Judgment :- 1. The 1st respondent had filed an application under the provisions of the Workmen Compensation Act, Commissioner, 1923, claiming compensation from the 2nd respondent and the appellant, in respect of the injuries sustained by him in a motor vehicle accident which occurred on 13.10.2005. The 2nd respondent is the owner of Maxi cab Tempo traveler bearing registration No.KA-05-B-3731, which had been insured by the appellant, as on 13.10.2005. The 1st respondent was employed by the 2nd respondent as a driver to drive the said vehicle. An accident involving the said vehicle occurred on 13.10.2005 and the 1st respondent sustained injuries, which arose out of and in the course of his employment. Though injuries were sustained and there was partial permanent disability resulting in loss of earning capacity, the 2nd respondent/employer, who was liable to pay compensation, did not pay the compensation, which resulted in an application being filed before the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, against the 2nd respondent and the appellant. 2. To the application, the 2nd respondent filed statement dated 18.02.2009, wherein he admitted the jural relationship, the occurrence of the accident, sustaining of injuries by the employee and the vehicle having been insured by the appellant with policy No.072300/31/04/08696 for the period from 23.03.2005 to 22.03.2006. However, the quantum of compensation claimed was questioned. The appellant filed its statement of objections on 08.11.2006 and contested the claim. 3. Issues were framed. The applicant deposed. He also examined Dr. S. Ramachandra, Orthopaedic Surgeon, Bowring & Lady Curzon Hospital, Bangalore. Ex.P-1 to Ex.P-9 were marked. No rebuttal evidence was adduced by the insured and insurer. Noticing that, on account of the injuries sustained in the accident there is partial permanent disability sustained by the employment/applicant, the claim application was allowed in part and an award for Rs.1,31,082/-with interest at 12% from 13.11.2005 was passed. This appeal is directed against the said award. 4. Sri. Arun Ponappa, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that, the Commissioner is not justified in awarding interest at 12% p.a. on the compensation amount w.e.f. 13.11.2005 and the date from which the interest was awarded is contrary to the law laid down in the case of Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., Vs. Mohammed Nasir & Others, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 3717. Ltd., Vs. Mohammed Nasir & Others, reported in 2009 AIR SCW 3717. Learned counsel submits that the compensation amount cannot ‘fail due’ so long as the same is not assessed as held in the case of Kamla Chaturvedi Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in 2009 ACJ 115 (SC). According to the learned counsel, the interest on the award amount becomes payable only from the date the compensation amount is assessed and ordered by the Commissioner. Learned counsel placed reliance also on the decision in the case of Pal Raj Vs. N.E.K.R.T.C. reported in (2010) 10 SCC 347 . 5. Learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent/claimant, on the other hand by placing reliance on the decision in the case of Sri. Aleemudin & Others Vs. Divisional Manager, M/s. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., Gulbarga, reported in ILR 2009 Kar 1422, contended that, the liability to pay interest will arise with the expiry of 30 days period from the date of accident in view of the provisions contained in S.4-A(3) of the Act and the Commissioner is justified in directing payment of compensation with interest w.e.f. 13.11.2005, since the accident in question occurred on 13.10.2005. Learned counsel submits that, the matter being squarely covered by the decision on which the reliance was placed by him, the impugned judgment and award being in consonance therewith, the appeal does not raise any substantial question of law for consideration. 6. In view of the rival contentions and the record of the case which I have perused, the question that arises for determination in this appeal is: What should be the starting point for computation of the amount of interest in a proceeding for compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923? 7. S.3 of the Act deals with the employer’s liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) provides that, the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if personal injury is caused to a workman by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The employer therefore becomes liable to pay the compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by an accident. The liability to pay compensation arises not from the date of order of assessment, but from the date of accident itself. S.4-A deals with compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default. The employer therefore becomes liable to pay the compensation as soon as the personal injury is caused to the workman by an accident. The liability to pay compensation arises not from the date of order of assessment, but from the date of accident itself. S.4-A deals with compensation to be paid when due and penalty for default. Subsection (3) confers jurisdiction on the Commissioner to direct the employer to pay the interest on the amount due if it is found that the employer is in default in paying the compensation due under the Act, within one month from the date it fell due. 8. In Pratap Narain Singh Deo Vs. Srinivas Sabata, reported in AIR 1976 SC 222 , the Apex Court has held as follows: “(7) Section 3 of the Act deals with the employer’s liability for compensation. Sub-section (1) of that section provides that the employer shall be liable to pay compensation if ‘personal injury is caused to a workman by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment’. It was not the case of the employer that the right to compensation was taken away under sub-section (5) of Section 3 because of the institution of a suit in a civil court for damages, in respect of the injury, against the employer or any other person. The employer therefore became liable to pay the compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the workman by the accident which admittedly arose out of and in the course of the employment. It is therefore futile to contend that the compensation did not fall due until after the Commissioner’s order dated 6.5.1969 under Section 19. What the section provides is that if any question arises in any proceeding under the Act as to the liability of any person to pay compensation or as to the amount or duration of the compensation it shall in default of agreement, be settled by the Commissioner. There is, therefore, nothing to justify the argument that the employer’s liability to pay compensation under Section 3, in respect of the injury, was suspended until after the settlement contemplated by Section 19. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary”. 9. In Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. The appellant was thus liable to pay compensation as soon as the aforesaid personal injury was caused to the appellant, and there is no justification for the argument to the contrary”. 9. In Kerala State Electricity Board Vs. Valsala K. reported in 2000 ACJ 5 (SC). It has been held as follows: “(2) Various High Courts in the country while dealing with the claim for compensation under Workmen’s Compensation Act have uniformly taken the view that the relevant date for determining the rights and liabilities of the parties is the date of accident.” 10. In the case of Pal Raj (supra), the appellant was employed as a driver in the respondent Corporation and during the course of employment, met with an accident and sustained grievous injuries. A claim having been made before the Commissioner to direct payment of compensation, an award was passed to pay the determined amount with interest at 12% p.a. from the date of filing of claim petition. An appeal was filed by the Corporation wherein the question raised was: Whether the percentage of disability taken by the Commissioner was against the weight of the medical evidence adduced in the matter? 11. The appeal having been allowed in part and the award having been reduced, by also holding that, there is error in awarding interest from the date of filing of the claim petition and holding that, the employee is entitled to interest on the compensation amount only after 30 days from the date of passing of the award, the said judgment was questioned before the Apex Court, wherein, taking notice of the alternate employment given to the employee, it was held that, the same cannot be ignored in computing the amount of compensation which the employee was entitled to. The appeal was disposed of accordingly. No ratio of law with regard to date from which the interest on the award amount is payable has been laid down. The case has been decided on the facts and circumstances which arose for consideration therein. 12. The decisions in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Vs. Mubasir Ahmed – 2007 ACJ 845 (SC) and Kamla Chaturvedi Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (supra) were noticed in the case of Sri. Aleemuddin & Others (supra) and it was held as follows: “8. 12. The decisions in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd., Vs. Mubasir Ahmed – 2007 ACJ 845 (SC) and Kamla Chaturvedi Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (supra) were noticed in the case of Sri. Aleemuddin & Others (supra) and it was held as follows: “8. Keeping in mind the ratio of law laid down in the case referred to supra, it is just and necessary to state that the larger Bench decision in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) appears to have not been brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, when the decision in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. Vs. Mubasir Ahmed and Kamala Chaturvedis Case (Supra) were delivered. The said two decisions are by Benches to two Hon’ble Judges of the Apex Court, whereas, the ration of law laid down in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s case, which has been followed in the subsequent cases, was rendered by a quorum of more than two Hon’ble Judges. Under Article-141 of the Constitution of India, the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is binding on all the Courts in the country. However, in the event if there is a conflict on the question of law in two decisions, while considering the question of law on the point and interpretation of statue, this Court is required to follow the course of action as has been laid down by the larger Full Bench of this Court in the case of Govindanaik G. Kalaghatigi (supra). 9. In view of the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo’s (Supra), which is the binding precedent in regard to the expression ‘fell due” appearing in Section-4-A(1) and (3) of the Act, following and applying the said ratio to the facts of the present case, it has to be held that the amount of compensation becomes due on expiry of one month from the date of accident and if the same is not paid or deposited, interest becomes payable after the expiry of one month period from the date of the workmen sustaining injuries due to an accident in the course of his employment and not after 30 days from the date of order/award passed by the Commissioner. The learned Commissioner has erred in not applying the law, as enunciated in the case of Pratap Narain Singh Deo (supra) and in not awarding the interest after expiry of 30 days from the date of the accident. Hence, the contentions of the learned Counsel for respondent are unacceptable. Substantial question of law stands answered accordingly.” 13. The sole question urged for consideration in this appeal was the question which was considered and decided in the case of Sri. Aleemudin (supra). Since the question raised and urged for consideration has already been decided in the case of Sri Aleemudin, for the very same reasons, the contention urged being untenable, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as devoid of merit. In the result, the appeal is dismissed with costs. Transfer the amount in deposit to the office of the commissioner for necessary action.