JUDGMENT (Per : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE J.B. PARDIWALA) By way of the present application, the applicant, newly elected Sarpanch of Bandra Village Panchayat, Tal. Gondal, Dist. Rajkot has prayed to review/recall the order passed by this Court dated 10th May, 2011 in LPA No. 2593 of 2010, arising from judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge in SCA No. 10991 of 2010. 2. The facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this application and also giving rise to this application can be summarized as under:- 2.1 Respondent No.1 was elected as Sarpanch of Bandra Village Panchayat, Tal. Gondal, Dist. Rajkot and assumed post of Sarpanch on 28th January, 2007. While holding the office of Sarpanch, he came to be served with a show cause notice issued by the District Development Officer, Rajkot, under Section 57(1) of the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (for short "the Act"), calling upon respondent No.1 to explain certain charges of misconduct in discharge of his duties as Sarpanch. Pursuant to the same, the District Development Officer, Rajkot, vide order dated 15th February, 2010, in exercise of powers under Section 57(1) of the Act, ordered removal of respondent No.1 from the office of Sarpanch, Bandra Village Panchayat. 2.2 Respondent No.1 preferred appeal before the State Government under the provisions of Section 57(3) of the Act, which also came to be dismissed confirming the order of removal from the post of Sarpanch passed by the District Development Officer, Rajkot. The orders passed by the authorities under the Act were subject matter of challenge before the learned Single Judge in a writ petition being SCA No. 10991 of 2010. Learned Single Judge also rejected the petition confirming the orders passed by the District Development Officer, Rajkot and the Additional Development Commissioner, State of Gujarat. 2.3 Respondent No.1 preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 2593 of 2010, which was taken up for hearing by this Court. 2.4 After hearing the respective parties and perusal of the record, this Court came to the conclusion that it was not possible to hold that the case of respondent No.1 - original petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 57 of the Act. 2.4 After hearing the respective parties and perusal of the record, this Court came to the conclusion that it was not possible to hold that the case of respondent No.1 - original petitioner falls within the ambit of Section 57 of the Act. This Court took the view that in a democracy governed by rule of law, once elected to an office in a democratic institution, the person elected is entitled to hold the office for the term for which he has been elected and removal of a Sarpanch from his office on flimsy charges and accusations is a serious matter as it curtails the statutory term of the holder of the office and it would also cast a stigma on the holder of the office. 2.5 Vide judgment and order dated 10th May, 2011, we allowed the appeal quashing and setting aside the orders passed by the authorities under the Act as well as the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge and also further ordered that respondent No.1 herein i.e. original petitioner is allowed to resume his office of Sarpanch. 2.6 It appears that before the original petitioner i.e. respondent No.1 herein could prefer appeal, a Notification came to be issued on 27th December, 2010 for holding fresh election, as the post of Sarpanch fell vacant. The applicant herein filed his nomination paper and contested the election, and he was declared elected and assumed the office of Sarpanch. 3. It is the case of the applicant that all these facts were not brought to the notice of this Court and therefore, this Court was unable to take cognizance of the subsequent events which took place between the date of removal of respondent No.1 from the office of Sarpanch, till the date of passing of the judgment and order in appeal. It is the case of the applicant that since he has already been elected as a Sarpanch, this Court could not have passed an order allowing respondent No.1 to resume his office of Sarpanch. Under these set of facts and circumstances of the case, the applicant has prayed to recall or review the part of the order where this Court has said that the appellant -original petitioner is allowed to resume his office of Sarpanch. 4. We have heard learned counsel Mr. B.S. Patel, appearing with learned Advocate Mr. Umang H. Oza for the applicant, Mr. 4. We have heard learned counsel Mr. B.S. Patel, appearing with learned Advocate Mr. Umang H. Oza for the applicant, Mr. Bharat T. Rao, appearing for respondent No.1 - original petitioner, Ms. Krina Calla, learned Assistant Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.2 and learned Advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw, appearing for respondents Nos. 3 and 4. 5. We concede to the fact that at the time of passing of judgment and order dated 10th May, 2011 in LPA No. 2593 of 2010, the subsequent events which took place between 15th September, 2010 i.e. the date on which learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition of respondent No.1, till the date the applicant herein came to be elected as Sarpanch, could not be taken cognizance of. To this limited extent, we are inclined to take our order dated 10th May, 2011 in review so as to clarify the position as to whether any legal right has accrued in favour of the applicant to continue as Sarpanch or whether the original appellant i.e. respondent No.1 should be allowed to resume his office of Sarpanch, as we have quashed and set aside the orders of the authorities under the Act as well as the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge. 6. It would be expedient at this stage to place on record few dates, which in our opinion, are important. (a) On 15.2.2010, the original petitioner was ordered to be removed from the office of Sarpanch vide order passed by the District Development Officer, Rajkot; (b) On 20thJuly, 2010, State Government dismissed the appeal under Section 57(3) of the Act; (c) On 15th September, 2010, learned Single Judge rejected the writ petition preferred by the original petitioner being SCA No. 10991 of 2010; (d) On 27th December, 2010, a Notification was issued by the Collector, Rajkot, for holding fresh election to the post of Sarpanch of village Bandra; (e) On 15thOctober,2010, the original petitioner preferred LPA No. 2593 of 2010; (f) On 13th January, 2011, the appeal was taken up for hearing by this Court for the first time and on that day, we issued notice to the respondents; (g) On 13th January, 2011, learned AGP accepted notice on behalf of Additional Development Commissioner i.e. respondent No.1 in the appeal. While issuing Notice on respondents Nos. While issuing Notice on respondents Nos. 2 and 3, we also clarified that the appeal will be disposed of at the stage of admission, and if possible on the next date. Notice was made returnable on 8th February, 2011. We observed that no interim order is granted for the present and that is how we disposed of CA No. 13238 of 2010, which was preferred along with LPA No. 2593 of 2010. (h) On 16th January, 2011, respondent No.1 herein came to be elected as Sarpanch of village Bandra, pursuant to a fresh election declared vide Notification dated 27th December, 2010. (i) On 10th May, 2011, we passed final judgment and order allowing LPA No. 2593 of 2010 preferred by the original petitioner. 7. It is evident on perusal of the relevant dates that much before the applicant herein came to be elected as Sarpanch, we had already taken cognizance in appeal and issued notices to the respondents. During the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal, a fresh election had taken place. In our view, the election is governed by the principle of lis-pendens. In any case, the fresh election had taken place on account of the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge, confirming the orders passed by the authorities under the Act, removing the original petitioner from the post of Sarpanch. Once the impugned order is quashed and set aside, as we have done while allowing the Letters Patent Appeal, fresh election cannot survive. As a necessary consequence, the status-quo ante as it existed has to be restored. 8. However, learned counsel for the applicant herein strenuously urged that respondent No.1 was aware on 13th January, 2011 i.e. the date on which this Court issued notice for the first time that the election process has already started and his nomination paper was rejected, but still no efforts were made to persuade this Court to stay the election, as a result of which, after 3 days i.e on 16th January, 2011, applicant herein was declared elected to the post of Sarpanch of Bandra Gram Panchayat. He would submit, relying on a Division Bench judgment of this High Court in the case of Dipakbhai M. Patel Vs. He would submit, relying on a Division Bench judgment of this High Court in the case of Dipakbhai M. Patel Vs. A.S. Patel, reported in 2009 (3) GLR page 2167 that before this Court allowed the appeal of respondent No.1 and allowed him to resume his office of Sarpanch, the applicant had already taken over the charge as a Sarpanch and therefore, this Court ought to have refrained itself from granting the consequential relief of reinstating respondent No.1 to the office of Sarpanch. Counsel has relied upon paragraph 37 of the above referred judgment, which reads as under:- "37. Consequent to the setting aside of the orders of removal, normally as a necessary corollary the appellants would be required to be restored to their original position, however, considering the fact that the appellants were to a certain extent responsible for the delay in the hearing of the appeal, and in the meantime the elections to the vacancies created on account of their removal have already been held. The newly elected members appear to have taken charge and moreover, such newly elected members are not before us. Hence, in their absence it would not be possible to pass any order adversely affecting their rights. In the circumstances, though the orders of removal are quashed and set aside, the Court refrains from granting the consequential relief of reinstatingthe appellants to the office of members of the Bopal Gram Panchayat. This view finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., 2006 (2) SCC 1 wherein despite holdingthe impugned Proclamation to be unconstitutional, the Court refused to exercise discretionary jurisdiction of ordering status-quo-ante to be restored byrestoring the Legislative assembly as it stood on the date of the said proclamation." 9. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Bharat T. Rao, appearing for respondent No.1 i.e. original petitioner submitted that this application deserves to be rejected. He would submit that it is not that the factum of fresh election was not placed before the Hon'ble Court. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Bharat T. Rao, appearing for respondent No.1 i.e. original petitioner submitted that this application deserves to be rejected. He would submit that it is not that the factum of fresh election was not placed before the Hon'ble Court. He submitted that as a matter of fact, in the affidavit-in-reply filed by District Development Officer i.e. original respondent No.2, in paragraph 7, it has been specifically stated that subsequent to the removal of respondent No.1 from the post of Sarpanch, fresh election was held by the Election Commission and newly elected Sarpanch has also posted. He submitted that however, it was not specifically pointed out to this Hon'ble Court about this development during the course of hearing and therefore, this Hon'ble Court may clarify as to what would be the effect of the same. He would also submit that the basic rule is that the rights and liabilities of the parties to the petition should be determined on the basis of the date of filing of the petition. He would submit, on the strength of the principle of lis-pendens, that even if the Court has not thought fit to grant any relief pending final consideration of the appeal, still any action during the interregnum period would always be subject to the final outcome of the petition. 10. We are of the view that the law on the subject is well settled. While it is true that the right to relief must be judged by reference to the date on which the legal proceedings were instituted, it is equally true that if subsequent to the filing of the proceedings like in the present case appeal, certain developments took place that have a bearing on the right to relief claimed by a party, such subsequent events may not be completely shut out from consideration. What the Court in such a situation is expected to do is to examine the impact of the said subsequent development on the right to relief claimed by a party, and if necessary, mould the relief suitably so that the same is tailored to the situation that obtained on the date relief is actually granted. 10.1 In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. Motor and General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 4 as under:- "4. 10.1 In Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu Vs. Motor and General Traders (1975) 1 SCC 770 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 4 as under:- "4. ...If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it, is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies bending the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other dis-entitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial court. If the litigation pends, the power exits, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice. Rulings on this point are legion, even as situations for applications of this equitable rule are myriad. We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the Court, and in many cases must, take cautions cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." 10.2 To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Om Prakash Gupta Vs. Ranbir B. Goyal (2002) 2 SCC 256 , where the Supreme Court declared that although the ordinary rule of civil law is that the rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of the institution of the suit, yet the court has power to mould the relief in case the following three conditions are satisfied:- "11. ...(i) that the relief, as claimed originally has, by reason of subsequent events, become inappropriate or cannot be granted; (ii) that talking note of such subsequent event or changed circumstances would shorten litigation and enable complete justice being done to the parties; and (iii) that such subsequent event is brought to the notice of the court promptly and in accordance with the rules of procedural law so that the opposite party is not taken by surprise." 10.3 InHasmat Rai Vs. Raghunath Prasad (1981) 3 SCC 103 , the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 14 as under:- "14. ...If the tenant is in a position to show that the need for requirement no more exits because of subsequent events, it would be open to him to point out such events and the court including the appellant court has to examine, evaluate and adjudicate [upon] the same." 10.4 To thesame effect is the decision of the Supreme Court in Baba Kashinath Bhinge Vs. Samast Lingayat Gavali, 1994 Supp. (3) SCC 698, where relying upon the decision in Hasmat Rai's case (supra) the Supreme Court held as under:- "21. ... that in a case of bona fide requirement it is necessary to establish that the landlord needs the premises and the need subsists till a decree is passed in his favour. In a case where such need is available at the time of the filing of the petition but becomes extinct by the time the matter attains finality in appeal for revision no decree will be justified. for that purpose the court should take all the subsequent events into consideration and mould the relief accordingly." "2. Equally it is settled by this Court in series of judgments and a reference in this behalf would be sufficient by citing Hasmat Rai v. Raghunath Prasad that in a case of bona fide requirement, it is always necessary, till the decree of eviction is passed that the landlord should satisfy that the need is bona fide and the need subsists. In a case where the need is available at the time of filing of the petition, but at the time of granting decree it may not continue to subsists, in that event, the decree for eviction could not be made. Similarly pending appeal or revision or writ petition, the need may become more acute. The court should take into account all the subsequent events to mould the relief. The High Court may not be justified in omitting to consider this aspect of the matter but that does not render the judgment illegal for the subsequent discussion we are going to make." 10.5 Reference may also be made to the decision in Ramesh Kumar Vs. Kesho Ram, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 623, where in paragraph 6, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "6. Kesho Ram, 1992 Supp. (2) SCC 623, where in paragraph 6, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "6. The normal rule is that in any litigation the rights and obligations of the parties are adjudicated upon as they obtain at the commencement of the lis. But this is subject to an exception. Wherever subsequent events of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the court is not precluded from taking a 'cautious cognizance' of the subsequent changes of fact and law to mould the relief." 10.6 In Bihar Finance Service House Construction Co-operative Society Ltd. Vs. Gautam Goswami - (2008) 5 SCC 339 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 23 observed as under:- "23. The judgment and order of the Patna High Court setting aside the declaration under Section 6 of the Act was set aside by this Court. It issued certain directions. Such directions were issued not only in presence of the State of Bihar but also in presence of those who had objected to the acquisition proceedings and filed writ applications before the Patna High Court. The claim made by each one of them had been taken into consideration. If the applicants are purchasers of lands pendente lite which was subject-matter of different proceedings before the Patan High Court as also this Court, they are also bound thereby." 10.7 Another important decision of the Supreme Court, which we may quote and which applies in the present case is of Pratap Rai Tanwani Vs. Uttam Chand - (2004) 8 SCC 490 , where the Supreme Court observed that subsequent developments can be taken into consideration to afford relief to the parties, provided only when such developments had a material impact on those rights and obligations. 10.8 In a very recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court in the case of Jai Prakash Gupta Vs. Riyaz Ahamad - (2009) 10 SCC 197 , the Supreme Court quoted Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court. In paragraph 24 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "24. It also reminds us of a celebrated judgment of a Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chhote Khan v. Mohd. Riyaz Ahamad - (2009) 10 SCC 197 , the Supreme Court quoted Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court. In paragraph 24 of the judgment, the Supreme Court observed as under:- "24. It also reminds us of a celebrated judgment of a Full Bench decision of the Nagpur High Court in Chhote Khan v. Mohd. Obedulla Khan in which the view of the Court to take note of the subsequent developments specially at the appellate stage was taken up for consideration. Hidayatullah, J. (as His Lordship then was) held as under: (AIR p. 364, para 7) "7. [On a review of judicial opinion,] that an action must be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the commencement of the action....No doubt, courts 'can' and sometimes 'must' take notice of subsequent events, but that is done merely 'inter partes' to shorten litigation but not to give to a defendant an advantage because a third party has acquired the right...of the plaintiff." 11. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, it is a settled proposition of law that subsequent developments of fact or law which have a material bearing on the entitlement of the parties to relief or on aspects which bear on the moulding of the relief occur, the Court, even at any stage of the proceedings, is not precluded from taking a cautious cognizance of the subsequent developments of fact and law to mould the relief. 12. Keeping these principles in mind and considering the nature of subsequent developments as brought out by the applicant herein during the pendency of the Letters Patent Appeal, we are of the view that the elections which took place on 16th January, 2011 was governed by the principle of lis-pendens. Fresh election had taken place on account of the impugned order which was passed by the authorities and confirmed by the learned Single Judge removing respondent No.1 - original petitioner from the post of Sarpanch, which this Court quashed and set aside, holding that respondent No.1 -original petitioner was wrongly removed from the office of the Sarpanch. Once the impugned order is quashed, election cannot survive. As a necessary consequence, status-quo ante has got to be restored. 13. In taking this view, we are also fortified by a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Baburao Vishwanath Mathpati Vs. Once the impugned order is quashed, election cannot survive. As a necessary consequence, status-quo ante has got to be restored. 13. In taking this view, we are also fortified by a Division Bench judgment of the Bombay High Court, in the case of Baburao Vishwanath Mathpati Vs. State, reported in AIR 1996 (Bom.) page 227, wherein the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court relying on judgment of the Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court, observed in paragraph 93 as under:- "93. It is pointed out to us by the learned counsel for the respondent No.4 and the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the petitioner has not claimed any relief against the respondent No.4, who is at present working as President of the Municipal Council, Parbhani. It is pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that after the impugned order the petitioner filed the above writ petition on 12-8-1994 while the respondent No.4 came to be elected as President of the Municipal Council on 2-11-1994. Mr.Talekar, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that it is not necessary to amend the petition by seeking a prayer for the removal of the respondent No.4 as President of the Municipal Council when the principle of lis pendens applies. Moreover, he points out that this Court has already passed an order on 1-11-1994 when the application for interim relief of stay to the meeting to elect new President was to be held on 2nd Nov. 1994 at 12 noon this Court has passed an order in extenso and refused to grant interim relief. However, it is observed that the election of the President of the Municipal Council which is to take place on 2-11-1994 shall be subject to the result of the present writ petition. Similarly Mr.Talekar has placed reliance on the ruling reported in 1995 AIHC 3644 (Punj & Har), (Parvinder Singh v. State of Punjab). On identical issue it is observed in para 11: "In view of the above we are satisfied that the impugned order dated 19th April, 1994 (Annexure B-5) by which the petitioner was removed from the office of the presidentship as well as membership of the Committee cannot be sustained. It is quashed. The petitioner is restored to his original position. Mr. Bagchi has pointed out that during the pendency of the petition a fresh election had taken place. It is quashed. The petitioner is restored to his original position. Mr. Bagchi has pointed out that during the pendency of the petition a fresh election had taken place. In our view, the election is governed by the principle of lis pendens. In any case fresh election had taken place on account of the impugned order. Once the impugned order is quashed election cannot be survived. As a necessary consequence status quo ante as existed prior to April 19, 1994 has to be restored." The present writ petition filed by the petitioner rests more on strong ground and we have already come to the conclusion that in view of the reasons stated above, the impugned order cannot be sustained and deserves to be quashed. Similarly even though the petitioner has not made any prayer against respondent No.4, may be for his removal from the office of the President -and that he should restored to his original office as President of the Municipal Council, Parbhani, in view of the observations made above together with this Court's interim order passed on 1.11.1994, the petitioner will have to be restored to his original office of the President of the Parbhani Municipal Council as existed before passing the impugned order." 14. Now, coming to the decision of the Division Bench of this High Court in the case of Dipakbhai M. Patel (supra) which has been heavily relied upon, we are of the view that in the peculiar facts emerging in the case before the Court, the Division Bench took the view that though the consequence to the setting aside of the orders of removal, normally has a necessary corollary that the appellants would be required to be restored to their original position, however, the Court took into consideration the fact that the newly elected members already took charge and that they were not before the Court and therefore, in the absence of the newly elected members, the Court did not deem fit to pass any orders adversely affecting their rights, and in spite of the fact that the orders of removal were quashed, the Court refrained from granting consequential relief of reinstating the appellants of that case to the office of members of Bopal Gram Panchayat. The Division Bench also relied upon the decision of the apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India, 2006 (2) SCC. The Division Bench also relied upon the decision of the apex Court in the case of Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India, 2006 (2) SCC. It is expedient to observe here at this stage that Rameshwar Prasad's case was in connection with dissolution of Bihar Legislative Assembly at the nascent stage by Presidential Proclamation and the Supreme Court was confronted to decide whether the same was constitutional or not. In this set of facts, Supreme Court took the view while declaring the proclamation dated 23rd May, 2005 to be unconstitutional, that though an order of status-quo ante as prevailing as on dissolution of the Assembly could have been ordered, however, the Supreme Court declined to grant such a relief taking into consideration the larger public interest, more particularly the fact that the election process had been set in motion and was at an advanced stage. The Supreme Court also took judicial notice of the fact that considerable amount must have been spent; enormous preparations made and ground works done in the process of election and that too for election in a State like Bihar. Having regard to all these subsequent developments coupled with numbers belonging to different political parties, Supreme Court thought fit not to put the State in another spell of uncertainty. Despite unconstitutionality of the proclamation, Supreme Court thought to mould the relief by not directing status-quo ante. Thus judgment of Rameshwar Prasad Vs. Union of India (supra) stands altogether on a different footing and we are of the view that the same cannot be made applicable in the present case. However, it still remains a matter of discretion, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. 15. We are of the opinion that the applicant herein has no legal right to say that since he has already been elected as Sarpanch, he should now be permitted to continue in the office of Sarpanch, inspite of Court holding that the removal of respondent No.1 - original petitioner from the office of Sarpanch was illegal and unconstitutional. If the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Dipakbhai (supra) is applied blanketly, then in such a situation in all cases relating to matters of election, the Courts will have to grant relief pending final consideration of the matter and that would again not be possible and permissible. 16. If the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the applicant in the case of Dipakbhai (supra) is applied blanketly, then in such a situation in all cases relating to matters of election, the Courts will have to grant relief pending final consideration of the matter and that would again not be possible and permissible. 16. We once again at the cost of repetition deem fit to state that removal from the post of Sarpanch brings to bear on the elected person or holder of the public office by election, serious consequences, some times more severe penalties prescribed and at times disastrous impact on fair name and good reputation obtained and acquired in course of public life. If the elected persons are allowed to be removed on such jejune grounds, it would simply mean throttling down the principle of democracy in the local self-bodies and the elected representatives of the people like the respondent no.1 herein – original petitioner would be made to lose their tenure at the altar of the arbitrary exercise of powers by the officers who have been charged with the duty under the Act to at least addressed themselves to the real object behind such provisions, besides the grounds and procedure. In spite of all these, today if we accept the prayer of the applicant herein to permit him to continue as Sarpanch, it will be nothing short of mockery of justice. 17. We would also like to look into one another legal issue as it assumes importance, not only so far as the present case is concerned, but even as a broad principle of law. We have discussed in the earlier part of our judgment that on the principle of lis pendens any action or any development which takes place during the pendency of any legal proceeding, then the said action or development would always be subject to the final outcome of the proceeding which would finally decide the rights and obligations of the respective parties. The term “lis pendens” as explained in the Law Lexicon is as under : “Lis means a suit, action controversy,or dispute, and lis pendens means a pending suit. The doctrine denotes those principles and rules of law which define and limit the operation of the common-law maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur, that is, pending the suit nothing should be changed. A pending suit. The doctrine denotes those principles and rules of law which define and limit the operation of the common-law maxim pendente lite nihil innovetur, that is, pending the suit nothing should be changed. A pending suit. As soon as proceedings are commenced to recover or charge some specific property [Ex parte Thornton (1867)2 Ch.p.178] there is “lis pendens” - a pending suit, the consequence of which is that until the litigation is at an end neither litigant can deal with the property to the prejudice of the other. A lis pendens is defined in Wharton's Law Dictionary as a pending suit. “Lis” means a suit, action, controversy, or dispute, and dispute is a conflict or contest, while controversy is a disputed question, a suit at law; and the pendens of the lis is not disturbed on in any manner affected by the fact of an appeal taken from one Court to another. The litigation or contest still goes on. The rule of “lis pendens” is statutory and imposes two conditions:(i) the existence of a contentious suit, and (ii) that the transfer should be during its active prosecution in a Court of the kind described in S.52, Transfer of Property Act. (31 B.393=9 Bom LR 530).” The maxim “Pendente lite nihil innovetur” according to the Law Lexicon is as under :- “During a litigation nothing new should be introduced. During a litigation no change in the position of things, or of parties, can be made.” Applying this principle of law, during the pendency of a petition, nothing new can be introduced and if at all anything new is introduced, the same would also be subject to the final outcome of the petition, which woulddecide the rights and obligations of the parties. 18. We are of the view that it is not even necessary to clarify that any action during the pendency or say, in the present case, fresh election to the post of Sarpanch, shall be subject to the final outcome of the petition. The principle of “lis pendens” itself can be termed as a constructive notice of the fact that if election is conducted during the pendency of the petition, the same shall be subject to the final outcome of the petition and the person elected in the said election would be bound by the final order, which the Court may pass ultimately. 19. 19. In the above conspectus of the entire matter, we review the last part of our judgment and clarify that though applicant No.1 has been elected to the office of Sarpanch, but since we have quashed and set aside the orders of removal of respondent No.1 - original petitioner from the office of Sarpanch being illegal and unconstitutional, we are of the view that respondent No.1 - original petitioner should be permitted to resume his office of Sarpanch. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in this application and the same is rejected with no order as to costs.