Judgment NIRMALJIT KAUR, J. 1. This is a revision petition against the order dated 28.01.2010, vide which, an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C for summoning of additional accused was dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge, Rohtak. 2. The facts, in short, are that the daughter of the present petitioner-Saroj Bala was married to Kamal son of respondents No.3 and 4 i.e Jagdish and Sarla. Thus, the respondent No.2 in the revision petition is the husband of the deceased, respondents No.3 and 4 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law of the deceased and respondent No.5 is the married sister-in-law. A child was born to the deceased-Sarla. On 08.04.2009, the victim is stated to have consumed poisonous substance and was taken to the hospital at Bhiwani. She died in the hospital. The inquest proceedings were conducted and a statement of the family was recorded. Thereafter, on 12.04.2009, an application was filed by the mother of the deceased-Saroj Bala i.e the present petitioner alleging that her husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law use to taunt and harass Saraj Bala to bring more dowry. It is further alleged that their daughter was beaten up on various occasions. They tried their best to fulfill the demands of her in-laws. In fact, it is specifically stated in the FIR that on 22.10.2008, an amount of 1,20,000/-was paid to the mother-in-law of Saroj Bala. It is further stated that their daughter has been killed by the husband, father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law. However, the FIR was investigated. The father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law were found innocent. Challan was filed only against the husband. 3. Thereafter, an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C was filed to summon the father-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law. The said application was dismissed by the District and Sessions Judge, Rohtak vide order dated 28.01.2010. 4. While challenging the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that as per the post mortem report, chest cavity was found full with blood and 5th and 6th Ribs of both sides were found fractured. The cause of death is shock and injuries to vital organ i.e lungs in this case. As such, the medical report falsifies the story put forward by the prosecution that she died on account of taking Blood Pressure Pills. It is further stated that the police colluded with the accused and did not proceed against the accused persons except husband. 5. As such, the medical report falsifies the story put forward by the prosecution that she died on account of taking Blood Pressure Pills. It is further stated that the police colluded with the accused and did not proceed against the accused persons except husband. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, while opposing the present petition, submitted that on the death of the deceased, inquest and Post Mortem Report were conducted and no objection was raised by Chhaju Ram, father of the deceased, Lokesh, brother of the deceased and Krishan, uncle of the deceased. It is further stated that the injury to the ribs was on account of the effort made by the doctors to revive the petitioner and the ribs were fractured on account of the pressure put on the heart while trying to pump blood. It is further stated that the deceased was suffering from leprosy and from various diseases, therefore, she committed suicide being upset of her illness. 6. Learned counsel for the parties were heard. 7. It is a well settled proposition of law that an order under Section 319 Cr.P.C should not be passed only because one of the witnesses wish to implicate another person. The Courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests is that the Court should come to the reasonable conclusion on the basis of evidence before it that the same is likely to lead to conviction. 8. In Michael Machado and another v. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, 2000(2) RCR (Criminal) 75, while considering the basic requirements of Section 319 of the Code, Court said: The basic requirement for invoking the above Section is that it should appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, had committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the Court entertain some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. 9. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. 9. In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka reported as 2004 (4) RCR (Criminal) 678, the Court ruled that the power to summon an accused is an extraordinary power conferred on the Court and it should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the person other than the accused. 10. The Apex Court in the case of Sarabjit Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another reported as 2009(3) RCR (Criminal) 388, in para 17, observed as under: 17. The provision of Section 319 of the Code, on a plain reading,provides that such an extraordinary case has been made out must appear to the court. Has the criterion laid down by this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra) been satisfied is the question? Indisputably, before an additional accused can be summoned for standing trial, the nature of the evidence should be such which would make out grounds for exercise of extraordinary power. The materials brought before the court must also be such which would satisfy the court that it is one of those cases where its jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly. We may notice that in Y. Saraba Reddy v. Puthur Rami Reddy and Anr. [JT 2007 (6) SC 460], this Court opined: "...Undisputedly, it is an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking action against a person against whom action had not been taken earlier. The word evidence" in Section 319 contemplates that evidence of witnesses given in Court..." An order under Section 319 of the Code, therefore, should not be passed only because the first informant or one of the witnesses seeks to implicate other person (s). Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. Sufficient and cogent reasons are required to be assigned by the court so as to satisfy the ingredients of the provisions. Mere ipse dixit would not serve the purpose. Such an evidence must be convincing one at least for the purpose of exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction. For the aforementioned purpose, the courts are required to apply stringent tests; one of the tests being whether evidence on record is such which would reasonably lead to conviction of the person sought to be summoned. 11. Honble the Apex Court in the case of Brindaban Das and others v. State of West Bengal reported as 2009(1) RCR (Criminal) 672, held, in para 19 and 20, as under: 19. The fulcrum on which the invocation of Section 319 Cr.P.C. Rests is whether the summoning of persons other than the named accused would make such a difference to the prosecution as would enable ti not only to prove its case but to also secure the conviction of the persons summoned. 20. In the instant case, on the quality of the evidence adduced by the prosecution as far as the appellants are concerned, it is difficult to hold with any amount of certainty that the same would in all probability secure a conviction against the appellants. The evidence which seeks to connect the appellants with the commission of the offence are hearsay in nature. Section 319 Cr.P.C. Contemplates a situation where the evidence adduced by the prosecution not only implicates a person other than the named accused but is sufficient for the purpose of convicting the person to whom summons is issued. The law in this regard was explained in Ram Kishan Rastogis case (Supra) and as pointed out by Mr. Ghosh, consistently followed thereafter, except for the note of discord struck in Rajender Singhs case (supra). It is only logical that there must be substantive evidence against a person in order to summon him for trial, although, he is not named in the charge sheet or he has been discharged from the case, which would warrant his prosecution thereafter with a good chance of his conviction. 12. And in the fact of that case, the Court held in para 21 as under: 21. 12. And in the fact of that case, the Court held in para 21 as under: 21. Since in the present case, except for a statement in the FIR that the complainant strongly believed that the murder of her father was pre-planned and there were many conspirators involved, there is no direct evidence of the complicity of the appellants in the incident, it would not be proper to subject the appellants to trial by invoking the provisions or Section 319 Cr.P.C. 13. On the other hand, there is also no dispute with the proposition of law laid down by Honble the Supreme Court in the case of Suman V/s. State of Rajasthan and another reported as 2009(4) RCR (Criminal) 908 that the Sessions Court can take cognizance against the person qua whom there is a no committal order and can be proceeded against if in the course of any inquiry into or trial of an offence it appears from the evidence that such person has also committed any offence and deserves to be tried with other accused and a person can be proceeded against under Section 319 Cr.P.C if from the evidence collected/produced in the course of any inquiry, the Court is prima facie satisfied that such person has committed offence for which he can be tried with other accused. 14. In the said case, of Suman (supra) as per the complainant  after one week of the marriage, her mother-in-law -Rukmani Devi and nanad -Suman (the appellant herein) told her that in the marriage, items like scooter, fridge, air-conditioner etc. have not been given and the marriage party was not served well; that mother-in-law -Rukmani Devi and nanad  Suman forcibly took the complainant to a lady doctor and got implanted Copper-T so that she may not give birth to any child; that nanad -Suman started instigating the husband of the complainant either on phone or otherwise and thereupon, he not only used to assault, but also humiliate and torture the complainant; that on 7.4.2002 the husband gave beating with the belan and nanad -Suman snatched her hair and forcibly removed the brings. In her statement made before the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., respondent No.2 reiterated all the allegations. In her statement made before the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C., respondent No.2 reiterated all the allegations. The father and mother of respondent No.2 and 4 other persons, whose statements were recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C., clearly spelt out the role played by the appellant in harassing respondent No.2 and instigating her husband to inflict torture upon her. Despite this, the police did not file charge-sheet against the appellant thinking that she had no occasion to make demand for dowry or harass respondent No.2 because she was living with her husband, Mahendra Pal at Bikaner. In her statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., respondent No.2 again made specific allegations against the appellant. While deciding the application filed under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the learned Judicial Magistrate noticed the allegations made by respondent No.2 in the complaint that her mother-in-law, Smt. Rukmani Devi and sister-in-law, Suman had castigated her for insufficient dowry and subjected her to physical and mental harassment and that the sister-in-law had instigated her husband to inflict physical torture, which were supported by the statements recorded by the police under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It was, therefore, in the facts of that case, Honble the Supreme Court held that the learned Judicial Magistrate has objectively considered the entire matter and judiciously exercised discretion under Section 319 Cr.P.C. 15. Coming back to the present case, the statement of Hoshiari Devi was recorded. Hoshiari Devi is the mother of the victim. In the said statement, the allegation qua the mother-in-law are specific and the same reads as under : A son was born to my daughter Saroj Bala in the year 2007 again said in the year 2006 and Rs.50,000/-were given at the time of Chhuchhak ceremony. Sarla, mother-in-law of my daughter kicked the utensils saying that such Chhuchhak used to be given ten years. They demanded one big car and Rs.1,50,000/-in cash and turned my daughter Saroj Bala out of her matrimonial house after giving her beatings and left her at Bus Stand, Jhajjar. We sent our daughter Saroj Bala to her matrimonial home along with my Devar Krishan and gave Rs.1,20,000/-to him who further handed over the said amount to Sarla Devi, mother-in-law of my daughter. 16. We sent our daughter Saroj Bala to her matrimonial home along with my Devar Krishan and gave Rs.1,20,000/-to him who further handed over the said amount to Sarla Devi, mother-in-law of my daughter. 16. Thus, while applying the test as laid down in the cases of Sarabjit Singh and another (supra) and Suman (supra) and from the FIR, as well as, from the statement of the complainant, who is the mother of the victim, it is evident that there is specific allegation qua the mother-in-law. The interference of the mother-in-law in the day to day married life of her daughter-in-law, cannot be ruled out. In the Indian families, the role of the mother-in-law and place in the house is of utmost important. The motherin- law has an active role in the matrimonial life. Therefore, she cannot be placed on the same pedestal as other family members. Moreover, there are specific allegations against her and sufficient to summon under Section 319 of Cr.P.C. 17. However, the allegations qua respondent No.3 i.e father-in-law and respondent No.5 i.e sister-in-law are vague. There is no specific allegation qua father-in-law either in the FIR or in the statement and therefore not sufficient to summon under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. 18. With respect to the allegation qua respondent No.5 i.e. sister-in-law, it may be seen that she is married and does not reside in the same house. The same is a typical case of enroping the entire family. She apparently being married and staying separately, has no role to play in the matrimonial life of her brother and his wife. 19. As such, the present petition is partly allowed qua respondent No.4 and she is accordingly ordered to be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to face trial, whereas, the petition qua respondent No.3 i.e father-in-law and respondent No.5 i.e sister-in-law is dismissed. 20. The petition is partly allowed as above.