Judgment Pratap Kumar Ray, J. 1. HEARD the learned Advocates appearing for the parties. 2. ASSAILING the judgment and order dated 2nd September, 2009 passed in W.P. No. 34 of 2008 by the learned Trial Judge, this appeal has been preferred. The impugned judgment under appeal reads such: 'This writ petition is directed against an order dated 5th September, 2007 by which a preliminary objection as regards delay was rejected by the Labour Court and the matter was fixed for hearing on 12th October, 2007. Challenging that order this writ petition was filed on 22nd January, 2008, and an order staying the direction issued by the learned Labour Court for hearing of the matter was passed. The interim order was extended from time to time. Today, again prayer for extending the interim order was repeated when the matter was heard on merit. Mr. Partha Bhanja Choudhury, learned Advocate appearing for the petitioners, submitted that by virtue of the State Amendments of section 10(1B) Clause [c] of the Industrial Disputes Act there is a provision that application must be filed within sixty days before the Labour Court or the Tribunal. In this case the application initially was filed before a wrong forum and after the mistake was pointed out then the application was taken back and filed in the appropriate forum. In the process two years elapsed and, therefore, the period of sixty days had already expired and thus the application was barred by limitation. Mr. Ali, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the respondents contended that the provision relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioners does not really incorporate any period of limitation. He drew my attention to sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Limitation Act, which provides as follows: "3.(1) - Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed although limitation has not been set up as a defence". He contended that the language appearing in the clause relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioners does not contain any such peremptory direction. Therefore, the period provided therein cannot be treated as a period of limitation. That period is mere directory and not mandatory. The object of that provision is that it is desirable that the disputes concerning the labour and the industrial houses be disposed of early. Therefore, the period provided therein cannot be treated as a period of limitation. That period is mere directory and not mandatory. The object of that provision is that it is desirable that the disputes concerning the labour and the industrial houses be disposed of early. This provision is not intended to non-suit the workman on the ground of delay. That is why this provision is not worded in such peremptory language as the provisions of the Limitation Act. He, accordingly, submitted that the ground sought to be advanced on behalf of the writ petitioners is without any merit whatsoever. I have considered the rival submissions and am of the view that there is a great deal of force in the submission advanced by Mr. Ali. I am not impressed by the submission that clause [c] of section 10(1B) of the Industrial Disputes Act creates any bar of limitation. Therefore, I am unable to hold that the order under challenge is contrary to law. This writ petition is accordingly dismissed. The learned Labour Court is directed to proceed with the matter as expeditiously as possible. It is, however, clarified that the petitioners shall be entitled to take all points on merits which may be available to them. Let xerox certified copy of this order be supplied by the department within seven days to the learned Advocates appearing for the parties upon compliance with the necessary formalities." The very short and interesting question is involved in this appeal about purposive and conceptual idea of amendment of section 10 by substitution of provision of sub-section (1-B) by West Bengal amendment, in the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, providing scope to the workman concerned to raise the dispute straightway by taking his case from the Conciliation Officer for effective adjudication of the issue by the Labour Court or Tribunal on framing the issues by the Court itself and limitation to file such an application by the workman and failing to file such application within the time specified in the said amended provision being West Bengal Amendment, whether the workman should be non-suited. 3. THE issue involved is within the periphery of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which admittedly a beneficial act to render social justice to the workman concerned by opening a forum for speedy and easy disposal of the disputes as to be raised by the workman without prolonged litigation in the Civil Court. 3. THE issue involved is within the periphery of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which admittedly a beneficial act to render social justice to the workman concerned by opening a forum for speedy and easy disposal of the disputes as to be raised by the workman without prolonged litigation in the Civil Court. It is a beneficial legislation for the workman and statutory provision of Industrial Disputes Act always to be interpreted in favour of the workman, if there is any conflict of views regarding interpretation of a statutory provision which may result a contradictory view on interest of the workman. An industrial dispute of a workman accordingly could be resolved in the manner as specified in the statute itself. THE legislature at their wisdom has kept an opening for adjudication of the lis or dispute by settlement of the dispute in between workman and the employer, through one officer who has been named and styled as Conciliation Officer in the statute. THE conciliation procedure has been laid down under section 12 empowering the Conciliation Officer to settle the dispute amicably on hearing the rival parties, namely the workman and the employer. Section 12 is the provision whereby the duty to Conciliation Officer has, been stipulated. Section 12 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 reads such: "12. Duties of conciliation officers. - (1) Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, the conciliation officer may, or where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, shall, hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner. (2) THE conciliation officer shall, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the dispute, without delay, investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and the right settlement thereof and may do all such things as he thinks fit for the purpose of including the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement of the dispute. (3) If a settlement of the dispute or of any of the matters in dispute is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings the conciliation officer shall send a report thereof to the appropriate Government or an officer authorised in this behalf by the appropriate Government together with a memorandum of the settlement signed by the parties to the dispute. (4) If no such settlement is arrived at, the conciliation officer shall, as soon as practicable after the close of the investigation, send to the appropriate Government a full report setting forth the steps taken by him for ascertaining the facts and circumstances relating to the dispute and for bringing about a settlement thereof, together with a full statement of such facts and circumstances, and the reasons on account of which, in his opinion, a settlement could not be arrived at. (5) If, on a consideration of the report referred to in sub-section (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefore. (6) A report under this section shall be submitted within fourteen days of commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government: Provided that, subject to the approval of the conciliation officer, the time for the submission of the report may be extended by such period as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute." 4. ON a reading of said section 12, it appears that the Conciliation Officer first will try to reconcile the matter by way of settling the issues mutually, and failing to do so, will submit a report to the government for the purpose of reference of the same to the Labour Court/Tribunal .for adjudication of the dispute. Time limit for such settlement under the Central Legislation is only 14 days including the decision to submit a report within that period from the date of commencement of conciliation procedure as it appears from sub-section (6) of section 12. This time limit however has been extended by way of state amendment stipulating 60 days limit by West Bengal Act No. LVIII of 1980 whereby section 6 of the amendment act for the words "fourteen days" as stipulated in the principal act, the words "within sixty days" was substituted. Similarly, the proviso to sub-section (6) was amended by extending the time limit "not exceeding six months" by said West Bengal Amendment. Similarly, the proviso to sub-section (6) was amended by extending the time limit "not exceeding six months" by said West Bengal Amendment. The West Bengal Amendment reads such: State Amendment West Bengal -In sub-section (6) of section 12 of the principal Act, - (i) a for the words "within fourteen days', the words "after completion of the conciliation proceedings within sixty days" shall be substituted; and (ii) in the proviso, after the words "such period", the words "not exceeding six months" shall be inserted. - W.B. Act No. LVII of 1980, section 6." Hence it appears from section 12 that the Conciliation Officer will have to dispose of the issue either by way of settlement or by referring the matter when settlement could not be reached, to the Government for onwards steps as to be taken by the Government, namely, reference of the dispute for adjudication exercising the power under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Section 10 is the provision for reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunal by the appropriate Government. Section 10 reads such: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. Section 10 is the provision for reference of dispute to Boards, Courts or Tribunal by the appropriate Government. Section 10 reads such: "10. Reference of disputes to Boards, Courts or Tribunals. - (1) Where the appropriate Government is of opinion that any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, it may at any time, by order in writing, - (a) refer the dispute to a Board for promoting a settlement thereof, or (b) refer any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to the dispute to a Court for inquiry; or (c) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, if it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule, to a Labour Court for adjudication; or (d) refer the dispute or any matter appearing to be connected with, or relevant to, the dispute, whether it relates to any matter specified in the Second Schedule or the Third Schedule, to a Tribunal for adjudication: Provided that where the dispute relates to any matter specified in the Third Schedule and is not likely to affect more than one hundred workmen, the appropriate Government may, if it so thinks fit, make the reference to a Labour Court under Clause (c): Provided further that where the dispute relates to a public utility service and a notice under section 22 has been given, the appropriate Government shall, unless it considers that the notice has been frivolously or vexatiously given or that it would be inexpedient so to do, make a reference under this sub-section notwithstanding that any other proceedings under this Act in respect of the dispute may have commenced: Provided also that where the dispute in relation to which the Central Government is the appropriate Government, it shall be competent for that Government to refer the dispute to a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, constituted by the State Government." 5. IT appears that there was no limit prescribed by which the appropriate Government will take a decision to refer the Industrial Disputes for adjudication by the Courts or Tribunals as the case may be. As there was no time limit prescribed for reference taking decision by the appropriate Government, functioning administratively, the workman used to suffer for keeping the matter pending by the Government. As there was no time limit prescribed for reference taking decision by the appropriate Government, functioning administratively, the workman used to suffer for keeping the matter pending by the Government. Having regard to such situation, the State Government introduced a state amendment of section 10 by incorporation of the new provision of sub-section (1-B) after sub-section (1-A) of section 10 aforesaid. The West Bengal amendment was effected by West Bengal Act 33 of 1989 with effect from 8th December, 1989. The relevant State Amendment reads such: State Amendment West Bengal -In section 10 of the principal Act, after sub-section (1-A), the following sub-section shall be inserted - "(1-B)(a) Notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act, where in a conciliation proceeding of an industrial dispute relating to an individual workman, no settlement is arrived at within a period of sixty days from the date of raising of the dispute, the party raising the dispute may apply to the Conciliation Officer in such manner and in such form as may be prescribed, for a certificate about the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. (b) The Conciliation Officer shall, on receipt of the application under clause (a), issue a certificate within seven days from the date of receipt in such manner, in such form and containing such particulars as may be prescribed. A copy of the certificate shall also to sent to the appropriate Government for information. (c) The party may, within a period of sixty days from the receipt of such certificate or, where such certificate has not been issued within seven days as aforesaid, within a period of sixty days commencing from the day immediately after the expiry of seven days as aforesaid, file an application in such form and in such manner and with such particulars of demands as may be prescribed, to such Labour Court or Tribunal as may be specified by the appropriate Government by notification. Different Labour Court or Tribunal as may be specified for different areas or different classes of industries. Different Labour Court or Tribunal as may be specified for different areas or different classes of industries. (d) The Labour Court or Tribunal specified under clause (c) shall, within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of an application under clause (c), give a hearing to the parties and frame the specific issues in dispute, and shall thereafter proceed so to adjudicate on the issues so framed as if it were an industrial dispute referred to in sub-section (1).- [W.B. Act 33 of 1989, section 4 (w.e.f. 8-12-1989)]" 6. IN this appeal we have to interpret the provision of clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) of sub-section (1-B), the said amended provision by the State Amendment relating to the time limit as prescribed thereof for taking different actions by the respective parties, namely, the conciliation officer and the workman. By the said State Amendment it is provided under clause (a) of sub-section (1-B) which starts with a non-obstanti clause by using the word "notwithstanding", that if no settlement is arrived at within a period of sixty days, the party who is raising the dispute may apply to the conciliation officer for grant of a certificate about the pendency of the conciliation proceedings. Clause (b) of the said sub-section provides a time limit of seven days for grant of said certificate by the Conciliation Officer from the date of receipt of the application. Clause C of sub-section 1B provides time limit of 60 days from the date of receipt of such certificate to file the application raising the dispute in the manner as prescribed to the Labour Court concerned having territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate the issue and Clause D vests the power to the concerned Labour Court or the Tribunal to frame specific issue of dispute upon hearing the parties and thereby to adjudicate the matter. 7. TERRITORIAL jurisdiction for adjudication has been notified by Notification dated 25th July. 1997 by the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, I.R. Branch. The said Notification reads such:- GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL LABOUR DEPARTMENT I.R. Branch 1085-IR/IR/12L-9/95 Dated: 25-07-1997. 7. TERRITORIAL jurisdiction for adjudication has been notified by Notification dated 25th July. 1997 by the Government of West Bengal, Labour Department, I.R. Branch. The said Notification reads such:- GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL LABOUR DEPARTMENT I.R. Branch 1085-IR/IR/12L-9/95 Dated: 25-07-1997. Notification In exercise of the power conferred by clause (c) sub-section (1B) of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (14 of 1947), (hereinafter referred to as the said Act), read with sub-rule (4) of rule 12A of the West Bengal Industrial Disputes Act, 1958, as subsequently amended, the Governor is pleased hereby to specify with effect from the date of this notification, the Labour Courts/Industrial Tribunals in column (1) of the Schedule below for the districts mentioned against each such Labour Court/ Industrial Tribunal in column (2) of the said Schedule for giving a hearing to the parties and framing the specific issues in dispute, and for adjudicating on the issues so framed, under clause (6) of sub-section (1B) of section 10 of the said Act. Schedule Labour Court Industrial Tribunal District (1) (2) 1. Sixth Industrial Tribunal constituted (i) Cooch Behar under notification No., 8115-IR/IR/ (ii) Jalpaiguri 3A-6/59, dated the 21st June, 1960. (iii) Darjeeling (iv) Uttar Dinajpur (v) Dakshin Dinajpur (vi) Malda 2. Ninth Industrial Tribunal constituted (i) Burdwan under notification No.4481-GE/G/3A- (ii) Birbhum 20/66, dated the 7th September, 1967 (iii) Bankura (iv) Purulia 3. First Labour Court constituted under (i) Murshidabad notification No.4485-GE/G/3A-107/66, (ii) Nadia dated the 7th September. 1967. (iii) Hooghly (iv) Howrah 4. Second Labour Court constituted (i) North 24-Parganas under notification No. 1727-IR/IR- (ii) South 24-Parganas 3A-58 dated the 26th April, 1967. (iii) Calcutta (iv) Midnapore By order of the Governor Sd/- P.K. Banerjee Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal" 8. IT is an admitted position that the concerned industry where the workman was working and where from he was dismissed, is situated within the District Howrah and, as such, the territorial jurisdiction to file an application under Clause C of sub-section 1B as referred to above, vests to the First Labour Court, to determine the issue. IT is an admitted position that the concerned industry where the workman was working and where from he was dismissed, is situated within the District Howrah and, as such, the territorial jurisdiction to file an application under Clause C of sub-section 1B as referred to above, vests to the First Labour Court, to determine the issue. From the records, it appears that on 14th January, 2004, a dispute was raised to the Settlement Officer and on 8th March, 2C04 i.e. just on the 55 days from the date of filing of dispute, application was filed praying for grant of certificate under Clause A of sub-section 1B of section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, namely, the provision of the State Amendment. The Conciliation Officer on 10th March, 2004 issued such certificate. The respondent/workmen filed his application under Clause C of sub-section 1B on 24th March, 2004 in the Second Labour Court, however, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, in view of identification of territorial jurisdiction by the said Notification as quoted above. The company/writ petitioner/appellant filed written statement and took the point of jurisdiction. Written statement was filed on 24th October, 2005. Thereafter, the workman withdrawing the application filed before the Second Labour Court, submitted the same on the same day i.e.. 30th March, 2006 to the First Labour Court, who had the territorial jurisdiction, to decide the issue under Clause C of sub-section 1B of section 10 as aforesaid and before that First Labour Court the point was raised about limitation to entertain the application alleging, inter alia, two major points namely, l]that under Clause A of the said provision before expiry of 60 days, the workman filed an application seeking grant of certificate and Conciliation Officer granted it before expiry of 60 days, and 2] the workman filed the application before the Competent Court having territorial jurisdiction on 30th March, 2006 causing a delay of more than 2 years from the date of grant of certificate issued on 10th March, 2004. 9. THE First Labour Court adjudicated the preliminary point about maintainability of the application. It is the view of the First Labour Court that limitation has no applicability relating to the provisions laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act and thereby held that the application was maintainable. THE order of the First Labour Court reads such: 'THE record is taken up today for passing necessary order. It is the view of the First Labour Court that limitation has no applicability relating to the provisions laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act and thereby held that the application was maintainable. THE order of the First Labour Court reads such: 'THE record is taken up today for passing necessary order. THE hearing of this case arises out of an issue raised by learned Advocate on behalf of the O.P. on maintainability point. One Rajjack Haider has filed this case under section 10(lB)(d) of the I.D. Act for his reinstatement in the company with full backwages and other consequential reliefs. THE O.P. i.e. the Ladlow Jute Mills entered appearance in this case and filed W.S. in this case. After filing W.S. in this case, the O.P. has submitted before the Court that the present case is completely barred by limitation and is not maintainable. Now, considering the pleadings of the parties this case was taken up for hearing on maintainability point as preliminary issue. In Para - 4 of the W.S., the O.P. has categorically stated while clause C of sub-section (1B) of section - 10 of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (as it applies in West Bengal) enjoying upon the parties wishing to make an application under that provision of the statute to the appropriate Labour Court or Tribunal of jurisdiction to do so "within a period of 60 days from the receipt of such certificate" that may be issued to the said party by the conciliation officer concerned of the appropriate Government at the said Assistance, in the given case, it is apparent on record that be applicant workman had patently filed his impugned application with the Learned Court nearly two years after his receipt of the material certificate from the conciliation officer concern which is not permissible in law. Secondly on the basis of the alleged fact as recorded in the material certificate issued by the conciliation officer concerned in the given case, the said certificate patently could not be issued lawfully by the said conciliation officer to the applicant/workmen on the date he did so and therefore on the strength of the impugned said certificate of the conciliation officer, the applicant/workman neither could file nor can maintain his impugned application before the learned Court. Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the O.P. Ladlow Jute Mills has argued that as per section 10 sub-section 1A(c) of the I.D. Act, 1947, a workman may within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of certificate from a conciliation officer filed an application in such form and in such manner and with such particulars of demands as may be prescribed to the Labour Court but in the instant case the applicant has filed this impugned application under section 10(1B)(d) nearly two years after his receipt of the material certificate from the conciliation officer concerned and as such the instant application is barred by limitation and is not maintainable. In this connection learned Lawyer appearing on behalf of the O.P. has placed reliance on several decisions reported in AIR 1975 Supreme Court page 915, (2005) 5 Supreme Court cases Page 91. It is not in dispute that the service of the workman has terminated vide dismissal letter dated 16.12.2003 issued by the O.P. company and thereafter the applicant raised on Industrial Dispute relating to his alleged termination of service w.e.f. 16.12.2003 against M/s. Ladlow Jute Mills O.P. company on 14.1.2004. Thereafter the conciliation officer started conciliation proceeding but failed to arrive at a settlement within a period of 60 days from the date arising a dispute and the applicant workman filed an application on 8.3.2004 for issuance of certificate as per section 10(1B) of the Act and conciliation officer issued a certificate about period of conciliation proceeding on 10.03.2004 in favour of the application. THE present applicant/workman, Rajjack Haider has filed the instant case on 30.03.06 about two years after issuance of the said certificate. THE present applicants in para 18 of the original application was stated that after receipt of the pendency certificate, he filed an application before the learned Second Labour Court mistakenly which was bona fide, inadvertence and not an intentional default inasmuch as the said Court does not have the jurisdiction under law to adjudicate in the above matter. THE workman thereby withdraw the case from the said case and filed this instant case before this Court for adjudication. THE workman thereby withdraw the case from the said case and filed this instant case before this Court for adjudication. Learned Lawyer appointing on behalf of the applicant has placed reliance on in the case of R.N. Turi v. Union of India 2006 (108) FLR-122 WHEREIN THE Hon'ble Court has observed that "the provision of Article 137 of the schedule to limitation Act 1963 are not applied to the proceeding under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied to the workman merely on the ground of delay". Learned Advocate on behalf of the applicant has also placed reliance on a decision reported in 1999(82) FLR-137 Supreme Court, wherein learned Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that "the provision of Articles - 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act 1963 are not applicable to the proceeding under the Act and that the relief under it cannot be denied of the workmen merely on the ground of delay". Moreover the case decisions, cited by the learned Advocate of the O.P., I find has little relevance in the context of the instant case. So, having heard the learned Advocate for the respective parties, considering the materials on record and in the facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the decision which has been cited by the learned Advocate of the applicant I am inclined to hold that the instant case is not barred by limitation and this case is quite maintainable in law. Fixing 12.10.2007 for hearing the case on merit." 10. ASSAILING the order of the First Labour Court, writ application was moved by the company unsuccessfully being W.P. No.34 of 2008. ASSAILING the order of the learned Trial Judge as aforesaid, this appeal has been preferred. As already discussed that the Industrial Disputes Act is a social- welfare legislation and/or a beneficial legislation for the workmen i.e. industrial workers to resolve the disputes amicably for the purpose of industrial peace which is the sine qua non for the growth of a country by setting up of a different industrial organizations. As already discussed that the Industrial Disputes Act is a social- welfare legislation and/or a beneficial legislation for the workmen i.e. industrial workers to resolve the disputes amicably for the purpose of industrial peace which is the sine qua non for the growth of a country by setting up of a different industrial organizations. Since the economic factor is the issue for better development of the country which could be done by industrial growth, the Industrial Disputes Act, provided different methods and procedures to keep peace in the industrial field so that industry is not closed or the workmen do not suffer from any exploitation in the hands of the employer. The Constitution in its preamble has provided economic and social justice as a guiding pillar to lead our country and with that object in mind the legislatures enacted the Industrial Disputes Act. The dispute, accordingly, as to be raised, if possible could be resolved by the Settlement Officer amicably and if not within the time limit of 60 days, he has to submit a report to the appropriate government under section 12 sub-section 6 as already discussed above. Hence, it appears that the final time limit either to settle the issue amicably or to submit a report to the appropriate government is only 60 days before the Conciliation Officer. After expiry of 60 days, legislatures intended that there should not be any pending conciliation proceeding and with that idea, the legislatures provided by State Amendment a time limit of 60 days to complete the issue either to settle the dispute or to submit a report to the appropriate government so that the appropriate government may take decision to refer the matter under section 10 to the appropriate Court or the Tribunal for adjudication of the issue. Though the time limit has been fixed entrusting duty upon the Conciliation Officer to complete the issue within the time limit of 60 days, but failure to such will not vitiate his action if the government subsequently raises the dispute to the Labour Court/Tribunal for adjudication by exercising the power under section 10 of the said Act by entertaining the report submitted by the Conciliation Officer even after expiry of 60 days. 11. 11. IT appears on reading of section 10 and section 12 of the principal Act that the workman practically had no say if there is a delay either before the Conciliation Officer or before the appropriate government for raising the industrial dispute to the adjudicatory body namely, the Labour Court or the Tribunal. Though the statutory provision of the Industrial Disputes Act already referred to is a beneficial provision of the workman and the balance of convenience always in favour of the workman in the said Act; having regard to such inconvenience as caused, the state legislatures in their wisdom amended section 10 by incorporating a provision section 101B) with different Clauses A to D. Due to insertion of said provision after section 10 sub-section 1A of the Principal Act, workman got benefit to handle the issue by his own way raising an action by himself, so that Industrial Dispute could be adjudicated upon by the Labour Court/Tribunal by framing specific issues on the basis of his application after taking a certificate from the Conciliation Officer. The conceptual idea and purpose of state amendment is totally beneficial action in favour of workman concerned, so that workman may get answer of industrial dispute for which he is suffering by speedy disposal of the issue by the adjudicatory body namely, the Labour Court/Tribunal. With that idea different time limits have been prescribed. The time limit, which is required to be considered by the workman raising the industrial dispute, starts with the word 'may' whereas the time limit, which is required to be performed by the Conciliation Officer to take action, starts with the word 'shall'. The distinguishing feature of using the words 'may' and 'shall' has great relevancy and the legislatures purposely in their wisdom have used two different words while framing different time limits relating to act of different persons concerned namely, dispute raiser and the Conciliation Officer. IT is a general principle of the statutory interpretation that the word 'may' originally is used with reference to any directory provision and 'shall' ordinarily is used for a mandatory provision. But the test is not so simple to identify mandatory and directory character of a provision. Its consequential effect requires an in depth interpretation of concerned statutory provision and the purpose for which it has been enacted including the remedial measure requires to achieve. 12. But the test is not so simple to identify mandatory and directory character of a provision. Its consequential effect requires an in depth interpretation of concerned statutory provision and the purpose for which it has been enacted including the remedial measure requires to achieve. 12. THE test of mandatory provision and its consequential effect, dealt with by the Constitutional Bench, having regard to the use of the word 'shall' in the case of Collector of Monghyr and Ors. v. Keshav Prasad Goenka and others reported in AIR 1962 SC 1694 , where the Court held "mere 'shall' is inclusive to determine that test, similarly, mere absence of the imperative, is not conclusive either". In paragraph 12 of the said judgment it is held that interpretation depends on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection safeguarding right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve. Paragraph 12 of the judgment reads such:- "12. We feel unable to accept the submission of learned Counsel that in the context in which the words "for the reasons to be recorded by him" occur in section 5A and considering the scheme of Ch. II of the Act, the requirement of these words could be held to be otherwise than mandatory. It is needless to add that the employment of the auxiliary verb "shall" is inclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. THE question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission, to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. It would, inter alia, depend on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection for the safeguarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve." In the said Constitutional Bench judgement, Court held further that negative, prohibitory and exclusive words are indicative of the legislative intent that statute is mandatory. This view again considered by three Judges Bench in the case of Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Others reported in AIR 1977 SC 536 wherein earlier view taken in the case of M. Pentiah and Ors. This view again considered by three Judges Bench in the case of Mannalal Khetan v. Kedar Nath Khetan and Others reported in AIR 1977 SC 536 wherein earlier view taken in the case of M. Pentiah and Ors. v. Muddala Veeramallappa and Ors. reported in AIR 1961 SC 1107 was relied upon. When a time limit is prescribed by a statute directing a public functionary to act, it is always presumed as a directory provision unless consequence of it failing to perform the duty within the time limit, is specified; but this also not a factor only and not a conclusive one, is the view expressed by author Sutherland in Statutory Construction Book, third edition, volume 3 at page 107. 13. AS it appears that the West Bengal Amendment was made for the purpose of providing benefits to the workman concern to have adjudication of dispute by the adjudicatory body namely, Labour Court or the Tribunal by filing application upon having a certificate from the Conciliation Officer about pendency of the conciliation proceeding. The condition precedent or the sine qua non of maintainability of the said application under Clause C of said section is only to see whether a conciliation proceeding was pending on that date or not. Time limit therein as prescribed by using the word 'may' under Clause A practically is a directory provision and it is not at all a mandatory provision. Clause C and Clause A if read together, it appears that conceptual idea to raise the industrial dispute postulates to handle own case by filing application when a conciliation proceeding is pending and not adjudicated within sixty days from the date of raising that dispute before the Conciliation Officer. The time limit, accordingly, cannot be construed as a mandatory provision to reject the application filed by the workman under Clause C aforesaid. Grant of certificate prior to sixty days, cannot be construed as a lapse of such a degree that the action would be rendered as void-ab-initio. AS best it could be said that there is a irregularity and Conciliation Officer ought to have waited till sixty days from the date of issue any certificate. For that irregularity, the action cannot be said as void ah initio to oust the workman from legal arena for adjudication of his case by a competent Labour Court. 14. AS best it could be said that there is a irregularity and Conciliation Officer ought to have waited till sixty days from the date of issue any certificate. For that irregularity, the action cannot be said as void ah initio to oust the workman from legal arena for adjudication of his case by a competent Labour Court. 14. IF the issue considered in another angle, it appears that the statute prescribed a time limit of 60 days under section 12 to complete the conciliation proceeding either by settlement of it or by submitting a report to the appropriate government though the provision is not mandatory but a directory one. If we consider the intention of the legislatures to stipulate the time limit, naturally a question will evolve that within 60 days everything should be completed under section 12 sub-section (6). If it is considered that within 60 days conciliation proceeding is to be completed either by settlement or by submitting a report, naturally within 60 days time limit the workman gets right to approach the Conciliation Officer for a certificate about pendency of the conciliation proceeding under Clause A of sub-section (1B) and the action cannot be said as so grave and so fatal that it could be declared as null and void. Furthermore, it is a basic principle of statutory provision that a conceptual idea for incorporating a statutory provision will be taken note of to provide the benefit for whom such beneficial legislation is provided. With that idea, the filing of an application prior to expiry of 60 days and roughly on 55 days from the date of filing the dispute before the Conciliation Officer by the workman-respondent cannot be said as an action to nullify his subsequent action to raise an action to an action raising a dispute further by an application under Clause C of said act being State Amendment, subsequently, before the concerned Labour Court. Grant of certificate also cannot be said as an illegal action on the part of the Conciliation Officer. Grant of certificate also cannot be said as an illegal action on the part of the Conciliation Officer. Besides the aforesaid point, it appears that the concerned employer or the company has not suffered any prejudice due to lapse or irregularity even if any for filing of application by the workman prior to expiry of 60 days before the Conciliation Officer requesting to grant certificate and thereby grant of said certificate by the said Officer before expiry of such 60 days. As the provision is within the domain or field of procedural law, the point as taken by the writ petitioner-appellant before us to nullify the application filed before the Labour Court is not legally sustainable. So far as the second point as raised about the delay in filing the application before the Labour Court on the factual parameter as discussed namely, the filing of the application initially to a Labour Court having no territorial jurisdiction and thereafter withdrawal of the same and re-filing in competent Labour Court having territorial jurisdiction, we are of the view that lapse also could not be considered as so fatal to non-suit the workman for proper adjudication of the dispute by the proper Labour Court. 15. IT appears that Clause C starts with the word 'may' could be construed here as indicative of a protection stipulating a directory provision and it cannot be construed as a mandatory provision. As there is no scope for transfer of any case from one Labour Court to other Labour Court, we are of the view that the same would not vitiate the proceeding. IT appears that the workman- respondent was prompt enough to file application on 24th March 2004 but unfortunately it was second Labour Court. As soon as he understood the defect, he re-filed it to the first Labour Court on 30th March 2006. May be there is a delay but that delay will not be construed as fatal to oust the jurisdiction of the first Labour Court to adjudicate the issue. Having regard to the aforesaid discussion, accordingly we are of the view that there is no illegality to interfere with the impugned judgment under appeal. 16. BEFORE parting with the matter, the judgment as has been referred to by the writ petitioner appellant [Paresh Nath Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Others) reported in 2007 (3) CHN 917 is required to be dealt with. 16. BEFORE parting with the matter, the judgment as has been referred to by the writ petitioner appellant [Paresh Nath Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Others) reported in 2007 (3) CHN 917 is required to be dealt with. The judgment has no applicability in the instant case for the simple reason that under the Administrative Tribunal Act, a provision has been made providing time limit for filing an application raising the grievance with a rider that Limitation Act would be applicable to condone any lapse/delay to file such an application. Once Limitation is prescribed in a particular statute that special provision of limitation prescribed therein, to be considered to condone delay of filing any application under special statute. In the instant case, as already discussed that Limitation Act has no applicability so far as different applications as could be filed under the Industrial Disputes Act and as already discussed that there is no question of time limit in view of directory provision by using the word 'may', as such, the judgment as has been relied upon is not applicable in this case. It is a settled legal proposition of law that ratio decidendi of a judgment has applicability and ratio decidendi be considered taking note of a question involved and point of law applied thereto. It is also a settled proposition of law that even a change of word makes a gulf of difference in between conclusion to be reached. A Constitution Bench in the case of State of Punjab v. Baldev Singh reported in (1999) 6 SCC 172 in paragraph 43 held "a decision is an authority for what it decides and not that everything said therein constitutes a precedent. The Courts are obliged to employ an intelligent technique in the use of precedents bearing it in mind that a decision of the Court takes its colour from the questions involved in the case in which it was rendered". In the case of the Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 , a judgment of three Judges Bench, the Court held "one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts". In the case of the Regional Manager and Another v. Pawan Kumar Dubey reported in AIR 1976 SC 1766 , a judgment of three Judges Bench, the Court held "one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts". A detail discussion has been made about the precedence, which is binding in nature and its consequential effect, by Lord Halsberry in the Case of Quinn v. Leathern reported in 1901 AC 495. That view consistently is being followed by the Apex Court. Reliance is placed to the judgment in the case of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd. and Anr. v. N.R. Vairamani and Anr. reported in (2004) 8 SCC 579 and in the case of Sarva Shramik Sanghatana (Ky), Mumbai v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2008) 1 SCC 494 . With the aforesaid reasons, the appeal stands dismissed. No order as to costs. Urgent certified photocopies of this order be made available to the parties, if applied for, upon compliance of all requisite formalities. Appeal dismissed.