Judgment J.C. Upadhyaya, J.—The New India Assurance Co. Ltd., the appellant herein, which was original opponent No. 2 in M.A.C. Petition No. 649/1989, has preferred this appeal challenging the legality and validity of the impugned judgment and award dated 30/10/2001 rendered by the Ld. M.A.C. Tribunal [Aux.], Rajkot at Gondal [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’] in the aforementioned claim petition. 2. The brief facts leading to the claim petition, in nutshell, are as under : 2.1. A vehicular accident took place on 7/5/1987 and as per the case of the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 herein, who were original claimants, deceased Mohanbhai Bhimabhai was driving motor cycle and he was going towards Gondal and when he reached near village Chordi on Jetpur-Gondal Highway, at that time the Respondent No. 6 herein, who was original opponent No. 1, came from the opposite direction driving his taxi car No. GTX 9217 with full speed, rashly and negligently and dashed said taxi car with the motor cycle. Deceased Mohanbhai sustained bodily injuries and he succumbed to the injuries. Deceased was aged about 37 years and he was serving as Executive Junior Engineer in G.E.B., at Virpur. The claimants, who happened to be widow, daughter, sons and mother of the deceased Mohanbhai filed the abovementioned claim petition to recover by way of compensation Rs. 15 lacs. 2.2. The Tribunal, after appreciating and evaluating oral and documentary evidence on record, came to the conclusion that the driver of the taxi car was negligent to the extent of 70%, whereas the deceased himself was contributorily negligent to the extent of 30%. The Tribunal further came to the conclusion that the insurance policy contained limited liability to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- to indemnify the insured [owner of the taxi car]. The Tribunal by virtue of the impugned judgment and award, awarded Rs. 14,85,400/- by way of compensation to the original claimants with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization with proportionate costs thereon. 50,000/- to indemnify the insured [owner of the taxi car]. The Tribunal by virtue of the impugned judgment and award, awarded Rs. 14,85,400/- by way of compensation to the original claimants with interest @ 9% per annum from the date of filing of the claim petition till realization with proportionate costs thereon. The Tribunal directed both the opponents, namely driver-cum-owner of the taxi car as well as the appellant – insurance company to satisfy the award in toto, but the Tribunal further directed that upon making such payment, the New India Assurance Co., can recover the excess amount from the insured [driver-cum-owner of the taxi car], by executing the award against him to the extent of such excess amount as per Section 174 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’]. This has given rise to the instant appeal by the insurance company. 3. Ms. Lilu Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant insurance company, at the outset, submitted that it was prime statutory contention raised by the insurance company before the Tribunal that insurance policy contained limited liability to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- and the Tribunal, after appreciating the evidence of the Officer of the insurance company, examined before it and considering the policy itself, rightly came to the conclusion that the liability of the insurance company to indemnify the owner of the vehicle was limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. However, Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant asserted that the Tribunal, after arriving at such conclusion, thereafter seriously erred in directing the insurance company to satisfy the full award and to recover the excess amount paid by the insurance company from the insured. It is submitted that thus the Tribunal followed the practice which was considered as “pay and recover method”. 3.1. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that Hon’ble the Apex Court in so many decisions including the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C.M. Jaya reported in 2002 A.C.J. 271 [SC] has deprecated such practice and has observed that such direction as it is issued by the Tribunal, cannot be issued. Ms. Bhaya, therefore, submitted that such direction issued by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 3.2. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that even the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal is exorbitantly high and excessive. Ms. Bhaya, therefore, submitted that such direction issued by the Tribunal deserves to be set aside. 3.2. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant further submitted that even the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal is exorbitantly high and excessive. It is submitted that as per the evidence adduced by the claimants, at the time of accidental death, the salary of the deceased was Rs. 3,441=68 ps., per month. Despite this, the Tribunal assessed the future prospective income of the deceased at Rs. 15,000/- per month. That thus, the Tribunal committed serious illegality and irregularity while fixing future prospective income of the deceased. The compensation, therefore, deserves to be reduced accordingly. 3.3. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant though fairly conceded that before the Tribunal, the appellant insurance company had filed application at Exh. 48 seeking permission as contemplated under Section 170 of the Act, the said application came to be not pressed by the learned advocate representing the insurance company before the Tribunal on the ground that owner had appeared in said matter and he was contesting the matter and accordingly said application stood disposed of. However, Ms. Bhaya submitted that as per the recent decision of Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. Meghji Naran Soratiya reported in [2009] 12 S.C.C. 796 the provisions contained in Section 170 of the Act should not be strictly construed. It is submitted that as a matter of fact the original opponent No. 1 – driver-cum-owner [the insured] appeared before the Tribunal through his advocate, but he did not effectively contest the matter. That thus virtually there was collusion between the insured and the claimants. It is further submitted that the Tribunal permitted the insurance company to raise all the defences including the challenge to the alleged negligence of the driver of the taxi as well as on the question of quantum. Ms. Bhaya, therefore, submitted that though the application under Section 170 of the Act stood disposed of as withdrawn, virtually the Tribunal permitted the insurance company to contest the claim petition on all counts. It is, therefore, submitted that in the instant appeal, the insurance company can challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. 3.4. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Ms. Bhaya, therefore, submitted that though the application under Section 170 of the Act stood disposed of as withdrawn, virtually the Tribunal permitted the insurance company to contest the claim petition on all counts. It is, therefore, submitted that in the instant appeal, the insurance company can challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. 3.4. Ms. Bhaya, Ld. Counsel for the appellant - insurance company alternatively submitted that if the Court comes to the conclusion that once the application under Section 170 of the Act though filed by the appellant - insurance company before the Tribunal, but was not pressed and accordingly stood disposed of and consequently in the appeal, the insurance company cannot raise any defence about the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal, then the Respondent No. 6 herein [original opponent No. 1 – driver-cum-owner of the taxi and the insured] may be transposed as co-appellant in this appeal. 4. Mr. MTM Hakim, Ld. Counsel for Mr. T.L. Sheth, Ld. Counsel for the Respondent Nos. 1 to 5 [original claimants] supported the impugned judgment and award passed by the Tribunal. It is submitted that the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal is just and reasonable. The deceased was serving as Junior Engineer in the Gujarat Electricity Board [GEB] and at the time of his death, he was aged about 37 years and his net monthly salary was Rs. 3,441-68 ps., but before the Tribunal the claimants have adduced cogent evidence showing that at the time of his retirement, even on the existing post on which the deceased was serving, he would have earned at-least Rs. 25 lacs. That thus, in the instant case, there was concrete evidence on record regarding definite rise in the income due to future prospects. Mr. Hakim relied upon a case of K.R. Madhusudan vs. Administrative Officer reported in [2011] 4 S.C.C. 689. 4.1. Mr. Hakim, Ld. Counsel for the original claimants submitted that though the Tribunal erred in holding that the liability of the insurance company to indemnify the insured was limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-, but the claimants have not challenged said finding by preferring any separate appeal nor any cross objections have been lodged in the appeal of the insurance company and, therefore, he has nothing to argue on such finding. 50,000/-, but the claimants have not challenged said finding by preferring any separate appeal nor any cross objections have been lodged in the appeal of the insurance company and, therefore, he has nothing to argue on such finding. However, it is submitted that the Tribunal was perfectly right in saddling liability upon the appellant - insurance company to satisfy the full award and then to recover excess amount from the insured. In support of this submission, Mr. Hakim drew our attention to the insurance policy and more particularly the avoidance clause to the effect that any payment made by the insurance company by the reason of wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the M.V. Act, 1939, is recoverable from the insured. He submitted that in this appeal, on behalf of the appellant - insurance company reliance is placed upon the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C.M. Jaya [Supra], but in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Vimal Devi reported in 2010 A.C.J. 2878, Hon’ble the Apex Court discussed the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C.M. Jaya [Supra] as well as the case of Amrit Lal Sood vs. Kaushlya Devi Thapar reported in 1998 A.C.J. 531 [SC] and the identical avoidance clause was available there in the insurance policy and Hon’ble the Apex Court held that the avoidance clause in the policy makes all the difference and the direction of the High Court to the appellant – insurance company to make payment of the full amount of compensation to the claimants and then to recover its dues from the owner of the vehicle was held to be directly in accordance with avoidance clause. It is, therefore, submitted that the ratio laid down in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Vimal Devi [Supra] shall fully apply in the instant case. 4.2. Mr. Hakim, Ld. Counsel for the original claimants next submitted that it is admitted position that the application under Section 170 of the Act filed by the insurance company before the Tribunal was subsequently not pressed on the ground that the insured had appeared in the claim case and he was contesting the matter. Accordingly, said application stood disposed of and, therefore, no permission was granted by the Tribunal to the insurance company to contest the claim on all counts including the quantum. Accordingly, said application stood disposed of and, therefore, no permission was granted by the Tribunal to the insurance company to contest the claim on all counts including the quantum. That therefore, the appellant - insurance company cannot challenge the quantum fixed by the Tribunal in this appeal. Mr. Hakim submitted that the appellant – insurance company relied upon a case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Meghji Naran Soratiya [Supra], but the facts of said case are completely different. In the said case, the insurance company had in fact filed application under Section 170 of the Act and said application was allowed by the Tribunal, but while allowing said application, no reason was assigned by the Tribunal. In the aforesaid background, Hon’ble the Apex Court held that in the appeal, insurance company can challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal. Mr. Hakim relied upon a case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Manjulaben Jayantibhai Patel reported in 2003 [3] G.L.R. 2018 and submitted that once the insurance company did not obtain permission of Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act, the insurance company cannot file an appeal against the award challenging the findings of the Tribunal as regards negligence and quantum of compensation and mere fact that the insurance company was allowed to cross-examine witnesses would not amount to implied permission under Section 170 of the Act. He also relied upon the case of Shankarayya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Reported in 1998 A.C.J. 513, wherein almost identical question had arisen before Hon’ble the Apex Court and in the facts and circumstances of the case, Hon’ble the Apex Court held that in absence of any permission of the Tribunal as contemplated under Section 170 of the Act, the appeal filed by the insurance company before the High Court was held to be incompetent and the order of reduction of quantum of compensation passed by the High Court was set aside. Mr. Hakim, therefore, submitted that even on merits, the Tribunal did not commit any error while fixing quantum of compensation, but in the alternative Mr. Hakim submitted that the insurance company in the facts and circumstances discussed above, is incompetent to challenge the order of quantum of compensation passed by the Tribunal by preferring this appeal. 4.3. Mr. Hakim, Ld. Mr. Hakim, therefore, submitted that even on merits, the Tribunal did not commit any error while fixing quantum of compensation, but in the alternative Mr. Hakim submitted that the insurance company in the facts and circumstances discussed above, is incompetent to challenge the order of quantum of compensation passed by the Tribunal by preferring this appeal. 4.3. Mr. Hakim, Ld. Counsel for the original claimants submitted that the oral request at this stage made on behalf of the appellant - insurance company for transposition of Respondent No. 6 [insured] as one of the co-appellants can never be accepted for the reason that at the time of filing of this appeal, the appellant - insurance company was well aware of the fact that no permission was obtained of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act and secondly without the consent of the concerned respondent, he cannot be transposed as co-appellant. 4.4. Ultimately, it is submitted that the appeal may be dismissed. 5. At the outset, there is no dispute that the Tribunal appreciating the oral and documentary evidence on record and especially considering the insurance policy itself came to the conclusion that the liability to indemnify the insured in the instant case of the insurance company was limited to the extent of Rs. 50,000/-. However, what is found objectionable by the appellant - insurance company is the direction given by the Tribunal to the insurance company to satisfy the full award and pay the entire amount of compensation fixed by the Tribunal with interest and costs to the claimants and then to recover the excess amount from the insured. According to the appellant - insurance company, the Tribunal was not competent to pass such direction. In this respect, perusing the insurance policy, below the first page of the insurance policy, there is “Important Notice” and below it, it is stated as under : “The insured is not indemnified if the Vehicle is used or driven otherwise than in accordance with the Schedule of this Policy. Any payment made by the Company by reason or wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is recoverable from the Insured. See the clause headed “AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN TERMS AND RIGHT OF RECOVERY”. Any payment made by the Company by reason or wider terms appearing in the certificate in order to comply with the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 is recoverable from the Insured. See the clause headed “AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN TERMS AND RIGHT OF RECOVERY”. Then in the insurance policy, various clauses are narrated and in Section III there is a clause referred as “avoidance of certain terms and right of recovery.” Below it, it is stated as under : “AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN TERMS AND RIGHT OF RECOVERY— Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 96. But the Insured shall repay to the Company all sums paid by the Company which the Company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions.” 5.1. In the above context, it is necessary to consider the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. Vimal Devi [Supra] decided by Hon’ble the Apex Court on 5/10/2010. In the said case, New India Assurance Co. Ltd., filed appeal before Hon’ble the Apex Court challenging the order of the High Court wherein though the liability of the insurer company was held to be limited to Rs. 50,000/-, directed it to pay the entire amount of compensation being Rs. 4,90,000/- along with interest to the claimants and then to recover the amount beyond its liability of Rs. 50,000/- from the insured. Thus, the appellant - insurance company was aggrieved by the direction given by the High Court. In Paras 4, 5, 6 and 7 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed as under :— “4. Mr. M.R. Calla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, in his reply submitted that the reliance placed on the Constitution Bench decision was misplaced and the appellant overlooked the finer point of distinction made in the decision in C.M. Jaya, 2002 ACJ 271 [SC]. Mr. M.R. Calla, the learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent, in his reply submitted that the reliance placed on the Constitution Bench decision was misplaced and the appellant overlooked the finer point of distinction made in the decision in C.M. Jaya, 2002 ACJ 271 [SC]. He submitted that in the case in hand, the High Court had noticed the avoidance clause in the policy which was in the following terms : “AVOIDANCE OF CERTAIN TERMS AND RIGHT OF RECOVERY— Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 96. But the insured shall repay to the company all sums paid by the company which the company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions.” 5. The avoidance clause came up for consideration before a three Judge Bench of this Court in Amrit Lal Sood vs. Kaushalya Devi Thapar, 1998 ACJ 531 [SC]. In its decision court observed : “[13] In the policy in the present case also, there is a clause under the heading : “Avoidance of certain terms and right of recovery – which reads thus : “Nothing in this Policy or any endorsement hereon shall affect the right of any person indemnified by this Policy or any other person to recover an amount under or by virtue of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, Section 96. But the insured shall repay to the company all sums paid by the company which the company would not have been liable to pay but for the said provisions.” [14] The above clause does not enable the insurance company to resist or avoid the claim made by the claimant. The clause will arise for consideration only in a dispute between the insurer and the insured. The question whether under the said clause the insurer can claim repayment from the insured is left open. The circumstance that the owner of the vehicle did not file an appeal against the judgment of Single Judge of the High Court under the Letters Patent may also be relevant in the event of claim by the insurance company against the insured for repayment of the amount. We are not concerned with that question here. The circumstance that the owner of the vehicle did not file an appeal against the judgment of Single Judge of the High Court under the Letters Patent may also be relevant in the event of claim by the insurance company against the insured for repayment of the amount. We are not concerned with that question here. [15] In the result, we hold that the insurance company is also liable to meet the claim of the claimant and satisfy the award passed by the Tribunal and modified by the High Court. The judgment of the High Court in sofar as it exonerates the insurance company [Respondent No. 5 herein] from the liability, is set aside. The award passed by the Division Bench of the High Court can be enforced against the Respondent No. 5 also. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. The parties will bear their respective costs. 6. Mr. Calla further submitted that in C.M. Jaya, 2002 ACJ 271 [SC], a Constitution Bench of this Court indeed held that in a policy for limited liability it was not open to the Court to direct the insurance company to make any payment beyond the amount of the limited liability but it took note of the decision in Amrit Lal Sood, 1998 ACJ 531 [SC] with approval. He referred to Paras 8 and 12 of the judgment in C.M. Jaya [Supra] where the decision in Amrit Lal Sood [Supra] is noticed with approval. 7. The avoidance clause in the policy in this case makes all the difference and the direction of the High Court to the appellant, insurance company to make payment of the full amount of compensation to the claimants and to recover its dues from the owner of the vehicle is directly in accordance with that clause. In our view, the submission of Mr. Calla is well founded. The appellant in this case can derive no benefit from the decision in C.M. Jaya, 2002 ACJ 271 [SC].” 6. We have seen that in the instant case, almost identical is the avoidance clause in the insurance policy. As held by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Para 7 in Vimal Devi’s case [Supra] that the avoidance clause in the policy in this case makes all the difference. We have seen that in the instant case, almost identical is the avoidance clause in the insurance policy. As held by Hon’ble the Apex Court in Para 7 in Vimal Devi’s case [Supra] that the avoidance clause in the policy in this case makes all the difference. Under such circumstances, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the direction issued by the Tribunal directing the appellant – insurance company to pay the entire compensation amount along with interest and costs to the claimants and then to recover the excess amount from the insured, is directly in accordance with the avoidance clause contained in the insurance policy. Therefore, the submission that such direction issued by the Tribunal is perverse or erroneous cannot be accepted. 7. Perusing the record of the case, it transpires that at the time of the accident and death, the deceased was aged about 37 years and he was serving as Junior Engineer in the Gujarat Electricity Board [GEB] and at the time of the accident and death, his net salary was Rs. 3,441-68 ps., per month. Before the Tribunal, at Exh. 29, the claimants produced a statement prepared by the Executive Engineer of the GEB, wherein it is stated that from the month of June 1987 [the deceased met with accidental death on 7/5/1987] to the date of his retirement in the month of September 2007, had the deceased been alive, he would have earned Rs. 24,80,002-25 ps. In the case of K.R. Madhusudan vs. Administrative Officer [Supra], Hon’ble the Apex Court, considering the case of Sarla Verma vs. D.T.C. Reported in [2009] 6 S.C.C. 121, held that Sarla Verma rule of thumb is to be applied to those cases where there is no concrete evidence on record of definite rise in income due to future prospects. It is further held that it can be deviated from in exceptional circumstances where income of deceased is bound to increase. In that case, deceased, a Government servant, was entitled to and in fact bound to get a rise in income in future and said fact was corroborated by evidence on record. In the aforesaid background, on behalf of the respondents – claimants, Ld. Counsel Mr. Hakim submitted that the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be excessive or exorbitant. In the aforesaid background, on behalf of the respondents – claimants, Ld. Counsel Mr. Hakim submitted that the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal cannot be said to be excessive or exorbitant. However, we are of the opinion that even though this aspect of the matter is not gone into in detail in this appeal, yet the Paramount question would be as to whether the appellant – insurance company can challenge the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal in this appeal? 8. There is no dispute that as per Section 170 of the Act, if the Claim Tribunal is satisfied that the insured failed to contest the claim petition or that there is collusion between the insured and the claimant, the Tribunal by passing speaking order may direct the insurance company to contest the claim petition on all counts. In the instant case, considering the record of the case, though the appellant – insurance company filed an application at Exh. 48 under Section 170 of the Act, but before any order could be passed by the Tribunal, Ld. Advocate representing the insurance company made an endorsement below said application to the effect that since the owner [the insured] has appeared and he was contesting and, therefore, said application was not pressed. Accordingly, said application came to be disposed of. Perusing the record of the case, it further transpires that the insured opponent No. 1 appeared through his advocate and filed written statement. He also stepped into the witness box and deposed on oath at Exh. 62. Thus, in the instant case, it cannot be said that insured failed to contest the claim or that there was any collusion between the insured and the claimants. At this stage, at the time of arguments on behalf of the appellant, it was submitted that the insured only made a show before the Tribunal that he was contesting the matter, but virtually there was a collusion between him and the claimants. If that be so, the appellant insurance company was not prevented from drawing the attention of the Tribunal to that effect and to seek permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act. Nothing whatsoever was done. In the case of Shankarayya vs. United India Insurance Co. If that be so, the appellant insurance company was not prevented from drawing the attention of the Tribunal to that effect and to seek permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act. Nothing whatsoever was done. In the case of Shankarayya vs. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [Supra] almost identical situation had arisen in said matter before Hon’ble the Apex Court and Hon’ble the Apex Court held that the appeal filed by the respondent United India Insurance Co., before the High Court challenging the quantum of compensation was incompetent and consequently the order of reduction of quantum of compensation passed by the High Court was set aside and the award passed by the Tribunal was restored. Moreover, before us, on behalf of the appellant - insurance company, it was tried to be submitted that though below application under Section 170 of the Act, Tribunal did not pass any order, as a matter of fact the appellant - insurance company was permitted by the Tribunal to cross-examine the witnesses examined by the claimants and to contest the claim petition on all counts and, therefore, the permission as contemplated under Section 170 of the Act can be said to be deemed to have been granted by the Tribunal. To such submission, if the case of the Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Manjulaben J. Patel [Supra] decided by this Court is considered, this Court has categorically observed that in case when the permission of the Tribunal under Section 170 of the Act was not obtained by the insurer, then mere fact that the insurer was allowed to cross-examine would not amount to implied permission under Section 170 of the Act. 9. The facts and circumstances of the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Meghji Naran Soratiya [Supra] relied upon on behalf of the appellant - insurance company are completely different than the facts and circumstances and evidence on record in the instant case. In the case relied upon on behalf of the appellant - insurance company, though the concerned Tribunal had permitted the appellant - insurance company to contest the claim petition by allowing the application under Section 170 of the Act, but the said order passed by the Tribunal was not a reasoned order. In the case relied upon on behalf of the appellant - insurance company, though the concerned Tribunal had permitted the appellant - insurance company to contest the claim petition by allowing the application under Section 170 of the Act, but the said order passed by the Tribunal was not a reasoned order. Hon’ble the Apex Court observed that the circumstance that the insured failed to contest the claim petition can be gathered even by perusing the record of the claim case. The said fact is verifiable from the record of the case. In the above background, in Para 17 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed that the grant of permission by the Tribunal to the insurer to contest the proceedings did not call for any interference as both, driver and owner though served, remained absent and did not contest the claim. In the result, in Para 18 Hon’ble the Apex Court observed that “But under no circumstances, the Tribunal’s permission to contest the claim can be equated to or treated as denial of permission to contest the claim, merely on the ground that reasons were not recorded.” As stated above, in the instant case, it was the appellant - insurance company itself which did not press application filed under Section 170 of the Act. Therefore, there was no reason whatsoever for the Tribunal to allow said application. Moreover, while withdrawing said application, the insurance company specifically stated that the owner of the vehicle [insured] was contesting the matter. Verifying the record of the case, in the instant case, it becomes clear that the insured appeared before the Tribunal through his advocate, filed written statement and even stepped into the witness box. Thus, in the facts and circumstances, the above decision relied upon by the appellant - insurance company does not help it. 10. We are of the considered opinion that the challenge to the quantum of compensation fixed by the Tribunal made by the appellant - insurance company, in this appeal, cannot be considered. To put it differently, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appeal of the appellant - insurance company challenging the quantum of compensation is incompetent. The alternative request made on behalf of the appellant - insurance company, at this stage regarding transposition of Respondent No. 6 [insured] as co-appellant, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be granted. 11. The alternative request made on behalf of the appellant - insurance company, at this stage regarding transposition of Respondent No. 6 [insured] as co-appellant, in the facts and circumstances of the case, cannot be granted. 11. In the above view of the matter, the appeal is devoid of any merits and deserves dismissal. 12. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal stands dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, parties to bear their own costs. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. After pronouncement of the judgment, the Ld. Counsel for the appellant prays for suspending the operation of the order for sometime so as to enable the appellant to approach before the Higher Forum. Considering the facts and circumstances and as the issues are covered by the decision of Hon’ble the Apex Court, the said prayer is not granted.