JUDGMENT S.C. DHARMADHIKARI, J. 1. These two Second Appeals arise out of cross suits and between same parties. Common arguments were canvassed and they can be conveniently disposed off by a common Judgment. 2. Second Appeal No. 47 of 1999 is filed by the Original plaintiffs in Regular Civil Suit No. 114 of 1990, challenging the Judgment and Decree of the Civil Judge Junior Division, Sattari at Valpoi, Goa and that of the District Court in Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1993 dated 30.7.1999. The respondents to this Second Appeal are the Original Defendants in the suit. 3. The prayer of the appellants/plaintiffs in this suit is for declaration and consequential relief in regard to the suit property known as "Deusu Moli" in the village Brahma Karmali of Sattari Goa. This property constituted of coconut garden, jackfruit trees cashewnut trees etc. and the property is more particularly described in paragraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of the plaint. 4. According to the plaintiffs, this property originally formed part of the property know as "Mocasso Carambolim Brahma" belonging to them. 5. In paragraphs 3 and 4 this is what the plaintiffs has alleged:- "3. The plaintiffs say that the late Shri Dattaram alias Dattu Ram Bhat Kelkar was the last cultivator and possessor of this land by virtue of the "Potto" given to the ancestors of the said Kelkar by the ancestors of these plaintiffs. 4. The plaintiffs say that the said Dattu Kelkar was one of the "Potto" possessor amongst many others and the said Kelkar, like other Potto possessors used to pay "foro" to ancestors of the plaintiffs which was fixed every year after assessment of the crop of the property allotted to them. The said Kelkar used to pay 'foro' to the plaintiffs family." 6. The appellants, thereafter, alleged that the said Dattaram Kelkar and his wife died 70 years ago without any issue or any legal representative or legal heir and therefore the suit property reverted back to them and their family. It is stated that the father of the plaintiffs took possession of the same and since then they are in exclusive physical possession of the property know as "Deusum Mali" and the possession of the property "Nigud Sarem" was taken by Savitri Dessai, member of the family. Her name is recorded in the survey records of the property. It is stated that the father of the plaintiffs took possession of the same and since then they are in exclusive physical possession of the property know as "Deusum Mali" and the possession of the property "Nigud Sarem" was taken by Savitri Dessai, member of the family. Her name is recorded in the survey records of the property. In para 6, their specific case was that for the last 70 years their family is in possession of property "Deusum Mali" and are enjoying the same. 7. In the plaint, the appellants made reference to a suit filed by Defendants/respondents being Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988, which was pending before the same Court. 8. In para 8 of the plaint, the appellant states thus:- "8. The plaintiffs say that only on perusal of the plaint in the said suit, it came to the knowledge of these plaintiffs that the defendants have played a trick and have manufactured different documents which are bogus in nature but are capable of creating wrong notion in the minds of authorities and may prove detrimental to the interest of these plaintiffs in regard to the suit properties. The said documents are in the nature of a Gift Deed dated 16.4.1966 and a Sale Deed dated 16.4.1966. The above said Deed of Gift and the Deed of Sale, both dated 16.4.1966 are hereinafter termed as the "suit documents." 9. In such circumstances, appellant state that the above document namely the Gift Deed dated 16.4.1966 and the Sale Deed dated 16.4.1966 are ab-intio void and a nullity, as the transfers were without ownership or possession and without any rights in respect of the properties. A detailed reference was made to the Gift Deed and the Sale Deed in paragraphs 10 and 11 respectively of the plaint. It. is in such circumstances and alleging that the cause of action arose on 17.8.1988, when the papers in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988, filed by the respondents/Defendants were handed over to them and from that date, the suit from which Second Appeal No. 47 of 1999 arises, came to be filed. The prayers therein are for declaration that the Sale Deed and the Gift Deed, both are null and void and are of no legal effect and the appellants be declared as owners in possession of the suit properties. This suit was filed on 15.10.1990. 10. The prayers therein are for declaration that the Sale Deed and the Gift Deed, both are null and void and are of no legal effect and the appellants be declared as owners in possession of the suit properties. This suit was filed on 15.10.1990. 10. Upon being served with the papers in this suit, Written Statement was filed on behalf of all respondents/Defendants in which some of the averments contained in the plaint are admitted. 11. As far as para 2 of the plaint is concerned, in the Written Statement it is stated that "Mocasso" changed into a private property of Kelkar. While denying paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint, what the respondents/Defendants state is that the Kelkar couple died without issue. They state that their predecessors in title came in possession of the suit properties vested in them by death of the couple, sometime in 1940. It is alleged that Ganga alias Bhagirathi died as a widow and she was the eldest sister of Ramchandra Dev Bhat Marathe. From 1940 to 1990, possession of the Defendants is bona-fide, with title, peaceful, uninterrupted, exclusive, open with the knowledge of the plaintiffs/appellants giving the acquisition of the properties by prescription after the death of widow of Kelkar. 12. In para 5 of the Written Statement what is stated is that the averments in paragraphs 8 to 11 of the plaint are denied except that the Deeds are valid. Further, para 5 reads as under:- "The shares totally devolving on the defendants as follows:- To defendants Nos. 3 and 4 = 1/4 by sale deed from late Govind Deu Bhat Marathe his wife Jayanti to all defendants jointly 1/4 by gift deed from late Ramchandra Deu Bhat Marathe and his two wives Rucmini and Satiabhama. The living wife Smt. Satiabhama alias Champubai is enjoying life interest by the gift deed." 13. On these pleadings, the learned Trial Judge framed the necessary issues and by the Judgment and Decree dated 30.1.1993, held that the appellants/plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are owners of the property and they have failed to prove that the suit property was in "Potto" possession of Dattaram Kelkar and after his death so also death of his wife, the property reverted back to them. The learned Judge held that findings on Issues 4 and 5 have already been rendered in deciding Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988 and therefore dismissal of the said suit would be the requisite finding of the said issues. Consistent with this, the learned Judge dismissed the appellants' suit without costs. 14. Aggrieved by this Judgment and Decree, the appellants carried the matter in the appeal before the Court of the District Judge and the Additional District Judge at Mapusa being Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1993, which was dismissed. The Judgment delivered by the Lower Appellate Court is dated 30.7.1999 and aggrieved by the same, the present Second Appeal is filed. 15. At the stage of admission this Court admitted the Second Appeal on the substantial question of law framed at para 19 (A) to (D) which read as under:- (A) Whether, in view of the categorical admission on the part of the respondents to the effect that the suit property was being held by Mr. Dattaram alias Dattu Rama Bhat Kelkar, as a "Potto" possessor and he used to pay "Foro" to the ancestors of the appellants, which was fixed every year after assessment of the crop of the property allotted to him, the Sale Deed and the Gift Deed, both dated 16.4.1966 which was based on the assumption that the suit property was owned by Mr. Dattaram alias Dattu Rama Bhat Kelkar, were legally sustainable? (B) Whether, the Certificate of Inscription made on the basis of the Gift, made by the wife in favour of the husband, could constitute a document of title, and that too of ownership? (C) Whether, the conclusion drawn by the Learned Additional District Judge that the appellants failed to establish their ownership is perverse, being contrary to the pleadings of the parties? (D) Whether, in view of the specific plea raised by the respondents, namely of prescription, it was open to the Courts below, to record acquisition of title by the respondents otherwise than by way of adverse prescription? 16. The Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 is filed by the appellants/Original Defendants/ respondents and it arises out of, Regular Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1992 and that Regular Civil Appeal was preferred by the respondents herein, who are the Original plaintiffs. 16. The Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 is filed by the appellants/Original Defendants/ respondents and it arises out of, Regular Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1992 and that Regular Civil Appeal was preferred by the respondents herein, who are the Original plaintiffs. It is in respect of Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988, re-numbered as Regular Civil Suit No. 41 of 1990. That suit was instituted by respondents herein against the appellants before me in the same Trial Court. That suit was dismissed by a Judgment and Decree dated 22.4.1992. 17. The claim of the respondents in that suit pertains to the same property which is the part of the present suit. However, in para 3 of the plaint, respondent No.3 has stated that by virtue of Gift Deed dated 18.4.1966, the respondents became the absolute owners of the property and since then they are in peaceful possession of the property. Further, it is stated that prior to the Gift Deed, the said property was owned, possessed and peacefully enjoyed by their predecessors in title. It is alleged that the Record of Right of village Carambolim Brahma was prepared and the name of the Occupants present respondent Nos. 1, 3 and 5 were recorded therein. There was no dispute or objection from any person to this record. 18. It is alleged that sometime in the year 1987, the Original Defendant No.1 made an encroachment in the suit property and occupied an area of 100 square metres by constructing a shed of country tiles. It was alleged that in the same year, the Original Defendant No.1 managed to include his name as "Cultivator" without any notice to respondent No.1/ original plaintiff No.1 and without following prescribed procedure. It was specifically alleged that the appellants before me have no right in the suit property and that they are trespassers. It is in these circumstances and relying upon the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue (Record of Rights and Register of Cultivators) Rules, 1969, that the suit for mandatory injunction directing the appellants to remove the encroachment and to restore the possession of 100 square metres from the suit property to the respondents was filed. 19. It is in these circumstances and relying upon the Goa, Daman and Diu Land Revenue (Record of Rights and Register of Cultivators) Rules, 1969, that the suit for mandatory injunction directing the appellants to remove the encroachment and to restore the possession of 100 square metres from the suit property to the respondents was filed. 19. The prayer for declaration is that the entry in the name of the Original Defendant/ appellant No.1 in the Cultivators column of Survey No. 58, Sub-Division 2 of the village Carambolim, Brahma of Sattari Taluka for the year 1986-87 is void and liable to be cancelled. Further, they claim perpetual injunction restraining the present appellants, their agents, servants and family members from interfering with the possession in respect of the property "Deusum Mali" and further prayer is for issuance of mandatory injunction to remove the encroachment and to restore the property back to the respondents. That suit was filed on 8.6.1988. Upon the suit, being filed summons came to be issued. Written Statement was filed by the appellants and while denying the claim of respondents, they contended that the Gift Deed dated 18.4.1966 is a bogus document. It is null and void and the Donors are not the owners of the property. Hence, gift by such a Donor is bogus. They specifically contended that the property "Deusum Mali" is part and parcel of the property "Mocasso" belonging to them which was given as "Potto" to one Bhoto Kelkar. Its last descendant was Dattu Kelkar, who died 75 years back, leaving no heir and since then the property is possessed and enjoyed by the appellants/Defendants to this suit. They claim that they are absolute owners and cultivators of the property and denied that at any time the plaintiffs/respondents were the owners in possession of the property. In these terms, they denied the entire case of ownership and encroachment and prayed that the suit be dismissed. This Written Statement was filed in the Trial Court on 18.8.1988. 20. On these pleadings, learned Trial Judge framed the following issues:- (1) Does the plaintiffs prove that he is owner of the suit property? (2) Does the plaintiffs prove that he is in possession of the suit property? (3) Does the plaintiffs prove that defendants encroached to the extent of 100 sq. mts. in the suit property? 20. On these pleadings, learned Trial Judge framed the following issues:- (1) Does the plaintiffs prove that he is owner of the suit property? (2) Does the plaintiffs prove that he is in possession of the suit property? (3) Does the plaintiffs prove that defendants encroached to the extent of 100 sq. mts. in the suit property? (4) Is the plaintiffs entitled for a mandatory injunction removing the construction done by the defendants to the extent, of 100 sq. mts.? (5) Is the plaintiffs entitled for the relief of declaration stating that entry of the name of the defendant No.1 in the cultivators column of survey No. 58/2 of the village Carambolim Brahma, Sattari Taluka for the years 1986-87 is illegal and therefore, liable to be cancelled? (6) What relief, what order? 21. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the learned Trial Judge proceeded to dismiss the respondents suit as observed above. 22. It is aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court that the respondents to the Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 filed an appeal before the District Court and the learned Additional District Judge, Panaji, by the impugned Judgment, decreed the suit. The learned Additional District Judge issued permanent injunction restraining the appellants in this Second Appeal, their agents, servants and family members from interfering with the possession of the respondents herein in respect of the property concerned and they were also directed to remove the encroachment and restore the land to its original condition and hand over it to the respondents, before me. 23. This Second Appeal came to be admitted on the substantial question of law, which reads thus:- (A) Whether, the Additional District Judge could have answered the first point for determination, namely whether, the respondents prove that they are owners in possession of the suit property, in the affirmative, when he had himself come to the conclusion, that it was not possible to give a declaration of ownership of the suit property in favour of the respondents and did not also come to the finding, that the respondents were in possession of the suit property? (B) Whether, the Additional District Judge could have decreed the Suit of the respondents for permanent and mandatory injunction against the appellants without coming to a finding that the respondents were in lawful possession of the suit property and especially in view of the fact that the case of the appellants was that the suit property formed a part of the Mocasso belonging to them was accepted by the respondents? (C) Whether, the finding of the Additional District Judge that Mr. Govind Deu Bhat Marathe and Ramchandra Deu Bhat Marathe, were the brothers of Mrs. Bhaguirathi Kelkar, is perverse, being based on inadmissible evidence? (D) Whether, the reversal by the Learned Additional District Judge of the adverse inference, which the Trial Court had drawn against the respondents, for failing to step into the witness box, is arbitrary? (E) Whether the Learned Additional District Judge could have reversed the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court and decreed the Suit of the respondents without reversing the finding recorded by the Learned Trial Judge, to the effect that the respondents had neither proved possession of the suit property nor established how the suit property came to Mr. Ramchandra Marathe and Mr. Govind Marathe? (F) Whether, the Certificate of Inscription and Description prepared on the basis of a Gift Deed made by the wife in .favour of the husband could be considered to be a document of title? 24. It is on these Appeals, I have heard common arguments. 25. Mr. Lotlikar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants in both these Appeals submitted that the present cases are clear and clinching proof of contradictory findings and conclusions. He submitted that the Trial Judge dismissed the suit filed by the appellants and also dismissed the suit filed by the respondents. He submitted that the Lower Appellate Court while decreeing the suit filed by the respondents came to an erroneous conclusion that they have proved the case of ownership. Mr. Lotlikar further submitted that the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, in Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000, would reveal that reference is made to the oral evidence led on behalf of the respondents in the suit. However, omitting to make a complete reference, the Trial Judge has not given any finding, but has made stray observations. Mr. Lotlikar further submitted that the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, in Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000, would reveal that reference is made to the oral evidence led on behalf of the respondents in the suit. However, omitting to make a complete reference, the Trial Judge has not given any finding, but has made stray observations. He submitted that the Lower Appellate Court was aware of the facts in Regular Civil Suit and that what respondents preferred was a First Appeal invoking jurisdiction under Section 96. Such a First Appeal lies both on law and facts. The learned Judge failed to appreciate the oral and documentary evidence on record. The learned Judge is justified in interfering with the findings of the Trial Court but only after recording a conclusion that the Trial Court has acted perversely or that the Decree is erroneous on law and facts. In c the instant case, Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 is filed to demonstrate that the Lower Appellate Court has not recorded any finding that the Trial Court has acted perversely. The learned Appellate Judge has not given any finding on ownership of the property. On the other hand, while framing points for determination, the learned Judge was aware that he had to give declaration on possession of the parties over the suit property. He gives finding in affirmative on point 1. However, discussion on point 1 ends at point 20, in which the learned Judge concludes that on comparing evidence of both sides, respondent case is more probable as far as the title of the property is concerned. At the same time he holds that it would not be possible to give declaration of ownership of the suit property in the favour of the respondents. 26. Mr. Lotlikar complains that unless a finding is given on the ownership of the property, a mandatory injunction against the trespassers and directing to remove the encroachment cannot be granted. Further, perpetual injunction restraining them cannot be granted when they fail to prove their case of ownership. The Decree of the Trial Court ought to have been confirmed. Reversing it, without any such finding and conclusion, is erroneous in law and the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court be reversed totally. 27. Further, perpetual injunction restraining them cannot be granted when they fail to prove their case of ownership. The Decree of the Trial Court ought to have been confirmed. Reversing it, without any such finding and conclusion, is erroneous in law and the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court be reversed totally. 27. As far as Second Appeal No. 47 of 1999 is concerned, it is preferred by the appellants against dismissal of their own suit. It is contended by Mr. Lotlikar that the Trial Judge dismissed the suit of the appellants by the Judgment and Decree dated 30.7.1999. However, the same Judge should have been aware of the fact that he dismissed the respondents' suit in respect of the same property and virtually dealing with the same issues by Judgment and Decree of 1992. If he had dismissed that suit there was no justification for his dismissal of the appellants suit and particularly when the appellants had successfully demonstrated that they are in possession of the property. They have proved that the property "Mocasso" belongs to them and if that has been proved, the appellants' suit could have not been dismissed so also the Judgment of the Trial Court should have not been confirmed by the Lower Appellate Court. The Lower Appellate Court ought to have noticed the Judgment and Decree in Regular Civil Suit preferred by the appellants delivered on 30.7.1999. The Lower Appellate Court on the very same day allowed the Regular Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1992, preferred by the respondents but while allowing the same he has given no finding much less binding and decisive on the issue of ownership. If going by the probability and preponderance the appellant version is more probable then their suit should have been decreed and that is how substantial questions of law have arisen and that this Court should answer them accordingly. He therefore submitted that both Second Appeals be allowed. In any event, if, the first Second Appeal is allowed, then, it would be logical that the other Appeal should also be allowed. 28. On the other hand, Mr. Da Costa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents supported the impugned Judgments in both the Appeals. He submitted that the appellants cannot take advantage of any deficiency in pleadings in as much as the parties are not educated and do not understand the implications of law. 28. On the other hand, Mr. Da Costa, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents supported the impugned Judgments in both the Appeals. He submitted that the appellants cannot take advantage of any deficiency in pleadings in as much as the parties are not educated and do not understand the implications of law. This Court must see the documents relied upon. It is the case of the appellants that they had right in the property and they cannot claim ownership because they themselves plead to be the cultivators. If they are cultivators and claim in that capacity, then, their claim of absolute ownership cannot be held to be proved. He further submitted that documents relied upon by the appellants themselves would show the contradiction in their case. He relied on the Translation of the Summary/Inventory Application and submitted that in that case Shantaram Dattugi Dessai claims to be the land owner and the head of the family as stated and that these properties are tributary to the deceased Gonoxama Gonoba Dessai. It is described under No. 10034 with annual quit-rent. It has also been shown from the same document, that 1/2 of it is in favour of the Dattu Rama Kelkar and other 1/2 on the southern side belongs to Vithal Vishnu Kelkar and that there is a statement therein that Bhaguiratibai was a widow of Dattu Rama Kelkar. She on her death left her brothers Govind Deu Boto Marathe and Rama Deu Boto Marathe and that is because she had no issue of her own. Thus, according to Mr. Da Costa these documents have falsified the case set out in the plaint in the present appellants' suit. He also brought to my notice another document which according to him would show that the case of plaintiffs is that they have been given purely temporary grant, by the predecessors of the Defendant to the said suit. In such circumstances, the same is given on the basis of infectious. In other words it is not given in perpetuity. The only right that is conferred in the Relgao is to collect "Foros" i.e. prescribed right. Therefore, all rights as claimed are contrary to the wording of this document. The Court below was right in dismissing the suit and the exercise cannot be termed as perverse, so as to permit interference in a Second Appeal. The only right that is conferred in the Relgao is to collect "Foros" i.e. prescribed right. Therefore, all rights as claimed are contrary to the wording of this document. The Court below was right in dismissing the suit and the exercise cannot be termed as perverse, so as to permit interference in a Second Appeal. In Second Appeal, it is not permissible for this Court to re-assess the documentary evidence and this Court should not disturb the findings of facts but proceed to dismiss both the Second Appeals. He submits that each document which has been now relied upon by the appellants is referred to by Lower Appellate Court in its Judgment while allowing the respondents Regular Civil Appeals. There is no inconsistency or contradiction inasmuch as the Trial Court has dismissed both the suits and the Lower Appellate Court has confirmed the dismissal of the appellants' suit but reversed the Judgment in the respondents' suit. That reversal is based upon the documents which have been produced by the appellants themselves. Therefore, this Court should not go by some deficiency in the pleadings or any superficial error of the Lower Appellate Court, but proceed to dismiss the Appeals. 29. With the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties, I have perused the Judgments under Appeal, in both the Second Appeals. I have also carefully perused the pleadings in the suits. 30. As far as the suit filed by the appellants is concerned, I have already adverted to the plaint averments and reproduced part of the same. There the specific case was that the predecessor-in-title of the respondent Dattaram alias Dattu Rama Bhat Kelkar was the land cultivator by virtue of "Potto" given to the ancestors of the said Kelkar by the appellants' ancestors. The Lower Appellate Court, as also the Trial Court, had before them these averments in the plaint and the stand of the respondents in their Written Statement in Regular Civil Suit No. 114 of 1990. The Lower Appellate Court, in para 9 of the Judgment rendered in Regular Civil Appeal No. 15 of 1993, held that it is the duty of the appellants before me to prove that they were real owners of the suit property, yet, in para 9 itself, during the course of reference to the pleadings, the learned Judge culled out some admissions on the part of the appellants. It referred to some documents and contentions of the parties. There is no discussion as to who was examined by the appellants/plaintiffs, in support of their case, what is the witnesses version and whether it is in any way falsified in the cross examination. There is absolutely no reference to the stand taken in the Written Statement. It is very clear that a cursory reference has been made to the depositions of important witnesses. It is not as if the documents were not produced by the appellants. It is not as if some documents have been produced and their contents proved by oral evidence by the respondents. Even their case has not been fully accepted. If the test is of preponderance of probabilities as this is a civil dispute, then, there was no reason as to why when there is no denial of the appellants' case in the Written Statement of the respondents' that the Court below refused to accept the version of the appellants/plaintiffs. The learned Judge was fully aware of the stand of the appellants, inasmuch as in para 10 of the Judgment a reference is made to it. A reference is also made to the document under which the temporary grant, namely, "Potto" was created. In such circumstances, without, in any manner, discussing the oral and documentary evidence led by the appellants/plaintiffs, the findings are recorded in favour of the respondents/Defendants. These findings are recorded on perusal of the inventory proceedings as well. The Inventory Proceedings should have been seen in the light of the documents that are produced by the appellants/plaintiffs. By relying on the Land Registration Certificate at exhibit AW 1/E and by the Inventory Proceedings what the learned Judge has concluded is that the document of partition, produced by the respondents has presumptive value. Further, perusal of Inventory Proceedings, according to the learned Judge, would indicate that the properties belonged to the deceased Ghanashyam. The contents of the Inventory Proceedings are discarded on the spacious ground that the respondents were not parties to the same. To my mind, all the findings recorded from paras 9 to 12 overlook and completely ignore the pleadings in the suit. The contents of the Inventory Proceedings are discarded on the spacious ground that the respondents were not parties to the same. To my mind, all the findings recorded from paras 9 to 12 overlook and completely ignore the pleadings in the suit. If the contents of paras 1, 3 and 4 of the plaint are not denied and if the ownership of the appellants has not been put in issue at all, then, it is not possible to accept the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents that the Inventory Proceedings and other documents should be seen minutely as they falsify the appellants' case. This is not a case where the stand of the appellants was in any way doubtful or unclear. Instead the respondents were inconsistent in their assertion. 31. When it came to the appellants' suit, their stand is what has been referred to above. In their Written Statement, they do not deny the contents of paras 3 and 4 of the Plaint. Instead, they refer to the fact that their predecessor-in-title came in possession of the properties sometime in 1940. From 1940, till 1990, their possession is bona-fide, with title and peaceful, uninterrupted, exclusive, open, with knowledge of plaintiffs. In para 5 of the Written Statement, they refer to the shares devolving on them by a Sale Deed and by a Gift Deed. However, a perusal of the Plaint in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988 which is filed by the respondents against the appellants herein shows that there is absolutely no reference to the Sale Deed. The said Sale Deed was stated to be in favour of Deu Ramchandra Marathe. So also there is a reference to Govind Deu Bhat Marathe as party to the said sale deed and it is stated that defendant No. 3 and 4 are claiming under this Sale Deed from late Govind Deu Bhat Marathe and his wife Jayanti. Then, there is a Gift Deed from Ramchandra Deu Bhat Marathe and his two wives, namely, Rucmini and Satiabama and that is how 1/4th share comes to the respondents. However, in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988, there is only reference to the Gift Deed. There is absolute silence about the Sale Deed in the Written Statement and the Plaint of the same parties. However, in Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988, there is only reference to the Gift Deed. There is absolute silence about the Sale Deed in the Written Statement and the Plaint of the same parties. Thus, this is not a case where any contradiction has to be seen as far as the version of the appellants/plaintiffs and the contents of the documents relied upon by them. The inconsistency in the pleadings of the respondents throughout would point to the fact that they were obliged to show as to how the title in the suit property devolves on them under the deeds in question. When their version was before the Court below, the Court below did not categorically hold and give a finding in their favour. All that the Court states is that there may be something to be said in respondents' (Original plaintiffs in R.C.S. No. 74 of 1986 favour but, conclusive finding is not possible to be rendered, yet, their suit came to be decreed. The Decree passed in their Suit was clearly erroneous as there were inconsistencies in the pleadings and their oral documentary evidence. If, at one stage, the respondents chose to rely on a Gift Deed and a Sale Deed but when they remain silent about the Sale Deed, then, their version was more improbable and did not deserve acceptance. 32. Assuming that the Court below was correct in its approach, as to one probable version being accepted, that conclusion is supportable when that is rendered on a complete scrutiny and verification of the pleadings and the material on record. Ordinarily, this Court would not interfere in pure findings of facts, unless they are perverse. However, in the instant case, this Court is justified in interfering because, the substantial questions of law that are raised d between the parties arise on account of misdirection of the Court below and on account of brushing aside of vital material and clear contradiction in case of the respondents. The Court below was obliged to go into all this and render proper and conclusive findings. 33. It is rather unfortunate that fundamental flaws and basic errors have been noticed when the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court in this case are presided over by the same learned Judges. The Trial Court did not make any endeavour to consolidate both the suits. 33. It is rather unfortunate that fundamental flaws and basic errors have been noticed when the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court in this case are presided over by the same learned Judges. The Trial Court did not make any endeavour to consolidate both the suits. Equally, the Lower Appellate Court did not decide the Regular Civil Appeals together, although it was possible to do so. Had anyone of them bothered to consolidate the matters, possibly they would not have rendered erroneous and conflicting conclusions. It is because of this fundamental error committed that the further confusion has taken place. 34. My careful scrutiny of both the Judgments, leaves me in no manner of doubt that when the respondents go before the Court with Regular Civil Suit for declaration and injunction and base their claim on the entry in the Record of Rights in favour the appellants and challenge it as defective and faulty and pray that the entry needs to be quashed and set aside, then, such a claim has to be considered and granted only after the respondents prove their title to the immovable property in question. If the immovable property is not coming through their predecessor-in-tile by way of temporary grant, but permanently vested in them and creates a right and that their case is that there is an encroachment on the land, then, it was incumbent upon the respondents to prove their title completely. The, burden was squarely on them. That they have miserably failed to do so is clear from the findings recorded by the Trial Judge in their suit. In the Suit filed by the respondents/plaintiffs being Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988 (old)/Regular Civil Suit No. 41 of 1990 (new), the Trial Court referred to the case of the plaintiffs and the case of the Defendants. The Defendants in that Suit are the appellants before me. As far as issues are concerned, they also have been perused by me. The learned Judge has clearly held that the appellants are "Mokasodar" of the suit property. It is also an admitted position, according to the Trial Court, that the suit property was given by "Potto" on purely temporary grant to one Boto Kelkar, whose last descendant Dattu Rama Boto Kelkar died in 1922. The issue of title was, therefore, not necessary to be decided. 35. It is also an admitted position, according to the Trial Court, that the suit property was given by "Potto" on purely temporary grant to one Boto Kelkar, whose last descendant Dattu Rama Boto Kelkar died in 1922. The issue of title was, therefore, not necessary to be decided. 35. As far as Issue No.2 is concerned, the learned Trial Judge holds that the respondents/ plaintiffs have failed to prove that they are owners of the suit property. While concluding that they have so failed, in Para 10 of the Judgment, it has been held that when the Gift Deed was allegedly executed in the year 1966, plaintiff No.1 was 17 years old, plaintiff No.2 was 14 years old and plaintiff No.3 was 7 years old. Thus, they were minors. All of them have been described as minors. There is absolutely nothing on record to show that the properties were managed and looked after by them, post 1966. That is the year of execution of the Gift Deed. The Attorney of the plaintiffs/respondents before me entered the witness box. Learned Trial Judge has observed that there was no need for the Power of Attorney to depose on their behalf, because, the original plaintiffs No. 1, 3 and 5 are residing in Goa. They have entered the witness box. Some of them were present in the Court. In such circumstances, adverse inference drawn was fully justified. In addition, when there were no documents to show their possession, then, the claim that the Original Defendants in the suit have trespassed into the suit property did not deserve to be accepted. It is in these circumstances, and finding that the entry in the column is correctly recorded, that the suit was dismissed. 36. When the matter was carried in appeal before the Lower Appellate Court by the respondents, one finds that the learned Judge a framed three points for determination and one of which was whether the respondents prove that they are owners in possession of the suit property. As I have already held above, the learned Judge entered into the claim of ownership although the Trial Court did not find it necessary to render any finding on that issue. As I have already held above, the learned Judge entered into the claim of ownership although the Trial Court did not find it necessary to render any finding on that issue. From para 11 of the Order of the Lower Appellate Court, it is apparent that the view taken was that it was incumbent upon the respondents to prove that they are owners of the property because what implicit from the prayer for perpetual injunction, according to the Lower Appellate Court, is the declaration of a title. If that was the basis on which it proceeded and it was aware of the stand taken by the parties, then, without the appellants/ Original plaintiffs stepping into the witness box and the version of the Power of Attorney being doubtful, how the claim of ownership was sustained and accepted, has not been clarified at all. This Judgment can, hardly, satisfy the tests that have been laid down regarding duty or the function of a First Appellate Court. The learned Judge has clearly misdirected himself and when he rendered a finding which was unnecessary for the case, the Judgment cannot be sustained. 37. Assuming that the finding was necessary, then, it was plain duty of the First Appellate Court to have carefully appraised and appreciated the evidence on record. That it did not do so, is clear from paras 11 to 17 of its Judgment. It referred to the case of the respondents and from para 17 onwards, it refers to the case of the appellants and their documents. Although, there is a reference to the oral and documentary evidence, there are no comments made. If there are the documents which are adverted to by the appellants' witnesses and therefore, it was not possible to accept their case, then, the First Appellate Court should have said so. It does not say that the respondents' case is totally unacceptable, unreliable and/or not trustworthy. In para 20 of the Judgment, it compares the evidence of both, the appellants and the respondents and all that it states is that it finds that the appellants'/respondents' case more probable, so far as ownership is concerned. But at the same time, it holds that it may not be possible to give a declaration of ownership of the suit property in favour of the respondents. But at the same time, it holds that it may not be possible to give a declaration of ownership of the suit property in favour of the respondents. Once, it is of such an opinion, then, there was no warrant for interfering with the findings and the conclusion of the Trial Court in dismissing the Suit of the respondents. Despite such a tentative and adhoc conclusion drawn in para 20 of the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, it proceeded to decree the respondents' Suit. There is merit in the contention of Shri Lotlikar that by this process and by this exercise, the Lower Appellate Court has failed in its duty as the First Appellate Court. It has clearly misdirected itself in law. It has without any warrant and justification in law, interfered with the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court dismissing the respondents' suit. 38. Once the respondents' suit cannot be conclusively decided in their favour and neither they have proved their case of ownership of the property, nor interference with their possession and encroachment by the appellants herein, then, on the same process of reasoning and bearing in mind that the dispute is between the same parties in relation to the same properties, the appellants' Suit should have been decreed. But that having not been done and having adverted to both the Judgments, in the light of the pleadings in both the suits, so also the stand of the parties, there is no alternative, but to allow these Second Appeals. 39. Accordingly, both the Second Appeals are allowed. In so far as Second Appeal No. 47 of 1999 is concerned, Judgment of the Court below is quashed and set aside. The Suit of the appellants is decreed. It is declared that the Sale Deed dated 16.4.1966 which is referred to in Prayer Clause (a)(i) and the Gift Deed dated 16.4.1966 which is referred to in Prayer Clause (a)(ii) are declared null and void and confer no title in favour of the respondents. Consequently, it is declared that the appellants are owners of the Suit Property. There shall be a Decree in favour of the appellants in terms of Prayer Clauses (a) and (b) of the Regular Civil Suit No. 114 of 1990. Consequently, it is declared that the appellants are owners of the Suit Property. There shall be a Decree in favour of the appellants in terms of Prayer Clauses (a) and (b) of the Regular Civil Suit No. 114 of 1990. As a result of the above Judgment and Decree in favour of the appellants, they are also entitled to succeed in Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 and the Judgment of the Lower Appellate Court, decreeing the Suit of the respondents, namely Regular Civil Suit No. 74 of 1988 (old) and Regular Civil Suit No. 41 of 1990 (New), is quashed and set aside Judgment and Decree of dismissal of this Suit, passed by the Trial Court, is restored. 40. The Decision that has been cited by Mr. D'Costa, before me and rendered by this Court is in Second Appeal No. 7 of 2001, decided on 17.9.2004, reported in 107(4) BLR 614. As far as that is concerned, reliance on the observations in para 17 would not, in I any manner, advance the respondents' case. The principle therein applied cannot be followed in this case because the plaintiffs therein had, in their favour, evidence of both, title and possession in respect of the property claimed by them. In that case, the Defendants failed to prove their case, both on title and possession. Naturally, therefore, the principle has been applied and the registration and entry is held to be conclusive. Such is not the case before me, because, on facts, I have found that this principle cannot be applied in this case. 41. Finding that no assistance can be drawn from the principle laid down in the above decision, then, reading of the documents shows that the grant was not in fact temporary, but creating ownership rights, is an argument of no assistance. Ultimately, the contents of the documents would be of assistance, if the pleadings and evidence are consistent therewith. If the pleadings are to the contrary and if there are fatal admissions therein, those cannot be ignored in preference to the contents of some of the documents, which have been relied upon by the respondents. 42. In the above circumstances and as a result of the above discussion, the Second Appeals succeed in the aforementioned terms. There will be no order as to costs. 42. In the above circumstances and as a result of the above discussion, the Second Appeals succeed in the aforementioned terms. There will be no order as to costs. The Cross Objection No. 8 of 2000 in Second Appeal No. 18 of 2000 does not survive in the light of the above conclusions.