JUDGMENT : K.K. Tated, J. Heard learned senior counsel for petitioner and learned counsel for respondents. By this petition under Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India, petitioner challenges the order dated December 24, 1998 passed by Industrial Court, Thane, in Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 holding that the respondent original complainant is entitled to reinstatement and also 70% back wages. 2. Being aggrieved by the said order dated December 24, 1998 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane, the petitioner original respondent No. 1 preferred present writ petition under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. A few facts of the matter are as under : The petitioner-company is a Public Limited Company incorporated under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act, 1956, having its head office at Bhandup, Mumbai and the Ferrous Foundry Works at Thane engaging about 600 employees. 4. The respondent original complainant filed Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 in the Industrial Court at Thane, in the matter of unfair labour practices as defined under Item 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV to the M.R.T.U. and PULP Act, 1971. The respondent was in employment of petitioner company since August 1, 1975 as senior fitter in Maintenance Department. However, the respondent left the services of the petitioner company from April 20, 1977 and rejoined on March 7, 1978 Since then the respondent was in the employment with the petitioner company. 5. On or about October 1986, the employees of the petitioner-company put up a demand for the bonus. However, the same was declined by the petitioner-company. Thereafter, the petitioner-company declared lock out from January 10, 1987 Because of; declaration of lock out, Association of Engineering Workers filed a Complaint (ULP) No. 16/1987 against the petitioner alleging that the lock up declared by them is illegal. The Industrial Court passed an interim order on; March 10, 1987 to the effect that the notice dated January 9, 1987 issued by the petitioner does not constitute lock out. 6. The Association then filed a Revision which was ultimately dismissed on August 26, 1987. However, the members of Association of Engineering Workers who were working at Thane Foundry continued to resort to the illegal strike from January 10, 1987 to March 27, 1987 disregarding the notices issued by the petitioner. 6. The Association then filed a Revision which was ultimately dismissed on August 26, 1987. However, the members of Association of Engineering Workers who were working at Thane Foundry continued to resort to the illegal strike from January 10, 1987 to March 27, 1987 disregarding the notices issued by the petitioner. Therefore, the petitioner issued a final notice individually to all the workmen calling upon them to report to duty latest by March 2, 1988 However, the workmen did not, respond and therefore, the petitioner issued individual notices of discharge on March 24, 1988 to 321 workmen then on the rolls including the respondent and also displayed the names of the workmen to whom the notices were issued on the notice board outside the main gate of the company/factory. In view of the illegal strike resorted to by the workmen for a period of one year, the petitioner-company by way of abundant caution discharged them under the model standing order and forwarded alongwith the notice, cheque for 13 days wages in lieu of notice. 7. During the same period, another Union namely, Engineering and General Mazdoor Sangh filed a Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 before the Labour Court, Thane, on April 28, 1988 praying for reinstatement of the said 321 workmen with full wages and continuity of services from March 24, 1988 and for declaration of the letter dated March 24, 1988 as null and void. 8. In the mean while, the Engineering and General Mazdoor Sangh, the Complainant in Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 requested the petitioner-company to start the factory and assured that the workmen would give maximum co-operation in achieving maximum production and will maintain discipline and good behaviour and no further demands of the financial nature would be made. After detailed discussion and negotiation the petitioner agreed to absorb 120 workmen out of 257, 64 having already resigned and further agreed to give compensation to the balance at the rate of 45 days wages for every nine completed years of the service up to January 9, 1987 over and above other terminal dues. The said settlement was executed on September 4, 1989 Some of the relevant paragraphs of Memorandum of Settlement dated September 4, 1989 are as under: 1. The said settlement was executed on September 4, 1989 Some of the relevant paragraphs of Memorandum of Settlement dated September 4, 1989 are as under: 1. The Union and all the workmen accept and agree that the order of cessation dated March 24, 1988 is valid and legal and was justified and that in respect of the same no controversy lies and do not dispute the same in view of the settlement reached hereby. 3. The Union and the workmen agree and accept to withdraw the said Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 and declare hereby that no dispute in the matter of cessation of employments survives. This Settlement shall come into effect on and after the withdrawal of the said Complaint. 4. The Company upon the withdrawal of the said Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 agrees to employ 120 workmen whose names are given in the list annexed as "Annexure - A" within a period of six months in a phased manner. Those workmen will be taken as per requirements from time to time and within six months, subject to the force majeure, all of 120 workmen will be employed. However, the first batch of such workmen will resume duty two days' after the said withdrawal of the Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1998 from the Vth Labour Court, Bombay subject to the other clauses of this Settlement. 6. The Union undertakes and agrees that this Settlement will be signed by all the workmen and the Union. 11. It is agreed that the Company shall treat those workmen whose names are given in Annexure A as in continuous service although they will not be entitled to and be paid wages, leave, gratuity, provident fund, ex gratia, retrenchment compensation or any benefits in respect of the period from January 10, 1987 upto the date the workmen are taken in employment. 16. The Company agrees to give preference in employment to such of the workmen who have ceased to be in employment on and from March 24, 1988 and shown in Annexure 'B' hereto if and when any vacancy arises in future and if they are found suitable for the same. 16. The Company agrees to give preference in employment to such of the workmen who have ceased to be in employment on and from March 24, 1988 and shown in Annexure 'B' hereto if and when any vacancy arises in future and if they are found suitable for the same. It is clearly understood and agreed that such of workmen who are given employment shall be new employees and their services shall be reckoned from the date of fresh employment and will be paid wages and other benefits applicable to temporary workmen till they are made permanent by the Company as per its rules and practice. 18. It is agreed that this Settlement will be signed by all the workmen mentioned in Annexure 'A' and 'B' hereto and unless it is so signed within two months from the date hereof, this Settlement will automatically, become non-operative and not binding of any of the parties. However, in view of the Union having majority of the above workmen as its members the Company agrees to waive signature of all the workmen if it is satisfied that in its opinion only few workmen have not signed the Settlement. In that case those few workmen will not be entitled to any benefit of this Settlement including those mentioned in Clause 7 hereof. The Union agrees not to take up the individual case of such few workmen. It is agreed that those workmen mentioned in Annexure B who have been provided with residential facility will vacate the same before they are paid their dues under this Settlement. 9. In view of the Memorandum of Settlement dated September 4, 1989 the Engineering and General Mazdoor Sangh, Thane and petitioner-company filed joint praecipe/application before the 5th Labour Court at Bombay in Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 stating that parties to the said Complaint have arrived at settlement out of Court and therefore, the Complaint be dismissed for want of prosecution. The said consent praecipe/application was filed before the Vth Labour Court in September 1989. On the basis of said Application for disposal of Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988, the Labour Court passed an order on September 5, 1989 and disposed of the said complaint. 10. As per Memorandum of Settlement dated September 4, 1989 leaving 11 members including the respondent, rest of 257 members of the Union/Sangh have signed the said settlement and accepted terms and conditions thereof. 11. 10. As per Memorandum of Settlement dated September 4, 1989 leaving 11 members including the respondent, rest of 257 members of the Union/Sangh have signed the said settlement and accepted terms and conditions thereof. 11. The respondent No. 1, on October 26, 1989 filed Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 in the Industrial Court at Thane, complaining unfair labour practices as defined in Item No. 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 seeking declaration that the action of the petitioner-Company of not allowing the petitioner to resume duty on March 28, 1988 is illegal retrenchment and to direct the petitioner to reinstate the respondent with effect from March 20, 1988 with full back wages and with continuity of service. In the said complaint, the petitioner-company filed their affidavit in reply dated February 4, 1998 opposing the reliefs claimed by the respondent on the ground that the respondent failed to disclose any cause of action in the said complaint. They submitted that the settlement dated September 4, 1989 signed with the Union/Sangh representing the workmen is binding not only on those workmen who have signed the same but all the members. They further raised the point of limitation stating that the cause of action arose on March 24, 1988 where as, the respondent filed Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 on October 27, 1989 which is barred by limitation. Not only that the respondent failed to file any application for condonation of delay along with the complaint. They further raised objection of maintainability of the said complaint on the ground that the previous complaint filed by the Union being Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 before the 5th Labour Court was for the same cause of action and the respondent is member of the said Union/Sangh. Therefore, for the same cause of action, respondent cannot file the present complaint. 12. Considering the objections raised by the petitioner, the Industrial Court by its order dated December 24, 1998 held that petitioner committed unfair labour practices under Item No. 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and directed petitioner to reinstate the respondent in service with 70% back wages. 13. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court is against justice, equity and good conscience and same is liable to be set aside. 13. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court is against justice, equity and good conscience and same is liable to be set aside. He further submits that the Industrial Court ought to have held that the complaint filed by the respondent under Item 5, 9 and 10 of the Schedule IV of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 on October 26, 1989 was barred by limitation. The Industrial Court failed to appreciate that the respondent failed to file any application for condonation of delay. 14. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as filed, because the jurisdiction to entertain a complaint from the retrenched workman, by declaring the retrenchment illegal rests with the Labour Court, as per Section 7 of the MRTU and PULP Act. 15. The learned senior counsel further submits that the learned Member of Industrial Court failed to appreciate that the complaint of respondent No. 1 was primarily concerned with his discharge from the services of the petitioner from March 24, 1988 for which the Industrial Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint as it is exclusively under the jurisdiction of the Labour Court. In support of this submission, he relies on the reported judgment in the matter of Dilip s/o Indrabhanji Wawande v. Industrial Court, Nagpur and Others, 1996-I-LLJ-842 (Bom) and A-Z (Industrial) Premises Co-op. Society Ltd. v. A.T. Utekar and Others 1997 (2) CLR 1033. 16. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner-company submits that the Industrial Court ought to have held that the Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 filed by the respondent was not maintainable in view of the principle of res judicata. He submits that initially, for the same cause of action, the Engineering and General Mazdoor Sangh, Thane had filed Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 under Item No. 1 (a), (b), (d), and (f) of Schedule IV of MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 and for directing petitioner-company to reinstate all the workmen with full back wages and continuity of service from the date of termination dated March 24, 1988. 17. The respondent was a member of the said Union. 17. The respondent was a member of the said Union. The said complaint was withdrawn by the Union in view of memorandum of settlement dated September 4, 1989 therefore, filing of present complaint by the respondent in his individual capacity for the same cause of action is hit by principle of res judicata. 18. The learned senior counsel submits that admittedly Association of Engineering Workers (hereinafter referred to as "the Sangh") filed Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 for reinstatement of the workmen whose services were terminated by the letter dated March 24, 1988. The Sangh arrived at the settlement on January 4, 1989. One of the clause of which was withdrawal of the Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 in which the respondent original complainant was also concerned. Pursuant to the settlement, an application was made to the Labour Court on September 5, 1989 for dismissal of the Complaint for want of prosecution. The Labour Court by its order dated September 5, 1989 was pleased to dismiss the Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988. The present complaint was filed by respondent original complainant on October 26, 1989 in which the substantial prayers are about the legality or his termination; therefore, the fresh complaint on the same cause of action cannot be filed. In support of his contention, he relies on the judgment in the matter of G.B. Hingurani. Partner, Fashion Apparels, Mumbai v. Vinayak Narayan Govekar and Another, 2011-II-LLJ-817 (Bom). In that case, our High Court held that on the same point second complaint is not tenable. Head note of the said authority reads as under: Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act. 1971 -Section 28-ULP Complaint-Closure of establishment - Earlier ULP Complaint No. 743/1991 was settled by all the workers and disposed of on March 18, 1998, except by one workman i.e., respondent No. 1 (present complainant) -petitioner's grievance that this 2nd complaint is not maintainable at law, rejected - Hence this petition - Held that in view of law settled on the point this 2nd complaint is not entertainable - It is unsustainable as principles of res judicata, estoppel are also relevant in industrial disputes - Issues already settled in one proceeding, cannot be reagitated - Whether matter was decided on merits or not, is irrelevant. 19. 19. He also relies on the judgment in the matter of Maharashtra Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti and Another v. Horizon, the Beach Hotel and Others, 2006-IV-LLJ (Suppl)-50 (Bom). In that case, our High Court held that fresh complaint for the same cause of action is not maintainable after withdrawal of the earlier one. The Head note of the said judgment reads as under: Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 -Item 6 of Schedule II and Item 9 of Schedule IV-Code of Civil Procedure -Order 23 Rule 1 - Maintainability of fresh complaint after withdrawal of earlier one -respondent No. 1 runs to hotel at Juhu-Mumbai - Bharatiya Kamgar Karmachari Sangh is recognised union of workers in the establishment of respondent No. 1 - In June 1999 Industrial relations between management and workers became strained - According to Management, workers resorted to illegal strike while according to workers, management was preventing them from attending the work -On July 10, 1999, aforesaid recognised union filed complaint of unfair labour practice under Item 6 of Schedule II and Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act alleging that respondent No. 1 has effected illegal lock-out - On February 24, 2000, said recognised union withdrew the complaint -On April 28, 2000, petitioner nos. 2 and 29 other workmen filed another complaint alleging same facts which is held by Industrial Court as not maintainable and hence this petition - Following the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarguja Transport Service Vs. State Transport Appellate Tribunal, M.P., Gwalior and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 5 , it is held that principle contained in Order 23 Rule 1 of C.P.C. would also apply equally to the proceeding before Labour or Industrial Court and as such the Industrial Court has rightly held the second complaint to be not maintainable. 20. He also relics on the judgment in the matter of Association of Engineering Works v. Oriental Rubeer Industries and Others LNIND 1993 Bom 383. In that case also our High Court held that if the earlier complaint on the same fact was dismissed then the subsequent complaint is not maintainable to agitate the same issue. Paragraph No. 7 of the judgment reads thus: In view of the above position, the question of delay loses all significance. In that case also our High Court held that if the earlier complaint on the same fact was dismissed then the subsequent complaint is not maintainable to agitate the same issue. Paragraph No. 7 of the judgment reads thus: In view of the above position, the question of delay loses all significance. However, it may be mentioned that the contention of the petitioner before the Industrial Court that the closure of an establishment gives rise to a continuous cause of action and, as such, no period of limitation applies, does not appear to be tenable in law. As regards the decision of the Supreme Court in Mst. Katiji, (supra), it may be observed that the Supreme Court in the above case has given guidelines to the Courts to take a liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, but the said judgment should not be read in a manner which may amount to giving a good-bye to all period of limitation prescribed by the statutes. The concept of liberal approach is only a departure from the earlier tough approach which required a person to explain the delay for each day. It should not be; stretched too far because after all periods of limitation are intended to bring an end to the litigation at some point of time and they must receive due consideration. Condonation of delay will depend on facts; and circumstances of each case. However, in the present case, that question is not very relevant in view of the fact that the second complaint is not maintainable even by application of principles of res judicata. 21. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the settlement dated September 4, 1989 is binding on respondent also. The respondent in his; deposition admitted that he was also member of the said Union/Sangh. He also stated in his deposition that he was present in the meeting of workers union, therefore, the decision taken by Union on behalf of their members is binding on each and every member in view of Section 18(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 18 of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under: 18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding: (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Section 18 of the industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads as under: 18. Persons on whom settlements and awards are binding: (1) A settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and workman otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement. Provided that, where there is a recognised union for any undertaking under any law for the time being in force, than such agreement (not being an agreement in respect of dismissal, discharge, removal retrenchment, termination of service, or suspension of an employee) shall be arrived at between the employer and the recognised union only; and such agreement shall be binding on all persons referred to in Clause (c) and Clause (d) of sub-section (3) of this Section. (2) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (3), an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall be binding on the parties to the agreement who referred the dispute to arbitration. (3) A settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings under this Act or an arbitration award in a case where a notification has been issued under sub-section (3A) of Section 10-A or an arbitration award in case where there is a recognized union for any undertaking under any law for the time being in force or an award of a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal which has become enforceable shall be binding on. (a) all parties to the industrial dispute; (b) all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to the dispute, unless the Board, arbitrator, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be records the opinion that they were so summoned without proper cause; (c) where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is an employer, his heirs, successors or assigns in respect of the establishment to which the dispute relates; (d) Where a party referred to in Clause (a) or Clause (b) is composed of workmen, all persons who were employed in the establishment or part of the establishment, as the case may be, to which the dispute relates on the date of the dispute and all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment or part. 22. He submits that the settlement was signed with the Sangh in which the Sangh accepted that the settlement dated March 24, 1988 was valid, legal and justified. 22. He submits that the settlement was signed with the Sangh in which the Sangh accepted that the settlement dated March 24, 1988 was valid, legal and justified. The respondent original complainant was listed in the settlement at serial No. 38 and admittedly, the respondent original complainant was a member of the said Sangh and that at the General body meeting a decision was taken that 120 workers would be allowed to resume duties and that the respondent original-complainant worker was present at the meeting, that in the Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 filed by the Sangh, the Sangh claimed to represent all employees and that the respondent original complainant was inducted in the complaint. He submits that it is well settled law that the settlement u/s 2 (p) reads with Section 18 (1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is binding on all members of the Sangh. In support of this contention, he relies on the judgment in the matter of P. Virudhachalam and Others Vs. Management of Lotus Mills and Another, (1998) 1 SCC 650 . In that case, the Apex Court held that the settlement reached during the conciliation proceedings is binding, not only on members of signatory unions but also on the workmen whose Union, having participated in proceedings, refused to sign settlement, the settlement ipso-facto binds all workmen who were parties to Industrial dispute. Paragraph nos. 8 and 9 of that judgment read as under at pp. 394 to 396 of LLJ: 8. It has to be kept in view that the Act is based on the principle of collective bargaining for resolving industrial disputes and for maintaining industrial peace. The principle of industrial democracy is the bedrock of the Act. The employer or a class of employers on the one hand and the accredited representatives of the workmen on the other are expected to resolve the industrial dispute amicably as far as possible by entering into the settlement outside the conciliation proceedings or if no settlement is reached and the dispute reaches conciliator even during conciliation proceedings. In all these negotiations based on collective bargaining individual workman necessarily recedes in back ground. The reins of bargaining on his behalf is handed over to the union representing such workman. The unions espouse the common cause on behalf of all their members. In all these negotiations based on collective bargaining individual workman necessarily recedes in back ground. The reins of bargaining on his behalf is handed over to the union representing such workman. The unions espouse the common cause on behalf of all their members. Consequently, settlement arrived at by them with management would bind at least their members and if such settlement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings, it would bind even non-members. Thus, settlements are the live wires under the Act for ensuring industrial peace and prosperity. Section 10(2) of the Act highlights this position by providing that where the parties to an industrial dispute apply in the prescribed manner, whether jointly or separately, for a reference of the dispute to a Board, Court, Labour Court. Tribunal or National Tribunal, the appropriate Government, if satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party, shall make the reference accordingly. Individual workman comes into the picture only in connection with a limited class of industrial disputes as indicated by Section 2-A of the Act dealing with discharges, dismissals, retrenchments or otherwise termination of services of an individual workman. Save and except the aforesaid class of disputes, which an individual workman can raise, rest of the industrial disputes including disputes pertaining to illegal lock-out, lay-off and lay-off compensation have to be filtered through the process of collective bargaining and they are disputes of general nature or class disputes wherein individual workman by himself has no say. In this connection, it is profitable to keep in view a decision of thee-Member Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Prasad Vishwakrama v. Chairman Industrial Tribunal Patna and Others 1961-I-LLJ-504 wherein Das Gupta, J., speaking for this Court made the following pertinent observations on the scheme of the Act, at the time when Section 2-A was not on the statute book: It is now well settled that a dispute between an individual workman and an employer cannot be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act unless it is taken up by a union of the workmen or by a considerable number of workmen. In Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal, 1957-I-LLJ-27, Mr. In Central Provinces Transport Service Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal, 1957-I-LLJ-27, Mr. Justice Venkatarama Ayyar speaking for the Court pointed out after considering numerous decisions in this matter that the preponderance of judicial opinion was clearly in favour of the view that a dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute but it may become one if it is taken up by a union or a number of workmen. Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2(k) is wide enough to cover disputes between: an employer and a single employee observed the learned Judge: The scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion to settle only disputes which involve the rights of work-men as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. This view which has been re-affirmed by the Court in several later decisions recognises the great importance in modern industrial life of collective bargaining between the workmen and the employers. It is well known how before the days of collective bargaining labour was at a great disadvantage in obtaining reasonable terms for contracts of service from his employer. As trade unions developed in the country and collective bargaining became the rule and employers found it necessary and convenient to deal with the representatives of work-men, instead of individual workman, not only for the making or modification of contracts but in the matter of taking disciplinary action against one or more workmen and as regards all other disputes. The necessary corollary to this is that the individual workman is at no stage a party to the industrial dispute independently of the union. The union or those workmen who have by their sponsoring turned the individual dispute into an industrial dispute, can therefore claim to have a say in the conduct of the proceedings before the Tribunal. It is not unreasonable to think that Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an Officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member..... 9. It is not unreasonable to think that Section 3 of the Industrial Disputes Act recognises this position, by providing that the workman who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by an Officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member..... 9. Consequently, the provisions contained in the first proviso to Section 25-C of the Act would also necessarily require an agreement to be entered into on behalf of the affected class of workmen by their accredited representatives being office bearers of their union. It is easy to visualise that when lay-off has been imposed by the management in an establishment or in any department thereof, the entire body of workmen working therein would be affected by lay-off. Therefore, their grievance in connection with lay-off compensation pertaining to the period of lay-off would not be necessarily an individual grievance but would be grievance of the class of workmen as a whole affected by such layoff. If there is a binding settlement embodying an agreement on behalf of a class of workmen through their union in connection with lay-off compensation it would obviously be binding on all the members of the union and if such settlement based on agreement is arrived at during conciliation proceedings it would be binding to the entire class of workmen covered by the industrial dispute regarding lay-off compensation. The individual workman can raise his grievance u/s 25-C only if his statutory right of lay-off u/s 25-C is not hedged in by any binding effect of an agreement entered into by its own union with the management, whether in or outside conciliation proceedings or even by other unions that may arrive at such settlement during the course of conciliation proceedings. Then only individual workman can have full play u/s 25-C for vindicating his right of lay-off compensation. 23. That judgment also clearly held that in the matter of Collective bargaining Individual Workman necessarily recedes to the background. He submits that the present settlement has been arrived at in the back-ground of termination of 321 workmen. The dispute covers a class of employees whose services were terminated. The respondent was admittedly a member of the Sangh and is bound by the settlement. He submits that the present settlement has been arrived at in the back-ground of termination of 321 workmen. The dispute covers a class of employees whose services were terminated. The respondent was admittedly a member of the Sangh and is bound by the settlement. He further submits that Clause 18 of the settlement only provides that those who have not signed the settlement would not be entitled to any benefits of the settlement including those mentioned in clause 7 thereof. He submits that it does not state that the settlement will not be binding on the workmen who do not sign the settlement. It only provides that the benefits of the settlement would not be given to them. The benefits are contained in Clause 7, Clause 12 regarding bonus and clause 16 regarding preference in the re-employment. 24. The learned senior counsel submits that the Complaint (ULP) No. 534/1989 filed by the respondent original complainant was barred by limitation. He submits that the respondent's services were discontinued pursuant to the order dated March 24, 1988 The respondent original complainant filed Complaint (ULP) No. 534/1989 on October 26, 1989 i.e. after nine months from the date of termination. The prayer in the said complaint was in effect for reinstatement of the respondent original complainant for illegal termination. That there was a termination of services whether legal or illegal on March 28, 1988 is an admitted position. The Sangh representating the workman including the respondent original complainant filed Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 on April 28, 1988 under Item I of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, which relates to termination alleging wrongful termination. The prayer (c) in the complaint was for reinstatement of all workmen was in effect for reinstatement from March 24, 1988. He submits that the trial Court i.e. the Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that there was a continuing cause of action and therefore, the complaint filed by the respondent original complainant was well within time. He submits that in case of termination, the question of continuous cause of action can never arise. In support of this contention, he relies on the judgment in the matter of Association of Engineering Works v. Oriental Rubberer Industries and Others (supra). In that case, our High Court held that once the closure notice is issued, cause of action arises for the employees who were affected. In support of this contention, he relies on the judgment in the matter of Association of Engineering Works v. Oriental Rubberer Industries and Others (supra). In that case, our High Court held that once the closure notice is issued, cause of action arises for the employees who were affected. There is no question of any continuity of cause of action. Head note II of the judgment reads thus: II. Limitation - Bar of - Condonation -Complaint of Unfair Labour Practice - Filed in 1987 as regards notice of closure dated November 3, 1980 - Submission that there should be liberal approach as regards condonation of delay - Held that the concept of liberal approach is only a departure from the earlier tough approach which required a person to explain the delay for each day but the same should not be stretched too far because after all periods of limitation are intended to bring an end to the litigation at some point of time and they must receive due consideration. 25. He further submits that admittedly in the present case, the respondent complainant did not file any application for condonation of delay, inspite of that the Industrial Court answered issue No. 5 on the matter of limitation in favour of the respondent original complainant though it was admittedly filed after more than ninety days after the occurrence of the cause of action. 26. The next submission made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of petitioner about granting of 70% back wages to the respondent original complainant. He submits that the respondent original complainant at the time of termination was employed gainfully. Admittedly, he was doing business. He in his evidence in examination-in-chief has no where stated that he was not employed any where nor he has mentioned that he was engaged in business. However, in cross-examination, the respondent original complainant admitted that he was engaged in the business of fabrication work, painting of car, and that he had a workshop. In his reexamination, it is made out that the fabrication workshop he was running during his employment was continued by him even up to February 4, 1988 when he gave evidence. Therefore, the respondent original complainant is not entitled to any back wages. He submits that the Industrial Court not only erred in directing reinstatement, but also in further directing 70% of back wages from 1987. Therefore, the respondent original complainant is not entitled to any back wages. He submits that the Industrial Court not only erred in directing reinstatement, but also in further directing 70% of back wages from 1987. In support of this submission. The learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner relies on the judgment in the matter of U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. and Another Vs. Udai Narain Pandey, (2006) 1 SCC 479 . In that judgment the Apex Court held that as a matter of course, Court should not grant back wages, it depends; upon the facts and circumstances of the each case. Head note "A" of this judgment reads thus; U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 -Sections 6-N - 60 - Back wages -respondent a daily wager terminated without complying with Section 25-F of I.D. Act -Labour Court held it illegal - Passed Award for reinstatement with full back wages -Meanwhile industrial undertaking closed w.e.f. March 26, 1993 - High Court dismissed writ petition, challenging the Award - Hence this Appeal - Held that no precise formula could be laid down as to under what circumstances, payment of full back wages, should be allowed - it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case - On facts of instant case, Award of back wages to the extent of 25% for the period from April 1, 1987 to March 26, 1994 would be justified. 27. He also relies on judgment in the matter of J.K. Synthetics Ltd. Vs. K.P. Agrawal and Another, (2007) 2 SCC 433 . 28. He submits that as the respondent original complainant was gainfully employed during that entire period, the Industrial Court erred in not considering these facts before passing order holding that the petitioners are liable to pay 70% back wages to the respondent original complainant. 29. On these submissions and authorities, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner submits that the impugned judgment and award passed by the Industrial Court is liable to be set aside. 30. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submits that there is no substance in the present writ petition as the Industrial Court has considered each and every fact of the matter and after considering oral as well as documentary evidence directed the petitioner to reinstate respondent original complaint with 70% back wages. 30. On the other hand, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submits that there is no substance in the present writ petition as the Industrial Court has considered each and every fact of the matter and after considering oral as well as documentary evidence directed the petitioner to reinstate respondent original complaint with 70% back wages. He submits that the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the complaint filed by the respondent-original complainant. He submits that the Section 5 of the Industrial Disputes Act gives jurisdiction to the Industrial Court to try and entertain the complaint of unfair labour practices, except the unfair labour practice defined under Item-1 of the Schedule IV of the Act. He submits that the respondent-original complainant filed the present complaint under Item 5, 9 and 10 of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. Therefore, the Industrial Court has jurisdiction to entertain the present complaint. In support of his contention, he relies on the judgment in the matter of S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Employees' Union Vs. S.G. Chemicals and Dyes Trading Limited and Another, (1986) 2 SCC 624 and in the matter of Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan and Another AIR 1998 SC 168. He submits that in both these cases, the Apex Court held that the statutory provisions constitute the part of the contract of employment and if pursuant to the breach of contract, the services are terminated, then same is covered under item 9 of schedule IV of the Act and therefore, the complaint of unfair labour practice is maintainable and the Industrial Court have jurisdiction to entertain the same. 31. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent original complainant submits that the withdrawal of the complaint filed by the Sangh would not come in any way of the respondent original complainant in agitating his cause of termination. He submits that in the present complaint, the respondent original complainant agitated his personal rights and therefore, there is no question of applicability of principles of res judicata. The learned senior counsel further submits that the settlement dated September 4, 1989 entered by the Sangh has put the seal of legality and validity on the termination of the employees. He submits that in the present complaint, the respondent original complainant agitated his personal rights and therefore, there is no question of applicability of principles of res judicata. The learned senior counsel further submits that the settlement dated September 4, 1989 entered by the Sangh has put the seal of legality and validity on the termination of the employees. He submits that the said settlement cannot bind the individual till he accepts the same in his individual capacity to put an end to the dispute between the workmen and employer. He submits that admittedly, the respondent-original complainant-workman was not party to the said settlement nor he had accepted the benefit arising out of the settlement and therefore, under the law that settlement is not binding on him. He submits that the settlement can be arrived at between the parties at dispute and in case of the termination of the employment, it must be with the individual workman, it can be said at the most that the Union can act as the mediating agency to resolve the dispute but the Union cannot settle the dispute of termination of employment by-passing the individual as it is not the issue of collective bargaining. 32. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent original complainant submits that the respondent/original complainant filed the present complaint during the period of limitation. He submits that the petitioner company is covered by the Chapter V - B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thus, it is imperative on the part of the petitioner company to follow the requirement of the Section 25-N before effecting the termination' of the respondent. This admittedly, not complied with and thus, as per the schedule of the said Section 25-N(7), the respondent is in the deemed employment of the petitioner-company and entitled to the whole wages. Thus, it is submitted that the cause of action continues. 33. In respect of gainful employment the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent original complainant submits that the scheme of Section 25-N(7) clearly mandates that the effect of the non-compliance entitles the workman to full wages with the consequential benefits in law. He submits that in any event, the Industrial Court has refused 30% of the wages to the respondent original complainant-worker. 34. He submits that in any event, the Industrial Court has refused 30% of the wages to the respondent original complainant-worker. 34. In support of all these submissions, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of respondent original complainant relies on following authorities: (1) Oswal Agro Furane Ltd. and Another v. Oswal Agro Furane Workers Union and Others AIR 2005 SC 1555 (2) Bombay Municipal Executive Staff Union and Others v. Municipal Commissioner and Others, 1993-III-LLJ (Suppl)-135 (3) Mumbai Mazdoor Sabha v. S.A. Patil, Member, Industrial Court, Bombay and Another, 1994-II-LLJ-891 (4) Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Hindustan Lever Employees' Union and Others, 1999-II-LLJ-804 (Bom). (5) Dattatraya Shankarrao Kharde and Others v. Executive Engineer, Chief Gate Erection Unit No. 2, Nagpur and Another, 1994-I-LLJ-395. (6) Uptron India Limited v. Shammi Bhan and Another (supra). (7) R.K. Shinde and Others v. Shekoba Auto Pvt. Ltd. and Another, 2008-II-LLJ-1037 (Bom) (8) Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation, Nagpur, through its Divisional Controller, Bhandara v. Premlal s/o Khatri Gajbhiye, 2003-II-LLJ-1108(Bom). (9) Nicks (India) Tools Vs. Ram Surat and Another, (2004) 8 SCC 222 (10) Delta Theatres Pvt. Ltd. v. Bombay Labour Union, 1995-III-LLJ (Suppl)-257 (Bom). 35. I have gone through the impugned judgment dated December 24, 1998 passed by the Industrial Court, Thane in Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989. I have also gone through the authorities cited by both the sides. After considering the submissions made by the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-original complaint the following three points arises for determination of this Court. (1) Whether the settlement dated September 4, 1989 between the Sangh and the Petitioner company is binding upon the respondent-original complainant-employee? (2) Whether the petitioner-Company violated the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act? (3) Whether the Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 filed by the respondent original complainant-employee barred by the principles of res judicata and barred by limitation? 36. Admittedly, in the present case, the Sangh filed Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 in the Labour Court at Thane under item 1 (a), (b), (d), (f) of Schedule IV of the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971 with following reliefs: (a) Hold and declare that the respondent have engaged in Unfair Labour Practice within the meaning of Item No. 1 (a), (b), (d) and (f) of Schedule IV of the M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. (b) Direct the respondent to cease and desist from engaging in Unfair Labour Practice complained herein above; (c) Direct the respondent company to reinstate all the workmen with full back wages and continuity of service from the day of alleged letter dated March 24, 1988. (d) Declare the letters dated August 24, 1988 addressed to the workers that they have ceased from the employment of the company as null and void. (e) Direct the respondent to pay the compensation to all the workers for hardships caused to the workmen. (f) Pending the hearing and final disposal of the case the complaint the Honourable Court may be pleased to grant interim and/or ad-interim injunctions in terms of prayers below: (i) Restrain the respondent and their directors, officers, servants, agents, subordinates etc. from removing and/or alienating in any manner whatsoever the plant, machinery and/or other assets of the company, from disposing the factory property like movable and immovable of the respondent company. (ii) Direct the respondent to pay 80% of the wages to all the affected workmen regularly on pay day every month. OR Direct the respondent to employ the workers and pay their wages regularly on the pay day. (g) Cost of this complaint alongwith compensation for the hardship caused to the workers. (h) Any other reliefs to meet the ends of justice or this Honourable Court deems fit and proper be granted in favour of the complainants member. 37. During the pendency of the said Complaint, the settlement was arrived at between the Sangh and the petitioner. Therefore, the Sangh filed an application before the Labour Court stating that they arrived at a settlement out of Court and therefore, prayed that the complaint be dismissed for want of prosecution along with the said application they annexed copy of the settlement. Pursuant to the said application, the Labour Court passed an order on September 5, 1989 allowing the Sangh to withdraw their complaint, at that time, the Court passed following order: Complainant has withdrawn his complaint by Exhibit U-108. Withdrawal is allowed and Complaint is dismissed. 38. It is also on record that in general body meeting of the Sangh, the respondent original complainant was present and at that time, he was the member of the said Sangh. Withdrawal is allowed and Complaint is dismissed. 38. It is also on record that in general body meeting of the Sangh, the respondent original complainant was present and at that time, he was the member of the said Sangh. Therefore, the decision taken by the Sangh is binding on respondent original complainant-worker-employee also as held by the Apex Court in the matter of Vrudhachalam P. and Others v. Management of Lotus Mills and Another (supra). The settlement reached during conciliation proceedings is binding not only on members of signatory unions' but also on workmen whose union, having participated in proceedings, refused to sign settlement. Therefore, the learned Member of the Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the settlement dated September 4, 1989 was not binding on respondent original complainant. 39. The second point about the violation of the provisions of Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act, at the hands of petitioner. It is to be noted that the petitioner acted as per settlement dated September 4, 1989 between the Sangh and them. On the basis of the said settlement, the Sangh withdrew Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 filed by them under item 1 (a), (b), (f) of schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. If the company acts on the basis of settlement with the Union, there is no question of holding that company violated Section 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. Therefore, the Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the petitioner Company violated the provisions of Sections 25-F, 25-G and 25-H of the Industrial Disputes Act. 40. In respect of the third point, whether the Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 filed by the respondent-original employee is barred by the principles of res judicata and barred by limitation. It is an admitted fact that the respondent original complainant was member of the Sangh. The Sangh on behalf of its member filed Complaint (ULP) No. 128/1988 before the Labour Court at Mumbai under Item No. a, b, f of M.R.T.U. and PULP Act, 1971. In the said complaint the Sangh made a statement that matter was settled out of the Court by settlement dated September 4, 1989. On the basis of the said settlement, the Labour Court disposed of the said complaint. In the said complaint the Sangh made a statement that matter was settled out of the Court by settlement dated September 4, 1989. On the basis of the said settlement, the Labour Court disposed of the said complaint. Therefore, for the same cause of action, respondent original complainant cannot file the second complaint as held by our High Court in the matter of G.B. Hingurani, Partner, Fashion Apparels, Mumbai v. Vinayak Narayan Govekar and Another (supra) and in the matter of Maharashtra Kamgar Sangharsh Samiti and Another v. Horizon, the Beach Hotel and Others (supra). It is barred by the principles of res judicata. 41. In respect of limitation, admittedly the respondent original complainant services were discontinued, pursuant to the order dated March 24, 1988 and he filed the present Complaint (ULP) No. 534/1989 on October 26, 1989 i.e. after 19 months from the date of termination. Therefore, this complaint is barred by limitation. The Industrial Court erred in coming to the conclusion that the complaint filed by the respondent original complainant was not barred by law of limitation. 42. As the impugned judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court cannot be sustained on the three grounds mentioned above, it is not necessary to consider the other issues raised by the parties. 43. In view of the above mentioned facts and circumstances, the judgment and order passed by the learned Member, Industrial Court, Thane dated December 24, 1988 in Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 is set aside and the Complaint filed by the respondent original complainant bearing Complaint (ULP) No. 554/1989 is dismissed. 44. No order as to costs. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents apply for stay of this order. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case, same is rejected.