JUDGMENT Hon'ble VYAS, J.—Instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India for quashing order dated 23.2.2010 passed by the District Judge, Banswara in Civil Misc. Case No. 3/2008 whereby learned trial Judge allowed application filed under Section 24 C.P.C. by the respondents and passed order for transferring Civil Original Suit No. 4/2007 and 7/2007 pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Banswara, to the Court of Addl. District Judge, Banswara. 2. As per facts of the case plaintiff-petitioners filed Suit No.4/2007 and 7/2007 in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Banswara on 13.2.2007 for permanent injunction and restraining the defendants from interfering in their possession. As per the petitioners, the said case is fixed for recording plaintiffs' evidence. 3. Another suit was filed by the respondents for possession and injunction and said suit was registered as Suit No. 26/2007 which is pending in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Banswara. For challenging the order impugned dated 23.2.2010 passed upon application filed under Section 24, C.P.C. by the defendants, it is submitted by learned counsel appearing on behalf of plaintiff petitioners that Suit No. 4/2007 and 7/2007 were filed by the plaintiff-petitioners in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara. For consolidating both the cases, an application was filed by the respondent Ravindra Nath under Section 151 C.P.C. on the ground that subject-matter of both the suits is identical, in which, similar issues will be framed and similar evidence will be recorded, therefore, in the interest of justice, both the suits may be heard together to avoid contrary judgments. The said application filed by respondent under Section 151, C.P.C. was rejected vide order dated 19.5.2008. Said order which is made by the trial Court was challenged before this Court by way of filing writ petition being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4576/2008 but co-ordinate Bench of this Court dismissed the said writ petition on 4.9.2008 vide Annex.4. 4. Another application was filed by the petitioners under Section 10, C.P.C., in the civil suit filed by respondent Ravindra Nath and others for staying the proceedings of that suit till decision of the suit filed by the petitioners being Suit No. 4/2007 which was pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara. 4. Another application was filed by the petitioners under Section 10, C.P.C., in the civil suit filed by respondent Ravindra Nath and others for staying the proceedings of that suit till decision of the suit filed by the petitioners being Suit No. 4/2007 which was pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara. Said application was filed on the ground that property in question is the same and parties are also the same, therefore, the proceedings in civil suit may be stayed till decision of suit No. 4/2007. 5. Learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Banswara rejected the application filed by the plaintiff under Section 10, C.P.C. vide order dated 18.12.2009. While inviting attention towards both the above orders passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara and upon application for consolidating the suits and for staying the proceedings till disposal of the suit, it is submitted by learned counsel for the plaintiff-petitioners that by both the orders it is categorically observed by both the Courts that subject-matter is not same; but, the learned District Judge, Banswara while accepting the application filed under Section 24, C.P.C. has passed order to transfer civil suits No. 4/2007 and 7/2007, pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara, to the Court of Addl. District Judge (Fast Track), Banswara is totally in contravention of orders passed by both the Courts and upheld by this Court. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the prayer in the suit pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.), Banswara and prayer of the suit pending in the Court of Addl. District Judge, Banswara are altogether different, therefore, the order passed by the District Judge under Section 24, C.P.C. is totally erroneous because both the Courts below found that controversies are different in between the parties, therefore, the order impugned order dated 23.2.2010 may be quashed and set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners also submitted that due to passing the impugned order under Section 24, C.P.C. the right to appeal has been curtained by the District Judge, so also, the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) is having jurisdiction to adjudicate the prayer of the petitioners made in the suit but vide the impugned order learned District Judge has illegally transferred those suits to the Court of Addl. District Judge (Fast Track), Banswara, which is illegal. 8. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. Div.) is having jurisdiction to adjudicate the prayer of the petitioners made in the suit but vide the impugned order learned District Judge has illegally transferred those suits to the Court of Addl. District Judge (Fast Track), Banswara, which is illegal. 8. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate Mr. M.R. Singhvi, appearing on behalf of the respondents, at the first instance, submitted that any order passed by the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Banswara and Addl. District Judge (Fast Track), Banswara upon applications filed under Section 151, C.P.C. and under Section 10, C.P.C. do not curtail the powers of the District Judge under Section 24, C.P.C. for transferring any particular case for adjudication. The only embargo is that order of the District Judge must be in consonance with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 9. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that admittedly an application under Section 10, C.P.C. was filed by one of the petitioners in the Court of Addl. District Judge for staying the proceedings of the suit filed by the defendant on the ground that subject-matter in the said suit is similar to the case pending in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr.Div.), which is Civil Suit No. 4/2007; meaning thereby, one of the petitioners accepted the fact that subject matter of the suit is he same. While inviting my attention towards the impugned order passed by the District Judge, it is submitted that there is no direction in the order for consolidating all the three cases but order is to transfer the Civil Suits No. 4/2007 and 7/2007 to the Court of Addl. District Judge, Banswara for hearing because the land in question which is admittedly situated in Araji No. 328/14/1 and No. 356/41/2 is in question. Further, while inviting attention towards pleadings of the suit filed before the Civil Judge (Sr.Div.) by the plaintiff-petitioners, it is submitted that in suit No. 4/2007 the plaintiff-petitioners Purushottam Lal and Shakuntala are claiming right upon the land situated in Araji No. 328/14/1 and in civil suit No. 7/2007 filed by four plaintiffs Piyush, Bharat, Jalaj and Manoj Kumar, they are claiming their right on the ground of adverse possession of plots No. 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30 and 31 and the said plots are situated in Arazi Khasra No. 356/41/2 which is evident from the reply filed by the defendant in the suit. Therefore, it cannot be said that learned District Judge has wrongly exercised his powers under Section 24, C.P.C. 10. While refuting the arguments of learned counsel for the petitioners that prayers of all the suits are different, it is submitted by learned counsel for the respondents that one suit was filed by the plaintiff-petitioners on the ground of adverse possession and second suit was filed by the petitioners on the ground that it is purchased by them under sale-deed but the fact remains that the land in question in all these three suits is the same for which these three suits is the same for which these three suits have been filed, therefore, no error has been committed by the learned District Judge. 11. I have considered rival submissions made by both the parties and perused the entire pleadings of the case. 12. First of all, it is required to be observed that learned District Judge has elaborately decided the application filed under Section 24, C.P.C. while considering various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court. The finding given by the trial Court is perfectly in consonance with the ingredients of Section 24, C.P.C. Learned District Judge specifically observed in the order that both the suits No. 4/2007 and 7/2007 may be transferred to the court of Addl. District Judge for adjudication. further, it is observed by the learned District Judge that, ^^;g vUrfjrh U;k;ky; ij fuHkZj djsxk fd og i{kdkjku~ dks lquus ds i'pkr~ rhuksa nkoksa dk fopkj.k ,d lkFk djrh gS vFkok ,d izdj.k ds fuLrkj.k ds ckn nwljs izdj.k dk fopkj.k djrh gSA** The above direction in the order clearly speaks that it is not an order for consolidating the suits. Therefore, the apprehension of the petitioners that Addl. District Judge is not competent to try the suit is totally unfounded because the Court of Addl. District Judge, Banswara is superior Court to the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) and controversy involved is of the same nature though may not be based on identical prayer is pending in his Court, then, there is jurisdiction left with the higher Court to try the suit along with suit already pending in that higher Court. In this view of the matter, no case is made out for interference in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In this view of the matter, no case is made out for interference in exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In my above adjudication, I am supported by the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court, reported in 2010(8) SCC 329 , in which, Apex Court has held that power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India should not be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of administration of justice in the larger public interest. Frequent exercise of power under Article 227 of the Constitution will be counter-productive and will divest the power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable matters. 13. It is worthwhile to note here that after amendment in the Civil Procedure Code, the right of filing revision petition under Section 115, C.P.C. was curtained but, thereafter, petitions are being filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the recent judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty, reported in 2010(8) SCC 329 , Hon'ble Apex Court elaborately considered the scope of interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In para 48 and 49 of the said judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that of course under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India the interference of the High Court is permissible; but, it has been held that an improper and frequent exercise of this power will be counter-productive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. the power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principles. This reserved and exceptional power is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of administration of justice in the larger public interest. Power under Article 227 may be unfettered, therefore, high degree of judicial discipline is necessary. Para 48 and 49 of the said judgment run as under : "48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. Power under Article 227 may be unfettered, therefore, high degree of judicial discipline is necessary. Para 48 and 49 of the said judgment run as under : "48. The jurisdiction under Article 226 normally is exercised where a party is affected but power under Article 227 can be exercised by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. In fact, the power under Article 226 in exercised in favour of persons or citizens for vindication of their fundamental rights or other statutory rights. The jurisdiction under Article 227 is exercised by the High Court for vindication of its position as the highest judicial authority in the State. In certain cases where there is infringement of fundamental right, the relief under Article 226 of the Constitution can be claimed ex debito justitiae or as a matter of right. But in cases where the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Article 227, such exercise is entirely discretionary and no person can claim it as a matter of right. From an order of a Single Judge passed under Article 226, a letters patent appeal or an intra-court appeal is maintainable. But no such appeal is maintainable from an order passed by a Single Judge of a High Court in exercise of power under Article 227. In almost all the High Courts, rules have been framed for regulating the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226. No such rule appears to have been framed for exercise of High Court's power under Article 227 possibly to keep such exercise entirely in the domain of the discretion of High Court. 49. On a analysis of the aforesaid decisions of this court, the following principles on the exercise of High Court's jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution may be formulated. (a) A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is different from a petition under Article 227. The mode of exercise of power by the High Court under these two articles is also different. (b) In any even, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Court is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (b) In any even, a petition under Article 227 cannot be called a writ petition. The history of the conferment of writ jurisdiction on High Court is substantially different from the history of conferment of the power of superintendence on the High Courts under Article 227 and have been discussed above. (c) High courts cannot, at the drop of a hat, in exercise of its power of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution, interfere with the orders of tribunals or courts inferior to it. Nor can it, in exercise of this power, act as a court of appeal over the orders of the Court or Tribunal subordinate to it. In cases where an alternative statutory mode of redressal has been provided, that would also operate as a restrain on the exercise of this power by the High Court. (d) The parameters of interference by High Courts in exercise of their power of superintendence have been repeatedly laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by this Court. In this regard the High Court must be guided by the principles laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh and the principles in Waryam Singh have been repeatedly followed by subsequent Constitution Benches and various other decisions of this Court. (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it, "within the bounds of their authority". (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such Tribunals and Courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in he orders of the Tribunals and courts subordinate to it or whether there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the Tribunals or Courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (i) The High Court's power of superintendence under Article 227 cannot be curtailed by any statute. It has been declared a part of the basic structure of the Constitution by the Constitution Bench of this Court. L. Chandra Kumar vs. Union of India and therefore abridgement by a constitutional amendment is also very doubtful. (j) It may be true that a statutory amendment of a rather cognate provision, like Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Civil Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1999 does not and cannot cut down the ambit of High Court's power under Article 227. At the same time, it must e remembered that such statutory amendment does not correspondingly expand the High Court's jurisdiction of superintendence under Article 227. (k) The power is discretionary and has to be exercised on equitable principle. In an appropriate case, the power can be exercised suo motu. (l) On a proper appreciation of the wide and unfettered power of the High Court under Article 227, it transpires that the main object of this article is to keep strict administrative and judicial control by the High Court on the administration of justice within its territory. (m) The object of superintendence, both administrative and judicial is to maintain efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under this article is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the Tribunals and Courts subordinate to the High Courts. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in he administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. (n) This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in he administration of justice in the larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievance. Therefore, the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline pointed out above. (o) An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality." 14. In view of the above discussion and the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court rendered in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case (supra), I am of the opinion that no case is made out for interference in the order dated 23.2.2010 because case of the petitioner does not fall in any of the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court. Therefore, there is no force in this writ petition. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed.