JUDGMENT 1. - In this writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the plaintiff-petitioner has prayed for quashing the orders impugned dated 03.05.2010 (Annexure-12) and dated 20.8.2010 (Annexure-13) and further prayed that applications filed by the petitioner for appointment of Commissioner and for directions to the Station House Officer (SHO), Police Station, Amba Mata, Udaipur and Urban, Improvement Trust, Udaipur in contempt proceedings, may be allowed. 2. As per facts of the case, the plaintiff-petitioner filed a civil suit along with an application under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC for temporary injunction against the respondents. The respondents No. 1 & 2 separately filed their reply to the application for temporary injunction. The learned trial Court appointed Shri Satish Shrimali, Advocate as Commissioner to inspect the site. The Commissioner submitted his report on 06.02.2009 (Annexure-4). Thereafter, the learned trial Court after hearing both the parties granted temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff-petitioner vide order dated 03.02.2010 whereby the trial Court restrained the respondent no. 1 from raising any construction upon the land in question of the plaintiff's plot without proper construction permission and leaving set back. As per the plaintiff-petitioner , inspite of the order passed by the trial Court, the respondent No. 1 continued with the construction and disobeyed the order passed by the trial Court on 03.02.2010. Therefore, the plaintiff-petitioner filed an application under Order 39, Rule 2A read with Section 151 of CPC against the respondents for committing contempt with the prayer for demolishing the construction raised by the respondent No. 1 in the set back area and for sentencing him for violating the injunction order. 3. In reply to the application filed under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC, it is submitted by the respondent No. 1 that he has not raised any construction in violation of the order. But to prove the correct fact, an application was filed by the petitioner for appointment of commissioner on 23.04.2010. The petitioner filed another application under Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code in the suit for directing the Station House Officer (SHO), Police Station Amba Mata, Udaipur to restrain the respondent No. 1 from raising any construction in the Eastern and Western set back area and for direction to the respondent No. 2 demolish the construction raised in violation of the injunction order. The respondent No. 1 filed reply to the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code and after hearing both the parties, the learned trial Court vide order dated 03.05.2010 rejected the application of the petitioner for appointment of Commissioner so also rejected application filed under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for demolishing the construction with police aid vide order dated 20.08.2010. Hence, this writ petition is filed for quashing both the orders of trial Court. 4. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner is that both the applications filed by the petitioner for appointment of the Commissioner so also for seeking police assistance for demolishing the construction, which is alleged to be raised after passing temporary injunction, have wrongly been rejected by the trial Court. Further it is submitted that in this matter, maintaining dignity of the order passed by the Court is in question. Once an order has been made by the trial Court upon the application for temporary injunction restraining the respondent No. 1 not to proceed further for construction, then, it is the duty of the defendant to obey the order of the Court and if the defendant has violated the order passed by the Court, then, it is the duty of the Court to initiate appropriate proceeding against contemnor and to pass an appropriate order for maintaining dignity in respect of the order passed by the Court. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that after passing the order for temporary injunction, when the defendant raised construction in violation of the order, then, in compelling circumstances, there was no option left with the plaintiff-petitioner to file an application for appointment of Commissioner to apprise, the Court how the defendant has violated the order passed by the Court. But upon filing the said application, the learned trial Court instead of passing an order for appointment of Commissioner rejected the prayer of the petitioner for appointment Commissioner, therefore, it is prayed that while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the applications filed by the petitioner for appointment of Commissioner may be allowed and trial Court may be directed to appoint Commissioner and get report of the site for the purpose of taking action against the respondent-defendant for flouting the order passed by the Court while deciding application for temporary injunction. So far as another application, which is filed by the petitioner under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code for seeking police assistance and for direction to the respondent No.2-UIT, Udaipur demolish the construction alleged to have been raised after passing temporary injunction, it is submitted that repeatedly, the plaintiff-petitioner made prayer and apprised the Court that defendant is not complying the direction given by the Court not to raise construction but the learned trial Court rejected the application, which is totally erroneous. Learned counsel for the petitioner while relying upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Meera Chaulian v. Harsli Bishnoi & Anr., reported in 2007(2) Civil Court Cases p.g (SC) ; the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Chandu Ram v. Farangi Lal, reported in 1993 (7) Civil Court Cases 688 ; and the judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in Varala Ramachandra Reddy v. Mekala Yedi Reddy & Ors., reported in 2010 (4) Civil Court cases 453 (A.P.) vehemently argued that it si the duty of the trial Court to appoint Local Commissioner in a suit for permanent injunction for survey and for demarcating the land and to give his report about the boundaries and further, as per the above judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court, the order for providing police help can be passed upon the application filed under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code, if any person is flouting the order passed by the Court. Therefore, it is prayed that this writ petition. may bellowed and impugned orders may be quashed. 5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1 submits that an application under Order 39, Rule 2A read with Section 151 CPC has been filed by the plaintiff-petitioner, which is pending consideration before the trial Court. In the suit, one application under Section 151 CPC was filed by the petitioner for appointment of Commissioner but learned trial Court after perusing the reply filed by the respondents found that no case is made out for appointment of Commissioner because prior to deciding application for temporary injunction, the Commissioner was already appointed and the said Commissioner already submit his report, upon which, the application filed under Order 39, Rule 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC was decided. Further it is observed in the order that if again prayer for appointment of Commissioner is accepted, then, it amounts to creating evidence in favour of the plaintiff. In this view of the matter, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the trial Court was conscious while deciding application file for appointment of Commissioner in the proceeding initiated under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC that no evidence can be created to proceed against the petitioner. Therefore, there is no error in the order impugned dated 3.5.2010. 6. While defending the order dated 20.8.2010 passed by the trial court upon the application filed under Section 151 CPC, it is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that on the one hand, the petitioner initiated contempt proceedings against the respondent No. 1 under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC, which is pending and on the other hand, an application was filed in the suit under Section 151 CPC for providing police assistance and to demolish the construction, which is alleged to be raised after passing the order for temporary injunction. Both these applications cannot be flied simultaneously and if any disobedience is made by the respondent-defendant, then, action can be taken upon application filed under Order 3, Rule 2A CPC after adjudication. Therefore, according to learned counsel for the respondents, the trial Court rightly rejected the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 CPC in the suit. 7. While inviting my attention towards order of the trial Court dated 20.8.2010, it is pointed out by learned counsel for the respondents that in para 4 of the order, the trial Court observed that as per photographs placed on record, it appears that the position, which was in existence prior to deciding the application for temporary injunction, is maintained. Further it is observed that if any construction has been made prior to deciding application for temporary injunction, that can be demolished in the event of deciding suit in favour of plaintiff- petitioner. It is also observed that the plaintiff has separately initiated contempt proceedings, in which, if it will be proved that any construction has been raised without leaving set back area in contravention of the order, then, appropriate order could be passed to punish respondent. Therefore, there is no illegality in the order of rejection of application. It is also observed that the plaintiff has separately initiated contempt proceedings, in which, if it will be proved that any construction has been raised without leaving set back area in contravention of the order, then, appropriate order could be passed to punish respondent. Therefore, there is no illegality in the order of rejection of application. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that though the legislature has curtailed the right of filing revision against the interlocutory order but the litigants are filing writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in very causal manner. the power of superintendence is required to be exercised sparingly, if gross violation of rules or statute is found. The Hon'ble Supreme Court recently adjudicated the matter with regard to exercising power under Article 227 of the constitution of India in Shalini Shyam Shetty and Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329 and in Jai Singh and Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Anr., reported in (2010) 9 SCC 385 wherein, the Hon'ble Supreme Court disapproved the general tendency of the High Court in entertaining writs in pure civil/private disputes. Therefore, no case is made out for interference by this court while exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 8. After hearing learned counsel for both the parties, I have perused the entire pleadings and documents annexed with the writ petition. In this writ petition, as stated above, the petitioner is challenging order dated 3.5.2010 (Annexure-12), which has been passed upon the application filed under Section 151 CPC in the suit by the plaintiff-petitioner for appointment of Commissioner and order dated 20.8.2010 (Annexure-13), which has been passed upon the application filed under Section 151 CPC seeking direction to the SHO, Police Station Amba Mata, Udaipur to restrain the respondent No. 1 from raising any construction in violation of interim order and for directing respondent No. 2 to demolish the construction raised in violation of the inunction order. The learned trial Court while deciding the temporary injunction application of the plaintiff-petitioner passed following order on 3.2.2010. The learned trial Court while deciding the temporary injunction application of the plaintiff-petitioner passed following order on 3.2.2010. " 14- vr% izkFkhZ dk izkFkZu i= fo:) foi{kh la[;k 1 ckcr vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk bl gn rd Lohdkj fd;k tkdj foi{kh la[;k 1 dks bl vk'k; dh vLFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ls ikcUn fd;k tkrk gS fd og rks Qslyk ewy okn izkFkhZ ds IyhV ls lVek fdlh izdkj dk fuekZ.k dk;Z fcuk lsVcsd NksM+s ,oa fcuk fuekZ.k Lohd`fr ds ugha djs] u djkosA " 9. In the above order, it is specifically directed that till disposal of the suit, the respondent-defendant shall not raise construction in the side of the plaintiff's plot without any construction permission or without leaving set back area. It is obvious that no complete prohibitory order has been passed that defendant shall not raise any construction. The case of the defendant is that after depositing required fees, his construction was regulated by the U.I.T. Meaning thereby, if the defendant flouted the order passed by the trial Court upon the application for temporary injunction, then, obviously it is a matter of contempt/wilful disobedience, for which, the plaintiff-petitioner has already initiated proceeding under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC against the respondent-defendant, which is still pending. In my opinion, instead of challenging the order passed by the trial Court upon his application for appointment of Commissioner, the petitioner is required to pursue the proceedings initiated by him under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC. Under said provision, if it is found after adjudication by the trial Court that the defendant has violated the order, the, obviously he would be punished. For adjudication and to prove disobedience, it is the duty of the plaintiff-petitioner to prove it before the Court by way of cogent evidence without insisting to appoint Commissioner again. I am in full agreement with the finding of the trial Court for rejecting the application for appointment of Commissioner. The trial Court observed that prior to deciding application for temporary injunction, the Commissioner was appointed, who has submitted his report, which is on record and no order can be made for creating evidence in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the prayer of the plaintiff-petitioner for quashing order dated 03.05.2010 is hereby rejected. 10. The trial Court observed that prior to deciding application for temporary injunction, the Commissioner was appointed, who has submitted his report, which is on record and no order can be made for creating evidence in favour of the plaintiff. Therefore, the prayer of the plaintiff-petitioner for quashing order dated 03.05.2010 is hereby rejected. 10. So far as another prayer for quashing the order dated 20.08.2010 (Annexure-13), which is passed upon the application filed by the petitioner under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code, first of all, 1 am of the opinion, that once the plaintiff-petitioner initiated proceedings for contempt under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC, then, there was no occasion left for the petitioner to file an application under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code in the suit for seeking direction for police assistance and direction to the UIT for demolishing the construction alleged to be made after passing the order of temporary injunction. It is true that there is power left with this Court to entertain petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India but at the same time, it is the duty of the Court that in the event of the nonavailability of remedy under Section 151 Civil Procedure Code to challenge the interlocutory order, the power of superintendence should be exercised with proper care and caution. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in clear term held in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 329 that under Article 227 of Constitution of India, High Court can suo motu invoke its power as the custodian of justice but an improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 48 and 49 of the said judgment observed as under: "48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 is exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex debito justitiae or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a letters patent appeal or an intra-Court appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all the High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 49. On an analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this Court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated: (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any even, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Court is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. (c) High Courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or Courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a Court of appeal over the orders of the Court or tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law' or fact or just because another view' than the one taken by the tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must be remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (I) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain, public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Court. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in the administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 11. Likewise, in Jai Singh & Ors. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 11. Likewise, in Jai Singh & Ors. v. Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Anr., reported in (2010) 9 Supreme Court Cases 385 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has made the following adjudication for the purpose of exercising power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in para 15 of the judgment : "15. The High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, has the jurisdiction to ensure that all subordinate Courts as well as statutory or quasi-judicial tribunals, exercise the powers vested in them, within the bounds of their authority the High Court has the power and the jurisdiction to ensure that they act in accordance with the well-established principles of law'. The High Court is vested with the powers of superintendence and/or judicial revision, even in matters where no revision or appeal lies to the High Court. The jurisdiction under this article is, in some ways, wider than the power ana jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is, however, well to remember the well-known adage that greater the power, greater the care and caution in exercise thereof. The High Court is, therefore, expected to exercise such wide powers with great care, caution and circumspection. The exercise of jurisdiction must be within the well-recognised constraints. It can not be exercised like a "bull in a china shop", to correct all errors of judgment of a Court, or tribunal, acting within the limits of its jurisdiction. This correctional jurisdiction can be exercised in cases where orders have been passed in gave dereliction of duty or in flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice." 12. After perusing pleadings and findings given by the trial Court in the impugned orders so also the fact that contempt proceedings initiated by the plaintiff-petitioner under Order 39, Rule 2A CPC is still pending, I am of the opinion that in view of the aforesaid judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, no case is made out for interference by this Court under Article 227 of Constitution of India.Accordingly, this writ petition being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed.Petition dismissed. *******