Judgment :- I.P. MUKERJI, J. FACTS: The applicant is a statutory body under the Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority Act, 1974. This Act was adopted by the State of Jharkhand, after its formation. On 16th May, 1986 the applicant granted a lease of 12 acres of land to M/s. Jamshedpur Cement Ltd. for a period of 99 years commencing from 16th May 1986. It is situated at M-20P, 6th Phase, Adityapur Industrial Area, District – Seraikella, Kharsawan in the State of Jharkhand. It was to be used for industrial purposes. Now, this lease had some restrictive covenants which have become very important for the purposes of adjudication of the disputes in this application. The clauses are Clause 6(i) and clause 6(v). They read as follows : “6(i) That the lessee will not assign, mortgage, underlet or part with the possession over the land or any right or interest therein or in respect thereto without the provisions (previous [sic]) consent of and also without due approval of any such deed by the lessor or his nominee : ……………. (v) If at any time the said land or any part or parts thereof shall no longer be required by the lessee for the purposes for which it is leased out to him the lessee shall while selling or assigning the said land or such part or parts thereof as aforesaid first make an offer of the same to the State Government / Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority ………” Their import was that the lessee could not assign the lease without the previous consent of the applicant. The deed of assignment had also to be approved by them. In such case the applicant had also a pre-emptive right to take the property. Now M/s. Jamshedpur Cement Ltd went into liquidation. This property was put up for “sale” by the Official Liquidator of this Court. On 5th January, 2007, this Court confirmed “sale” in favour of Hi-Tech Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. for 4.80 crores. By another order dated 28th January, 2009, the official liquidator was directed to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the “purchaser” within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. The applicant lessor has come up before this Court. It has two basic objections. By another order dated 28th January, 2009, the official liquidator was directed to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in favour of the “purchaser” within a period of three weeks from the date of the order. The applicant lessor has come up before this Court. It has two basic objections. The first objection is that under the above clauses their permission was required before any assignment of the lease could have been ordered by the Court. In the absence of such permission, the official liquidator had no right to assign the lease. Secondly, as per the current industrial policy of the Jharkhand Government a new lease can only be executed for a period of 30 years. The direction by this Court in its order for execution of conveyance for assignment of the entire unexpired term of the lease was not proper. However, they are prepared to accord such permission ex-post facto provided a sum of Rs.71,58,792/- being the land cost is paid to them. This premium was calculated by estimating the appreciation in the cost of the land. In any event according to the applicant as of now, the assignment in favour of the purchaser/assignee is invalid. Before I proceed further with the judgment, examination of the terms and conditions of sale is very necessary. It is necessary because if an order is passed upholding the contention of the applicant, then, the right of the purchaser will be affected; so also, the interests of the creditors of the company in liquidation. The sale notice was published by the Official Liquidator on 14th April, 2006. The notice was for “sale of movable and immovable assets” of the company including “lease hold land (rectangular more or less) of 12 acres.” It also stated that the applicant had leased the above land together with factory building, shed, boundary wall, security gate, plant and machinery to the company for 99 years with effect from 10th April, 1986. The sale was to be conducted on an “as is where is whatever there is” basis. As noted above, this Court confirmed the sale on 5th January 2007. On 16th April, 2008 the applicant issued what they described as a land allotment order where they said that the said land would be allotted to the purchaser/assignee Hi-tech Chemical Private Limited upon their making payment of a sum of Rs.53,78,472/- as land cost. As noted above, this Court confirmed the sale on 5th January 2007. On 16th April, 2008 the applicant issued what they described as a land allotment order where they said that the said land would be allotted to the purchaser/assignee Hi-tech Chemical Private Limited upon their making payment of a sum of Rs.53,78,472/- as land cost. On 6th August, 2008, they submitted this claim to the Official Liquidator. On 28th January, 2009, an order was passed by this Court directing the Official Liquidator to execute the conveyance in favour of the said purchaser/assignee. On 31st March, 2010 such conveyance for the unexpired term of the lease, that is, 77 years was executed by the Official Liquidator in favour of the purchaser/assignee. The applicant has taken out two applications. The first is C.A. No. 117 of 2009. The prayers in the Judge’s Summons in that application are as follows: “i. The lease with regard to the 12 acres of land situated at M-20P, 6th Phase, Adityapur Industrial Area, District – Seraikella, Kharsawan in the State of Jharkhand, Jamshedpur – 832108, Adityapur, be granted in favour of the applicant for a period of 30 days as per the Land Allotment Order dated 16th April, 2008 being Annexure “A” hereto and as per the Bond executed by the applicant dated 21st may, 2008 in favour of the respondent No.1/ petitioner being Annexure “C” hereof in accordance with the Industrial Policy of the State of Jharkhand dated 25th August, 2001 being Annexure “F” hereof; ii. A Deed of Lease be executed by the respondent No.1/petitioner in this regard pertaining to the 30 years of lease in respect of the aforesaid 12 acres of land in favour of the applicant; (b) The time to execute the Lease Deed by the respondent No.1/petitioner in favour of the applicant be extended by reasonable period or till the disposal of the instant petition; (c) Cancellation of Notice of Termination dated 28th April, 2008 in the order dated 28th January, 2009 be recalled; (d) The time given to the respondent No.1/petitioner by the order dated 28th January, 2009 to lodge its claim before the Official Liquidator relating to its dues pertaining to Jamshedpur Cement Ltd. (In Liquidation) and relating to the land cost of Rs.53,78,472/-for allotment of 12 acres of land in favour of the applicant as per details contained in paragraph 31 of the Affidavit in support of the Summons. (e) The official Liquidator, High Court Calcutta be directed to consider the claims of the respondent No.1/petitioner with regards to the land cost of Rs.53,78,472/- for allotment of 12 acres of land in favour of the applicant as per details given in paragraph 31 of the Affidavit in support of the Summons along with its dues pertaining to Jamshedpur Cement Ltd. (in liquidation). (f) Ad interim order in terms of prayers above; (g) Necessary order as to costs; (h) Such further order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be given as to this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper;” The second application is C.A. No. 217 of 2009. (f) Ad interim order in terms of prayers above; (g) Necessary order as to costs; (h) Such further order or orders be made and/or direction or directions be given as to this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper;” The second application is C.A. No. 217 of 2009. The prayers in the Judge’s Summons in that application are as follows: “a) The order dated 5th January, 2007 passed by the Hon’ble Justice Sanjib Banerjee in C.A. No. 655 of 2006 being Annexure “A” to the affidavit in support of the Summons be set aside; b) The order dated 28th January, 2009 passed by the Hon’ble Justice Maharaj Sinha in C.A. No. 7 of 2009 being Annexure “B” to the affidavit in support of the Summons be set aside; c) 12 Acres of additional land in possession of the applicant / purchaser, Hi-Tech Chemicals Pvt. Ltd. by the Official Liquidator, High Court, Calcutta on 27th February, 2007 pursuant to the order dated 5th January, 2007 be returned to the respondent No. 1/petitioner being the landlord / lessor thereof; d) Injunction restraining the applicant / purchaser from taking any steps or further steps in furtherance of the sale order dated 5th January 2007 and the order dated 28th January 2009 or making any investment and / or further construction on the said land till the disposal of the instant applicant; e) Ad-interim order in terms of prayers above; f) Appropriate order as to costs; g) Such further or other order or orders be passed and /or direction or directions be given as to this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper;” DISCUSSION: The arguments of the respective learned counsel for the parties will appear as I discuss the merits of this matter. The sale of the assets of the company-in-liquidation by the official liquidator is not a voluntary sale or a sale by operation of law but is a voluntary sale to which the general principles of law governing transfer of property apply. (see Revenue Divisional Officer – v – Brunton and Co. (Engineers) Ltd., reported in 69 Company Cases, page 497; M/s. Parasram Harnand Rao – v – M/s. Shanti Prasad Narinder Kumar Jain and another, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1655 ; Cox & Kings Ltd. and another – v – Chander Malhotra (Smt), reported in (1997)2 SCC 687 cited by Mr. P.C. Sen, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant). (Engineers) Ltd., reported in 69 Company Cases, page 497; M/s. Parasram Harnand Rao – v – M/s. Shanti Prasad Narinder Kumar Jain and another, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1655 ; Cox & Kings Ltd. and another – v – Chander Malhotra (Smt), reported in (1997)2 SCC 687 cited by Mr. P.C. Sen, learned Senior Advocate for the applicant). According to Smt. Jatan Kanwar Golcha, - v – M/s. Golcha Properties Private Ltd., reported in AIR 1971 SC 374 cited by him, the Official Liquidator has to observe the rules of natural justice in taking steps for liquidation of a company. Therefore, I agree that the Official Liquidator ought to have given notice to the applicant, being the lessor before proceeding to put up the lease hold interest for assignment. Mr. Abhrajit Mitra, the learned counsel for the purchaser/assignee has shown me a letter dated 23rd July, 2007 of the applicant to the Official Liquidator. According to him, not even once in that letter did the applicant whisper about the sale conducted by the official liquidator being void or that there could not be any assignment of the lease beyond a period of 30 years. By that letter they only wanted the land cost of Rs.93,53,844/-. On that condition it could issue a fresh deed of lease. It is true that ex-post facto sanction can be made and can relate back. But the effect of such sanction differs from case to case (Graphite India Ltd. and another – v – Durgapur Projects Ltd and other reported in AIR 1999 SC 3289 cited by the learned counsel for the purchaser). In that case the Hon’ble Supreme Court was considering the effect of a delayed sanction by the State Government of a proposal of a licensee for electricity supply for an increase in the tariff from a particular date or period. The Hon’ble Court said in paragraphs 17 of 18 of its Judgment: 17. That approval can date back we have been referred to a decision of this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Friends Co-op. Housing Society Ltd., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 456 : (1995 AIR SCW 3800 : AIR 1996 SC 114 : 1995 ALL LJ 2066). In this case notification under Section 20 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 was published on June 7, 1982. Housing Society Ltd., 1995 Supp (3) SCC 456 : (1995 AIR SCW 3800 : AIR 1996 SC 114 : 1995 ALL LJ 2066). In this case notification under Section 20 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikash Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 was published on June 7, 1982. Immediately the appellant had sought for approval of the State Government through its letter dated July 27, 1982. The Government approved the scheme on August 24, 1982 (Section 28 is equivalent to Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894). Thereafter declaration under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam (equivalent to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act) was published on February 28, 1987. Allahabad High Court in a writ petition set aside the declaration holding that since prior approval of the State Government was not obtained the notification under Section 28 and declaration under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam were invalid and inoperative. Question before this Court was whether it would be prior approval or approval given subsequent to the notification under Section 28 or declaration under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam was valid in law. This Court observed that if prior approval would have been a pre-condition for further steps, the Act would have said so and this not having been done what is materials is to obtain the approval of the State Government. This Court said that the reason for this appeared to have been that when a scheme has been framed the land suitably required for effective implementation of the scheme should alone be acquired and not in excess in the guise of framing the scheme. Relying on its two earlier decisions in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1370 ) and The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 , this Court held (Para 5 of AIR SCW: AIR):- “ This Court in Life Insurance Corpn. Relying on its two earlier decisions in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd., (1986) 1 SCC 264 : ( AIR 1986 SC 1370 ) and The Lord Krishna Textile Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1961 SC 860 , this Court held (Para 5 of AIR SCW: AIR):- “ This Court in Life Insurance Corpn. of India v. Escorts Ltd. considering the distinction between “special permission” and “general permission”, “previous approval” or “prior approval” in para 63 held that : “We are conscious that the word ‘prior’ or ‘previous’ may be implied if the contextual situation or the object and design of the legislation demands it, we find no such compelling circumstances justifying reading any such implication into Section 29(1) of the Act.” Ordinarily, the difference between approval and permission is that in the first case the action holds good until it is disapproved, while in the other case it does not become effective until permission is obtained. But permission subsequently granted may validate the previous Act. As to the word ‘approval’ in Section 33(2) (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, it was stated in Lord Krishna Textiles Mills Ltd. v. Workmen, that the Management need not obtain the previous consent before taking any action. The requirement that the Management must obtain approval was distinguished from the requirement that it must obtain permission, of which mention is made in Section 33 (1).” This Court then said that approval envisaged is to enable the Parishad, the appellant, to proceed further in implementation of the scheme framed. Unless approval is given by the Government the scheme may not be effectively implemented. This Court then said “nevertheless, once the approval is given, all the previous acts done or actions taken in anticipation of the approval get validated and the publications made under the Act thereby become valid.” 18. It would thus appear that in the present case when approval was granted by the State Government by its letter dated April 27, 1992 the approval relates back and the revision would be effective from April 8, 1991. It is difficult to accept the argument of Graphite that the letter dated April 27, 1992 is not an approval of the increase in tariff effective from April 8, 1991. It is difficult to accept the argument of Graphite that the letter dated April 27, 1992 is not an approval of the increase in tariff effective from April 8, 1991. On December 23, 1991, DPL wrote to the State Government on the subject of general revision in power tariff by it and referred to its letter dated February 9, 1991. It said that the Board of Directors of DPL at 405th meeting held on December 13, 1991 approved the proposal for general revision of power tariff of DPL to all its consumers. DPL sought approval of the State Government to effect the tariff revision from March 3, 1992. It also pointed out that “the company (DPL) should have a benefit of revision in rate of supply to WBSEB as a whole for which Government should be moved.” In its letter dated April 27, 1992 to DPL the State Government granted approval for revision of tariff for different categories of consumers and as regards rate applicable to Graphite the letter said “as existing w.e.f. 8-4-91”. We do not think any argument is needed for us not to hold that ex post facto approval was granted for tariff revision as regards the supply to Graphite from April 8, 1991. It is also difficult to accept the argument of the Graphite that unless approval is granted there cannot be any revision in tariff. It is not the requirement of law even if Sixth Schedule of Supply Act is held to be applicable that approval has to be granted within 60 days of the notice given to the State Government. That revision can certainly become applicable after the expiry of the period of 60 days. If approval is not granted, the increased charges paid by the consumer are liable to be adjusted / refunded. In this connection reference may be made to the constitution of the Rating Committee under Section 57- A of the Supply Act. Under forth proviso to clause (1) of the Sixty Schedule it is provided that if charges of supply fixed in pursuance of the recommendations of a Rating Committee are lower than those notified by the licensee, the licensee shall refund to the consumers the excess amount recovered by him from them.” I am unable to agree with him on the basis of Official Liquidator, High Court, Calcutta – v – Ujjain Nagar Palika Nigam & Ors. reported in 2009(2) CLJ (Cal) 360 that the claim of Adityapur should be entirely borne out of funds of the official liquidator. I will deal with that case when I draw my conclusions in this application. It is absolutely plain that the interest of the company-in-liquidation which the Official Liquidator was trying to transfer or assign was a lease hold interest, with a right to the lessee to assign the unexpired period of the lease with the previous permission of the lessor. Now, the Official Liquidator could not confer any better title to the property than what the company-in-liquidation had. Such permission by the applicant, in my judgment had to be express and prior and not implied from dealings as the learned Counsel for the purchaser/assignee tried to argue. There is nothing on record to show that the applicant Adityapur Industrial Area Development Authority had accorded such permission. Section 55(1)(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 enjoins the seller, to disclose to the buyer any material defect in the property or in the seller’s title thereto of which the buyer was not aware and which the buyer could not with ordinary care discover. Similar is the provision in case of lease (See Section 108(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882) In the terms and conditions of sale which I have thoroughly examined there is no mention that the property professed to be sold was the unexpired period of lease which could only be assigned with the permission of the lessor and which permission had not been obtained. The stipulations in the terms and conditions were such as if the property that was being sold was freehold. But, it is a fundamental principle of the law of transfer of immovable property that the buyer or lessee is also obliged to make his own enquiry as to the title and satisfy himself about it before proceeding to buy it. Only in case when such defect in title cannot be ascertained with ordinary care is the seller or lessor enjoined with a duty to make the disclosure under Section 55(1)(a) or Section 108(a). The last sub paragraph of Section 55 enacts that any failure to make such disclosure by the seller can be described as fraudulent. If a sale or transfer is fraudulent, it is avoidable and can be set aside. The last sub paragraph of Section 55 enacts that any failure to make such disclosure by the seller can be described as fraudulent. If a sale or transfer is fraudulent, it is avoidable and can be set aside. Furthermore, at this stage I would like to state that the phrase “as is where is basis” does not include any property being sold or demised with a defective title but refers to the state of the property at the time it is sold. eg: with tenants, occupants structures and so on. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the instant defect is not a defect which the buyer / assignee could not discover with ordinary care. Diligent enquiry could have revealed that the lease could only be assigned with the permission of the applicant. In my judgment, in the absence of an express prior permission by Adityapur, the Official Liquidator had no title at all to sell the property. If the Official Liquidator had no title to sell the property, the defect in the property was far more serious than the defect contemplated in Section 55(1)(a) which makes the sale fraudulent. If a sale is fraudulent the sale is voidable and can be set aside. But if the defect in title is deeper than that, as in this case the assignor could not be said to have any title over the property. The sale/assignment would have been void ab initio and the parties would have to be put back to the same position in which they were before the assignment, had the applicant not waived their rights conditionally under clause 6(i) as discussed below. But, the assignment/sale was confirmed long ago. The purchaser/assignee has not only paid the entire consideration but has made use of the property by setting up his factory there. In this state of facts the attempt of the company court would be to regularize the act of the Official Liquidator than to defeat it. Such regularization can be made by obtaining ex-post facto permission of Adityapur applying Graphite India Ltd. & Anr – v – Durgapur Projects Ltd. (Supra). Adityapur is prepared to give such ex-post facto permission provided the above consideration demanded by them is paid to them. Such willingness is also evident from their letter dated 23rd July 2007 to the Official Liquidator discussed above. Thus, there is also conditional waiver of clause 6(i). Adityapur is prepared to give such ex-post facto permission provided the above consideration demanded by them is paid to them. Such willingness is also evident from their letter dated 23rd July 2007 to the Official Liquidator discussed above. Thus, there is also conditional waiver of clause 6(i). Now, let me discuss the case of Official Liquidator – v – Ujjain Nagar Palika Nigam (Supra). Our division Bench remarked as follows in paragraphs 10,12 and 19. “10. We have heard learned Counsel for the respective parties and have perused the order under appeal. The issue formulated by the learned Judge for decision was whether claims arising against the Official Liquidator representing the company in liquidation for any period of time subsequent to the order of winding up can outright be rejected or not. The learned Judge proceeded to hold that it is the obligation of the Official Liquidator to protect the assets of the company in liquidation till such time the assets are sold. It was further held that the contention of the Official Liquidator that debts and claims and particularly claims on account of Municipal tax would be payable only till winding up of the company in liquidation in view of Section 530 of the Companies Act read with Rule 154 of the Companies (Court) Rules is patently misconceived since there is no provision in either of those statutory provisions which restricts claims and debts only till the date of the winding up order. It was also held that post-liquidation liabilities are to be treated as part of the cost of winding up of the company in liquidation and such liabilities would get priority over all other liabilities of the company. The Official Liquidator having rejected the claim of the Nigam on the basis of his interpretation of Section 530 of the companies Act and Rule 154 of the Companies (Court) Rules, the impugned rejection of Proof of Debts was held not sustainable in law and, therefore, the impugned notices of rejection were set aside. The Official Liquidator having rejected the claim of the Nigam on the basis of his interpretation of Section 530 of the companies Act and Rule 154 of the Companies (Court) Rules, the impugned rejection of Proof of Debts was held not sustainable in law and, therefore, the impugned notices of rejection were set aside. While holding that the Official Liquidator would be bound to discharge the tax liability as per the claim of the Nigam even for the post-liquidation period, the Official Liquidator was granted liberty to file appeal against the demands raised by the Nigam within the date specified therein and it was further directed that if such appeal is filed within the date specified, the appeal shall be considered on merits waiving limitation, if any.” “12. There is no express provision in the sale notice that the liability to bear charges on account of water and property taxes must be borne by the purchaser. We are unable to comprehend that the expression “as is where is whatever there is basis” comprises within its ambit the liability to clear statutory charges as might have accrued and are in arrears. The terms and conditions of the sale do specify that the Official Liquidator shall not provide any guarantee and / or warranty as to quality, quantity or specification of the assets sold and the intending purchaser is required to satisfy himself in this regard after physical inspection of the assets of the company in liquidation and no complaint as to defects, if any, in the description, quality or quantity of the assets sold would be entertained after the sale is over and that any mistake in the notice inviting tender shall not vitiate the sale. These per se, in our opinion, would not tantamount to a representation being made to an intending purchaser that while bidding for the assets put up for sale he is also to bear the expenses towards arrear dues of the Nigam. Guarantee and / or warrantee as to quality, quantity or specification of the assets sold cannot be equated with the liability attached to the same. The terms and conditions of the tender only protect the Official Liquidator to the extent of quality, quantity and specification and would not extend to claiming of immunity to clear taxes claimed by the Nigam.” “19. The terms and conditions of the tender only protect the Official Liquidator to the extent of quality, quantity and specification and would not extend to claiming of immunity to clear taxes claimed by the Nigam.” “19. We are of the view that the liability on account of property and water taxes claimed by the Nigam, to the extent rejected by the Official Liquidator is a post – liquidation liability which the Official Liquidator is obliged to discharge in the absence of a clear provision in the sale notice that the intending purchaser must satisfy himself as regards the assets of the company in liquidation in all respects including encumbrances.” This case has only partial application. The sum claimed by the Applicant is not a statutory change. It is the premium demanded by the lessor for giving permission to the lessee to assign the lease. Now, in the usual course of things, the purchaser / assignee ought to have offered a price which would be payable if he got the property absolutely. This would have been substantially higher than 4.80 crores. The purchaser/ assignee presumed to be prudent is deemed to have known the restrictions in the lease and yet had gone ahead with the transaction. Now, out of the consideration received, the claim of the Applicant ought to have been discharged, as expenses of winding up, incurred for clearing the title of the property. In my Judgment the Official Liquidator was also at fault for not properly representing his title in the terms and conditions of sale. As a result the purchaser/assignee paid less and got the conveyance. Now, to ask him to pay the entire claim of the Applicant would be unjust. Equally unjust would be an order asking the Official Liquidator to pay the entire amount, as that would affect the creditors. Considering the above circumstances, I am of the view that both the Official Liquidator and the purchaser are equally responsible for not discharging their respective duties in this sale/assignment of lease. Hence, they should bear in equal measure the compensation that is payable to Adityapur for giving ex-post facto permission. The Applicant has demanded different amounts as compensation at different points of time. By their letter dated 16th April, 2008 they wanted Rs.53,78,472/-; in the Judge’s Summons they claim Rs.71,58,792/-. In their letter dated 23rd July, 2007 they demanded Rs.93,53,844/-. Therefore, the lowest claim of Rs. The Applicant has demanded different amounts as compensation at different points of time. By their letter dated 16th April, 2008 they wanted Rs.53,78,472/-; in the Judge’s Summons they claim Rs.71,58,792/-. In their letter dated 23rd July, 2007 they demanded Rs.93,53,844/-. Therefore, the lowest claim of Rs. 53,78,472/- is a true estimate of the “land cost” claimed for giving such permission, as all these claims were made almost contemporaneously. Therefore, a just and proper order would be that 50% of this Rs.53,78,472/- is to be paid by the Official Liquidator to Adityapur within four weeks from the date of service on him of a copy of this order. The purchaser/assignee will make a similar payment to Adityapur within four weeks from such date of service of this order. Upon receipt of such payment, Adityapur will accord or be deemed to have accorded their ex-post facto permission in terms of Clause 6(1) of the lease. The payment made by the Official Liquidator is to be treated as if that payment was not received by the Official Liquidator beneficially, but, was set apart to clear his title and should be treated as expenses of winding up. This order is executable as a decree. Both applications are disposed of. No order as to costs.