ORDER : S.R. Waghmare, J. These four appeals have been filed by the petitioner Inderpal Singh u/s 482 of the Cr.P.C, being aggrieved by the order passed by the Judicial Magistrate Class-I, Indore in Criminal Case No. 1968/01, 1969/07, 217/07 and 1970/07 dated 11.-1.2010 and for quashing of the complaint filed by the respondent complainant M/s. Bridgestone India Pvt. Ltd. 2. Counsel for the petitioner has candidly admitted that these four petitions are a second round of litigation since the petitioners had been constrained to file similar petitions being aggrieved by the order of the trial Court dated 2.6.2009 rejecting the application filed by the petitioner u/s 177 of the Cr.P.C. raising objection on the issue of taking cognizance of the offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act by the Court concerned on the grounds that the trial Court lacked jurisdiction. She also admitted that this Hon'ble Court had by order dated 3.12.2009 remanded the matter back to the trial Court to pass a fresh order after considering of the facts and documents filed by the parties and after granting proper opportunity of hearing to both and the issue of jurisdiction was to be decided within a month from the date of the order. 3. Consequently the trial Court has now again passed the impugned order again rejecting the application of the petitioner filed u/s 177 of the Cr.P.C. raising objection to the jurisdiction of the trial Court to try the matter. 4. Referring to the brief facts of the case Counsel stated that in a nutshell accused Inderpal was resident of Chandigarh, his business is also situated at Chandigarh, his Bank is also in Chandigarh. The cheque has also been dishonoured when presented by the complainant by the Bank at Chandigarh. The notice of demand has also been served to the accused in Chandigarh and especially when the complainant had alleged that the Bank at Chandigarh had dishonoured the disputed cheques; the cause of action accrued to the complainant only at Chandigarh and hence the complaint ought to have been filed in a Court in Chandigarh and that this Court would not be the Court of competent jurisdiction. And thus the accused had filed application u/s 177 of the Cr.P.C. for dismissal of the complaint. Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following cases to bolster her submissions K. Bhaskaran Vs.
And thus the accused had filed application u/s 177 of the Cr.P.C. for dismissal of the complaint. Counsel for the petitioner has relied on the following cases to bolster her submissions K. Bhaskaran Vs. Sankaran Vaidhyan Balan and Another, AIR 1999 SC 3762 to state that in view of “Section 178(d) of the Cr.P.C. the complainant can choose any one of those Courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of the following five acts, the components of the offence, took place: (i) drawing of the cheque; (ii) presentation of the cheque to the Bank; (iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee Bank; (iv) giving of notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount; (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. It may therefore be an idle exercise to question jurisdiction relating to this offence. High Court in appeal rightly set aside the finding of the trial Court that it had no territorial jurisdiction because the cheque had been dishonoured in a different district, outside its jurisdiction. Further on facts, High Court rightly held that trial Court had jurisdiction as the cheque had been issued at a shop within its jurisdiction”. Further she relied on Shamshad Begum (Smt.) v. B. Mohammed, IV (2008) CCR 594 (SC) to state that “it is not necessary that concatenation of five acts constituting an offence u/s 138 of NI Act, 1881, “should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at five different localities”. And Barman Electronics Private Limited and Another v. National Panasonic India Pvt. Ltd., I (2009) BC 649 (SC) to state that issuance of notice would not give rise to cause of action to inaction of notice would and, therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court to try a criminal case is governed by the provisions of Criminal Procedure Code and not on common law principle and ordinarily Courts will have jurisdiction where the offence has been committed. She relied on Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., II (2001)BC 108 to urge that the Court constituted in the place where the drawer Bank situated would have jurisdiction to try the offence.
She relied on Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd., II (2001)BC 108 to urge that the Court constituted in the place where the drawer Bank situated would have jurisdiction to try the offence. Relying on referring to judgment of our own Court in the matter of Manjui v. Wasim Sheikh in M.Cr.C. No. 1233/2009 on 3.3.2009 Counsel contended that the Court had held that in the light of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in any one of the 5 acts of joint presentation return of cheque and giving receipt of notice can be the place of trial and all the Apex Court's judgments were considered by the Court. She also cited various other cases which more or less reiterated the same view. Counsel urged that all the five acts had taken place within the jurisdiction in the Court at Chandigarh then the learned trial Court had erred in taking cognizance of the offence u/s 138 of the NI Act at Indore and prayed that the complaint be quashed. 5. She also urged that the complainant by filing reply stated that the cheque issued by the accused was presented by the complainant at the IDBI Bank, Branch at Indore for payment. The notices were issued to the accused at Indore and hence the trial Court had jurisdiction to try the matter and had prayed for dismissal of the application u/s 177 of the Cr.P.C; whereas the petitioner's Counsel prayed that the order taking cognizance of offence be quashed. 6. Per contra the Counsel for the respondent fully supported the impugned order vehemently and urged that repeatedly the trial Court had again not fallen into error and properly held that the complaint was triable at Indore, especially when Section 177 of the Cr.P.C. mandates that every offence shall ordinarily be enquired into and tried in a Court within whose jurisdiction it was committed. 7. Counsel has discussed all the judgments cited by the Counsel for the petitioner and laid emphasis on the fact that the Kerala High Court in the matter of Philipose P.M. Vs.
7. Counsel has discussed all the judgments cited by the Counsel for the petitioner and laid emphasis on the fact that the Kerala High Court in the matter of Philipose P.M. Vs. P.C. Chandy and Another, (2010) 1 BC 137 held that Harman Electronic's case by the Apex Court (supra) does not over rule K. Bhaskaran's case and similarly in Shamshad Begum's case was decided on November 3, 2008, the Harman Electronics ' case was decided on December 13, 2008 and hence the later decision has to be followed. He relied on judgment of Delhi High Court to state that where the Court in whose territorial jurisdiction drawee Bank is situated would have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the complaint and considering the law of precedent the Delhi High Court held that when two decisions of Coordinate Benches of Supreme Court are cited, then later one prevails. Counsel stated that in this light Harman Electronic's case would prevail since the case was presented on the IDBI Bank, Indore. The Court, Indore has jurisdiction to try the matter. Counsel stated that the petitions are without merit and same be dismissed. 8. On considering the above submissions I find that all the five acts as per ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the matter K. Bhaskaran have taken place at Chandigarh and Counsel for the petitioner has also stated that although the cheque was presented at the IDBI Bank at Indore, the original drawe Bank would be the Bank at Chandigarh on which the cheque was drawn and in this light also I find that the complainant has no ground to file the complaint at Indore and there is substance in the submissions put forth by the Counsel for the petitioner. In view of the above foregoing discussions, the petitions are allowed. The complaint filed by the petitioner may be returned to the complainant. In the interest of justice the impugned order is set aside with a direction that the complaint may be returned for presentation before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The delay if any occasioned in filing the complaint may be condoned on proper application. 9. The petitions are allowed to the terms herein above indicated. Original judgment is retained in M.Cr.C. No. 2674/10 and a copy whereof be placed in the record of connected M.Cr.C. Nos. 2675/10, 2676/10 and 2677/10.