ORDER J. B. PARDIWALA, J. This is a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ of mandamus, preferred by a self financing institution imparting education in the discipline of Ayurved at the level of graduation. 2. The petitioner-Institute has challenged the illegal action on the part of respondent No. 1-Gujarat Ayurved University declining to accept the admissions granted by the Institute herein to 50 students for the current academic year 2010-11 as students of First Year for the concerned course at the level of graduation in the discipline of Ayurved medicines. 3. The petitioner-Institute has prayed for a writ of mandamus or a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the respondent-University to annul its decision dated 15th February, 2011 and enroll 50 students admitted by the petitioner-Institute for the academic year 2010-11 as students of First Year in the discipline of Ayurved at the level of graduation as per the details provided to the respondent-University vide the communication of the petitioner-Institute dated 6th December, 2010. 4. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this petition can be summarised as under : (1) On 1st June, 2006, the Institute became functional for imparting education in the discipline of Ayurved at the level of graduation on the pattern of self-financing with an intake capacity of 50 students divided in the ratio of 37:13 respectively as State seats and Management seats. (2) Record reveals that on 22nd July, 2010, the Central Government through its Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, passed an order under Sec. 13A of the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970 (here in after referred to as, 'the I.M.C.C. Act') for the academic year 2010-11 granting permission to the Institute to admit 50 students. (3) On 18th September, 2010 and 23rd September, 2010, respondent No.2-Admission Committee deputed its officials to oversee the process of admission in the Management quota in the set-up of the petitioner institute. Based upon the aforesaid permission, respondent No. 2-Admission Committee, filled up in all 37 seats in the set-up of the petitioner-Institute and the petitioner-Institute filled in the remaining 13 seats as Management seats with the approval of respondent No. 2-Admission Committee. Based upon the aforesaid permission, respondent No. 2-Admission Committee, filled up in all 37 seats in the set-up of the petitioner-Institute and the petitioner-Institute filled in the remaining 13 seats as Management seats with the approval of respondent No. 2-Admission Committee. (4) Record reveals that the petitioner-Institute received an order dated 28th September, 2010 from the Government of India through its Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department, withdrawing the permission for admission granted vide the aforesaid order dated 22nd July, 2010 for the academic year 2010-11. (5) The petitioner-Institute preferred Special Civil Application No. 12756 of 2010, in which the Division Bench of this Court passed an order dated 28th September, 2010, giving time to the petitioner-Institute to rectify the deficiencies, if any, and after the deficiencies are taken care of, liberty was given to the petitioner-Institute to bring it to the notice of the concerned authority. The relevant part of the order dated 28th September, 2010 is reproduced here in below "However, as the question relates to fulfilments of the basic eligibility criteria is a question of fact and cannot be determined by this Court, and whether the petitioner's Institute actually fulfils even the relaxed 80% criteria i.e., of 80% teaching staff, 100 patients per day in O.P.D. and 100 beds in O.P.D., is the question of fact and it cannot be determined by this Court, we are not inclined to issue any direction to the respondents. The petitioner is given time to rectify the deficiencies. If the deficiencies have already been rectified, it may be brought to the notice of the concerned authority of Ministry of Home & Family Welfare, AYUSH, Government of India who may make inspection and pass appropriate order. Writ petition stands disposed of with the aforesaid observation. No costs." (6) It appears that respondent No.2-Admission Committee cancelled the admissions on or about 28th September, 2010, which were granted in respect of 37 State seats, inasmuch as, the permission for admission was withdrawn by the Central Government vide order dated 28th September, 2010. (7) The petitioner-Institute preferred Special Civil Application No. 14885 of 2010 as the representation of the petitioner-Institute was not being decided by the Central Government despite the order in this regard passed in Special Civil Application No. 12756 of 2010. (7) The petitioner-Institute preferred Special Civil Application No. 14885 of 2010 as the representation of the petitioner-Institute was not being decided by the Central Government despite the order in this regard passed in Special Civil Application No. 12756 of 2010. In Special Civil Application No. 14885 of 2010 the Institute prayed for the permission to fill up 37 State seats which were vacant on account of cancellation of admissions by respondent No.2-Admission Committee. It appears that, thereafter, the Institute received a circular dated 16th November, 2010 from the Central Council of Indian Medicine stipulating 30th November, 2010 as the last date for admitting students. (8) The petitioner-Institute preferred Civil Application No. 14158 of 2010 in Special Civil Application No. 14885 of 2010, seeking permission to admit students as the deadline for admission was approaching fast and no decision was taken by the Central Government despite representation of the Institute pointing out all deficiencies have been taken care of. (9) Record reveals that the Division Bench, on 26th November, 2010, passed an order in Civil Application No. 14158 of 2010 as under: "In the main matter i.e., Special Civil Application, notice has already been issued and the matter has been posted on 13th December, 2010. In the meantime, the petitioner-Institution intends to give admission to students in the discipline of Ayurved. From the record, it appears that the Central Council of Indian Medicine, New Delhi by letter No. F. No. 3-6 of 2010-Norms (20) dated 16-11-2010, extended the cut-off date of admission of students in Ayurved, Unani & Siddha colleges up to 30th November, 2010, as a one-time measure. Such an extension has been granted on the basis of demand made by the State Governments, Universities and Colleges. Such an extension has been granted on the basis of demand made by the State Governments, Universities and Colleges. In that view of the matter, while we are not inclined to express any opinion, allow the competent authority of the State Government or the Universities or the College authorities, whosoever is competent, to act in terms with the letter of the Central Council of Indian Medicines dated 16th November, 2010." (10) The petitioner-Institute addressed a letter to respondent No. 2-Admission Committee pointing out that as the process of admission is concluded in the set-up of respondent No.2, the petitioner-Institute is qualified as competent to fill up the vacant seats under Rule 22 of the Gujarat Professional Medical Educational Courses (Regulation of Admission and Payment of Fees) Rules, 2009 (hereinafter referred to as, 'the Admission Rules') pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court, and therefore, the Institute would be commencing the process of admission on 29th November, 2010 pursuant to a public notice for the same to be issued in the local dailies on 27th November, 2010, and therefore, respondent No.2-Admission Committee may submit the wait-list of students, if available, so that the same can be conducted by the petitioner. It appears that the Institute also requested respondent No.2-Admission Committee to depute its officials to inspect the process of admission. (11) Respondent No.2-Admission Committee, vide letter dated 27th November, 2010, informed the Institute that as the permission for admission is not granted by the Central Government to the petitioner institute, the process of admission cannot be permitted to be commenced by the petitioner-Institute. It appears that the objection was that the process of admission proposed by the Institute was on the premise of withdrawal of permission for admissions by the Central Governn1ent. (12) Record reveals that the Central Government, vide communication dated 30th November, 2010 (Annexure 'H') granted permission, to the petitioner-Institute for admission for the academic year 2010-11 by withdrawing the earlier order of cancellation. (13) On 6th December, 2010; the petitioner-Institute addressed a letter to respondent No. 1-University for the purpose of enrollment of the concerned students. The Institute also deposited enrollment fee with respondent No. 1-University. (13) On 6th December, 2010; the petitioner-Institute addressed a letter to respondent No. 1-University for the purpose of enrollment of the concerned students. The Institute also deposited enrollment fee with respondent No. 1-University. Once again, vide letter dated 28th December, 2010, respondent No. 1-University addressed communication to the petitioner, pointing out that unless it is certified by respondent No. 2-Admission Committee that the students have been validly admitted by the petitioner-Institute, enrollment would not be possible. Therefore, the petitioner-Institute addressed a communication dated 7th January, 2011 to respondent No.2-Admission Committee for certification of students admitted by it. Respondent No.2-Admission Committee issued a general circular dated 18th January, 2011, pointing out that students admitted by the concerned colleges under Rule 22 of the Admission Rules are not required to be certified by respondent No.2-Admission Committee. (14) The petitioner-Institute apprised respondent No. 1-University about the circular of the Admission Committee. However, it appears that on 11th February, 2011 the University called upon the Admission Committee to certify the admissions. Respondent No. 1-University declined to enroll students by raising objection to the process of admission as well as about the eligibility of certain students. (15) It is at this stage that the petitioner-Institute was constrained to prefer the present petition having left with no other option. 5. We have heard learned Advocate Mr. D.C. Dave appearing for the petitioner-Institute, learned A.G.P. Mr. Pranav Dave, appearing for respondent No.2-Admission Committee and learned Advocate Mr. R.C. Kakkad, appearing for respondent No. 1-University. 6. Learned Counsel for the petitioner put forward the following contentions : (1) He would submit that the course of action on the part of respondent No. 1-University is ex-facie violative of the fundamental right available to the petitioner under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. He submitted that as per the pronouncements of the Supreme Court in the cases of T.M.A. Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka, 2002 (8) SCC 712, Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka 2003 (6) SCC 697 , P.A. Inamdar v. State of Maharashtra, 2005 (6) SCC 537 respectively, it is the fundamental right of the petitioner as a self-financing institution under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India to admit students possessing the requisite qualification by following a procedure which is fair and transparent. He would submit that the admissions granted by the Institute were in consonance with the procedure and they can be divided into two broad categories, namely, Management quota seats and State quota seats. He would submit that so far as the admissions granted in respect of the Management quota seats were concerned, the same were granted under the supervision of the representatives of the Admission Committee of the State. He would also submit that at no point of time any objection of any nature was ever raised by the Admission Committee of the State in respect of the said admissions. (2) He would submit that so far as the State quota seats were concerned, it was specifically stated in Civil Application No. 14158 of 2010 that as the Admission Committee has already closed the process of admission, the seats in respect of which the admissions were cancelled by the Admission Committee following the order dated 28th September, 2010 passed by the Central Government through its Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department, would qualify as vacant seats required to be filled in by the petitioner-Institute under Rule 22 of the Admission Rules. He would also submit that since the outer-limit fixed by the Central Council of Indian Medicine for filling up the vacant seats in Ayurved Institutions and Colleges was to expire on 30th November, 2010, the Division Bench of this Court in its order dated 26th November, 2010 passed in Civil Application No. 14158 of 2010, stipulated that whoever is competent to fill up the vacant seats may act for the purpose of filling up the vacant seats before the stipulated outer-limit of 30th November, 2010. (3) He further submitted that so far as the objections sought to be raised by respondent-University in respect of in all 34 students named in the communication dated 15th February, 2011 is concerned, nothing has been explained as to how the said students would not qualify as possessing the requisite qualification to secure admission for the aforesaid course in the set-up of the petitioner-Institute. He would also submit that the objections raised by the University on the premise that prior permission of the concerned authority including the respondent-University was not sought for before granting admission despite such permission was mandatory is also devoid of any substance inasmuch as there is nothing in the order dated 26th November, 2010 which would even remotely suggest that such permission was necessary. (4) Lastly, he submitted that the objections raised by the University on the ground that no representative of the Admission Committee or University was kept present while granting admission under Rule 22 of the Admission Rules is also without any substance as there is no requirement to keep a representative of the University present at the time of granting admission under Rule 22 of the Admission Rules. 7. Per contra, learned Advocate for respondent No. 1-University submitted that the petitioner-Institute is not entitled to any relief and as the petitioner has prayed for a writ of mandamus, it would be for the petitioner to point out as to what is its legal right in this regard and what is the legal duty to be performed by the University. He would submit that in absence of any legal right and any legal duty, the petitioner-Institute is not entitled to any relief. 8. On the other hand, learned A.G.P. appearing for the Admission Committee, while opposing the petition, submitted that conditional permission for admission was granted to the petitioner-Institute by the Government of India, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare Department on 30th November, 2010. Learned A.G.P. would submit that the institutions completed admission process on 29th November, 2010, whereas the petitioner-Institute received fresh permission on 30th November, 2010. Thus, even prior to the permission for grant of 50 seats, the petitioner-Institute proceeded and admitted students by issuing fresh advertisement on their own without following any statutory rules and without following admission process as stipulated under the Admission Rules. 9. Learned A.G.P. would submit that the Institute could not have proceeded to grant admission in spite of clearly informing the Institute not to proceed with the admission and not to breach the statutory rules. The stand taken is that the respondents herein are not responsible for the admission granted by the petitioner-Institute on its own accord, which is in breach of the Admission Rules. 10. The stand taken is that the respondents herein are not responsible for the admission granted by the petitioner-Institute on its own accord, which is in breach of the Admission Rules. 10. We have given our anxious thoughts and considerations to the contentions of the respective parties and are of the view that for the reasons which we shall assign hereinafter, the petition deserves to be allowed with grant of relief as prayed for in the petition. 11. It is evident from the pleadings that the Gujarat Professional medical Educational Courses (Regulation of Admission and Payment of Fees) Rules, 2009 regulate admission to the First Year of the Professional Medical Educational Courses, which includes Ayurveda. The only rule relevant so far as the present petition is concerned is Rule 22, which reads as under : "22. Vacant Seats :- After the completion of admission process or offering admission to all the candidates whose names appear in the merit list, if the seats remained vacant, such vacant seats shall be displayed on the official website, and on the notice board of the office of the Admission Committee and the same may be intimated to the Colleges or Institutions wherein the seats are vacant. In case any candidate requires admission on such vacant seats, he shall apply directly to such Colleges or Institutions. The vacant seats shall be filled by giving priority to the students of Gujarat State. The Colleges or Institutions shall admit the candidates on the basis of inter se merit of the applicants; subject to the eligibility criteria, in respect of the course the candidate is granted admission, as laid down by the respective Council or as the case may be, the respective University." 12. It appears that the only strong objection at the end of the respondents as on today is that on the date on which the process of admission under Rule 22 of the Admission Rules was commenced by the petitioner-Institute, there was no valid permission from the Central Government under Sec. 13A of the I.M.C.C. Act to grant admission, and therefore, the admissions were without any authority. 13. We do not find any merit in this objection at the end of the respondents. 13. We do not find any merit in this objection at the end of the respondents. The process of admission commenced on 29th November, 2010 pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench dated 26th November, 2010 in Civil Application No. 14158 of 2010 in Special Civil Application No. 14885 of 2010 and the admissions were finalised on 30th November, 2010, the date on which the Central Government granted permission for admission. 14. We are of the view that when the permission for admission under Sec. 13A of the I.M.C.C. Act was granted by the Central Government to the petitioner-Institute on 30th November, 2010 for the academic year 2010-11 with an intake capacity of 50 students, pursuant to the order passed by the Division Bench in Special Civil Application No. 12756 of 2010, an objection of the nature can be termed as 'too technical'. The reason is that the entire process of admission undertaken by the petitioner-Institute can be termed as "fair and transparent". They issued public notice inviting applications from students. Respondent No.2-Admission Committee was requested to furnish wait-list of students, if available, so that they can be informed personally and respondent No.2-Admission Committee was requested to depute its officials to supervise the process of admission, if thought fit and proper. 15. On 30th November, 2010, when the Central Government granted permission to the Institute to admit students, the same was subject to rectification of some deficiencies as incorporated in the letter dated 30th November, 2010. We take notice of the fact that there is nothing to show that such deficiencies were not taken care of. Besides, the Central Government also clarified that non-fulfilment of conditions attached to the permission within time specified may entail withdrawal of permission. If there would have been any deficiencies, perhaps the permission would have been withdrawn but that is not the case. 16. We do not find any merit in the second contention of the respondents as regards the eligibility of some of the students. There appears to be practically no foundation for this contention. We fail to understand that all these students were found eligible for admission to the very course as per the process of admission undertaken by respondent No.2-Admission Committee at the relevant time then, how all of a sudden they become ineligible for the course merely because admissions have been granted by the petitioner-Institute. We fail to understand that all these students were found eligible for admission to the very course as per the process of admission undertaken by respondent No.2-Admission Committee at the relevant time then, how all of a sudden they become ineligible for the course merely because admissions have been granted by the petitioner-Institute. The contention that the order dated 30th November, 2010 issued by the Central Government granting permission for admission was conditional, and therefore, unless the order was not confirmed, respondent No. 1-University cannot be directed to enroll the students is also devoid of any merit. There is nothing in the order dated 30th November, 2010 suggesting that till the same is confirmed, students should not be enrolled by respondent No. 1-University. Beside this, we have noticed that this is not the ground on which the respondent No. 1-University declined enrollment in its communication dated 15th February, 2011, which is a subject-matter of challenge. 17. As observed earlier and once again at the cost of repetition, all conditions which have been stipulated in the order dated 30th November, 2010 have been complied with in its letter and spirit and there is no complaint in this regard. 18. Now, so far as the legal contention as regards the power to issue writ of mandamus is concerned, we are of the view that the law in this regard is well-settled. In a recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, Cannanore District Muslim Educational Association, Kanpur v. State of Kerala, reported in 2010 (6) SCC 373 , the Supreme Court has traced the entire law so far as writ of mandamus is concerned. It will be useful to quote relevant Paragraphs of the said judgment : "35. While dismissing the writ petition the Hon'ble High Court with respect, had taken a rather restricted view of the writ of mandamus. The writ of mandamus was originally a common law remedy, based on Royal Authority. In England, the writ is widely used in public law to prevent failure of justice in a wide variety of cases. 36. In England this writ was and still remains a prerogative writ. In America it is a writ of right. (Law of Mandamus by S. S. Merrill, Chicago, T. H. Flood and Company, 1892, Para 62, page 71). 37. About this writ, SA de Smith in 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action', 2nd Edn., pp. 36. In England this writ was and still remains a prerogative writ. In America it is a writ of right. (Law of Mandamus by S. S. Merrill, Chicago, T. H. Flood and Company, 1892, Para 62, page 71). 37. About this writ, SA de Smith in 'Judicial Review of Administrative Action', 2nd Edn., pp. 378 and 379 said that this writ was devised to prevent disorder from a failure of justice and defect of police and was used to compel the performance of a specific duty. 38. About this writ in 1762, Lord Mansfield observed that 'within the past century it had been liberally interposed for the benefit of the subject and advancement of justice'. 39. The exact observations of Lord Mansfield about this writ has been quoted in Wade's 'Administrative Law, Tenth Edition' and those observations are still relevant in understanding the scope of mandamus. Those observations are quoted below : "It was introduced, to prevent disorder from a failure of justice, and defect of police. Therefore, it ought to be used upon all occasions where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good Government there ought to be one..... The value of the matter, or the degree of its importance to the public police, is not scrupulously weighed. If there be a right, and no other specific remedy, this should not be denied. Writs of mandamus have been granted, to admit lecturers, clerks, sextons, and scavengers and c., to restore an alderman to precedency, an attorney to practise in an inferior Court, and c." 40. De Smith in Judicial Review, Sixth Edition has also acknowledged the contribution of Lord Mansfield which led to the development of law on Writ of Mandamus. The speech of Lord Mansfield in R. v. Blooer, 1760 (2) Burr, runs as under : "a prerogative writ flowing from the King himself, sitting in his Court, superintending the police and preserving the peace of this country". (See De Smith's Judicial Review 6th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, page 795 Para 15-036). 41. Almost a century ago, Darling, J. quoted the observations in Rex v. The Justices of Denbighshire, 1803 (4) East, 142, in The King v. The Revising Barrister, 1912 (3) King's Bench 518 which explains the wide sweep of mandamus. (See De Smith's Judicial Review 6th Edition, Sweet and Maxwell, page 795 Para 15-036). 41. Almost a century ago, Darling, J. quoted the observations in Rex v. The Justices of Denbighshire, 1803 (4) East, 142, in The King v. The Revising Barrister, 1912 (3) King's Bench 518 which explains the wide sweep of mandamus. The relevant observations are : "…...Instead of being astute to discover reasons for not applying this great constitutional remedy for error and misgovernment, we think it our duty to be vigilant to apply it in every case to which, by any reasonable construction, it can be made applicable...." 42. At page 531 of the report, Channell, J. said about mandamus : "It is most useful jurisdiction which enables this Court to set right mistakes." 43. In Dwarka Nath v. Income Tax Officer, Special Circle, D. Ward, Kanpur, AIR 1966 SC 81 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court commenting on the High Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 opined that this Article is deliberately couched in comprehensive language so that it confers wide power on High Court to 'reach injustice whenever it is found'. 44. Delivering the judgment Justice Subba Rao (as His Lordship then was) held that the Constitution designedly used such wide language in describing the nature of the power. The learned Judge further held that the High Court can issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs as understood in England; but the learned Judge added that the scope of these writs in India has been widened by the use of the expression "nature". 45. Learned Judge made it very clear that the said expression does not equate the writs that can be issued in India with those in England, but only draws an analogy from them. The learned Judge then clarifies the entire position as follows : ".... It enables the High Courts to mould the reliefs to meet the peculiar and complicated requirements of this country. Any attempt to equate the scope of the power of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution with that of the English Courts to issue prerogative writs is to introduce the unnecessary procedural restrictions grown over the years in a comparatively small country like England with a unitary form of Government to a vast country like India functioning under a federal structure. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself...." 46. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the Article itself...." 46. Same view was also expressed subsequently by this Court in J. R. Raghupathy v. State of A.P., AIR 1988 SC 1681 . Speaking for the Bench, Justice A. P. Sen, after an exhaustive analysis of the trend of Administrative Law in England, gave His Lordship's opinion in Paragraph (29) at page 1697 thus : "29. Much of the above discussion is of little or academic interest as the jurisdiction of the High Court to grant an appropriate writ, direction or order under Art. 226 of the Constitution is not subject to the archaic constraints on which prerogative writs were issued in England. Most of the cases in which the English Courts had earlier enunciated their limited power to pass on the legality of the exercise of the prerogative were decided at a time when the Courts took a generally rather circumscribed view of their ability to review Ministerial statutory discretion. The decision of the House of Lords in Padfield's case, (1968 AC 997) marks the emergence of the interventionist judicial attitude that has characterized many recent judgments." 47. In the Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Limited, 1986 (1) SCC 264 : AIR 1986 SC 1370 , this Court expressed the same opinion that in Constitution and Administrative Law, law in India forged ahead of the law in England (Para 101, page 344). 48. This Court has also taken a very broad view of the writ of mandamus in several decisions. In the case of the Comptroller and Auditor General of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi v. K. S. Jagannathan, AIR 1987 SC 537 , a three-Judge Bench of this Court referred to Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Vol. I Para 89 to illustrate the range of this remedy and quoted with approval the following passage from Halsbury about the efficacy of mandamus : "....is to remedy defects of justice and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right, and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual." (See Para 19, page 546 of the report) 49. In Paragraph 20, in the same page of the report, this Court further held : "....and in a proper case, in order to prevent injustice resulting to the concerned parties, the Court may itself pass an order or give directions which the Government or the public authority should have passed or given had it properly and lawfully exercised its discretion." 50. In a subsequent judgment also in Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajeevandasjiswami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V. R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607 : [1989 (2) GLR 1357 (SC)], this Court examined the development of the law of mandamus and held as under : '21. ....mandamus cannot be denied on the ground that the duty to be enforced is not imposed by the statute. Commenting on the development of this law, Professor De Smith states : "To be enforceable by mandamus a public duty does not necessarily have to be one imposed by statute. It may be sufficient for the duty to have been imposed by charter common law, custom or even contract." (Judicial Review of Administrative Act, 4th Ed. P. 540). We share this view. The judicial control over the fast expanding maze of bodies affecting the rights of the people should not be put into water-tight compartment. It should remain flexible to meet the requirements of variable circumstances. Mandamus is a very wide remedy which must be easily available 'to reach injustice wherever it is found'. Technicalities should not come in the way of granting that relief under Art. 226. We, therefore, reject the contention urged for the appellants on the maintainability of the writ petition'." 19. The facts of the case clearly show that the petitioner-Institute is entitled to admit and enroll 50 students admitted for the academic year 2010-11 as students of First Year in the discipline of Ayurved at the level of graduation. 20. For the reasons aforesaid, we quash and set aside the communication dated 15th February, 2011 issued by respondent No. 1-University and direct the respondent No. 1-University to enroll all 50 students admitted by the petitioner-Institute for the academic year 2010-11 as students of First Year in the discipline of Ayurved at the level of graduation as per the details provided in this regard to the respondent No. 1-University vide communication of the petitioner-Institute dated 6th December, 2010. The petition succeeds and is hereby allowed with no order as to cost. Petition allowed.