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2011 DIGILAW 540 (KAR)

Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Rep. by its Managing director Now Rep by its Chief Law officer v. State of Karnataka

2011-05-30

D.V.SHYLENDRA KUMAR

body2011
Judgment :- 1. These two writ petitions, one by Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, a transport corporation within the scope of Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporations Act, 1950 and as recognized in Chapter-VI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 [for short, the Act] and the other petition, though by two private persons but assigned only one writ petition number by the registry, are all for questioning the legality of an agreement entered into between the states of Karnataka and Andhrapradesh in terms of the agreement dated 7-3-2008 and published in the official gazette of even date, a copy of which is produced at Annexure-A to both the writ petitions. The challenge is in so far as it relates to, covering the permits in the names of existing operators as found in Annexures-VIII and IX to the notification, comprised of as many as 81 and 31 operators respectively, who have been operating on different interstate routes and also having counter signatures in the other state, other than where the primary permit has been issued, but not earlier covered in any reciprocal agreement between the two states, is sought to be quashed and for such purpose, the following prayers are sought: PRAYER IN WP 13637/2008 (i) Issue of writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ or order or direction to quash the Agreement referred to in Notification No. TRD 02 TM I dt.07.03.2008 in so far as it relate to Annexure-VIII and IX entered into between the 1st and 2nd respondents and published by the 1st respondent as at Annexure-A; (ii) Issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or order or direction directing the 1st and 2nd respondents to enter into agreement strictly in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 88(5) of the MV Act 1988 so as to fix the routes; and (iii) grant all other consequential reliefs including cost deemed fit in the Circumstances of the case, in the interest of Justice & Equity. PRAYER IN WP 28114/2009 (i) Issue of Writ of Certiorari & Quash the notification-dated 7th March 2008 bearing No.TRD 02 TMI 2003, Bangalore publishing the agreement between State of Karnataka and State of Andhra Pradesh insofar as it relates to the routes mentioned in Annexures VIII & IX [Annexure-A]; (ii) Issue such other Writ, Order or Direction as deemed fit in the circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice & equity. 2. These writ petitions had been listed earlier along with WP No 4950 of 2008, which was disposed of on 8-12-2010, but only these writ petitions had been remained over and as matters had been indicated to have been heard in part along with other petitions, are being listed before this court yet again, though as per the allocation of work to different benches, this is a subject matter to be listed before another bench. 3. Be that as it may, the matter having been shown as for further hearing etc., Sri Puttige R Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP No 13637 of 2008 and Sri Subhash Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner in WP No 28114 of 2009 have made further submissions and are heard on the merits of the matter. 4. 3. Be that as it may, the matter having been shown as for further hearing etc., Sri Puttige R Ramesh, learned counsel for the petitioners in WP No 13637 of 2008 and Sri Subhash Chandra, learned counsel for the petitioner in WP No 28114 of 2009 have made further submissions and are heard on the merits of the matter. 4. Submission of Sri Ramesh is that the agreement in so far as it refers to inclusion of the permits which are existing permits also covering the routes notified in the proposed agreement and as detailed in Annexure-VIII and IX to the agreement, is contrary to the statutory provisions; that such as agreement is outside the scope of sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act; that the statutory provision per se does not enable state governments to enter into an agreement of this nature, particularly by notifying the very names of the permit holders in the agreement; that it is clearly contrary to the scheme of the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act, as even when an agreement of this nature is sought to be entered into and in respect of proposed routes to be covered by the agreement, even before the proposals are finalized and even before the actual agreement is entered into, even at the stage of proposals, including the names of permit holders to cover the permits existing and held by them within the scope of the proposed agreement is contrary to the statutory provisions such as sections 69, 70, 71 & 72 of the Act and therefore the agreement in so far as it relates to and as contained in Annexures-VIII and IX to the agreement deserves to be quashed. 5. 5. Sri Ramesh also submits that entering into an agreement of this nature, apart from being an act outside the scope of sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act, is also in violation of the Constitutional mandate of equal opportunity to all persons, particularly as in respect of the proposed grant of permits, state governments cannot preempt the procedure contemplated under Section 71 of the Act, which statutory provision enables according an equal opportunity to all intended applicants aspiring for grant of a stage carriage permit and the state government, if has to bypass the procedure as contemplated in Sections 71 & 72 of the Act; that it amounts to clear denial of opportunity to aspiring applicants of an hearing and therefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and on this premise also, the notification deserves to be quashed. 6. Sri Puttige R Ramesh, also relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ASHWANI KUMAR vs REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BIKANER [ AIR 1999 SC 3888 ] to submit that as per the law declared in this case, existence of an interstate agreement is sine qua non for granting an interstate permit and even for creating an interstate route, it can never be an unilateral action of one state, but it can only be by a mutual, combined effort on the part of agreeing states to bring into existence an interstate route and it is only thereafter a permit can be granted on such route and placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court, submission is that while it is not open to the agreeing states to include any proposal for grant of a permit on any interstate route at the stage of publication of a draft agreement and in the guise of doing that, a person cannot be granted a permit which, in fact, is the effect of the draft of the agreement in terms of Annexure-VIII and IX as in the present situation in the guise of entering into an agreement under sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act, what is really done by the respective state government is virtually to grant inter state stage carriage permits in favour of 122 persons whose names figure in Annexure-VIII and IX to the draft agreement, even before the agreement has been finalized between the parties. 7. 7. Sri Ramesh has also placed reliance on the subsequent judgment of a Division Bench of this court in the case of SULOCHANA DAMODHAR vs THE STATE TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, BANGALORE [ 2009 (4) KCCR 2479 ], to submit that even in the case of an existing permit, unless there is a reciprocal agreement, it cannot be countersigned and therefore this requirement of law as is spelt out in the case of SULOCHANA DAMODHAR [supra] cannot be circumvented by the present manner of the agreement, particularly in respect of 122 existing permit holders and therefore also submits that the agreement in so far as Annexure-VIII and IX to the agreement is concerned, to be quashed. 8. Sri R Omkumar, learned AGA appearing for the respondent-authorities, defends the action submitting that it is always well within the power of the state to enter into an agreement and an agreement of this nature is valid in law. 9. Before the submissions can be examined, it is proper to understand the scope of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the scheme of Chapter V providing for control of grant of permits, wherein figures provisions of sub-section 5 of Section 88 of the Act, relating to validation of permits granted in one region to be operational in other states and the provisions of Chapter VI providing for exclusive operation of stage carriages by state transport undertakings in respect of notified routes. 10. Section 88 of the Act is a provision enabling effectuation of a permit issued in one region in another region by providing for countersignature in the other region. Subsection (5) of Section 88 of the Act, which is relevant for the purpose of this case, reading as under: 88. 10. Section 88 of the Act is a provision enabling effectuation of a permit issued in one region in another region by providing for countersignature in the other region. Subsection (5) of Section 88 of the Act, which is relevant for the purpose of this case, reading as under: 88. Validation of permits for use outside region in which granted.- (5) Every proposal to enter into an agreement between the States to fix the number of permits which is proposed to be granted or countersigned in respect of each route or area, shall be published by each of the State Governments concerned in the Official Gazette and in any one or more of the newspapers in regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by the agreement together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith may be submitted, and the date not being less than thirty days from the date of publication in the Official Gazette, on which, and the authority by which, and the time and place at which, the proposal and any representation received in connection therewith will be considered. while undoubtedly does deal with the procedure that is required to be adopted, when an interstate agreement is sought to be entered into, which is a specie of an inter-region agreement, in the sense, it is only inter-region permits which travel beyond the frontiers of one state, it contemplates the procedure to be adhered to before entering into an interstate agreement by agreeing states to enable the general public and those interested in the operations and control of the transport operations and to provide an opportunity to such members of public, so that the agreeing states are informed of the relevant aspects before an agreement is entered into. 11. 11. While it is true that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of ASHWANI KUMAR [supra] does indicate that one state cannot unilaterally start issuing permits which can have the validity beyond the frontiers of the issuing state and before issue of such permits or routes notified, there should be a mutually signed agreement between the two states, it does not necessarily mean that such permits which had been granted prior to the statutory provisions coming into force issued by one state and having their area of operation in another state, and which are operational hitherto but without being included within the scope of a reciprocal agreement between the two states hitherto, are either to be put to an end immediately or are set aside or that the two governments cannot enter into an agreement to ensure that such existing permits are brought into validity zone in terms of the law declared by the Supreme Court. 12. While it is true that grant of an interstate permit by an unilateral act of one state cannot be valid in law in the other state as declared and even an argument that it cannot be countersigned may be projected and the existing permits unless they are also covered by such an interstate agreement cannot continue for ever, the question would arise only in a situation where either a new permit is granted on an interstate route or even the existing permit is renewed by countersignature de hors an interstate agreement. 13. In the present case, while no such situation is pointed out, what is urged is even an enabling agreement and a proposal for, including an existing permit for being covered by an interstate agreement is also not contemplated within the scope of section 88(5) of the Act, as it is virtually begging the question etc. 14. This argument cannot be accepted for more than one reason. 14. This argument cannot be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, a situation of the present nature while is undoubtedly not covered by the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act, is not the end of the world one cannot lose sight of the legal position that sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act seeks to regulate the grant of new permits on interstate routes and for which purpose an enabling reciprocal agreement is to be entered into between two states, as is the procedure that is required to be followed in such situations. It cannot be contended that two agreeing states do not have any power to enter into an agreement, de hors the provisions of sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act. The limitations and regulations contemplated in sub-section (5) of Section 88 of the Act can apply only to situations covered under this statutory provision and not otherwise. 15. Therefore, the argument cannot be accepted and the judgments and rulings of the Supreme Court and a Division Bench of this court do not cover the present situation. 16. In so far as the argument of depriving of equal opportunity to persons like the petitioners in WP No 13637 of 2008 is concerned, while it is true that the scheme of Chapter V of the Act does envisage a fair and equal opportunity to all aspiring applicants, particularly as grant of stage carriage permit is an action of distribution of the largesse of the state, being distributed in favour of person/s and therefore an equal opportunity is a mandate of the Constitution as envisaged in Article 14 which operates and will be violated when the state indulges in discriminatory acts vis-à-vis similarly situated persons or indulges in arbitrary act in general, persons like the petitioners in this petition cannot be said to be on par with persons who are existing operators, who are already operating by stage carriage permits issued earlier and who are operating on such valid permits, who definitely stand on a different on a footing and are already at an advantageous situation than persons like the petitioners, who aspire to enter into this arena later. Existing operators and aspiring applicants do not constitute one class of persons but come under different categories and are not situated in identical or even similar circumstances. 17. Existing operators and aspiring applicants do not constitute one class of persons but come under different categories and are not situated in identical or even similar circumstances. 17. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 18. This apart, it is to be noticed that the existing operators are all persons who have been operating in the other state also and with the countersignature granted in the other state, which virtually means there is already consent by the other state for the interstate part of the route operational through the existing routes. Therefore also, the present situation in respect of the routes and the persons figuring in Annexure-VIII and IX to the agreement cannot be said are situations where there is an interstate permit which had been granted unilaterally by one state and even for argument’s sake, if it was so initially at some point of time by the periodic and regular countersignature by other state all along and all these years, it has become a permit granted in one state and having the consent of other countersigning state and therefore this is not a situation covered by law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of ASHWANI KUMAR [supra] as was sought to be applied and followed by this court in the case of SULOCHANA DAMODHAR [supra]. 19. It is for these reasons, I do not find any illegality, statutorily or otherwise, nor any constitutional lacunae in the draft agreement at Annexure-A and in respect of the situations covered as is indicated in respect of the permits and persons covered under Annexure-VIII and IX to the agreement. It is therefore, these two writ petitions are dismissed. 20. In view of dismissal of the writ petitions, all pending applications in Misc W. Nos. 7633, 7699, 7701, 7702, 7703, 7868, 7869, 7877 and 8416 of 2010 in WP No 28114 of 2009 and Misc W. Nos. 9101 & 9102 of 2009, 10, 2312, 7634, 7684, 7870, 7871 and 7876 of 2010 in WP No 13637 of 2008 will have no consequences and they are accordingly dismissed.