T. Nandakumar Singh, J.- The present appeal valued at Rs. 11,04,000/- (Rupees eleven lakhs four thou­sand) only is directed against the judgment and decree dated 30.10.2006 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge (Fast Track Court) Manipur East, passed in Original Suit No.27 of 2003/3/2005/ADJ/FTC/ME wherein and whereunder it is ordered and decreed that respondent-plaintiff may take back from the appellant-defendant No.1 the suit building and its rooms on payment of Rs.2 lakhs to the appellant-defendant No. 1 and enjoy the rent personally or otherwise. The appellant is defendant No. 1. 2. Heard Mr. N. Surendrajit, learned counsel for the appellant-defendant No. 1 and Mr. Th. Kesho, Advocate and Mr. Momon, learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff. 3. The respondent-plaintiff filed O.S. No. 27 of 2003/3/2005/ADJ/FTC/ME (for short 'O.S. No.23 of 2003') against; (1) the ap­pellant-defendant No.1, (2) Shri Brijesh Agarwal, proforma respondent-defendant No.2, (3) Shri Kapur Chand Jain, proforma respondent-defendant No.3 and (4) Shri Bharat Adhikari Nepali, proforma respon­dent-defendant No.4 for recovery of arrear monthly rent of the suit building from the de­fendants and also for evicting the defendants from the suit building. 4. The respondent-plaintiff pleaded in her plaint that the homestead under CS Dag No. 184, PattaNo. 87(A)/426, 844(Old)/734 (New) I.W.T. Imphal Municipality sheet No. 15 Khwai Bazar, Imphal having an area of .0101 hectare situated at MG Avenue, Imphal West District, once stood in the name of her father namely, Shri Ksh Tomba Singh, now expired; and that land was gifted to respon­dent-plaintiff by her late father, Ksh Tomba Singh in the year 1966. At the time of gift of the said land by her father, there was on old structure having two rooms standing on the said land. 4.1. Due to financial problems, the re-spondent-plaintiffapproached the appellant-defendant No.1 (her own brother) in the month of January 1991 and requested him to construct a new two storeyed pucca building on the said land after dismantling the old structures. Accordingly, the appellant-defendant No. 1 constructed the two storeyed pucca building on, the said land which is admittedly shop site, having four rooms at the ground floor and two rooms including bathroom etc. at the first floor. It is also pleaded that con­struction of two storeyed pucca building was completed in the month of February 1992. 4.2. Accordingly, the appellant-defendant No. 1 constructed the two storeyed pucca building on, the said land which is admittedly shop site, having four rooms at the ground floor and two rooms including bathroom etc. at the first floor. It is also pleaded that con­struction of two storeyed pucca building was completed in the month of February 1992. 4.2. It is also pleaded in the plaint that as per the appellant-defendant No.1 he had spent a sum of Rs.6 lakhs for constructing the said two storeyed pucca building but the plaintiff denied the said amount, said to have been spent by the appellant-defendant No. 1; according to the respondent-plaintiff, the amount was Rs.3 lakhs and that there was no material evidence to show that the appellant-defendant No.1 spent a sum of Rs.6 lakhs for construction of the said two storeyed pucca building. 4.3 After completing construction of the said two storeyed pucca building, the appel­lant-defendant No. 1 leased out the said four rooms in the ground floor of the two storeyed pucca building to defendant Nos. 2 and 3, i.e. proforma respondent Nos. 2 and 3 for the monthly rent of Rs. 1500/- per month per room from March 1992 up to December 2000 and Rs.2,500/- per room per month from January 2001 till olate of filing the suit. It is also pleaded that appellant-defendant No. 1 had taken some amount as advance i .e. a sum of Rs. 1,50,000/- as advance from respon­dent defendant No.2 and a sum of Rs.2,10,000/- from respondent-defendant No.3. The first floor of the two storeyed pucca building was leased out to the respon­dent defendant No.4 by the appellant-defendant No.1 from February 1998 for the monthly rent of Rs, 1000/- (Rupees one thousand) only per month i.e. Rs.2,000/- per two rooms up to December 2000 and also appellant-defendnat No. 1 took a sum of Rs.30,000/-from defendant No.4 as advance and from January 2000 had raised to Rs.2000/- per room i.e. Rs.4000/- for two rooms till the date of filing of the suit. Defendant No. 1 had col­lected Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakhs) from January 1992 to May 2003, Appellant-de­fendant No.1 also had collected a total monthly rent of Rs.4,63,000/- (Rupees four lakhs sixty three thousand) from defendant No.2 for 135 months from March 1992 to May 2003;and appellant-defendant No.1 had not paid the said rent collected from defen­dant Nos. Defendant No. 1 had col­lected Rs.4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakhs) from January 1992 to May 2003, Appellant-de­fendant No.1 also had collected a total monthly rent of Rs.4,63,000/- (Rupees four lakhs sixty three thousand) from defendant No.2 for 135 months from March 1992 to May 2003;and appellant-defendant No.1 had not paid the said rent collected from defen­dant Nos. 3 and 4 to the appellant-plaintiff in spite of several requests for payment of the said monthly rent. Ultimately, plaintiff-respon­dent gave written notice to defendants to start to give monthly rent directly to the respon­dent-plaintiff; and as they failed to pay monthly rent, respondent-plaintiff filed Origi­nal Suit for recovery of arrear rent and also for evicting the defendants from the said two storeyed pucca building constructed on the said land of the respondent-plaintiff. 5. The appellant-defendant No.1 filed written statement. In his written statement the appellant-defendant No. 1 did not deny that the said land and building belonged to respon­dent-plaintiff; but categorically denied the amount of rent, mentioned in the plaint, said to have been collected by defendant No.1 from defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4; and also that the appellant-defendant No.1 spent only a sum of Rs.3 lakhs for construction of the two storeyedpucca building. The appellant-defendant No. 1 pleaded in his written state­ment that the appellant-defendant No. 1 had incurred a sum of Rs.25 lakhs in demolition of the old structure on the said land and in construction of the said two storeyed pucca building thereon. The appellant-defendant No.1 had collected a sum of Rs.2,32,500/-(Rupees two lakhs thirty two thousand five hundred) from defendant No,2 as monthly rent for the period from October 1995 to June 2003 and a sum of Rs.2,32,500/- (Rupees two lakhs thirty two thousand five hundred) only from defendant No.3 for the said period and another sum of Rs, 51,200/- (Rupees fifty one thousand two hundred) only from defen­dant No.4 for the period from March 1998 to June 2003. Total amount of money re­ceived by appellant-defendant No.1 from defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4 up to the month of June 2003 is Rs.5,16,200/- (Rupees five lakhs sixteen thousand two hundred) only. There is still a balance of Rs.19,83,800/-(Rupees nineteen lakhs eighty three thousand eight hundred) to be recovered or adjusted from the monthly rent respectively from de­fendant Nos. 2,3 and 4. 2,3 and 4 up to the month of June 2003 is Rs.5,16,200/- (Rupees five lakhs sixteen thousand two hundred) only. There is still a balance of Rs.19,83,800/-(Rupees nineteen lakhs eighty three thousand eight hundred) to be recovered or adjusted from the monthly rent respectively from de­fendant Nos. 2,3 and 4. The appellant-de­fendant No.1 shall not handover the suit pre­mises i.e. two storeyed pucca building con­structed on the said land of respondent-plain­tiff, unless respondent-plaintiff paid the said balance amount of Rs. 19,83,800/- which are receivable from defendant Nos. 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 6. After taking into consideration of the cases of the parties in their pleadings, learned Trial Court framed as many as 12 issues as under: (1) Whether the two storeyed building was constructed by the defendant No.1 by repair­ing and modifying an old Pucca building on the basis of an agreement made between the plain­tiff and the defendant No. 1 that the cost of con­struction would have to be adjusted from rent paid by occupiers of the said building ? If so, what is the actual amount spent in construction of the same building ? (2) Whether the defendant No. 1 took a sum of Rs.75,000/- only in cash and sanitary materi­als worth Rs.75,000/- only as security deposit from the defendant No.2 ? If so, whether the defendant No.2 has paid rent at the rate of Rs. 1,500/- only per month for a single room for the period from the month of March 1992 till the month of December, 2000 and a sum of Rs.2500/- per month for a single room from the month of January 2001 till the date for occupying the western two ground floor rooms of the said building ? (3) Whether the defendant No.1 has col­lected Rs.4,63,000/-on)y from the defendant No.2 as rent for the period from the month of March 1992 till May 2003? If so whether the plaintiff is entitled to re­cover a sum of Rs.3,63,00/- from the defendant No.1 in respect of the rent paid by the defen­dant No.2? (4) Whether the defendants No. 1 took a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash and building construc­tion materials worth Rs. 1,10,000/- as security deposit from the defendant No.3 ? If so whether the plaintiff is entitled to re­cover a sum of Rs.3,63,00/- from the defendant No.1 in respect of the rent paid by the defen­dant No.2? (4) Whether the defendants No. 1 took a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- in cash and building construc­tion materials worth Rs. 1,10,000/- as security deposit from the defendant No.3 ? If so whether the defendant No. 3 has been occupying the eastern two ground floor rooms of the building from the month of March 1992 till date by paying rent at the rate of Rs.1,500/-per month for a single room from March 1992 upto December 2000 and Rs.2,500/- per month for a single room from January 2001 till date ? (5) Whether the defendant No.1 has col­lected Rs.4,63,000/- only from the defendant No.3 as rent for the period from the month of March 1992 till May 2002? If so whether a sum of Rs.3,63,000/- only is recoverable from the defendant No.1. by the plaintiff? (6) Whether the defendant No.1 took Rs.30,000/- only from the defendant No.4 as security deposit for occupying the first floor two rooms of the building ? If so whether the defendant No.4 has been occupying the said room since the month of February 1988 till date by paying Rs. 1,000/-per month as rent for a single room from January 1988 upto December, 2000 and Rs.2,000/- per month from January 2000 till date ? (7) Whether the defendant No.1 has col­lected Rs. 1,86,000/- as rent from the defendant No. 4 from January 1988 up to May 2003 ? If so whether a sum of Rs.1,76,000/- is re­coverable from the defendant No.4 by the plain­tiff. (8) Whether the defendant No.1 had occu­pied the 1st floor rooms now occupied by the defendant No.4 before the rooms were occu­pied by the defendant No.4 ? If so, whether the plaintiff is entitled to re­cover rent from the defendant No. 1? (9) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to re­cover a sum of Rs.60,000/- only from the defen­dant No.1 in respect of the unused deposit money of the defendant Nos. 2 and 3. (10) Whether the defendants No.2, 3 and 4 are liable to be evicted from the suit buildings as Schedule 'B', 'C' and 'D' respectively ? (11) Is there any cause of action in the suit ? (12) Reliefs? 7. 2 and 3. (10) Whether the defendants No.2, 3 and 4 are liable to be evicted from the suit buildings as Schedule 'B', 'C' and 'D' respectively ? (11) Is there any cause of action in the suit ? (12) Reliefs? 7. The respondent-plaintiff in support of her case examined two witnesses including herself i.e. PW.1 and one Shri Nahakpam Ibobi Singh, PW.2 and exhibited eight docu­ments. As stated above, it is not disputed that the said two storeyed pucca building is con­structed on the said land of respondent-plain­tiff. In other words, it is admitted case of the parties that the respondent-plaintiff is the owner of the said land and also the two storeyed pucca building constructed thereon. 8. The respondent-plaintiff had deposed in support of her pleaded case in the plaint. The respondent-plaintiff No.1 was not shaken in the cross examination. So also PW.2 had supported the pleaded case of the respon­dent-plaintiff No.1 in the plaint. Save and except some suggestions to PW.2 from the side of the appellant-defendant No. 1 which had been denied by PW.2 in his cross exami­nation, nothing favourable to the case of the appellant-defendant No. Ts case could be ex­tracted from the mouth of the PW.2. 9. The appellant-defendant No. 1, except himself as D W. 1, did not produce witness and documents in support of his case. The only case of the appellant-defendant No. 1 which is neither supported by any document nor any material is that he incurred an amount of more than Rs.25 lakhs (Rupees twenty five lakhs) in renovating/constructing the said two storeyed pucca building on the said land of the respondent-plaintiff. Further, the appellant-defendant No. 1 did not produce any docu­ment to show the amount of rent collected from defendant Nos. 2,3 and 4. The appel­lant-defendant No. 1 also admitted that re­spondent-plaintiff is the owner of the said land on which the said two storeyed pucca build­ing is constructed and he had constructed the two storeyed pucca building as requested by the respondent-plaintiff (his own elder sister). The disputes are the amount of money in­curred by the appellant-defendant No. 1 in constructing the said two storeyed pucca building in the year between 1992 to 1995 and the amount of rent collected by him from the defendants No. 2,3 and 4. 10. The disputes are the amount of money in­curred by the appellant-defendant No. 1 in constructing the said two storeyed pucca building in the year between 1992 to 1995 and the amount of rent collected by him from the defendants No. 2,3 and 4. 10. It is the case of the respondent-plain­tiff that the said two storeyed pucca-building was constructed in the year 1992 and the case of the appellant-defendant No. 1 was that he took four years in completing the construc­tion of the said two storeyed pucca building on the said land and it was completed only in the year 1995. 11. As there was dispute as to the expen­diture incurred by the appellant-defendant No. 1 in constructing the said two storeyed pucca building or the value of the two sto­reyed pucca building and also there was no documentary evidence in support of their re­spective cases regarding the value of the said two storeyed pucca building, the learned Trial Court, for the purpose of elucidating the mat­ter in dispute or/for ascertaining market value of the two storeyed pucca building, issued a commission to an Advocate, acceptable to both the parties, to make investigation and report thereon to the cause, vide order learned Trial Court dated 16.08.2005. In the said order dated 16.08.2005, the Commissioner was made to understand the points for which he had to submit report and those points were; (1) Number of rooms; (2) nature of the con­struction; (3) age/oldness of the structure; (4) amount of rent per month; and (5) any other related matter. The commissioner had been authorised to take the help of the Imphal Municipal Council (Engineering Section). The Commissioner, after local inspection and also recording the statements of defendant Nos. 3 and 4 i.e. the occupants of the said two storeyed pucca building constructed on the said land of respondent-plaintiff submitted de­tailed report; in that report, it is clearly stated that the amount of rent from the said struc­ture would not be less than Rs,6,600/- per month and also the cost of construction of the said two storeyed pucca building would be about Rs. 10,00,000/- (Rupees ten lakhs) if estimated at the cost of materials available in the market before 1995 and; it would not be less than 15,00,000/- (Rupees fifteen lakhs) if estimated at the present cost of materials available in the market and at the rate of present wage charged by the workers/labourers. 12. Learned Trial Court after appreciat­ing the statements of PWs and DWs, exhib­ited documents and also after considering the report of the Commissioner, vide impugned judgment dated 30.10.2006 made the find­ing that monthly rent of the said two storeyed pucca building was Rs.6,600/- per month and cost of the construction was between Rs.10 lakhs to 15 lakhs and as such on equitable principle, the cost of construction would be Rs. 12.5 lakhs and also that appellant-defen­dant No. 1 had collected rent at the rate of Rs.6,600/- per month; total being Rs. 11,08,800/- (Rupees eleven lakhs eight thousand eight hundred) only along with some charge allowance i.e. Rs,60,000/- (Rupees sixty thousand) and in the result, ordered and decreed that the plaintiff may take back from Appellant-defendant No. 1 the suit building and its rooms on payment of Rs.2 lakhs to defendant No. 1 (appellant-defendant) and enjoy the rents personlly or otherwise. 13. The appellant-defendant No. 1, who said to have incurred Rs.25 lakhs in demol­ishing the old structure and constructing the said two storeyed pucca building on the said land of the respondent-plaintiff, for which he kept the account, did not produce any docu­mentary evidence in support of his case. Ac­cording to the principles of best possible evi­dence, parties have to prove their cases ac­cording to the best possible evidence. In the present case, the account maintained by the Appellant-defendant No. 1 forthe money he had spent in constructing the two storeyed pucca building is the best evidence. The Apex Court in J. Yashoda Vs. K. Shobha Rani: (2007) 6 SCC 730 held that the rule which is most universal, namely, that best evidence the nature of the case will admit shall be produced only means that, so long as the higher or su­perior evidence is within the possession of a person or may be reached by a person, that person shall give no inferior proof in relation toil. 14. 14. In a civil suit, the plaintiff cannot be expected to prove his title beyond any rea­sonable doubt; a high degree of probability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiff's burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. 15. In the present case, the respondent-plaintiff could prove her case to the extent of a high degree of probability and, as the ap­pellant-defendant did not succeed in shifting back the onus, the respondent-plaintiff's bur­den of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. The Apex Court in R. V.E. Venkatachala Gounder Vs. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami & V.P. Temple & Anr : (2003) 8 SCC 752 (in para 29 and 30 of the SCC) held as follows: "29. In a suit for recovery of possession based on title it is for the plaintiff to prove his title and satisfy the Court that he, in law, is en­titled to dispossess the defendant from his pos­session over the suit property and for the pos­session to be restored to him. However, as held in A. Raghavamma Vs. A. Chenchamma: AIR 1964 there is an essential distinction between burden of proof and onus of roof: burden of proof lies upon a person who has to prove the fact continuous process in the evaluation of evidence. In our opinion, in a suit for posses­sion based on title once the plaintiff has been able to create a high degree of probability so as to shift the onus on the defendant it is for the defendant to discharge his onus and in the ab­sence thereof the burden of proof lying on the plaintiff shall be held to have been discharged so as to amount to proof of the plaintiffs title. 30. In the present case, the trial Court and the first appellate Court have noted that the plaintiff has not been able to produce any deed of the title directly lending support to his claim for title and at the same time the defendant too has no proof of his title much less even an in­signia of title. 30. In the present case, the trial Court and the first appellate Court have noted that the plaintiff has not been able to produce any deed of the title directly lending support to his claim for title and at the same time the defendant too has no proof of his title much less even an in­signia of title. Being a civil case the plaintiff cannot be expected to prove his title beyond any reasonable doubt; a high degree of prob­ability lending assurance of the availability of title with him would be enough to shift the onus on the defendant and if the defendant does not succeed in shifting back the onus, the plaintiffs burden of proof can safely be deemed to have been discharged. In the opinion of the two Courts below, the plaintiff had succeeded in shifting the onus on the defendant and here-fore, the burden of proof which lay on the plain­tiff had stood discharged...." (Emphasis supplied) 16. The standard of proof in civil suit is preponderance of probability. Inference of preponderance of probability can be drawn not only from the material on record but also by reference to the facts having the high de­gree of probability upon which the plaintiff relies. Withholding of relevant evidence i.e. best possible evidence by the party who has the best possible evidence would have the ad­verse inference. The Apex Court in M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani Vs State of Kerala & Anr: (i.e. a case filed under the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 for dishonour of cheque) (2006) 6 SCC 39 held that withholding of relevant evidence or best evidence would have the adverse inference. Para 43, 44 and 45 of the SCC in M.S. Narayana Menon's case (supra) read as fol­lows: "43. In Goaplast (P) Ltd. Vs. Chico Ursula D'Souza: (2003) 3 SCC 232 upon which reliance was placed by the learned counsel, this Court held that the presumption arising under Sec­tion 13 9 of the Act can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the per­son who wants to rebut the presumption. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether closure of accounts or stop­page of payment is sufficient defence to es­cape from the penal liability under Section 139 of the Act. The answer to the question was ren­dered in the negative. Such a question does not arise in the instant case. The question which arose for consideration therein was as to whether closure of accounts or stop­page of payment is sufficient defence to es­cape from the penal liability under Section 139 of the Act. The answer to the question was ren­dered in the negative. Such a question does not arise in the instant case. 44. In Kundan lal Rallaram Vs. Custodian, Evacuee Property : AIR 1961 SC 1316 Subba Rao, J., as the learned Chief Justice then was, held that while considering the question as to whether burden of proof in terms of Section 118 had been discharged or not, relevant evidence cannot be permitted to be withheld. If a relevant evidence is withheld, the Court may draw a presumption to the effect that if the same was produced, it might have gone unfavorable to the plaintiff. Such a presumption was itself held to be sufficient to rebut the presumption aris­ing under Section 118 of the Act stating: (AIR p. 1319, para 5) "Briefly stated, the burden of proof may be shifted by presumptions of law or fact, and presumptions of law or presumptions of fact may be rebutted not only by direct or circumstantial evidence but also by pre­sumptions of law or fact. We are not con­cerned here with irrefutable presumptions of law." 45. Two adverse inferences in the instant case are liable to be drawn against the second respondent : (i) He deliberately has not produced his books of accounts. (ii) He had not been maintaining the statutory books of accounts and other reg­isters in terms of the bye-laws of Cochin Stock Exchange. Moreover, the onus on a accused is not as heavy as that of the prosecution. It may be com­pared with a defendant in a civil proceeding." 17. The Apex Court in R. Kapilnath (dead) through LR Vs. Krishna : (2003) 1 SCC 444 held that where the plaintiff has claimed a higher right but has been able to prove only a lesser right or entitlement to re­lief, such plaintiff would not be disentitled from succeeding in his suit so long as the lesser right substantiated by him is sufficient in law to en­title him to a relief against the defendant. Para 5 of the SCC in R. Kapilnath's case (supra) read as follows: "5. Para 5 of the SCC in R. Kapilnath's case (supra) read as follows: "5. It was next submitted that though a peti­tion for eviction under Section 21(1)(p) of the Act can be filed by a landlord and it is not nec­essary that he must also be the owner of the premises, yet it is necessary that the petitioner must claim himself to be only a landlord and not an owner. The learned counsel further submit­ted that the respondent has claimed himself to be the owner of the premises which claim is inconsistent with his being a mere rent collec­tor on behalf of the temple and so the claim for eviction at his instance should have been re­fused. This submission too is wholly devoid of any merit. A petition for recovery of posses­sion of any premises can be filed by the land­lord against the tenant within the meaning of Section 21(1). Clause (h) of Section 3 includes in the meaning of "landlord" any person who is for the time being receiving or entitled to re­ceive rent in respect of any premises whether on his own account or on account or on behalf, or for the benefit of any other person etc. It cannot be doubted nor has it been disputed that the respondent is "landlord" within the meaning of Section 3(h) abovesaid. Though the respondent claimed himself to be an owner also so long as he has been found to be a landlord he is entitled to maintain the action for eviction under Section 21(1)(p). The plaintiff or the peti­tioner may claim a higher right and may suc­ceed in proving only a smaller right or entitle­ment to relief but that would not result in disen­titling the plaintiff or the petitioner from suc­ceeding so long as the smaller right success­fully substantiated by him is enough in law to entitle him to relief against the defendant." 18. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in R. Kapilnath's case (supra) there is nothing wrong in the impugned judg­ment and decree dated 30.10.2006 in grant­ing the respondent-plaintiff the lesser relief so far as the amount of arrear rent is con­cerned. 19. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in R. Kapilnath's case (supra) there is nothing wrong in the impugned judg­ment and decree dated 30.10.2006 in grant­ing the respondent-plaintiff the lesser relief so far as the amount of arrear rent is con­cerned. 19. As stated above, the appellant-defen­dant No. 1 has utterly failed to shift the onus to the respondent-plaintiff inasmuch as the respondent-plaintiff had shown high degree of probability of her case by producing the oral evidence as well as documentary evi­dence in the present case, in which the ap­pellant-defendant do not even deny that the respondent-plaintiffs the owner of the said land on which the said two storeyed pucca building was constructed by the appellant-defendant on the request of the respondent-plaintiff" 20. This Court agrees with the rending of the Trial Court in the impugned judgment and decree dated 30.10.2006 and as such, it is not required to reiterate the reasons given by the Trial Court. The reasons given by us above, in our view, would be sufficient for agreeing with the views of the Trial Court in the impugned judgment and decree. The Apex Court in Girijanandini Devi & Ors Vs. Bijendra Narain Choudhary: AIR 1967 SC 1124 (para 12 of the AIR) held that: "The Trial Court, as we have already ob­served, on a consideration of the entire evidence and the subsequent conduct of the parties came to the conclusion that there was no severance of Bijendra Narain from his uncle Bidya Narain and with that view the High Court agreed. It is true that the High Court did not enter upon a reappraisal of the evidence, but it generally ap­proved by the reasons adduced by the Trial Court in support of its conclusion. We are un­able to hold that the learned Judges of the High Court did not, as is contended before us, con­sider the evidence. It is not the duty of the ap­pellate Court when jt agrees with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the rea­sons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 21. It is not the duty of the ap­pellate Court when jt agrees with the view of the Trial Court on the evidence either to restate the effect of the evidence or to reiterate the rea­sons given by the Trial Court. Expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court decision of which is under appeal would ordinarily suffice." 21. For the foregoing reason, we are of firm view that the appellant-defendant No. 1 utterly failed to make out materials for inter­fering with the impugned judgment and de­cree of the learned Trial Court dated 30.10.2006. Accordingly, for the reasons dis­cussed above, this appeal is devoid of merit and dismissed.