticeably, there is no dispute with regard to the general identity of the land involved, in the series of proceedings herein before referred to. As alluded hereinabove, MUDA claims to have served the impugned order as well as the notices mentioned therein on all the occupants irrespective of whether they are or not the members of the Petitioner Association and the other Petitioners. On a cumulative consideration of all above, it is thus considered appropriate to deal with the issues raised on a representative basis with an endeavour to provide a quietus to the lingering stand off. 50. The Respondents at an earlier stage of the adjudication had raised preliminary objections bearing on the maintainability of the petitions urging the bar of constructive res judicata to the impeachment of the vires of Bye Law 11 as well as estoppel against the assailment of the legality and/or validity of the impugned order dated 05.07.2010. By order dated 10.08.2010 following a detailed discussion, the objections were negated. The following observations made therein have a bearing on the present pursuit, the above order having remained unassailed by the parties. These were, not re-agitated at the final hearing - 1) A Single Bench of this Court vide its judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 passed in a series of writ petitions registered as CR No. 111(SH)/1997 , et al, on a consideration of the pleaded facts and other materials on record had held that the Petitioners therein could make out a prima facie case that they have been rightly occupying their respective lands by way of purchase from the original owner, Ka Bril Kharkongor and in view of the nature of the dispute raised, the State Government/Respondents were left at liberty to establish their right/title in the land in question before a competent Court, if so advised. 2) The eviction process undertaken was held to be not in compliance of the procedural safeguards prescribed by law. 2) The eviction process undertaken was held to be not in compliance of the procedural safeguards prescribed by law. 3) A public notice dated 30.05.2005 thereafter was issued by the Deputy Commissioner, East Khasi Hills District, Shillong, notifying that the ongoing sale and the purchase of land in Mc. Cabe Road, Polo, Shillong was illegal and that anybody indulging in such transaction would be doing so at his/her own risk. The notice conveyed that the land was a disputed land. This notice was challenged in WP(C) No. 194(SH/2005 4) Individual notices under Section 3 of the Meghalaya Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1980, having been issued thereafter on 12.07.2005 and 28.07.2005, the pleadings of WP(C) No. 194 (SH)/2005 were amended and separate writ petitions were also instituted impugning the validity thereof. 5) All these writ petitions were disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court by his judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 observing that as the materials on record gave rise to disputed questions of facts, the same ought to be adjudicated upon by a Civil Court. 6) Being aggrieved, some of the members of the Petitioner Association preferred appeals being WA No. 12(SH)/2007, WA No. 16(SH)/2007, WA No. 17(SH)/2007 and WA No. 18(SH)/2007. 7) All these appeals were disposed of by a common judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 with the observations that: - i) the notices involved ought to be considered as those for showing cause against the action proposed thereby and that any person aggrieved would be entitled to appear before the competent officer of MUDA and submit his/her reply within a period of thirty days. ii) The MUDA would make an enquiry and if on the conclusion thereof it holds that the constructions in dispute have valid sanction would pass appropriate orders. If it is found otherwise, it would be entitled to demolish the same. iii) The Appellants/noticees were restrained from making further constructions. 51. In rejecting the preliminary objections, this Court not only took note of the observations made in the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, but also of the public notice dated 30.05.2005 issued almost three years thereafter treating the land to be disputed. iii) The Appellants/noticees were restrained from making further constructions. 51. In rejecting the preliminary objections, this Court not only took note of the observations made in the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, but also of the public notice dated 30.05.2005 issued almost three years thereafter treating the land to be disputed. It was observed as well, in the order dated 10.08.2010 that though another Single Bench of this Court had, in its judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 while disposing of WP(C) No. 194(SH)/2005 and other connected proceedings, noticed the decision dated 10.10.2002, no interference therewith or finding in effacement thereof was recorded. The fact that though, in the said judgment and order it was observed that no specific denial had been made by the members of the Petitioner Association to the imputation of illegal constructions on the land, the learned Single Judge noticing their claim as rightful owners of the land, had concluded that the prayers made in the writ petitions were such that those were 'to be only undergone and to be adjudicated upon' by the Civil Court was also considered. 52. In the judgment and order dated 13.02.2007 as well, the dispute with regard to the title/ownership of the land therefore, was acknowledged and the same was left to be adjudicated upon by a competent Civil Court being uninfluenced by any observation made therein. 53. The Division Bench of this Court in its judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, granted an opportunity to the members of the Petitioner Association as well as the other noticees to submit a reply to the impugned notice before MUDA substantiating their claim that the construction raised by them were on their own land. The final decision of MUDA was made contingent on an inquiry to be made by it preceding the same. In reiteration of the observation to this effect made in the order dated 10.08.2010, according to us, the representations/show causes permitted to be submitted by the noticees were not construed by the Division Bench of this Court to be a mere ritual so as to authorize or permit MUDA on the failure of the submission thereof within the time granted, to order their eviction and demolition of their structures thereon without offering to them any opportunity whatsoever or undertaking any semblance of scrutiny or inquiry prior thereto. 54. 54. The text of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, in our discernment, kept open, as well the issue of the status of the land involved to be ascertained in the inquiry required to be conducted by MUDA. The Respondents' plea of merger of the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002 in the determinations made on 13.02.2007 and 25.05.2010 as above, suggesting acknowledgement of the land to be a Government land, thus, absolving the Respondents in law to prove it to be so, is untenable. Noticeably, MUDA has not claimed ownership of the land. Admittedly, the Respondents, more particularly, the State of Meghalaya has not yet instituted any suit or proceeding either in the civil court or any other appropriate forum for a declaration of their/its right, title and interest therein. In our view, therefore, the judgment and orders dated 13.02.2007 and 25.05.2010, per se, do not dissolve the dispute bearing on the status of the land involved. 55. The impact of the decision rendered in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra), by a Full Bench of this Court now needs to be deciphered. The determination by the Full Bench was in answer to a reference made to this Court by the jurisdictional District Judge involving interpretation of the deeds executed in favour of Her Majesty, the Queen of England, whereby, the lands involved therein had been given on lease to Her Majesty for a period of 99 years on and from 10.12.1863. The issue apart therefrom pertained to the status of the successor Government in relation to the said lands after the lapse of the British Paramountcy and also default, if any of the Union and the State Government in payment of yearly rent rendering themselves liable to be evicted therefrom with the consequence of reversion thereof to the original owners. 56. The contextual facts demonstrate that three suits, namely, TS Nos. 17(SH), 18(SH) and 19(SH) of 1985, were instituted respectively by three Clans, i.e. Nangkhlaw, Kharlongor and Kurkalang in court of the Munsiff at Shillong, praying for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit lands described in the schedule to the plaints with the consequential relief for recovery of actual physical possession thereof by evicting the Defendants. 17(SH), 18(SH) and 19(SH) of 1985, were instituted respectively by three Clans, i.e. Nangkhlaw, Kharlongor and Kurkalang in court of the Munsiff at Shillong, praying for declaration of their right, title and interest over the suit lands described in the schedule to the plaints with the consequential relief for recovery of actual physical possession thereof by evicting the Defendants. The lands involved in the aforementioned suit were as hereinbelow: i) TS No. 17(H)/1985 - 300 acres, ii)TS No. 18(H)/1985 - 60 acres and iii) TS No. 19(H)/1985 - 60 acres. The lands covered the whole limits of the 3 Wards of the Shillong Municipality and Cantonment land (erstwhile British portion of Shillong or normal area). It was the pleaded case of the Plaintiffs that the suit lands belonging to the three respective clans had been leased out to the Queen of England and that the British Paramountcy having lapsed with the Indian Independent Act, 1947 and the creation of Dominion of India, those reverted to the Syiem of Mylliem (a native state) and its owners i.e. the three Clans. The Plaintiffs had also pleaded that the erstwhile sovereign authority had taken the lands on lease for a period of 99 years in the year 1863 with the concurrence of Syiem of Mylliem and that with the expiry of the said period, the lease stood determined and consequently the lands had reverted to them. On an exhaustive analysis of the facts and the law involved in the background of the historical perspective, the Plaintiffs' plea of reversion of lands to them on the expiry of the lease period was rejected and it was conclusively recorded that the same had merged with the State of Meghalaya. The reference was thus rejected and the suits were dismissed. 57. To start with, the Petitioners have consistently averred that the land involved in the instant proceeding had not been leased out by the relevant instrument/agreement in favour of Her Majesty, the Queen of England and that therefore, the decision in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra) is of no relevance whatsoever. This pleaded orientation is thus in sharp contrast to the one admittedly taken by the members of the Kharkongor Clan in the plaint of the TS No. 18(H)/1985, produced for the perusal of the Court in course of the arguments. (Supra) is of no relevance whatsoever. This pleaded orientation is thus in sharp contrast to the one admittedly taken by the members of the Kharkongor Clan in the plaint of the TS No. 18(H)/1985, produced for the perusal of the Court in course of the arguments. The letter dated 16.10.2003 of the Deputy Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Revenue Department (Annexure VII to the writ petition in WP(C) No. 3963/2010) also discloses the stand of the Government that the ownership of the land is disputed and that in terms of the judgment and order dated 10.10.2002, an appropriate forum ought to be approached to settle the question of title and ownership. 58. By way of recapitulation, the Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3963/2010 have in categorical terms stated that the lands in the occupation of the noticees are private lands of the Kharkongor Clan family which had never been sold, agreed to be sold, mortgaged or ceded to the British Crown and further were not included in the agreement made by the then Syiem of Mylliem with Her Majesty, the Queen of England. According to them, in the map drawn for the establishment of the Civil Station and Cantonment in the Shillong town in the year 1864 delineating the boundaries of the land so taken over by the British Government, the land herein was not included and in fact, was located between Pillar No. 16 and 17. They traced the ownership of the present land to the Respondent No. 5, the Ing Khadduh (youngest daughter) of the Kharkongor family, who, with the consent of her family members, sold plots therefrom by registered sale deeds to the members of the Petitioner Association and their predecessors-in-interest and also granted pattas to them. They also referred to a number of proceedings in which disputes surfaced between the Clan members and others relating to the Clan properties including such conveyed plots, which, however, ended in favour of the Respondent No. 5 and her purchasers. 59. In contradistinction, apart from the pleaded refutation of the Respondent Nos. They also referred to a number of proceedings in which disputes surfaced between the Clan members and others relating to the Clan properties including such conveyed plots, which, however, ended in favour of the Respondent No. 5 and her purchasers. 59. In contradistinction, apart from the pleaded refutation of the Respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 that the land is located within the Shillong Master Plan and Green Belt Area for conservation of environment and protection of River Wahumkhrah, the Respondent No. 2 in addition has, by his affidavit dated 10.01.2011, sought to demonstrate on the basis of the map sheets annexed thereto that the same is indubitably a Government land. The said Respondent while pointing out that the Petitioners' admission of payment of tax for their holdings axiomatically evinces the location of the land within the Urban Area of Shillong under the jurisdiction of Shillong Municipality Board, has sought to clarify as well that the indication of a dispute vis-a-vis the same as made in the letter dated 16.10.2003 and the public notice dated 30.05.2005 did by no means denote an admission of the Respondents that the same was not Government land. 60. The Respondent No. 5 in her affidavit endorsed the stand of the writ Petitioners in full. The writ Petitioners in WP(C) No. 3963/2010 in their rejoinder-affidavit further elaborated that the lands involved in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra) belong to different 'wombs' of Kharkongor Clan and were different from the one in hand. They asserted that the land in occupation of the noticees belonged to the Respondent No. 5 (since deceased) i.e. the wombs of Late Luh Kharkongor Dkhar, the Great Great Grandmother of the Respondent No. 5, as would be evident from the left margin of the sale deeds annexed to the additional pleadings filed by them. While stating that in the State of Meghalaya there are various wombs' of the Kharkongor Clan enjoying ownership of various areas, distinct from each other, they clarified that the lands covered by NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra), had not been claimed by Respondent No. 5 and thus the decision of the Full Bench was not applicable to the facts of the present case. 61. (Supra), had not been claimed by Respondent No. 5 and thus the decision of the Full Bench was not applicable to the facts of the present case. 61. In the teeth of such wholly irreconcilable factual claims, we are constrained to conclude that it is neither possible nor expedient to register a finding on the right, title and interest in and the ownership of the land involved in the dispute in the instant proceeding with its inherent limitation. Though, a host of sale deeds with accompanying documents, maps/plans, official publications of the Master Plans and notifications demarcating the wards of the Shillong Municipality/Board have been placed on record along with the respective pleadings, having regard to the enormity of the exercise to be undertaken into the minutest factual details demanding a studied scrutiny, as a Writ Court, we feel wholly ill-equipped to undertake such a fact finding process. Not only the nature of the issue with the consequence of a summary determination thereof on the basis of the pleadings and the documents appended thereto alone proclaim against the desirability of this endeavour, in the face of the consistent views expressed in the earlier rounds of litigation, we are of the firm comprehension that in order to maintain an uniformity in approach, the adjudication vis-a-vis the status of the land and the right, title, interest and ownership thereof ought to be left to a forum be it Civil Court or any other judicial institution competent/authorized in law therefore on a scrutiny of the pleadings as well as evidence oral and documentary. The learned Counsel for the parties though, have, before us, endeavoured to a certain extent to locate the land to substantiate their rival propositions, no consensus with regard to the situation thereof in the Master Plan/Scheme Area was discernible. Having regard to the nature of the protracted dispute and the ensuing consequences of any finding in this regard, we are of the unhesitant opinion that no conclusion ought to be recorded in a proceeding of the kind in hand only based on the materials presently available. Having regard to the nature of the protracted dispute and the ensuing consequences of any finding in this regard, we are of the unhesitant opinion that no conclusion ought to be recorded in a proceeding of the kind in hand only based on the materials presently available. A determination with regard to the status of the land and the right, title, interest and ownership thereof ought to be on the basis of evidence in a proceeding involving the parties staking their claims and supplemented by on spot survey of the sites/locations/plots as deemed essential with due reference to the relevant official records so as to ascribe a finality to and binding effect of such adjudication. The decision of the Full Bench of this Court in NONGKHLAW CLAN and Ors. (Supra) therefore, per se, does not clinch this issue in favour of the Respondents. 62. The challenge to the vires of Bye law II (ii) of the Bye Laws at this juncture needs to be attended. The Bye Laws as the notification No. UAM.64/93/535 dated 13th December, 2001 proclaims have been framed by MUDA in exercise of its powers conferred by Section 74 of the Act. The scope, ambit and the purport thereof for appropriate analysis would necessarily warrant a brief survey of the provisions of the parent enactment, it being claimed to be the source of its formulation. 63. The Act is an enactment of the State legislature to provide for the development of the towns and the country side of the State of Meghalaya and the preamble thereof propounds it to be a step to provide such development on sound planning principles with the object of securing proper sanitary conditions to conserve and promote public health, safety and general welfare of the people living therein. The legislation extends to the whole of Meghalaya including Autonomous Districts leaving it open, however to the District Council to apply all or any of the provisions thereof to such districts, however, by a notification to that effect. 64. The expressions 'Authority', 'Building' and 'Development' which are of considerable significance and defined in Sections 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) are extracted hereinbelow- 2(1) "Authority" shall mean the Local or Regional Authority appointed by the State Government for the purposes of administering the Act. 64. The expressions 'Authority', 'Building' and 'Development' which are of considerable significance and defined in Sections 2(1), 2(4) and 2(7) are extracted hereinbelow- 2(1) "Authority" shall mean the Local or Regional Authority appointed by the State Government for the purposes of administering the Act. Unless otherwise appointed by the State Government the Authority in the case of Municipal Areas shall be taken to mean the Municipal Board for the area constituted under the Assam Municipal Act,1956( as adopted by Meghalaya). 2(4)."Building" means any construction for whatsoever purpose and of whatsoever materials constructed and every part thereof whether used as human habitation or not and include plinth walls, chimney, drainage works, fixed platforms, verandah balcony, cornice or projection, or part of a building on anything affixed thereto or any walls, earth bank, fence or other construction enclosing or delimiting or intended to enclose or delimit any land or space. 2(7)."Development" means the carrying out of building, Engineering, Mining or other operations inn , on, or over the land, or material change in the use of any buildings or of land: Provided that the following operations or use of land shall not be deemed for the purposes of this Act to mean Development of the land, that is to say- (a) the carrying out of works for the maintenance, improvement or other alteration of any building being works which effect only the interior of the building o which do not materially affect the use and the external appearance of the building ; (b) the carrying out by a local authority of any works required for the maintenance or improvement of road, being works carried out on land within the boundaries of the land ; (c) the carrying out by any local authority any works for the purpose of inspecting, repairing or renewing and sewers, main pipes, cables or other apparatus, including the breaking open on any street or other land for that purpose; (d) the use of any building or other land within the cartilage of a dwelling house for any purpose incidental to the enjoinment of the dwelling house as such. Under Section 8-A, the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette constitute for the purposes of the Act, an authority to be called 'The Development Authority' with jurisdiction over such areas as may be specified therein. Under Section 8-A, the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette constitute for the purposes of the Act, an authority to be called 'The Development Authority' with jurisdiction over such areas as may be specified therein. Sub-section (2) prescribes that the Authority would be a body corporate having perpetual succession and a common seal with the power to acquire, hold and dispose of properties both movable and immovable and to enter into any agreement, and would in the same name sue and be sued. The composition of the Authority is provided in Section 8-B and the terms and conditions of the service of the Chairman and the members thereof testify the deep rooted State control on these counts. Section 8-D which outlines the functions and powers of the Authority also deserves to be quoted - '8-D. Functions and powers of the Authority- Subject to the provisions of this Act, rules and directions of the State Government the functions of the Authority shall be to promote and secure the development of the area according to the Master Plan and for that purpose it may carry out or cause to be carried out surveys of the area and to prepare report or reports of such surveys and to perform any other function which is supplemental incidental or consequential to any of the functions aforesaid or which may be prescribed. It would appear from hereinabove that this provision enjoins and comprehends all encompassing functions of the Authority supplementary, incidental or consequential to those specifically mentioned therein, the evident objective thereof being to equip it with the corresponding power to act for effective furtherance of the purposes of the enactment. 65. Section 8-EE authorizes the Chairman to exercise powers vested by the Act in the Authority to facilitate the transactions of business connected with the Act with the only rider that he would not act in opposition to or in contravention of any order of the Authority or usurp, the power reserved for it (Authority) at a meeting. Section 8-G empowers the Authority to appoint such number of officers and employees as may be necessary for the efficient performance of its functions, to determine their designations and grades. Their terms and conditions of service are to be determined by rules and regulations to be made in that regard. Chapter III of the Act is devoted to 'Master Plan' & 'Zoning Regulation'. Their terms and conditions of service are to be determined by rules and regulations to be made in that regard. Chapter III of the Act is devoted to 'Master Plan' & 'Zoning Regulation'. Thereunder a Master Plan & Zoning Regulation for the development of any area within the State is to be drawn up by the Director of Town and Country Planning in consultation with the local authorities concerned to be submitted with the State Government for examination and approval. After the Master Plan and the Zoning Regulation are finally prepared on a consideration of the objections, suggestions and representations that would have to be elicited by publishing the draft thereof for public responses, the same would be finally published. 66. Section 12 provides that after the Master Plan and Zoning Regulation are adopted, those would be sent for implementation to the Authority, whereafter as mandated by Section 13, no person would use any land, sub-divide any land or set up any new structure on any land covered by the Plan or change the existing structure of any building or use of any building or land within the area except with the permission of the Authority on a written application submitted for the purpose. 67. Chapter IV deals with 'Development Scheme'. The Authority under Section 15 may by notification in the official Gazette declare any area to be a scheme area and thereafter prepare a scheme. Such exercise can also be entrusted by the State Government to any local Authority. In the process of preparation of such scheme, the Authority, the Director of Town and Country Planning or the local Authority as the case may be would issue a notice inviting names of all the claimants or any person interested in the land or building within the area under the scheme. The Director of Town and Country Planning or the local Authority however, is prohibited from undertaking or carrying out any development of land in any area which is beyond the scheme area. The Director of Town and Country Planning or the local Authority however, is prohibited from undertaking or carrying out any development of land in any area which is beyond the scheme area. Here as well, after the publication of the development scheme on being approved and sanctioned by the Government following a scrutiny of the objections submitted by the interested persons and after affording them sufficient opportunities of hearing, no person within any area where scheme comes into force would be allowed to erect or proceed with any building or work or remove or alter or make additions or make any substantial repair to a building or a part of it etc. except on the permission of the Authority, application being submitted to that effect. 68. The provisions contained in Chapters II to IV therefrom attest that the Authority has the power and jurisdiction to administer the Act for achieving the purposes thereof within the areas included in the Master Plan and Zoning Regulations as well as the Development Scheme. This is of considerable relevance vis-a-vis the ongoing process of demolition and ouster undertaken by the Authority. The applicability of the Act and the Bye Laws also presupposes such a condition precedent. 69. In Chapter V, the Authority, if it determines that the lay out or a construction as contemplated therein is not in conformity with the sanctioned plan or is in violation of any provision of the Act it shall serve a notice on the person concerned requiring him to stay further execution until correction has been effected in accordance with such plan. Vide Meghalaya Town and Country Planning(Amendment) Act, 2004, Sections 30A and 30B were inserted. Whereas, under Section30A the power was conferred on the Authority to direct discontinuance of any development in any area in contravention of the Master Plan or Development Scheme or without the permission , approval or sanction referred to in Section 13 and/or Section 29 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permission, approval or sanction had been granted and also to cause removal of the person by whom such development had been commenced in case of non compliance of any direction to discontinue such development, the power of demolition of such development has been conferred on the Authority by Section 30B. These two provisions having regard to their significant bearing are also extracted hereinbelow- 30-A. Power to stop development (i) Where any development in any area has been commenced in contravention of the Master Plan or Development Scheme or without the permission, approval or sanction referred to in Section 13 and/or Section 29 or in contravention of any conditions subject to which such permissions, approval or sanction has been granted the Authority may, make an order requiring the development to be discontinued on and from the date of the service of the order and the order and such order shall be complied with accordingly." 30-B. Power of demolition of building.(1) where any development has been commenced or is being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the Master Plan or Development Scheme or without permission, approval or sanction referred to is Section 13 and Section 29of this Act or in the contravention of any of condition subject to which such permission, approval or sanction has been granted, the Authority may in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under this Act make an order directing that such development shall be removed by demolition , filling or otherwise by the owner, occupier, manager or by any person at whose instance the development has been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date on which a copy of the order of removal with brief statement of the reasons thereof has been delivered. (1) On his/her failure to comply with the order, the Authority may remove or cause to be removed the development and the expenses of such removal shall be removed from the owner, occupier, manager or any person at whose instance the development was commenced etc. as arrears of land revenue. Provided that no such order shall be made unless the owner, occupier, manager or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause why the order shall not be made." 70. A plain reading of Section 30A indicates the power of the Authority to direct discontinuance of the erring development, removal of persons responsible therefore as well as seizure of construction materials etc. in connection therewith. A plain reading of Section 30A indicates the power of the Authority to direct discontinuance of the erring development, removal of persons responsible therefore as well as seizure of construction materials etc. in connection therewith. The power of demolition contained in Section30B is invocable when a development has been commenced or being carried on or has been completed in contravention of the Master Plan or Development Scheme or without permission, approval or sanction referred to in Sections 13 and 29 of the Act or in contravention of any condition subject to which such permission, approval or sanction had been granted. In such a situation, the Authority has been left with the discretion to direct removal of such development by demolition, filling or otherwise by the owner, occupier , manager or any person at whose instance , the same had been commenced or is being carried out or has been completed. Such an action as is evident from this provision is permissible and would be in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under the Act. If the owner, occupier, or manager or the person at whose instance the development had been commenced or carried out or completed fails to act in terms of the directions issued within the time prescribed, the Authority is empowered to remove or cause to be removed the same and realize the expenses for such removal from the owner, occupier, manager and/or any such person as arrears of land revenue. 71. The proviso to Section 30B however, enjoins that no order of removal by demolition etc. as contemplated and permissible thereunder can be made unless the owner, occupier or manager or the person concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity to show cause as to why the same would not be made. This legislative inhibition is of decisive significance in the context of the final order dated 05.07.2010 issued by the Authority. As determined hereinbefore, the opportunity granted by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 to the noticees was not intended to be an idle formality. The Division Bench of this Court therein did not either mention or indicate that on the expiry of the period allowed by it, any representation/show cause as contemplated if submitted by the noticees could be overlooked, ignored and disregarded. The Division Bench of this Court therein did not either mention or indicate that on the expiry of the period allowed by it, any representation/show cause as contemplated if submitted by the noticees could be overlooked, ignored and disregarded. Though Section 30B was not in specific terms referred to in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, the course suggested for the parties does clearly comport thereto. In our unhesitant opinion, in absence of any unambiguous observation in the judgment and order dt. 25.05.2010 relieving MUDA of its obligation to undertake the scrutiny as required of it thereby, its move to issue the final order dated 05.07.2010 in the facts and circumstances of the case cannot be determined to be in consonance with the letter and spirit of the above decision of this Court and Section 30B of the Act. 72. Chapter X with the Caption 'Legal Proceedings' delineates a scheme for prosecution and punishment for the contraventions of the kind as mentioned therein. Section 51 therein makes a breach of any provision of the Master Plan and/or a Development Scheme to be punishable on conviction by a Magistrate following a prosecution. Prior thereto, the Authority is to notify the person of such breach or default requiring him to discontinue the same, so much so, that the failure to comply therewith would attract prosecution. 73. Section 56 comprehends simple punishment of fine to the extent of Rs. 500/-with or without simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to two months. Section 58 prohibits cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act except on the complaint of or upon information received from the Authority or from a person authorized by it. This Chapter therefore, visibly contemplates a situation where penalties by way of imprisonment or fine can be awarded for the referred violations and outrages on prosecution of the offender/violator and conviction by a court of law. The framework of the Chapter does not per se envisage the demolition of any development as defined by the Act at the instance of the Authority permissible under Section 30Bthereof. A prosecution for such development though may very well be contemplated in one or more of the provisions under Chapter X, steps for causing the demolition of offending development as a corrective measure seems to be beyond the purview thereof. This indeed, is endorsed by the plain language of Section 30B as well. A prosecution for such development though may very well be contemplated in one or more of the provisions under Chapter X, steps for causing the demolition of offending development as a corrective measure seems to be beyond the purview thereof. This indeed, is endorsed by the plain language of Section 30B as well. The Authority thereunder may in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under the Act make an order directing removal of the development made in contravention of the Master Plan or Development Scheme or in absence of any permission, approval or sanction or in transgression thereof. 74. To complete the narration, reference to Sections 73 and 74 of the Act is indispensable. Whereas, the former deals with the power of the State Government to make rules, the latter empowers the Authority to make Bye laws in respect of matters enumerated therein, but not inconsistent with the rules made by the State Government. The themes with which the Authority is endowed with the power of framing bye laws include inter alia- Clause (iv): zoning regulations prescribing the type and/or description of building which may or may not be, and the purpose for which a building may or may not be erected in any prescribed area or areas ; (vi) regulations in any manner not specifically provided for in this Act, erection of any enclosure, wall, fence,tent or the structure on any land within the limits of the Authority; 75. In the exercise of the aforementioned power under Section 74 of the Act, the Bye Laws had been framed. We are concerned with only Bye Law 11 thereof which occupies the center stage of the debate qua, the vires thereof and is extracted hereinbelow: 11. Offences and Penalties: Any person who contravenes with the provisions of the bye-laws or who interferences or obstruct any authorized personnel in the discharge of his duties shall be guilty of an offences. The Authority shall: (i) Punish the person by a fine as fixed by the Authority or as per the Meghalaya Town ad Country Planning Act, 1973. (ii) Take suitable action including demolition of un-authorized works as decided by the Authority. (iii) Take suitable action against licensed technical personnel and licence may withdrawn in case of an offence as decided by the Authority. 76. (ii) Take suitable action including demolition of un-authorized works as decided by the Authority. (iii) Take suitable action against licensed technical personnel and licence may withdrawn in case of an offence as decided by the Authority. 76. Section 73 amongst others permits the framing of rules by the State Government in respect of matters that may be delegated to any Authority established under this Act or to any officer. Our attention has been drawn to the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning (Constitution and Authority) Rules,1973 (for short, 'Constitution Rules) as well as the Meghalaya Town and Country Planning (Management of Authority) Rules, 1973 (for short, 'Management Rules). 77. It has indeed not been argued that the Bye Laws are in contravention of any rules made by the State Government in exercise of power under Section 73. A close perusal of Clauses (iv) and (vi) of Section 74 demonstrates their comprehensive and inclusive expanse. The Authority having been empowered to make bye laws in respect of matters catalogued in Section 74, in our view, it would be both impermissible and imprudent to scuttle the ambit of empowerment in absence of any apparent inconsistency with the rules framed by the State Government and more importantly, the provisions of the parent legislation. The Authority, as it is noticeable has been authorized to frame its Bye Laws by the Act itself and not the State Government. The obvious purpose of such endowment being to advance the purposes of the Act, no other circumspection to curtail the amplitude of the Bye laws ought to be inferred. 78. The plenary nature of the functions and the powers of the Authority conceptualized by the scheme of the Act and particularized amongst others in Section 8D and Chapters III, IV and v. in supplementation of each other emphatically endorses this view. The Bye laws therefore are well within the legislative limits conferred on the Authority by Section 74 of the Act and are patently not in conflict therewith. 79. The Apex Court in H.C. SUMAN and Anr. The Bye laws therefore are well within the legislative limits conferred on the Authority by Section 74 of the Act and are patently not in conflict therewith. 79. The Apex Court in H.C. SUMAN and Anr. (Supra) held in approval of the determination made in this regard in Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 QB.91 that a court ought to be slow to hold that a bye-law is void for unreasonableness and that it ought to be supported unless it is manifestly partial and unequal in its operation between different classes, or unjust, or made in bad faith, or clearly involving an unjustifiable interference with the liberty of those subject to it. 80. The Apex Court in AGRICULTURAL MARKETING COMMITTEE (Supra) tracing the power of delegation to be a constituent element of the legislative jurisdiction under Article 245 of the Constitution of India, in particular , observed that in course of enacting laws to meet the challenge of the complex socio-economic problems, the legislature often finds it convenient and necessary to delegate subsidiary or ancillary powers to delegatees of their choice for carrying out the policy laid down by the enactment. The legislature has to essentially lay down the legislative policy and the principles to afford guidance for carrying out the same by the delegatee and the subordinate legislation is comprehended for implementing the purposes and objects of the parent legislation. While reiterating that such delegation ought not to eventuate the effacement of the legislature or the legislative policy outlined by it, their Lordships emphasized that the delegatee has to assuredly dwell within the scope of its authority and cannot widen or constrict the contour of the delegating enactments or the policy laid down therein. 81. In O.M. PRAKASH AND ORS. ( Supra), the Apex Court recalled its observations in a Constitution Bench rendering in Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P., AIR 1964 SC 264 , vis-a vis the Bye laws framed under U.P. Municipal Act, 1916, that even if a particular bye law is framed not relating to any clause of the enabling provision of the concerned statue [Section298(2) of the U.P. Municipal Act, 1916] making thereof could be justified by referring to the general power conferred on the jurisdictional Municipal Board. It was further observed that once the Bye laws are ascertained to be within the competence of the maker, the fact that the preamble thereof mentioned clauses which are not relevant would not affect the validity thereof. Their Lordships underlined that the validity of the bye laws ought to be tested by reference to the question as to whether the Municipal Board had the power to make the same and if such power is established , any incorrect or inaccurate allusion of the source of power in the preamble thereof would not render it invalid. The view based on Kruse v. Johnson (Supra) was reiterated. 82. In the face of the deductions made on a survey of the provisions of the Act and the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court as above, the plea to the contrary raised on behalf of the Petitioner does not commend for acceptance. The authorities cited on their behalf are also of no avail to them. 82 A. Now to analyze the salient traits of Bye Law 11. The necessary prerequisites for the invocation of this Bye Law are- (i) contravention of the provisions of the bye laws and (ii) interference with or obstruction to any authorized person in the discharge of his duties. While enumerating that such a person in these eventualities would be guilty of an offence, the Authority thereby has been empowered to take any or more of the steps contemplated in Clause (i), (ii) and (iii). Whereas, clause(i) and (iii) contemplate punishment by imposition of fine as conceived by the Authority or as per the Act and suitable action against the licensed technical personnel together with withdrawal of the licence by the Authority respectively, under clause(ii), the Authority is competent to take suitable action including demolition of the unauthorized works if decided by it. 83. Action under clause(i) is instantly traceable to Section 31 and Chapter X of the Act and that under clause(iii) is within the purview of the incidental and ancillary power of the Authority recognized thereby. Though the caption of Bye law 11 reads- Offences and Penalties', in the estimate of this Court, the action envisaged in Clause (ii) stems from Section 30B of the Act, wherein, the Authority in addition to any prosecution that may be instituted under the Act can make an order directing the development mentioned therein to be removed by demolition, filling or otherwise. The language applied in Section 30B unmistakably extricates the consequence of demolition of the offending development from the ambit of prosecution otherwise contemplated by the Act under Chapter X thereof. The action contemplated under Clause (ii) of Bye law 11 is thus clearly distinguishable from and in addition to the remedies available to the Authority under Chapter X for penalizing a person following his prosecution and conviction by a court of law for his contravention and violation construed to be an offence thereunder. Bye law 11(ii) therefore is neither in conflict with nor repugnant to Chapter X of the Act or any other provision thereof and proclaims a distinct existence in the wholesome functional scheme of the Authority. Bye law 11(ii) therefore does not envisage a penalty otherwise awardable consequent upon conviction of an offender by a court of law as enumerated in Chapter X of the Act. The caption 'Offences and Penalties' of Bye law 11 therefore is not decisive vis-a-vis the import of clause(ii) thereof. The Petitioner's impugnment of this clause in the backdrop of Chapter X of the Act and the Code of Criminal Procedure and the legislative competence in the constitutional perspective therefore lacks persuasion. The framework of Chapter X of the Act and the ambit of Bye law 11(ii) enjoy independent and distinct existence and are neither dissentient nor mutilative of each other. These operate in their respective fields permitting harmonious co-existence. The essential pre conditions for the exercise of power under Bye law 11 aptly neuters its impeachment as a source of uncanalised power. Bye law 11(ii) is thus intra vires the Act qua, the front of challenges mounted in the instant polemic. 84. Vis-a-vis the plea that even if Bye law 11 is valid , the offences conceived of therein are triable under the Code, suffice it to state that the action contemplated under Clauses (i) and (iii) are visibly relatable to Chapter X and other provisions of the Act. The action under Bye law 11(ii) which is in alignment with Section 30B having been held to be beyond the purview of any prosecution, conviction and penalty as prescribed by Chapter X of the Act, this contention is not sustainable. The action under Bye law 11(ii) which is in alignment with Section 30B having been held to be beyond the purview of any prosecution, conviction and penalty as prescribed by Chapter X of the Act, this contention is not sustainable. Even otherwise, if the direction for demolition of development is construed to be a penalty for a criminal offence, the summary measure sanctioned thereby is saved by Section 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973 (as amended). 85. Having upheld the validity of Bye law 11, it is the next imperative to examine the denunciation of the impugned order dated 5.7.2010 for want of authority of the Secretary, MUDA. Whereas, the Petitioner contends that in the legislative scheme of the Act such an order could have been issued only by MUDA and none-else, the Respondents assert otherwise and endorse the validity thereof pleading that the Secretary had thereby only conveyed the decision of the Authority. That MUDA is a creature under the Act is obvious from Sections 8A and 8B thereof. Section 8A(2)enjoins that the Authority would be a body corporate having perpetual succession and common seal with power to acquire, hold and establish properties both movable and immovable and to enter into any agreement and would by the same name sue and be sued. As referred to hereinabove, Section 8D projects a wide expanse of its functions and powers in furtherance to the objectives of the Act. Under Section 8EE, the Chairman of MUDA can exercise all powers vested by the Act in it. The staff of the Authority under Section 8G is to be appointed by it with their designation and grades as may be considered necessary for the efficient performance of its functions. That the staff of the Authority includes its Secretary is apparent from Rule 14 of the Constitution Rules. Under this provision, the Secretary is authorized to exercise such power and authority of the duties as may be delegated to him by the Authority or the Chairman. Rule 31 of the Constitution Rules permits the Chairman to delegate by general and special order in writing all powers, duties or functions therein to any officer of the Authority as envisaged by Rule 16 of the Management Rules. The Chairman may delegate the functions to the Secretary of the Authority as desired by him. Rule 31 of the Constitution Rules permits the Chairman to delegate by general and special order in writing all powers, duties or functions therein to any officer of the Authority as envisaged by Rule 16 of the Management Rules. The Chairman may delegate the functions to the Secretary of the Authority as desired by him. In addition, the Chairman as contemplated under Rule 20 of the Management Rules may by general or special order in writing delegate to any officer of the Authority any of his powers, duties or functions therein. 86. The Authority being a body corporate it logically has to function through its staff under the supervision and control of its Chairman. In view of the host of enabling provisions noticed hereinabove, the plea of want of authority of the Secretary to act on behalf of the Chairman, MUDA in absence of overwhelming materials to the contrary, cannot be acceded to. The minutes of the meeting held on 2.7.2010 in the office chamber of the Minister In-charge, Urban and Planning etc. confirmed the presence of the Chairman, MUDA in the deliberations, whereafter the decision taken therein was conveyed by the impugned order dated 5.7.2010 signed by the Secretary , MUDA. The assailment of this order in the above legal and factual backdrop on the ground of lack of power of the Secretary thus, cannot be upheld. The decisions cited on behalf of the Petitioner on this aspect of the dissensus are distinguishable on facts and do not advance their case. 87. The present adjudicative pursuit would be left incomplete sans the analysis of the challenge to the penultimate action of MUDA in the form of the impugned order dated 05.07.2010. MUDA has not claimed ownership over the land involved. This, however, is not a pre-requisite for its initiatives under the Act, provided the same is located within the limits of the Master Plan and Zoning Regulations as well as Development Scheme conceived thereby. As held hereinabove, the MUDA's assertion to this effect to derive its jurisdiction to sustain the impugned order, has remained unproved in the teeth of irreconcilable factual dispositions of the parties on this count. The impugned order dated 05.07.2010 and the notices mentioned therein on this ground alone are thus liable to be interfered with. 88. As held hereinabove, the MUDA's assertion to this effect to derive its jurisdiction to sustain the impugned order, has remained unproved in the teeth of irreconcilable factual dispositions of the parties on this count. The impugned order dated 05.07.2010 and the notices mentioned therein on this ground alone are thus liable to be interfered with. 88. Be that as it may, the prominent features of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 may be recalled at this stage for responding to the other facets of the challenge to the MUDA's decision for demolition and ouster. As contained in paragraph 4 & 5 in particular of the aforementioned decision, the following are the preponent aspects thereof: - i) The notices (referred to in the order dated 05.07.2010 issued subsequently) should be taken to be notices to show cause. ii) Any person aggrieved by the said notice would be entitled to appear before the competent officer or the Meghalaya Urban Development Authority. iii) Such person may submit his reply and may also convince the authority that the construction raised by him is on his own land and that it is permissible and is under the appropriate and proper sanction. iv) If MUDA after making an inquiry comes to the conclusion that the constructions in dispute, in fact, have valid sanction would pass appropriate orders. v) If MUDA comes to the conclusion that such constructions are illegal and have no valid sanction or are encroaching upon the public land or such other places, then, after recording such finding, they would be entitled to demolish such constructions. vi) The noticees would be entitled to appear and file their replies before MUDA within 30 days (from the date of the judgment i.e. 25.05.2010). vii) MUDA would not demolish the constructions raised by the noticees till final disposal of the dispute. viii) The noticees would not proceed further with any construction on the land in dispute. ix) If the noticees are found proceeding with any construction it would amount to contempt of the lawful authority of the Court and result in withdrawal of the concession granted in their favour. x) MUDA then, without proceeding with the inquiry, would be entitled to demolish the entire illegal construction raised before and after the order. ix) If the noticees are found proceeding with any construction it would amount to contempt of the lawful authority of the Court and result in withdrawal of the concession granted in their favour. x) MUDA then, without proceeding with the inquiry, would be entitled to demolish the entire illegal construction raised before and after the order. xi) If the Appellants or the noticees are aggrieved by the final order to be passed by MUDA they would be entitled to challenge the same in an appropriate proceeding before an appropriate court/forum. 89. The above observations/directions apparently do not ratify the validity of the notices referred to therein if otherwise unsustainable and defeasible in law, amongst others, on the ground of vagueness, imprecision and ambiguity. Though, the parties are also at variance on the aspect of service thereof, the materials on record are exiguous to arrive at a decisive finding either way. The notices dated 14.12.2004, 28.07.2005 and 16.01.2007, on the face of the records, as mentioned in the impugned order dated 05.07.2010, however, do not describe the plot of land or the offending constructions thereon. The nature and extent of the violation under the Act and the Bye Laws necessitating the steps as notified to be taken also do not find a mention therein. Significantly, the notices dated 28.07.2005 and 16.01.2007 are addressed to 'All Concerned Person' and to 'All Concerned' respectively. Though, MUDA has endeavoured through the extracts of the relevant Dak Book to substantiate the service of the aforementioned notices on all persons now proposed to be ousted from the land in their occupation following the demolition of their structures thereon, the same, per se, cannot be unhesitatingly accepted to be a proof thereof and that too, at this distant point of time. This is more so, in view of the Petitioners' categorical refutation of issuance and service of such notices to all the occupants likely to be affected by the impugned order of demolition and eviction. The impugned order dated 05.07.2010, thus, suffers from these legal infirmities as well. The observation in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 that these notices are construable as those requiring the noticees to show cause, ipso facto, does not cure these fatal defects. 90. The representations/show causes available on records are by individuals and submitted on various dates, namely, 02.07.2010, 03.07.2010 and 05.07.2010. The observation in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 that these notices are construable as those requiring the noticees to show cause, ipso facto, does not cure these fatal defects. 90. The representations/show causes available on records are by individuals and submitted on various dates, namely, 02.07.2010, 03.07.2010 and 05.07.2010. Admittedly, the noticees had not submitted their representations/show causes within 30 days from the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010. On 24.06.2010 three letters of the even date had been addressed to the Minister, Urban Affairs, Shillong, Chairman and Secretary of MUDA on behalf of the Petitioner Association requesting for extension of 10 days time to do so, as certain relevant documents had not been made available to the noticees. MUDA very candidly has pleaded its inability to accede to such request, the time frame for submission of the representation/show cause having been fixed by this Court. That the representations aforementioned were pending on the date of the issuance of the order dated 05.07.2010 is apparent on the face of the records. A plain reading of the representations/show causes reveal the individual stands taken by the representationists/noticees, testifying the legality of their possession of their respective plots as well as constructions thereon, claiming right, title interest in and possession of the same. MUDA treated these representations to be non est having been submitted beyond time and as the minutes of the meeting dated 02.07.2010 held in the office chamber of the Minister In-charge Urban Affairs etc. Government of Meghalaya would reveal, a decision was taken to evict the occupants and demolish their structures, which eventually, found its shape in the form of the impugned order dated 05.07.2010. Admittedly, MUDA did not either consider the representations or conduct an enquiry into the same or otherwise, prior to such a decision culminating in the order dated 05.07.2010. 91. A plain reading of the text of the paragraph 4 & 5 of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, to repeat, does not convey the sanction of this Court to summarily evict the occupants of the land by dismantling their structures on their mere failure to submit representations/show causes within the time permitted by it. 91. A plain reading of the text of the paragraph 4 & 5 of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, to repeat, does not convey the sanction of this Court to summarily evict the occupants of the land by dismantling their structures on their mere failure to submit representations/show causes within the time permitted by it. Whereas, MUDA's hesitation to grant extension of time fixed by this Court is understandable, it reflex action to effect the ouster of the occupant from their land by demolition of their structures does not meet the constitutional mandate of fairness in State action. MUDA being a creature under the Act, it is not only bound by the provisions thereof, it's actions ought to be necessarily informed with fairness, transparency and non-arbitrariness to be valid. Though, not specifically referred to in the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, the directions contained therein enabling the noticees to submit representations/show causes and to MUDA to conduct an enquiry before taking a final decision, is apparently in harmony with the prescription of the opportunity of hearing contained in Section 30Bof the Act. From this point of view the noticees, who had not submitted any representation/show cause, as well cannot be forcibly evicted from their lands in occupation by demolition of their structures by an execute fiat, such a course being an anathema to the rule of law, as has been enunciated in a plethora of decisions, amongst others, in State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. v. Maharaja Dharmander Prasad Singh and Ors. (Supra) and Hindustan Times and Ors. v. State of UP and Anr. (Supra). 92. That the right to property is a human right and cannot be taken away, except in accordance with the provisions of the statute, has been held by the Apex Court, inter alia, in Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Anr. (Supra) and Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram and Ors. (Supra). MUDA, therefore, was required, under a constitutional and legal obligation to conduct an independent enquiry before taking an unilateral decision to demolish the structures of the occupants construing the same to be illegal and effecting their ouster from the land in their possession. v. Union of India and Anr. (Supra) and Lachhman Dass v. Jagat Ram and Ors. (Supra). MUDA, therefore, was required, under a constitutional and legal obligation to conduct an independent enquiry before taking an unilateral decision to demolish the structures of the occupants construing the same to be illegal and effecting their ouster from the land in their possession. This Court by its order judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 did never intend to supplant the enjoinment of opportunity of hearing engrafted in Section 30B, but only required its compliance by issuing the necessary directions as contained therein. 93. The impugned order dated 05.07.2010 when analysed in the above backdrop, presents several other inherent and irremediable pitfalls rendering it void in law. It suggests that the action proposed thereby is in compliance of the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, the addressee having failed to submit his representation/show cause within the time fixed thereby. In terms of this order, the MUDA's conclusion of illegality of the construction and encroachment upon government land was inevitable only for the default of the addressee to comply with the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010 necessitating, as a corollary, the demolition of the structures. Not only this comprehension of MUDA is belied by the judgment and order dated 25.05.2010, such a fallout not having been intended thereby, it manifests total non-application of mind and a restive move on its part to get the land cleared of the occupants and their structures under the cover of the aforementioned decision of this Court without discharging its obligations ordained thereby and the Act. MUDA, evidently, resorted to a summary move without complying with the statutory edict engrafted in Section 30B and undertaking an independent exercise to arrive at its own conclusion, on a consideration of the pending representations/show causes to justify the impugned decision with obvious irreversible and disastrous consequences qua those to be affected. As an entity conceived of and created under a statute, in a subsisting constitutional scheme of administrative governance, whereunder every State action to be valid, has to be deferential to the fundamental precept of fairness in action informed with the unflinching commitment to the rule of law, the order dated 05.07.2010 cannot be sustained. For all these considerations, the impugned decision of MUDA as contained in the orders dated 05.07.2010 are adjudged to be illegal, unconstitutional and void. For all these considerations, the impugned decision of MUDA as contained in the orders dated 05.07.2010 are adjudged to be illegal, unconstitutional and void. The authorities cited by the Respondents disapproving interference with the initiatives to demolish illegal structures, in the facts and circumstances of the case, are of no assistance to them. 94. In the result, the validity of Bye Law 11 is upheld. The decision of MUDA as conveyed by the final orders dated 05.07.2010, issued by its Secretary, however, is interfered with. The impugned orders dated 05.07.2010 are set aside. The petitions are accordingly partially allowed. No costs. Petition allowed