Judgment Amit Talukdar, J. 1. UNLESS the litmus test as set out in the first proviso of section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') is passed, there is hardly any scope for entertaining an appeal under the said Act. To put it simply, there must be sub- stantial question of law involved which would persuade the court to interfere with a finding returned by the learned Commissioner under the said Act. 2. FAR less than being substantial there is hardly even any question of law which would permit us to look into the order of the Commissioner in connection with Claim Case No. 308 of 2001 passed on 24.6.2010 in connection with the award of compensation passed in favour of the respondent. 3. BUT as a first court of appeal we have to not only give our reasons but set out the facts on the basis of which we would conclude in the aforesaid direction. The respondent was working as a steward in one of the vessels owned by the appellant and in course of his work on 27.12.1999 on account of suffering from chest pain he swooned and fell down on board resulting in injuries on his head, back and chest. This saw him incapacitated due to the accident to the level of 100 per cent as certified by Dr. H.K. Mukherjee, Orthopaedic Surgeon, PW 2. On the basis of the claim petition filed by the respondent, the Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation, First Court, West Bengal in Claim Case No. 308 of 2001 directed that the respondent would be entitled to a compensation of Rs.12,00.000 along with an interest of 12 per cent after one month from the date of passing of the order. While concluding in the aforesaid direction the learned Commissioner opined that as the appellant suffered loss of earning capacity to the extent of 100 per cent and after taking into account the evidence of PW 1, the claimant himself and also the deposition of the Deputy Manager, Human Resource of appellant's company, OPW 1, found that the criteria in respect of claim made under the said Act having been fulfilled, passing of the award was necessitated. 4. MR. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal, has placed before us a number of points. 4. MR. Ghosh, learned senior counsel appearing in support of the appeal, has placed before us a number of points. He has firstly submitted that the medical reports which have been relied upon by the appellant do not justify that appellant suffered from any cardiac problem. He has also challenged the competency of Dr. H.K. Mukherjee, PW 2, as he, being an Orthopaedic Surgeon, was not authorised to certify with regard to the illness suffered by the appellant. MR. Ghosh, learned senior counsel, has also drawn our attention to the deposition of the appellant, PW 1, to show that there was no accident and the injuries suffered by him cannot be said to arise out of and in the course of his employment. Furthermore, challenging the order under appeal he has invited our attention to the finding of the learned Commissioner to the effect that the respondent was covered by the National Maritime Board Agreement, whereas the respondent, according to his own showing, was a crew member in the inland vessel which does not cover the National Maritime Board Agreement award. In order to sustain his point he has referred to the decisions in the cases of- (1) Malikarjuna G. Hiremath v. Branch Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2009 ACJ 721 (SC); (2) Rashida Haroon Kupurade v. Divisional Manager, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., 2010 ACJ 721 (SC); and (3) Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti v. Prabhakar Maruti Garvali, 2007 ACJ 1 (SC); and furthermore, he has also shown from the tail end of the order under appeal that the award of interest from four weeks thereafter was improper in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. now Uttarakhand Trans. Corpn. v. Satnam Singh, 2012 ACJ 691 (SC). 5. DEVELOPING his argument further he has cited the decisions in Malikarjuna G. Hiremath, 2009 ACJ 721 (SC), Rashida Haroon Kupurade, 2010 ACJ 721 (SC) and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti, 2007 ACJ 1 (SC), that unless there is any causal relationship with the accident and the incident which led to the respondent's sufferings, no claim can be maintainable under the said Act. He has shown from the said decision that there must be an accident and due to such accident the injuries have been suffered which would result in fructification of a claim by the concerned respondent. He has shown from the said decision that there must be an accident and due to such accident the injuries have been suffered which would result in fructification of a claim by the concerned respondent. Since none of these criteria have been fulfilled, the entire award of compensation on the basis of such erroneous finding, according to the learned senior counsel, was liable to be set aside. 6. PER contra, Mr. Majumdar, for the respondent, has, at the outset, drawn our attention to the first proviso of section 30 of the said Act. In order to build up his case Mr. Majumdar has submitted that unless there is a substantial question of law involved no appeal would be maintainable under the provisions of the said Act. Mr. Majumdar was of the view that when on the own showing of the appellant, OPW 1, who was the Deputy Manager, Human Resource of the appellant's company, that after accepting, the respondent has suffered 100 per cent disability, was discharged from the service upon fulfilment of all the dues in respect of his compensation and provident fund dues, it is not open to the appellant to turn back and raise this question with regard to maintainability of the award. Mr. Majumdar has invited attention of the court to the cross-examination of PW 1, to show that question with regard to the application of the National Maritime Board Agreement award has little relevance as the respondent being a member of the crew is covered by the entire gamut of the award and simply referring the same would not make any difference. 7. WE have carefully appreciated the submissions made at the Bar in the light of the decisions cited vis-a-vis the materials which have been perceived by us in course of our foray into the entire materials that have transpired before us. 8. IN our opinion, we have found at the outset that there is a finding returned by the learned Commissioner which is absolutely factual in nature. We have looked into such facts, it cannot be said that either the same is perverse or susceptible to any other conclusion in the event the evidence is re appreciated by us in first appeal. IN our opinion, we have found at the outset that there is a finding returned by the learned Commissioner which is absolutely factual in nature. We have looked into such facts, it cannot be said that either the same is perverse or susceptible to any other conclusion in the event the evidence is re appreciated by us in first appeal. Thereafter, we find on the basis of appreciation of the evidence of PW 1 and OPW 2 on behalf of the appellant the decision with regard to payment of compensation was arrived at by the learned Commissioner. This is a subjective finding and there cannot be any legal lacuna which would attract the first proviso of section 30 (1) of the said Act. We have carefully looked into the same in our own way, on the basis of the plain reading of the provisions of section 30 of the said Act. 9. LEARNED senior counsel for appellant was very much emphatic with regard to the competency of Dr. H.K. Mukherjee, PW 2, to certify with regard to the injury of the respondent. We for one find that there is a basic mistake which was percolated in the entire scene. The respondent had a chest pain and due to the same had fallen down and as a result of which he suffered injuries as described hereinabove. These injuries were orthopaedic injuries in the head, chest and in the other portions of the body. Obviously, Dr. Mukherjee in his professional capacity was competent to depose likewise. Accepting the medical condition of 100 per cent disability the appellant had disbursed his payment and discharged him from the service As such, in our opinion, this question does not subsist further for oux decision. 10. NOW this would bring us to the question as to whether the incident that resulted in suffering of injury of the appellant after he underwent chest pain and fell on board has any causal relation with the accident. It has been accepted by appellant as it appears from the evidence of OPW 1 that the respondent at the concerned time was on duty on board one of the vessels owned by the appellant. It has been accepted by appellant as it appears from the evidence of OPW 1 that the respondent at the concerned time was on duty on board one of the vessels owned by the appellant. Obviously, this would mean that as he was on duty any application or injury during such time would come within the ambit of section 3 of the said Act to be arising out of and in the course of his employment. It has been borne out from the evidence that the respondent's job is strenuous and exacting in nature. Meticulous cross-examination by the appellant to this effect did not yield any result. It can safely be concluded that due to the strenuous nature of work it resulted in the fatigue of the respondent which saw him in the medical condition as a result of which he suffered necessary injuries as we have seen from the evidence and discussed by the finding of the learned Commissioner. 11. LEARNED senior counsel has referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Malikarjuna G. Hiremath, 2009 ACJ 721 (SC), Rashida Haroon Kupurade, 2010 ACJ 721 (SC) and Shakuntala Chandrakant Shreshti, 2007 ACJ 1 (SC), to show that unless there is a causal and proximate nexus with the accident and the injury no claim under the said Act can be maintained. We have reverentially perused the said decisions and are of the opinion that the same would be quite distinguishable in the fact situation of the present case. It has been borne out from the evidence that the respondent at the relevant time was functioning as the steward and in course of his duty he suffered chest pain and fell down as a result of which he sustained injury for which purpose he was treated by the company in various hospitals which has been detailed in the body of the judgment. There is no scope to conclude that neither there is any causal relation nor any linkage between the accident and the injury suffered by the respondent. As such, in our humble view the application of the ratio of the said decisions of the Apex Court cannot be said to be wholesome in the present appeal. 12. SO far as the question of the interest as raised by Mr. Ghosh in the light of the decision of U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. now Uttarakhand Trans. Corpn. As such, in our humble view the application of the ratio of the said decisions of the Apex Court cannot be said to be wholesome in the present appeal. 12. SO far as the question of the interest as raised by Mr. Ghosh in the light of the decision of U.P. State Road Trans. Corpn. now Uttarakhand Trans. Corpn. v. Satnam Singh, 2012 ACJ 691 (SC), the law in this regard is quite well settled in view of section 4-A of the said Act and we feel we need not entertain any further discussion in this regard as we do not find any defect or otherwise in the same. 13. AFTER we have found that the order under appeal does not suffer from any illegality and no question of substantial law has been raised, we find no merit in the same, accordingly dismiss the appeal. 14. AFTER we had dictated and pronounced the order in open court in presence of the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent, prayer for stay of the operation of this order has been made for six weeks. We have carefully considered the said prayer. We are of the view that as our finding has been arrived at on the premises hereinabove and in the event any stay of the same is granted, it would unnedessarily push the respondent to further uncertainty. He has suffered the injury way back in December 1999. The Commissioner gave his finding in 2010 and we are disposing of this appeal practically after a delay of nearly thirteen years from the date of incident. We see no reason as to why we should accede to the prayer for stay. Accordingly we regret the same. 15. URGENT Xerox certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the respondent. Appeal dismissed.