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2011 DIGILAW 514 (GUJ)

Rabari Merajbhai Meghabhai v. State of Gujarat Through Secretary

2011-07-05

G.B.SHAH, V.M.SAHAI

body2011
Judgment V.M. Sahai, J.—We have heard Mr. C.L. Soni, learned Counsel appearing for M/s. S.G. Associates for the petitioner and Ms. Jirga Jhaveri, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 2. The petitioner is owner of the agricultural land bearing Survey No. 156 paiki 1, admeasuring 14 Acres and 26 Gunthas of village Kamod, Taluka Deesa, District Banaskantha. The petitioner has his bore-well, three houses and constructed portion for care of cattle (Gaman). The said land has been inherited to the petitioner along with his mother and sister from his father. The respondents issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short ‘the Act’) on 27.02.2009 for acquiring 20 Are & 23 Sq. Mts. of land belonging to the petitioner of Survey No. 156 Paiki 1 as well as 21 Are & 25 Sq. Mts. of land of Survey No. 155 Paiki 1 for the purpose of construction of road, surrounding the airfield wall in Deesa. The petitioner challenged the said notification issued under Section 4 of the Act by filing Regular Civil Suit No. 32 of 2009 on 01.04.2009. 3. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, this notification dated 27.02.2009 issued under Section 4 of the Act has lapsed as it was not followed by declaration under Section 6 (1) of the Act within a period of one year. 4. Thereafter, the respondents issued another notification on 21.10.2010 under Section 4 of the Act read with Section 17 (4) of the act dispensing with inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act proposing to acquire land bearing Survey Nos. 155/1/P1 and 156/P/1 for the purpose of construction of road, surrounding the airfield wall in Deesa. 5. This notification dated 21.10.2010 was followed by declaration dated 11.01.2011 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act. The petitioner has challenged the notifications dated 27.02.2009 and 21.10.2010 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act as well as declaration dated 11.01.2011 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not advanced any argument before us with regard to validity of notification dated 27.02.2009 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act as the said notification lapsed as it was not followed by declaration issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not advanced any argument before us with regard to validity of notification dated 27.02.2009 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act as the said notification lapsed as it was not followed by declaration issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has challenged before us the notification dated 21.10.2010 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act and the declaration dated 11.01.2011 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act. 7. The main thrust of the argument of learned Counsel for the petitioner is that instead of acquiring the land of the petitioner for the purpose of construction of road, surrounding the airfield wall, the road should have been extended further upto the place where Government wasteland is situated so that the petitioner’s land is not required to be acquired and the road can be constructed on the Government wasteland. 8. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has urged that if Government wasteland is available at a distance of 7 to 8 kms., even then the land of the petitioner should not be acquired and the road should be constructed on the Government wasteland leaving aside the land of private individual. 9. The respondents have stated in their affidavit-in-reply in Paragraph 10 that the land in dispute is required for construction of road in Kamod village near Airfield wall and the land is required for public purpose. It has further been stated that no Government land or gaucher land next to the said proposed road is available. By acquiring the lands in question, the road of the shortest distance could be constructed and if other land is acquired, then it will affect the Milk Dairy, School and Panchayat office and it would be at a long distance and the other alternative of road from outside the village area will be at a distance of approximately 7 to 8 kms. whereas the present proposed road will be at the shortest distance of approximately 400 meters which is required to be constructed in interest of public at large. 10. The Apex Court in case of Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Others, (2011) 5 SCC 553 , after considering the entire law on Section 4 and Section 5-A, has prescribed the law in Paragraph 77. 10. The Apex Court in case of Radhy Shyam (Dead) Through L.Rs. and Others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh And Others, (2011) 5 SCC 553 , after considering the entire law on Section 4 and Section 5-A, has prescribed the law in Paragraph 77. Sub-para (i) and (v) of Paragraph 77 is extracted below :— “(i) Eminent domain is a right inherent in every sovereign to take and appropriate property belonging to citizens for public use. To put it differently, the sovereign is entitled to reassert its dominion over any portion of the soil of the State including private property without its owner’s consent provided that such assertion is on account of public exigency and for public good. (v) Section 17(1) read with Section 17(4) confers extraordinary power upon the State to acquire private property without complying with the mandate of Section 5-A. These provisions can be invoked only when the purpose of acquisition cannot brook the delay of even a few weeks or months. Therefore, before excluding the application of Section 5-A, the authority concerned must be fully satisfied that time of few weeks or months likely to be taken in conducting inquiry under Section 5-A will, in all probability, frustrate the public purpose for which land is proposed to be acquired.”:— 11. It has been held by the Apex Court in case of Nand Kishore Gupta and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Others, (2010) 10 SCC 282 , in Paragraph 34, as under : “34. The High Court has refuted all these contentions by giving good reasons. We will not go into these individual cases once the High Court has decided not to entertain these pleas and, in our opinion, correctly. After all, this was an acquisition for building up a highway and the abovementioned writ petitions pertained to the land required for interchange. It is obvious that the alignment of the highway cannot be changed, with the result, the area which is required for interchange, also cannot be changed. This is a typical example of the individual having to sacrifice his land for the public good. There can be no dispute that this road would add to the betterment of the citizens of East Yamuna area in particular and Uttar Pradesh in general. This is a typical example of the individual having to sacrifice his land for the public good. There can be no dispute that this road would add to the betterment of the citizens of East Yamuna area in particular and Uttar Pradesh in general. This is apart from the fact that the majority of the persons whose lands have been acquired, have either not objected to it or have accepted the compensation without any demur. It will, therefore, not be possible for us to go into these individual grievances, which have been rightly rejected by the High Court.” 12. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Apex Court, since the land is being acquired for the purpose of construction of road, surrounding the airfield wall in Deesa and it is required for public purpose and road is being constructed for the benefit of villagers from where the distance will be shortest, we are of the opinion that for achieving the public purpose, the land of the petitioner was rightly acquired by the State Government by invoking the urgency provisions. 13. We do not find any illegality in the notification dated 21.10.2010 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Act and the declaration dated 11.01.2011 issued under Section 6 (1) of the Act and the inquiry under Section 5-A of the Act has rightly been dispensed with. 14. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merits in this petition. This writ petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. P P P P P