1. The writ petition on hand is directed against order of J&K Special Tribunal dated 27.10.2008 whereby the Tribunal has set aside the order of Custodian Evacu­ees Property, Jammu-petitioner herein, under section 6 of Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, Svt. 2006 (hereinafter referred to as Act) declaring the property left by Shri Badcr-din an Evacuees, at W. No. 7 Basohli, as Evacuees Property. The background facts are as under: 2. Shri Kewtil Kapoor S/o Shri Gurdayal Kapoor, R/o W. No. 7 Basohli, on or immediately before 16.8.2007 brought it to the notice of the petitioner that respon­dent no. 1 herein was unauthorizedly raising construction on the landed property left behind by Shri Bader Din who had migrated to Pakistan. Respondent no. 2 prayed that the property be declared Evacuees Property under section 6 of the Act and steps taken to protect the property from encroachment and unauthorised sale. The petitioner after hearing the parties, scanning the record and taking note of the previous litigation pertaining to the property in question, in exercise of power under Act, issued notification under section 6 the Act, notifying property as Evacuee Property. The respondent before the Custodian Evacuees Property, Jammu and respondent no. 1 in the present writ petition, called in question the order passed by the petitioner, in a revision petition before the Special Tribunal, Jammu. The Tribunal on going through the record and hearing the counsel for the parties, held that the property in question was part of the family property of respondent no. 1, and that the respondent no. 1 had acquired the property under family settlement duly registered under the Registration Act. The Tribunal in support of the conclu­sion drawn, referred to an earlier observation of Deputy Custodian, Kathua dated 2.12.2005 wherein it was stated that the land in question cannot be deemed as Evacuee Property in absence of documentary evidence. The Tribunal also took note of Civil Suit pertaining to the property in question pending in the Court of Munsiff, Basohli, wherein no reference is made to the property being Evacuee Property. The Tribunal rushed to the conclusion that "Bader Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan" and that "the property as such cannot be deemed and declared as Evacuee Property." The Tribunal proceeded to set aside the order. 3. The Tribunal rushed to the conclusion that "Bader Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan" and that "the property as such cannot be deemed and declared as Evacuee Property." The Tribunal proceeded to set aside the order. 3. The order dated 27.10.2008 of Special Tribunal, Jammu is called in question in this petition on the ground that the impugned order has been made in a slipshod manner and depicts non application of mind by the Tribunal. The Tribunal is said to have selectively placed reliance on record and ignored to notice that Custodian Evacuees Property, Jammu had earlier vide No. 486/AP dated 28.7.2004 and 18-19/2001/AP dated 2.3.2004 directed the Assistant Custodian to proceed against Shri Krishan Gopal, who was reported to have demolished existing structure of Evacuee Bader Din as also the report submitted by Patwari Halqa, Basohli that he was interfering with the property in question. The Tribunal is said to have erron­eously placed reliance on observations of Assistant Custodian and Deputy Custo­dian dated 2.12.2005 and 26.2.2005. It is insisted that order dated 16.8.2007 is in accordance with law and not liable to be re vised/reviewed by the Tribunal. It is further pleaded that Tribunal has erroneously placed reliance on Civil Court proceedings, without noticing that no issue as regards the property in question being Evacuee Property, was raised in the Civil proceedings. 4. The petition is opposed by respondent-1 on the ground that the petitioner lacked any authority to file the writ petition and that the order impugned in the petition has been passed after due appreciation of the facts as also the record available, to the Tribunal. The respondent -1 has traced the source of his title/pro­prietorship in respect of subject matter of the petition and referred in detail to the proceedings initiated at the instance of respondent-2 before different authorities to see that the respondent-1 was divested of his legitimate right in the property in question. According to respondent-1, the properly in question was purchased in auction on 7-1-1925 A.D by Shri Ram Chand, uncle of respondent and thereafter devolved on respondent-1. It is averred that respondent-1, at whose instance the petitioner made order under section 6 of the Act, was a party to family settlement deed executed by his father Shri Gurdial Kapoor wherein the subject matter was admitted to be the property of respondent-1. The respondent no. It is averred that respondent-1, at whose instance the petitioner made order under section 6 of the Act, was a party to family settlement deed executed by his father Shri Gurdial Kapoor wherein the subject matter was admitted to be the property of respondent-1. The respondent no. 1 has disputed that any person of the name of Bader din ever lived in Ward No. 7, Basohli and that even if such person lived, he died issueless before the partition of the country and question of his having migrated to Pakistan, did not arise. It is reiterated that the Assistant Custodian, Kathua as also Deputy Custodian Kathua had prior to the order impugned in the revision petition before the Tribunal, declined the prayer for notifying the property in question as Evacuee Property and that the orders of the said officers were rightly relied upon by the Tribunal while allowing the revision petition. 5. I have gone through the pleadings and heard the learned counsel for the parties. 6. The Custodian Evacuee Property appointed by the Government in exercise of power under section 4 of the Act, is not only clothed with the power to notify the Evacuee Property that has vested in him under the Act, but also to take possession of the property so vested, administer it and to discharge duties qua the property as delineated under section 9 of the Act. The Custodian Evacuee Property has thus locus to question an order including order of J&K Special Tribunal effecting the property that the Custodian Evacuee property, considers to have vested in him, before any Court/forum including the High Court. So viewed, the ground urged in the reply to the writ petition as regards competence of the Custodian Evacuee Property, Jammu, petitioner herein, to file and maintain the writ petition, is bereft of any merit. Having dealt with the threshold objection as regards the main trainability of the petition, attention is to shift to other grounds raised in the petition. 7. Section 6 of the Act empowers the Custodian to notify from time to time Evacuee Property which has vested in him under this Act. It is pertinent to point out that in terms of section 5 of the Act, all the properties situate in the State, are deemed to have vested in the Custodian from the date such properties are notified so and registered as Evacuee Property. It is pertinent to point out that in terms of section 5 of the Act, all the properties situate in the State, are deemed to have vested in the Custodian from the date such properties are notified so and registered as Evacuee Property. In terms of section 6(2) of the Act once the property is vested in the Custodian, any person in possession of such property is to be deemed to be holding it on behalf of Custodian and is under a statutory duty to surrender its possession to the Custodian or any person duly authorised by him in this behalf. Any person claiming any right or interest in the property notified as Evacuee property under section 6 of the Act, is given a right to prefer claim to the Custodian pleading therein that the property notified as Evacuee Property under section 6 of the Act is not Evacuee Property. The Custodian, in the event such claim is preferred, is under an obligation to hold summary enquiry in prescribed manner, take such evidence as may be produced and for the reasons to be recorded, either reject the claim or allow it wholly or in part. Section 30 of the Act provides for an appeal, review or revision, amongst other orders against an order made under section 8 of the Act. Section 30-A of the Act independent of right to file appeal, review or revision, provided under section 30 of the Act, confers power of revision on the Minister In-charge of Evacuee Property, Department. The power of revision now in terms of section 3 of the J&K Special Tribunal Act 1988 to be exercised by the J&K Special Tribunal, empowers the Tribunal to call for the record of any proceeding in which any Custodian/Custodian General has passed an order under the provision of the Act at any time, either on its own or on application made in this behalf, for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order and pass any order in relation to it as it thinks fit. The power of revision conferred under section 30-A of the Act is independent of section 30 of the Act and in no manner restricted by the later. It follows that even a notification issued under section 6 of the Act by the Custodian, is subject to the revision before J&K Special Tribunal under the Act. The power of revision conferred under section 30-A of the Act is independent of section 30 of the Act and in no manner restricted by the later. It follows that even a notification issued under section 6 of the Act by the Custodian, is subject to the revision before J&K Special Tribunal under the Act. There is thus no scope for disagreement with the preposi­tion that revision against the order of Custodian Evacuee Property, Jammu dated 16.08.2007, was maintainable. This however, does not clinch the matter. It is next to be seen whether the Special Tribunal while exercising powers under section 30-A of the Act has dealt with the matter within the four corners of its revisional power or as contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Tribunal has travelled beyond the scope of such power. 8. The revisional jurisdiction, it is well settled, is always included in the appellate jurisdiction but the appellate jurisdiction is not so included in the revisio­nal jurisdiction. In other words, the scope of revisional jurisdiction is narrower as compared to the scope of appellate jurisdiction. The right of appeal includes within its sweep a right of being reheard on law as well as fact. The revisional jurisdiction, which is discretionary in nature, in general does not include such a right and is confined to the question of jurisdiction alone. 9. Even though power of revision under Section 30 and 30-A of the Act is wider in scope as against the power of revision under Section 115 CPC as held in Ghulam Qadir V. Special Tribunal and ors. (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 33 and reiterated in Mohd. Sharief & ors. v. J&K Special Tribunal and ors. 2007 (2) JKJ 180 (H.C), but a closer look at the order impugned reveals that the Tribunal while dealing with the revision filed by respondent-1 has travelled much beyond the scope of powers of revision conferred under section 30-A of the Act. The Tribunal has not only proceeded to sift and analyse the evidence that was before the Custodian at the time of making an order under section 6 of the Act, notifying the properly in question as Evacuee Property, re-appreciated evidence, but has gone to some of the aspects of the case that were neither agitated before the Custodian nor before the Tribunal. This apart, the Tribunal has rushed to the conclusion and made assumptions making reference to the documents/record that would not permit, sustain or lead to such conclusion/assumption. To illustrate one of the consideration that has weighed with the Tribunal to set aside the order, is that the property in question was subject matter of a civil suit between one Om Parkash and respondent -1 and others, and that the judgment in the civil suit questioned in appeal in the District Court and thereafter High Court settled that the property in question was not Evacuee Property. The decree dated 14-6-1986 in civil suit titled Om Parkash v. Gurdial Kapoor and Others was subject matter of Civil 1st Appeal No. 21 of 1980 before the District Judge, Kathua. The appeal succeeded and a suit was accordingly dismissed. The Civil Second Appeal No. 38/1982 taken against the 1st Appellate Court Judgment, was dismissed on 23-3-1992. In the Civil Suit as also the proceedings emanating there from the controversy was, whether the property in question was taken forcibly by respondent-1 and others after the death of Tek Chand and whether respondent-1 and others were in possession of the suit property even during the life time of Tek Chand. The question of the suit property being Evacuee Property, was not at all agitated in the suit by either of the parties nor did the question find place in the list of issues framed in the suit. The question, obviously, was not before 1st Appellate Court or the High Court. So viewed, the Tribunal had no reason to opine that the outcome of civil suit and the 1st and IInd Appeal arising out of the judgment and decree in the civil suit led to the conclusion that the property in question was not Evacuee Property. Similarly, the conclusion drawn by the Tribunal that Badar Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan, is based on surmises and conjectures and without being there any record to lead to such a conclusion. The Tribunal held that Badar Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan solely on the ground that in a suit filed by the father of respondent-2, it was pleaded that Badar Din had expired and there was no issue of said Badar Din and that the benefit of impugned property was enjoyed by predecessor in interest of respondent-2. The Tribunal held that Badar Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan solely on the ground that in a suit filed by the father of respondent-2, it was pleaded that Badar Din had expired and there was no issue of said Badar Din and that the benefit of impugned property was enjoyed by predecessor in interest of respondent-2. The Tribunal observed "this by implica­tion shows that Badar Din died in India and never migrated to Pakistan". The Tribunal after making said observation, proceeded to hold "the property as such cannot be declared to be Evacuee Property" and the order impugned before the Tribunal was not based on records. 10. While, as pointed out earlier, there can be no disagreement with the legal preposition that powers of revision conferred under section 30 and 30-A of the Act are wider in scope as compared to powers of revision under section 115 CPC, as while exercising power of revision, the Custodian General or the Minister In-charge of the Department (Special Tribunal) as the case may be, has to satisfy himself as to the "legality" or propriety of the order passed, yet such a power does not include a power to decide complex and intricate questions of fact by re-appreciating evidence when the Court below has yet to embark on such an exercise or to draw conclusions on the basis of surmises and conjectures and not material before the Tribunal. Further more, plentitude of Revisional Court/Tribunal power under section 30-A of the Act does not make the power at par with the powers of Appellate Court. In any case, the Revisional Court cannot by exercising revisional powers built up a case neither projected before the Court below, not possible on the edifice of material before the Revisional Court. 11. Against said backdrop respondent no. 1 cannot draw any support from law laid down in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal and ors. (2002) 1 Supreme Court Cases 33, forcefully and emphatically relied upon by his counsel. 12. So viewed, the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a jurisdictional error by assuming unto itself role of an appellate court and basing its conclusions on surmises and conjectures not sustainable on facts or law and the order impugned is liable to be quashed. 13. 12. So viewed, the Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a jurisdictional error by assuming unto itself role of an appellate court and basing its conclusions on surmises and conjectures not sustainable on facts or law and the order impugned is liable to be quashed. 13. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and order of J&K Special Tribunal dated 27th October, 2008, whereby order dated 16.08.2007 of Custodian Evacuees Property, Jammu under section 6 of Evacuees (Administration of Property) Act, Svt. 2006 in respect of the subject matter of the writ petition, has been set aside, is quashed. The respondent no. 1 shall be free to approach the Custodian Evacuee Property, Jammu with an application/claim under section 8 of the Act, a right available to the petitioner as laid down in Abdul Khaliq Dar (Haji) and ors v. State of J&K and ors. 2009 (1) JKJ173 (SC) and in the event such a claim is preferred, the petitioner shall entertain it irrespective of the delay occasioned because of bonafide effort made by the petitioner to question the Notification dated 16.08.2007 under section 6 of the Act in proceedings before the Tribunal and as far as possible pass orders in terms of section 8 (3) of the Act within three months from the date such a claim is preferred/application made.