JUDGMENT HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B.PARDIWALA This writ petition has been preferred by a student being aggrieved by the action of the respondent in cancelling her admission for post-graduate course in the branch of General Medicine for the academic year 2011-2012 in N.R.I. category of seats. 2. Brief facts giving rise to this petition can be summarised as under: 1. The petitioner passed her 12th Standard Examination in Science Stream conducted by the Gujarat Secondary and Higher Secondary Education Board, Gandhinagar in the academic year 2003-2004. The petitioner was in a position to secure admission in the order of merit in the academic year 2003-2004 at Pramukhswamy Medical College, Karamsad as a student of 1st M.B.B.S. 2. Record reveals that the petitioner cleared her M.B.B.S. in academic year 2009-2010. After completion of her internship in the month of March 2010, the petitioner proceeded towards U.S.A. in the month of May 2010. In the month of November 2010, the petitioner returned to India as per the terms of her visa. 3. In February 2011, the respondent – Smt.N.H.L. Municipal Medical College, which is run and managed by the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation, put on its website rules for admission for post-graduate courses in the discipline of Medicine for N.R.I. category of seats. 4. The petitioner applied for admission in the N.R.I. category of seats in the setup of the respondent pursuant to the rules for the current academic year 2011-2012 at the level of post-graduation in the faculty of Medicine. 5. The petitioner submitted her application accompanied by relevant documents to show her status as 'Non-Resident Indian' within the meaning of the rules. 6. Record reveals that the application was initially accepted by the respondent. One of the documents on which the petitioner relied upon to put forward her claim of being a 'Non-Resident Indian' is a certificate dated 11th March 2011 issued by one Mr.Mukesh M.Patel, an advocate and tax consultant, stating that in view of the fact that the petitioner was out of India from 31.5.2010 to 29.11.2010 and from 7.3.2011 to 9.3.2011 i.e. for a total number of 186 days during the financial year, she is eligible to apply for admission to the post-graduation courses in N.R.I. category of seats. 7. Respondent, vide communication dated 28th March 2011, asked the petitioner to remain present for the purpose of counselling on 9th April 2011 in the premise of the respondent. 7. Respondent, vide communication dated 28th March 2011, asked the petitioner to remain present for the purpose of counselling on 9th April 2011 in the premise of the respondent. In the first round of counselling, it appears that the petitioner opted for General Medicine as the branch of her choice at the level of postgraduation. On 9th April 2011, the petitioner was issued admission letter by the respondent at the level of post-graduation in the branch of General Medicine for the academic year 2011-2012 in N.R.I. category of seats. The petitioner was required to join the concerned course in the setup of the respondent by reporting for the same latest by 15th April 2011. The petitioner reported for the said course and thereupon join the same with effect from 15th April 2011. 8. On 14th June 2011, the petitioner was called in the office of the respondent and was informed that she was not eligible for admission in respect of N.R.I. category of seats on the basis of her stay outside India for a period of 186 days and, therefore, her admission to N.R.I. category of seats would stand cancelled. 9. Record reveals that the respondent took the decision to cancel the admission of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner visited foreign countries in the year 2010-2011 on visitor's visa and stayed outside India for a period of 186 days. To put it more precisely, the stay outside India on visitor's visa would not make a student eligible for consideration as a 'Non-Resident Indian' to get admission in the quota of N.R.I. category of seats. 10. It is at this stage that the petitioner thought fit to prefer this petition challenging the action and decision of the respondent in cancelling the admission for the post-graduate course in the branch of General Medicine in N.R.I. category of seats. 3. We have heard learned advocate Mr.D.C.Dave for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr.Abhishek Mehta for the respondent-College. We have also perused the record of the case. 4. The principal contentions which have been canvassed by learned advocate appearing for the petitioner are as under:- 1. It is submitted that the course of action on the part of the respondent in cancelling the admission of the petitioner is ex-facie arbitrary in nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. 4. The principal contentions which have been canvassed by learned advocate appearing for the petitioner are as under:- 1. It is submitted that the course of action on the part of the respondent in cancelling the admission of the petitioner is ex-facie arbitrary in nature and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 2. It is submitted that as per the rules governing admission to post-graduate courses, the term 'N.R.I.' means 'Non-Resident Indian' as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961. Relying on Section 6 of the Income Tax Act, learned advocate would submit that as the petitioner was out of India from 31.5.2010 to 29.11.2010 and from 7.3.2011 to 9.3.2011 i.e. for a total number of 186 days during the financial year, she would fall within the ambit of a 'Non-Resident Indian'. Counsel would submit that since the petitioner is fulfilling the eligibility criteria of being a 'Non-Resident Indian' as explained under the Income Tax Act and the rules also provided for the definition of 'N.R.I.' as per the Income Tax Act, the respondent could not have cancelled the admission at the last minute on the premise that the visit of the petitioner to a foreign country was on a visitor's visa. 3. Counsel would further submit that the action on the part of the respondent in cancelling the admission is in breach and violation of principle of promissory estoppel. He would submit that once admission was already granted after scrutiny of all necessary documents and other aspects, the respondent could not have thereafter cancelled the admission as this would ruin the entire career of the petitioner as a student. In short, the contention is that even on equitable considerations the admission could not have been cancelled, and this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India may balance the equities in favour of the petitioner. Counsel would further submit that even otherwise the petitioner was getting admission at Pramukhswamy Medical College at Karamsad and Bharti Vidyapith, Pune on merits. However, since the petitioner was desirous of prosecuting her studies in the setup of respondent, she opted for admission offered to her in the setup of respondent and decided not to seek admission at Pramukhswamy Medical College at Karamsad or Bharti Vidyapith at Pune in respect of being on the merit list. 4. However, since the petitioner was desirous of prosecuting her studies in the setup of respondent, she opted for admission offered to her in the setup of respondent and decided not to seek admission at Pramukhswamy Medical College at Karamsad or Bharti Vidyapith at Pune in respect of being on the merit list. 4. Counsel would further submit that as per the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Medical Council of India v/s. Madhu Singh and others, reported in AIR 2002 SC 3230 and in the matter of Mridul Dhar (minor) and another v/s. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 2005 SC 666 , it is absolutely impermissible on the part of any college imparting education in the faculty of Medicine at the level of post-graduation to grant any admission after 30th May of the concerned academic year. He would submit that cancellation of admission has laid to a situation where the petitioner has to suffer in respect of her academic career for having acted upon the promise at the end of the respondent. 5. The last contention of the learned counsel is that by cancelling the admission of the petitioner, no purpose would be served, inasmuch as, in view of the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, it will not be possible for the respondent to admit any other student at that stage. He would submit that if the decision of the respondent in cancelling the admission of the petitioner is upheld, then one seat at the level of post-graduation in the branch of General Medicine would go in waste and it would not be in the interest of anybody. 5. Per contra, learned counsel Mr.Abhishek Mehta appearing for the respondent has put forward the following contentions:- 1. It is submitted that on perusal and detailed scrutiny of the relevant documents including the copy of the passport submitted by the petitioner, it came to the notice of the respondent that the petitioner had claimed N.R.I. status in view of the fact that she had visitor's visa for various countries and had stayed outside India for 186 days in the previous year. He would submit that since the petitioner's stay outside India for 186 days was on visitor's visa, the same was not eligible for consideration as N.R.I. status to get admission on N.R.I. quota and, therefore, the petitioner, not having the requisite qualifications/criteria for being considered as N.R.I., the PG Admission and Scrutiny Committee took decision and revoked the provisional admission granted to the petitioner in P.G.Course of General Medicine in N.R.I. quota of the respondent – College. 2. He would further submit that the principle of promissory estoppel in such type of cases would not be applicable. He would further submit that as a matter of fact there was no promise at all of any nature. He submitted that admission given to the petitioner vide admission order dated 9th April 2011 was on provisional basis since the same would attained finality only after the completion of the final counselling and university enrollment. 3. He would submit that as a matter of fact there is suppression of material fact at the end of the petitioner before this Court that the petitioner had gone on visitor's visa to various countries including U.S.A and Dubai. 4. He would submit that the person who goes on visitor's visa cannot be considered as an N.R.I. for the purpose of granting admission to the P.G.course under the N.R.I. category of seats in the respondent – College. He would submit that when this fact came to the notice of the respondent, decision was taken to cancel the admission. 5. Learned counsel would further submit that the decision of the respondent in cancelling the admission of the petitioner is absolutely in consonance and conformity with the guidelines laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.A.Inamdar and others v/s. State of Maharashtra and others, reported in (2005)6 SCC 537 , while dealing with the issue of N.R.I. quota in educational institution. 6. We have given our anxious considerations and thoughts to the rival contentions of the respective parties. We have also gone through the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent by and through Dr.Pankaj Patel, Chairman, PG Admission and Scrutiny Committee and Dean of Smt.N.H.L. Municipal Medical College. At this stage, we would like to reproduce paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 12 and 15 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent. “7. We have also gone through the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent by and through Dr.Pankaj Patel, Chairman, PG Admission and Scrutiny Committee and Dean of Smt.N.H.L. Municipal Medical College. At this stage, we would like to reproduce paragraphs 7, 9, 11, 12 and 15 of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent. “7. That on perusal and detailed scrutiny of the relevant documents including the copies of passport submitted by the petitioner, it was ascertained that the petitioner had claimed NRI status in view of the fact that she had visitor's visa for various countries and had stayed outside India for 186 days in the previous year. Since the petitioner's stay outside India for 186 days was on visitor's visa the same was not eligible for consideration as NRI status to get admission on NRI quota and therefore, the petitioner, not having the requisite qualification/criteria for being considered as NRI, the PG Admission and Scrutiny Committee took a decision and revoked the provisional admission granted to the petitioner in PG course of General Medicine in NRI quota of the respondent college. 9. It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the petitioner has not pointed to the Hon'ble Court that the petitioner had gone on visitor's visa to various countries including USA and Dubai and was outside India for a period of 186 days. A person who goes on visitor's visa cannot be considered as an NRI for the purpose of granting admission to the PG course under the NRI category of the respondent college. When the said discrepancy came to light, the same was immediately rectified by informing the petitioner that her so-called claim of being an NRI was baseless and not tenable and that the petitioner was not eligible for being admitted under the NRI category for the PG course of the respondent college. In fact, the respondent college received a letter dated 13.6.2011 pointing out the fact of the petitioner having preferred the application under NRI quota of the respondent college despite the fact that the petitioner had posed herself to be NRI because she had gone on visitor's visa abroad and was outside India for more than 186 days. The respondent college immediately took note of the same and issued the letter dated 14.6.2011 informing the petitioner of the revocation of her provisional admission in the PG course under the NRI quota of the respondent college. The respondent college immediately took note of the same and issued the letter dated 14.6.2011 informing the petitioner of the revocation of her provisional admission in the PG course under the NRI quota of the respondent college. The respondent college also responded to the letter dated 13.6.2011 by way of letter dated 17.6.2011. 11. That the averment/allegation of the petitioner that the action of revocation of the petitioner's provisional admission is de hors the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or against the principles of promissory estoppel is denied and not admitted. That the present petition is not maintainable since no fundamental right of the petitioner has been infringed. That the facts narrated by the petitioner in the present petition are subject to confirmation with the record of the respondent college and therefore whatever is contrary to the record of the respondent college is denied and not admitted. That the contention of the petitioner that the petitioner had all the intention to go back to USA for the purpose of prosecuting further studies as she was having multiple visa for 10 years to visit the USA is completely unjustified and rather absurd since the petitioner was given visitor's visa for multiple entry for 10 years and not student visa (commonly known as F1/J1 visa) and the petitioner could not have procured any admission to any of the colleges in USA on the basis of visitor's visa. From the record submitted by the petitioner at the time of applying for the PG course under NRI quota, it came to light that the petitioner had a visitor's visa in B1/B2 category visa and therefore, a decision was taken to revoke the provisional admission given to the petitioner. 12. It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the definition of NRI as contained in the rules contained in the definition of NRI under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The said rules have been framed pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as contained in para 131 of P.A.Inamdar (supra) referred to in the preceding para and therefore the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are required to be read while interpreting the definition of 'NRI' under the rules framed for grant of admission under NRI quota. The said rules have been framed pursuant to the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as contained in para 131 of P.A.Inamdar (supra) referred to in the preceding para and therefore the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court are required to be read while interpreting the definition of 'NRI' under the rules framed for grant of admission under NRI quota. At the cost of repetition it is submitted that the admission granted to the petitioner was on provisional basis and therefore, the petitioner has no vested right to the said admission under the NRI quota which has been revoked immediately on the discrepancy having come to light. As far as the certificate attached to the present petition of a Tax Consultant declaring the present petitioner as an NRI is concerned, the same is also silent on the issue of the petitioner having remained outside India on visitor's visa and cannot be considered for the purpose of considering the petitioner's status to be that of an NRI. 15. It is humbly and respectfully submitted that the respondent college has acted in accordance with the observations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in P.A.Inamdar's judgment as well as in accordance with the rules for grant of admission under NRI quota and therefore the petitioner cannot claim any right much less vested right to the admission under the NRI quota. It is denied that the action of revoking the admission of the petitioner is against the principle of promissory estoppel. In fact, the respondent college would have perpetuated illegality if it would not have revoked the admission granted provisionally to the petitioner and the act of the petitioner in doing so is just, legal and proper. The statement made by the petitioner that she was getting admission in two other colleges by merit is denied and not admitted. The statement made by the petitioner that the last date for admission in respect of post-graduate admission is 30.5.2011 as prescribed by the Medical Council of India is over and it is not possible for the petitioner to secure admission elsewhere is not correct in view of the fact that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has extended the date of admission to 30.6.2011 for final counselling and the petitioner could have easily procured admission elsewhere since the petitioner had 15 days to do so. 8. 8. The central question which falls for our consideration in this petition is as to whether the petitioner can be termed as 'Non-Resident Indian' in the backdrop of the above factual aspects. For better adjudication of this issue it would be expedient to go through few relevant provisions of law. 9. As per the Gujarat Professional Medical Educational Colleges or Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Payment of Fees) Rules, 2008 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Rules'), the term 'N.R.I.' means 'Non-Resident Indian' as defined under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The term 'Non-Resident' has been defined under Section 2(30) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which reads as under:- “'non-resident' means a person who is not a 'resident', and includes a person who is not ordinarily resident within the meaning of clause(6) of section 6.” The term 'resident' as defined under Section 2(42) reads as under: “'resident' means a person who is resident in India within the meaning of section 6.” Section 6 of the Income Tax Act is with regard to 'residence in India'. The relevant portion of Section 6 reads as under: “6(1) An individual is said to be resident in India in any previous year, if he – (a) is in India in that year for a period or periods amounting in all to one hundred and eighty-two days or more; or (b) xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) xxxx xxxx xxxx “ Section 6(6) explains as to who is 'not ordinarily resident'. It reads as under: “A person is said to be 'not ordinarily resident' in India in any previous year if such person is - (a) an individual who has been a non-resident in India in nine out of the ten previous years preceding that year, or has during the seven previous years preceding that year been in India for a period of, or periods amounting in all to, seven hundred and twenty-nine days or less; or (b) a Hindu undivided family whose manager has been a non-resident in India in nine out of the ten previous years preceding that year, or has during the seven previous years preceding that year been in India for a period of, or periods amounting in all to, seven hundred and twenty-nine days or less.” 10. On plain reading of the relevant provisions, it is clear as per the definition of 'non-resident' that a person who is not resident is a 'non-resident'. Again 'resident' means a person who is resident in India within the meaning of Section 6. Section 6(1)(a) speaks only about who can be a person to be a resident in India. It is clear that for the purposes of Income Tax Act an individual would be a resident in India if he is in India in that year for a period or periods amounting in all to 182 days or more. This does not mean that if a person, for any reason, is out of India for a period or periods amounting in all to 182 days or more would automatically become a 'non-resident'. In the same manner a person is said to be 'not ordinarily resident' in India in any previous year if such person is an individual who has been a 'non-resident' in India in nine out of ten previous year preceding that year, or has, during the seven previous year preceding that year, been in India for a period or periods amount in all to 729 days or less. 11. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the contention of the petitioner trying to draw a necessary corollary flowing from Section 6(1)(a) that as the petitioner was out of India for a total number of 186 days, she would fall within the definition of being a 'Non-Resident Indian' as explained under the Income Tax Act. Section 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act only speaks about 'residence in India' for the purposes of Income Tax Act. We are of the view that as a matter of fact Section 6(1)(a) of the Income Tax Act is absolutely silent as regards the term 'Non-Resident Indian'. The logical corollary flowing from Section 6(1)(a) cannot be adopted or taken into consideration for the purpose of understanding the meaning of 'Non-Resident Indian'. Income Tax Act makes it abundantly clear that a 'Non-Resident' is a person who is not a resident and includes a person who is not ordinarily resident. The logical corollary flowing from Section 6(1)(a) cannot be adopted or taken into consideration for the purpose of understanding the meaning of 'Non-Resident Indian'. Income Tax Act makes it abundantly clear that a 'Non-Resident' is a person who is not a resident and includes a person who is not ordinarily resident. On the contrary, Section 6(6) makes it abundantly clear that a person is said to be 'not ordinarily resident' in India if such person is an individual who has been a 'non-resident' in India in nine out of ten previous years preceding that year, or has, during the seven previous years preceding that year, been in India for a period or periods amounting in all to 729 days or less. If a person goes abroad but at that time he does not know for how long he is going to stay abroad, that would indicate his intention to stay outside India for an uncertain period. A citizen of India may go abroad for many reasons. For example, a citizen of India may go abroad to look after his or her ailing friend or relative with the intention to return to India only after recovery of such ailing person, and in case return to India after three months when that person has recovered, these persons are not entitled to the status of an 'N.R.I.'. The period for which the visa is issued by the country to be visited is also not relevant. 12. In the present case, the petitioner had gone abroad on a visitor's visa. A person may be granted visa for a period of five years and when he leaves, he may be uncertain about the period of stay abroad but from that itself it is not possible to reach to a conclusion that such a person is a person resident outside India. The petitioner had not gone abroad on immigration visa or commonly known as “F1/J1” visa but the petitioner had a visitor's visa in “B1/B2” category. It is also not the case of the petitioner that her parents are staying outside India and are 'Non-Resident Indians”. 13. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted and if the logical corollary flowing from Section 6 of the Income Tax Act is blind-foldedly applied, then it would lead to disastrous results. It is also not the case of the petitioner that her parents are staying outside India and are 'Non-Resident Indians”. 13. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted and if the logical corollary flowing from Section 6 of the Income Tax Act is blind-foldedly applied, then it would lead to disastrous results. Any person from a affluent family would obtain visa for a period of about six months, stay outside India and upon his or her return to India would straightway claim the status of being a 'Non-Resident Indian'. It is manifest from the plain meaning of 'Non-Resident Indian' that 'Non-Resident Indian' is one who does not live within the jurisdiction in question. 14. As explained by Law Lexicon, the term 'Non-Resident' means “one who does not reside in, or is not a resident of, a particular place; one who has his abode in another state; one who resides out of the state. TEMPORARY ABSENCE. A person who leaves the state on business trips for brief periods of time, but without an intent to change his residence, is not a non-resident.” 14.1 It may be noted that the concept of reserving a certain quota of seats for NRI students in professional education has been in existence since long. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.A.Inamdar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra) clarified the entire situation and provided for regulating admissions in such a quota by making following observations. “131. Here itself we are inclined to deal with the question as to seats allocated for Non-Resident Indians (“NRI” for short) or NRI seats. It is common knowledge that some of the institutions grant admissions to a certain number of students under such quota by charging a higher amount of fee. In fact, the term “NRI” in relation to admissions is a misnomer. By and large, we have noticed in cases after cases coming to this Court, neither the students who get admissions under this category nor their parents are NRIs. In effect and reality, under this category, less meritorious students, but who can afford to bring more money, get admission. In fact, the term “NRI” in relation to admissions is a misnomer. By and large, we have noticed in cases after cases coming to this Court, neither the students who get admissions under this category nor their parents are NRIs. In effect and reality, under this category, less meritorious students, but who can afford to bring more money, get admission. During he course of hearing it was pointed out that a limited number of such seats should be made available as the money brought by such students admitted against NRI quota enables the educational institutions to strengthen their level of education and also to enlarge their educational activities. It was also pointed out that people of Indian origin, who have migrated to other countries, have a desire to bring back their children to their own country as they not only get education but also get reunited with the Indian cultural ethos by virtue of being here. They also wish the money which they would be spending elsewhere on education of their children should rather reach their own motherland. A limited reservation of such seats, not exceeding 15%, in our opinion, may be made available to NRIs depending on the discretion of management subject o two conditions. First, such seats should be utilized bona fide by NRIs only and for their children or wards. Secondly, within this quota, merit should not be given a complete go-by. The amount of money, in whatever form collected from such NRIs, should be utilized for benefiting students such as from economically weaker sections of the society, whom, on well-defined criteria, the educational institution may admit on subsidised payment of their fee. To prevent misutilisation of such quota or any malpractice referable to NRI quota seats, suitable legislation or regulation needs to be framed. So long as the State does not do it, it will be for the Committees constituted pursuant to the direction in Islamic Academy to regulate.” It can thus be seen that in the said decision of P.A.Inamdar and others vs. State of Maharashtra and others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court frowned upon admissions being granted to students in NRI quota where neither students nor their parents are NRIs. It was observed that in reality under this category less meritorious students who can afford to bring more money, get admissions. 15. It was observed that in reality under this category less meritorious students who can afford to bring more money, get admissions. 15. We may now deal with the contention as regards the doctrine of promissory estoppel as canvassed vociferously by the learned counsel for the petitioner. As a matter of fact, it is not really necessary for us to go into the question as to whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation would apply in the facts in issue in this case. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not really based on the principle of estoppel but is a doctrine evolved by equity in order to prevent injustice. 16. In order to invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel, clear, sound and positive intention must be led in the petition itself by the party invoking the doctrine and bald expressions without any supporting materials to the effect that the doctrine is directed because the party invoking the doctrine has altered his position relying on the assurance of the other side would not be sufficient to press into aid the doctrine. 17. As held by the Supreme Court in the case of Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. v/s. CTO, reported in (2005)1 SCC 625 , the Courts are bound to consider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large, because while considering the applicability of the doctrine the Courts have to do equity and the fundamental principle must be forever present in the mind of the Court. Applying this principle of law, if respondent – College, after having learnt about the fact that the petitioner had visited foreign country on visitor's visa and is not a 'Non-Resident Indian' in its true sense, then no illegality can be said to have been committed by the respondent – College in cancelling the admission. 18. Assuming for a moment that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable in the present case, though it does not apply still if the petitioner is allowed to continue, then it would be nothing sort of perpetuating illegality in the name of doctrine of promissory estoppel. Estoppel presupposes equity in the representee. The further requirement is that he who raises an equitable estoppel must do equity himself. Estoppel presupposes equity in the representee. The further requirement is that he who raises an equitable estoppel must do equity himself. He who wants to rely on the principle of estoppel on the basis that he acted upon the representation of the other side must come to the Court of law with clean hands. 19. As observed by the Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v/s. B.N. Bhattacharjee, reported in AIR 1979 SC 1725 , the soul of estoppel is equity, not facility for inequity. It is from this aspect of the matter that we are required to consider the present case. The petitioner rely upon the promissory estoppel on a fact that she was already admitted in the college for the postgraduate course after the first round of counselling and now since the admission has been cancelled at the last minute, her entire academic year would be wasted as no other college would admit her and, therefore, the respondent is estopped under the law from taking the course prejudicial to the petitioner. 20. For the above purpose, we need only to refer the fact that the respondent – College did not promise or give an assurance to the petitioner, which is necessary for the foundation of a true estoppel. 21. In American Jurisprudence, Volume 28, Paragraph 3 at page 601, it is noted that : “It is, moreover, recognised that the doctrine of estoppel when misapplied may be almost effective weapon for the accomplishment of injustice.” 22. It may not be out of place to mention in this context that the Supreme Court has time and again held in a series of decisions, though in a different context, in Guru Nanak Dev University v/s. Rajesh Bhaskar, reported in AIR 1993 SC 2412 and in St.John's Teacher Training Institute v/s. State of Tamil Nadu, reported in AIR 1994 SC 43 , that ill-conceived sympathy is subversive to the academic discipline leading to serious impasse in academic life. The Supreme Court further held that admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. 23. The High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is required to enforce rule of law and not to pass order or direction, which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law. The Supreme Court further held that admissions cannot be ordered without regard to the eligibility of the candidates. 23. The High Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is required to enforce rule of law and not to pass order or direction, which is contrary to what has been injuncted by law. The principles of justice and conscience are the basis of equity jurisdiction, of course it must not be taken that the contrast between law and equity is one between the system of strict rules and of broad discretion. Just as the common law has escaped from its early formalism, so over the years, equity has established some stricter rules for the application of its principles. In the context of the present case, suffice is to notice that the law is, by and large, well settled that the principles of promissory estoppel do apply in the matters of education and upon the Universities, but are circumscribed by the very basic requirements that in the name of promissory estoppel, illegality cannot be perpetuated and the University cannot be asked to do the impossible or impermissible. 24. In Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v/s. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in AIR 1979 SC 621 , the Supreme Court observed that, it is equally true that promissory estoppel cannot be used to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. We may also point out that the doctrine of promissory estoppel being an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires, if it can be shown by the Government or public authority that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government or public authority to the promise or representation made by it, the court would not raise an equity in favour of the person to whom the promise or representation is made and enforce the promise or representation against the Government or public authority. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. 25. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case, because on the facts, equity would not require that the Government or public authority should be held bound by the promise or representation made by it. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner vociferously submitted that the petitioner, having already been admitted by the respondent - College for the post-graduate course, the respondent could not have cancelled the admission on the premise that the same was on account of mistake or due to oversight of a relevant fact. He would further submit that even if the petitioner was admitted through mistake, the petitioner not being at fault, her admission should not have been cancelled. 26. In this regard reliance has been placed on paragraph 17 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Ashok Chand Singhvi v/s. University of Jodhpur and others, reported in AIR 1989 SC 823 , which reads as under: “17. It is submitted on behalf of the University that it was through mistake that the appellant was admitted. We are unable to accept the contention. It has been already noticed that both the Dean and the Vice-Chancellor considered the objections raised by the Officer-in-Charge, Admissions, and thereafter direction for admitting the appellant was made. When after considering all facts and circumstances and also the objections by the office to the Admission of a candidate, the Vice-Chancellor directs the admission of such a candidate, such admission could not be said to have been made through mistake. Assuming that the appellant was admitted through mistake, the appellant not being at fault, it is difficult to sustain the order withholding the admission of the appellant. In this connection, we may refer, to a decision of this Court in Rajendra Prasad Mathur v. Karnataka University, 1986 (Suppl) SCC 740 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1448 ). In that case, the appellants were admitted to certain private engineering colleges for the B.E. Degree Course, although they were not eligible for admission. In that case this Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the students whose admissions were subsequently cancelled and the order of cancellation was upheld by the High Court. In that case, the appellants were admitted to certain private engineering colleges for the B.E. Degree Course, although they were not eligible for admission. In that case this Court dismissed the appeals preferred by the students whose admissions were subsequently cancelled and the order of cancellation was upheld by the High Court. At the same time, this Court took the view that the fault lay with the engineering colleges which admitted the appellants and that there was no reason why the appellants should suffer for the sins of the management of these engineering colleges. Accordingly, this Court allowed the appellants to continue their studies in the respective engineering colleges in which they were granted admission. The same principle which weighed with this Court in that case should also be applied in the instant case. The appellant was not at fault and we do not see why he should suffer for the mistake committed by the Vice-Chancellor and the Dean of the Faculty of Engineering.” All we can say is that there is no law as such laid down by the Supreme Court as sought to be canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 27. The present case is just not a case of mistake. As discussed earlier, the petitioner cannot claim status of being an 'N.R.I.'. Even with this position if she is allowed to continue on equitable grounds, it will be nothing short of doing justice at the cost of doing injustice with others, and that too, in matters relating to students. 28. In this regard, we would like to quote and rely upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Chander Chinar Bada Akhara Udasin Society and others v/s. State of Jammu and Kashmir and others, reported in AIR 1997 SC 399 , wherein in paragraph 10, the Supreme Court observed as under: “It is unfortunate that due to the indifferent attitude of the State Government and haste shown by the appellant-society, the so-called selected candidates, who are said to have been admitted, are virtually on the roads. But only on equitable grounds, a procedure which is not sanctioned by law cannot be approved only to mitigate the hardship of such candidates who have sought admissions in the medical college aforesaid.” Having considered the entire matter from all angles, we are unable to accept any of the contentions canvassed by learned counsel for the petitioner. We are of the view that this issue is a very important issue and it is almost an eye-opener for respondent – College and all other colleges when it comes to giving admissions in N.R.I. quota. Way back in the year 2005, the Supreme Court in P.A.Inamdar's case observed that such seats should be utilized bonafidely by N.R.Is. only and for their children or wards. To prevent misutilization of such quota or any malpractice referable to N.R.I. quota seats, suitable legislation or regulation needs to be framed. So long as the State does not do it, it will be for the committees constituted pursuant to the directions in Islamic Academic to regulate. 29. We may also quote a Division Bench's judgment of this High Court in the case of State of Gujarat and another v/s. Brij Kishore Garg, reported in 2000(1) GLR 884 , wherein in paragraph 11, the Court has observed as under: “The Court cannot in absence of any legal or constitutional infirmity, substitute its judgment for that of academicians as if sitting in appeal. By catena of decisions of Supreme Court, it is well settled that the High Court cannot, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, (a) relax rules governing admission to educational institutions or rewrite them, (b) devise a scheme of its own relating to admission in place of that made by statutory authority, and (c) direct the educational institution to admit a particular candidate to a course contrary to rules. In matters relating to internal working of an educational institution and more particularly, in the matter of admissions, the Court will not interfere unless the act complained of is clearly beyond jurisdiction or contrary to the statutes, rules or regulations governing the institution, or there is a statutory duty which the authority has failed to perform or the impugned act is mala fide or arbitrary.” It is not established that the act of the respondent in cancelling the admission of the petitioner is beyond or contrary to the statutes, rules or regulations or is unreasonable, nor it is demonstrated that the said action of the respondent is arbitrary in any manner. 30. In the aforesaid view of the matter, we are of the opinion that no relief can be granted in favour of the petitioner. 31. As we do not find any merit in the writ petition, the same is hereby ordered to be rejected with no order as to cost.