JUDGMENT: 1. The 1st respondent herein filed O.S.No.162 of 1993 in the Court of Junior Civil Judge, Giddalur against the appellants and respondents 2 and 3 initially for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction in respect of the suit schedule property i.e., an extent of Ac.4.16 cents of land in Survey No.96/1 of Vondutla Village, Besthavaripet Mandal, Prakasam District. According to her, the property was purchased from the 2nd respondent, through a sale deed, dated 11.08.1983 (Ex.A.1) and that ever since then, she is in possession and enjoyment of the property. The cause of action for filing of suit is said to be the interference by appellants 1 and 2 (defendants 1 and 4) and respondents 2 and 3 (defendants 2 and 3) with her possession and enjoyment of the property. 2. Separate written statements were filed by the 1st appellant and 2nd respondent and a common written statement, by the 2nd appellant and 3rd respondent. The gist of their contention was that the 2nd respondent is the owner of the suit schedule property and certain other items and that he executed the sale deed-Ex.A.1 in favour of the 1st respondent, being under the impression that he was selling an extent of Ac.3.62 cents of land in Survey No.37/2 of the Village. It was urged that the father-in-law of the 1st respondent played fraud upon the 2nd respondent by inserting the particulars of another piece of land viz., Ac.4.16 cents in Survey No.96/1. It was also their case that in respect of the suit schedule property, there existed an agreement of sale, dated 04.01.1983 (Ex.B8) in favour of the 1st appellant and that the resultant sale deed was executed on 29.08.1992 (Ex.B.1) by the 2nd respondent. 3. During the pendency of the suit, the 1st respondent filed an application to permit her to amend the prayer in the suit to claim the alternative relief of recovery of possession, in case her plea as to possession over the property is not accepted. It was ordered. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit through its judgment, dated 30.07.2001. The 1st respondent filed A.S.No.152 of 2007 in the Court of VI Additional District Judge, Markapur. During the pendency of the appeal, appellants 3 to 8 herein were added as respondents 5 to 10 in the appeal. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal on 22.04.2010. 4. The trial Court dismissed the suit through its judgment, dated 30.07.2001. The 1st respondent filed A.S.No.152 of 2007 in the Court of VI Additional District Judge, Markapur. During the pendency of the appeal, appellants 3 to 8 herein were added as respondents 5 to 10 in the appeal. The lower appellate Court allowed the appeal on 22.04.2010. A finding was recorded to the effect that the 1st respondent is in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Accordingly, a decree, declaring her title over the suit schedule property and perpetual injunction in respect thereof, was passed. Hence, this second appeal. 5. Sri Nimmagadda Satyanarayana, learned counsel for the appellants submits that though there existed a sale deed in favour of the 1st respondent, executed by the 2nd respondent herein, there was no consensus-ad-idem and by making misrepresentation to him, the particulars of the suit schedule property were inserted for another piece of land. He submits that being sure and certain that he sold the land in Survey No.37/2 admeasuring Ac.3.62 cents, the 2nd respondent has entered into an agreement of sale and thereafter executed a sale deed in respect of Ac.4.16 cents in Survey No.96/1 in he year 1992 and ever since then, the appellants are in possession and enjoyment of the property. Learned counsel submits that when the suit itself was for the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession, there was no basis or justification for the lower appellate Court in passing the decree for declaration and perpetual injunction. 6. The suit was initially filed by the 1st respondent for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction. The suit was opposed mainly by the appellants 1 and 2 herein. The trial Court framed the following issues for its consideration: 1. whether the sale deed dated 11.08.1983 in favour of plaintiff is true, valid and binding on D-1 in respect of suit land? 2. whether the agreement dated 04.01.1983 is true, valid and binding on plaintiff? 3. whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for? 4. whether the plaintiff is entitled for alternative relief of possession as prayed for? 7. On behalf of the 1st respondent, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.26 were filed. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.8 were filed. whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and injunction as prayed for? 4. whether the plaintiff is entitled for alternative relief of possession as prayed for? 7. On behalf of the 1st respondent, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.26 were filed. On behalf of the appellants, D.Ws.1 to 7 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.8 were filed. The report submitted by the Commissioner was taken on record as Ex.X.1. The trial Court held that the 1st respondent is not entitled for the declaration of her title over the suit schedule property, much less, for any other consequential relief. In A.S.No.152 of 2007 filed by the 1st respondent, the lower appellate Court framed only one point for its consideration viz., whether the 1st respondent has established substantial grounds to set aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court and to decree the suit as prayed for. The appeal was allowed as observed earlier. 8. At the outset, the objection raised on behalf of the appellants as to the nature of the decree passed by the lower appellate Court needs to be dealt with. It is no doubt true that the suit was initially filed for the relief of declaration of title and perpetual injunction. However, when the appellants pleaded that they are in possession of the property, the 1st respondent filed an application seeking amendment of the relief in the plaint. Alternative relief of recovery of possession was also claimed. In clear terms, the 1st respondent prayed that if the Court comes to the conclusion that she is not in possession as on the date of filing of the suit, the defendants may be directed to deliver possession of the property. The trial Court dismissed the suit. The lower appellate Court has reassessed the evidence and recorded a finding to the effect that the 1st respondent is in possession of the property. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is any defect in the form of the decree. 9. The undisputed facts are that the 2nd respondent executed a sale deed in favour of the 1st respondent on 11.08.1983 marked as Ex.A.1. As long as that sale deed stands, there is no question of the tile of the 1st respondent over that property being doubted. 9. The undisputed facts are that the 2nd respondent executed a sale deed in favour of the 1st respondent on 11.08.1983 marked as Ex.A.1. As long as that sale deed stands, there is no question of the tile of the 1st respondent over that property being doubted. The main grounds pleaded by the appellants questioning title of the 1st respondent are that (a) the original owner of the property, 2nd respondent executed Ex.A.1 under the impression that he is transferring Ac.3.62 cents of land in Survey No.37/2; (b) he executed an agreement of sale- Ex.B.8 on 04.01.1983 in respect of the suit schedule property i.e. Ac.4.67 cents of land in Survey No.96/1 in favour of the 1st appellant; and (c) Ex.B.8 was followed by the sale deed, dated 29.08.1992 marked as Ex.B.1. Even if the assumption of the 2nd respondent, who deposed as D.W.2, was that he sold a totally different item of property through Ex.A.1., at least when he came to know that it is with reference to the suit schedule property, he ought to have filed a suit for cancellation of Ex.A.1. by pleading necessary grounds. 10. It was urged that the father-in- law of the 1st respondent, who negotiated the deal, played fraud upon the 2nd respondent. If that were to be so, a suit, by specifically raising the plea of fraud, ought to have been filed for the relief of cancellation of Ex.A.1 it is fundamental that a plea as to fraud or misrepresentation must be specifically raised in a properly constituted suit and it cannot be urged in any other manner, such as in the form of a deposition of a witness. There was not even an attempt by the 2nd respondent to claim such relief in the form of a counter claim in the suit filed by the 1st respondent. Hence, there was absolutely no basis for the defence offered by the appellants. 11. The appellants rested their claim on Exs.B.8 and B.1, the agreement of sale and sale deed respectively executed in their favour in relation to the very property i.e., the subject matter of Ex.A.1. By the time Ex.B.1 was executed, the vendor therein i.e., 2nd respondent ceased to be the owner of the property. The so- called ignorance or uncertainty feigned by him is absolutely of no help to the appellants. By the time Ex.B.1 was executed, the vendor therein i.e., 2nd respondent ceased to be the owner of the property. The so- called ignorance or uncertainty feigned by him is absolutely of no help to the appellants. If such a course is permitted, anyone, who is already parted with the property, can execute sale deed with impugnity, by pleading that he was under the impression that the sale deed executed by him is in respect of a different item of property. 12. The appellants pleaded that they are in possession of the property on the strength of Ex.B.8. The facts pertaining to the case clearly disclose that Ex.B.8 is brought into existence at the instance of appellants 1 and 2 to defeat the claim of the 1st respondent under Ex.A.1. Its origin itself is tainted with illegality. No recital of that document can be taken into account. In addition to that, the 1st respondent has placed before the trial Court, oral and documentary evidence to prove her possession over the suit schedule property. Ex.A.2 is a receipt, dated 27.01.1984 given by the Natural Resources Development Cooperative Society, for causing survey on ground water over the suit schedule property. Exs.A.3 and A.4 are the letters addressed by the Branch Managers of different Banks in relation to the loan transactions. Ex.A.5 to A.7 are the lease agreements executed in favour of the 1st respondent for the same land for the periods between 1986 and 1993. Ex.A.8 is the Electricity slab pass book for the property. Exs.A.9 to A.12 are cist receipts up to the year 1993. Other evidence, in the form of the receipts issued by the cooperative societies, where reference is made to the possession of the 1st respondent over the land was also adduced. The witnesses pertaining to these documents were also examined. With this preponderance of evidence, the lower appellate Court has rightly arrived at a conclusion that the 1st respondent is in possession of the property. 13. Thus, it is evident that the 1st respondent has proved not only her title to the suit schedule property by filing Ex.A.1, the sale deed, but also her possession over the property spread over several decades. Hence, no exception can be taken to the decree passed by the lower appellate Court. 14. The second appeal is accordingly dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.