1. The petitioner is a company registered under the Companies Act with its registered office at 3, Industrial Area Nandesari-391340 District Baroda. The peti­tioner in the year 1993 allowed merger with it of a Jammu based independent company namely Pine Chemicals Ltd. with its registered office at 10-lndustrial Complex Bari Brahmana, J&K, Jammu (hereinafter referred to as the Company) after the later closed its business in wake of enactment of Resin Extraction Act 1986. The petitioner thus inherited assets and liabilities of Pine Chemicals Ltd. and in said capacity has come up with present writ petition. 2. The petitioner claims to have engaged the respondent herein as a trainee welder on 5th October 1979 @ Rs.11/- per day for a period of six months which period admittedly was extended from time to time till the contract was terminated w.e.f 2.5.1981 after the respondent was paid stipend in lieu of 24 hours notice. The respondent questioned his termination and at the instance of the respondent, the Jammu and Kashmir Government vide SRO No.344 dated 23.6.1983 made a refer­ence of the dispute in terms of Industrial Disputes Act to the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court at Jammu. The dispute referred to the Tribunal was as under:- Whether the termination of the aforesaid trainee by the management was justified, if not what was he entitled to. The Tribunal vide its award dated 31.3.2003 held termination order to have been made in violation of section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act in as much as the conditions precedent to the retrenchment/termination had not been fulfilled. The Tribunal held the termination order bad in law and accordingly set aside the order. The Tribunal held the respondent entitled to reinstatement in service as also 50% of the back wages. 3. The Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court award dated 31.3.2003 is questioned in the present writ petition on the following grounds: 1) That the Tribunal committed an error in not appreciating that a "trainee" did not fall within definition of workman as defined under section 2(a) of Industrial Disputes Act 1947. 2) That the Tribunal failed to notice that under law there was no requirement of one month's prior notice before terminating contract of a trainee and that under Certified Standing Orders of the Company only 24 hours notice was required to be given or stipend in lieu of the notice paid to the trainee. 2) That the Tribunal failed to notice that under law there was no requirement of one month's prior notice before terminating contract of a trainee and that under Certified Standing Orders of the Company only 24 hours notice was required to be given or stipend in lieu of the notice paid to the trainee. 3) That the Tribunal after having been informed that the Pine Chemicals Ltd. had closed its operations at Bari Brahmana, Jammu lacked authority to direct reinstatement of the respondent. 4) That the Tribunal did not consider whether the respondent after his termination, was gainfully employed but directed payment of back wages without looking into this aspect of the matter and that the direction is contrary to the settled legal principles governing the matter 4. The respondent in his reply has disputed all the factual averments made in the petition. It is denied that the respondent was taken by the Pine Chemicals Company for only a period of six months. It is insisted that the respondent continued to be an employee of the company from the date of his appointment i.e 5.10.1979 till 2.5.1981 when the respondent was terminated. Attributing the termi­nation order to the malafides on the part of Company, it is insisted that section 25 of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 obligated the company to serve one months notice on the respondent prior to his termination. The respondent insists that his termination was to be in accordance with the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act and Certified Standing Orders of the Company if "contrary" to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 would not deprive the respondent of the rights available under the Act. The respondent also defends the award as regards payment of back wages, claimed to have been passed on proper appreciation of the evidence. Heard and considered. 5. It is admitted position of the parties that the respondent was engaged on 5.10.1979 and continued to work for Pine Chemicals Ltd. that later merged with petitioner company, till the termination order dated 2.5.1981. The case set up by the respondent that in the intervening period the respondent committed a series of lapses that left no option for the company but to terminate, what company calls "trainee" of the respondent, does not sound convincing. 6. The case set up by the respondent that in the intervening period the respondent committed a series of lapses that left no option for the company but to terminate, what company calls "trainee" of the respondent, does not sound convincing. 6. Para 3(2)(e) of Certified Standing Orders of the Company makes room for extension in training period of a "trainee" on merits. The company made repeated extensions in the training period of the respondent, implying thereby that the work and conduct of the respondent was up to the satisfaction of the company and it was only after the company was satisfied with his performance, successive extensions were given to the respondent. The respondent, even if accepted, to have been engaged/employed as a trainee on 5.10.1979 fell within definition of the "Work­man" as defined under para 2(2) of Certified Standing Orders of the company. The "Workman" as per para 2 (2) of the Certified Standing Orders includes an "appren­tice" as well as a "trainee". The definition of the "workman" in para 2(2) of the Certified Standing Orders of the Company is in tune with the definition given in section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947. The respondent admittedly was in continuous service of the company for more than one year and in terms of section 25 - F of the Industrial Dispute Act 1947 was entitled to one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for his retrenchment or in lieu of such notice payment of wages for the period of notice. The company on its own showing failed to serve one month's prior notice to the respondent before proceeding to terminate his service nor did it pay one month's wages to the respondent for the period of notice. The termination order has been passed in violation of section 25 (1;) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The petitioner cannot press into service para 14(1) of its Certified Standing Orders to insist that in terms of said para the company was competent to terminate the respondent after serving him 24 hours notice. The termination order has been passed in violation of section 25 (1;) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. The petitioner cannot press into service para 14(1) of its Certified Standing Orders to insist that in terms of said para the company was competent to terminate the respondent after serving him 24 hours notice. It is rightly held by the Tribunal that any part of the Certified Standing Orders in conflict with any provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was to give way to the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and that though under para 14(2) of the Certified Standing Orders of the company there was a requirement of 24 hours notice to a trainee, the period of notice in terms of section 25 (F) Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was one month and that notice in accordance with section 25 (F) of Industrial Disputes Act 1947 was a mandatory requirement. The argument that even if finding returned by the Tribunal that the notice served on the respondent was not in conformity with section 25 (F) of Industrial Disputes Act 1947, the Tribunal ought not to have directed reinstatement of the respondent as the Company had to the knowledge of the Tribunal wound up its business at Jammu, is specious and bereft of any merit. If a person running an industry is allowed to wriggle out of his responsibilities towards retrenched/terminated workman on the ground of his having closed the business, no workman shall be in a position to get his grievances redressed in wake of his illegal retrenchment/termination. An industrialist to escape his responsibility to reinstate a wrongfully re­trenched workman shall in each and every case come up with an argument that as he has closed his business/industry, the Industrial Tribunal lacks authority to direct reinstatement of retrenched/terminated workman. It is for the management of the industrial establishment to come up with all possible options sufficient to address the grievances of illegally retrenched/terminated workman. In the present case, if Pine Chemicals Ltd. Bari Brahmana, Jammu has closed its operations, it having merged with the petitioner company and its assets and the liabilities having gone to petitioner company, it is the petitioner company that is to reinstate the respondent in the petitioner company. In the present case, if Pine Chemicals Ltd. Bari Brahmana, Jammu has closed its operations, it having merged with the petitioner company and its assets and the liabilities having gone to petitioner company, it is the petitioner company that is to reinstate the respondent in the petitioner company. Similarly the case set up by the petitioner that Tribunal has passed the order as regards payment of back wages, without proper appreciation of the evidence on the file, is devoid of any substance. The Tribunal has after an elaborate and in-depth discussion of evidence brought on the file, held the respondent entitled to 50 % of the back wages. The Tribunal appears to have been alive to the fact that the respondent after his termination had not actually worked for the company and after noticing this fact, directed payment of only 50% of the back wages and not the full wages to the respondent. 7. The argument that in terms of section 2(00)(bb) Industrial Disputes Act 1947 non renewal of contract did not amount to retrenchment and that the Tribunal ought not to have treated the case before it as a case of "retrenchment" and proceeded to make the award, does not sound convincing. It needs to be pointed out that the company did not allow the engagement/employment of the respondent to come to an end by efflux of time. Had the company engaged the respondent for a period of, say, one year and after the contract came to an end by efflux of time, avoided to renew the contract, the Company could have been heard saying and might very well have argued that it was a case of non renewal of the contract of the company in terms of section 2(00)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 and the Company was not required to comply with section 25(F) of the Act as the non renewal of contract was not to be treated as retrenchment. This is not the situation in the present case. In the present case Shri O.N. Zadu, Administrative Manager of the Company has vide order dated 2.5.1981 spelt out the omissions and commis­sions attributed to the respondents, accused the respondent of having not shown any improvement in his work and proceeded to "terminate" the services of the respondent w.e.f 2.5.1981 AN. This is not the situation in the present case. In the present case Shri O.N. Zadu, Administrative Manager of the Company has vide order dated 2.5.1981 spelt out the omissions and commis­sions attributed to the respondents, accused the respondent of having not shown any improvement in his work and proceeded to "terminate" the services of the respondent w.e.f 2.5.1981 AN. In the circumstances it is not a case of non renewal of contract within meaning of section 2(00)(bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 but a case of retrenchment within meaning of section 2(00) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. 8. For the reasons discussed above, the petition is devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed. No case is made out to interfere with the Industrial Tribunal/Labour Court order dated 31.03.2003 whereby the Tribunal has directed reinstate­ment of the respondent and payment of 50% back wages. The petition is accordingly dismissed along with connected CMPs.