JUDGMENT A.K. Goswamy, J. 1. Heard Mr. K.L. John, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Tali Ao, learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. Despite service of notice, none has appeared for the respondent No. 1. This revision petition is directed against the judgment and order dated 29.11.2005, passed by Shri L.K. Achumi, learned Special Judge, (Deputy Commissioner) (J), Nagaland, Dimapur in Case No. RC 8(A) 98-Sil, whereby the Court discharged all the accused of the charges under Sections 120-B/420/468/471, IPC and Sections 13(2),13(i) (c) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, for short 'the Act'. 2. The people of Zaboka village under Mon District received a sum of Rs. 44 lakhs as land compensation from the Government of Nagaland for establishment of Tuli Paper Mill. The villagers formed a Trust under the name of Zaboka Village Development & Welfare Trust for short 'the Trust', under a registered deed for proper utilization of the money for the development work of the villagers. In terms of the deed of the Trust, the Deputy Commissioner, Mon District happens to be the ex-officio Chairman of the Trust. The Deputy Chairman of the Trust is to be selected by the villagers of Zaboka village. The Chairman and Deputy Chairman were authorized to operate the transaction of the bank account of the Trust. Corpus of the Trust was from the compensation awarded. 3. A writ petition vide Civil Rule No. 135(K)95 was filed before this Court by 4 (four) petitioners, namely, (1) Sh. Alei Konyak (2) Sh. Longahen Konyak (3) Toalong Konyak and (4) Sh. Ashan Konyak, who were all members of the Trust, stating that the Trust had deposited long term deposit of Rs. 22,34,400/- on 16.9.1987 vide TDRs No. 53549 under Account No. 140 in the Nagaland State Co-operative Bank, Tizit. The allegation for which the writ petition was filed was to the effect that on 23.6.1989, a meeting of the Trust was allegedly held in the office chamber of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon, where the writ petitioners were also allegedly present and shown to have participated by forging their signatures. In the said meeting, an amount of Rs. 10 lakh was given as loan to the respondent No. 1 in the present application. The respondent No. 1 was the then Deputy Chairman of the Trust Board. In the said meeting, an amount of Rs. 10 lakh was given as loan to the respondent No. 1 in the present application. The respondent No. 1 was the then Deputy Chairman of the Trust Board. Another meeting was also held whereby, a resolution was taken for sanctioning of Rs. 1,60,000/- on the basis of the resolution dated 20.4.1991. There was no record of any such Trust Committee adopting a resolution on 20.4.1991. One more Trust meeting was held on 3.3.1992 and a sum of Rs. 5 lakh was also given to the respondent No. 1 as long term loan for construction of Tea Garden at Tizit Valley. In the said meeting also, according to the writ petitioners, they were not present and their thumb impressions had been obtained through forgery. This Court, on the allegations aforesaid, while admitting the writ petition on 5.10.1995, had observed the desirability of the Central Bureau of Investigation, for short, 'the CBI' to make an enquiry into the allegations. Based on the order of the Court dated 29.2.1996, a case was registered, being PE-4(A)96-SLC and a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the CBI. The enquiry revealed that the resolutions dated 23.6.1989, 20.4.1991 and 3.3.1992 were not genuine but false and fabricated, as the thumb impressions found in the resolutions were quite different from the thumb impressions of the members. Subsequently, the CBI submitted its final report on 22.12.1997, showing that a prima facie case has been established against the accused persons. This Court, thereafter, by an order dated 12.10.1998, directed the CBI to proceed accordingly. Thereafter, a case was registered being RC-8(A)98-SLC under Section 120-B, 420, 468, 471, IPC and Sections 13(2)and 13(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. 4. On 12.5.2000, after completion of the investigation, Charge-Sheet No. 3/2000 was filed before the Court of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon and subsequently, the aforesaid case was transferred to the Court of Deputy Commissioner (J), Dimapur, wherein the same was registered as GR-7/2002 (arising out of RC-8(A) 98-SLC). As indicated in the Charge-Sheet, it was established that on 7.6.1989, the respondent No. 1 herein submitted a written prayer to the Chairman of the Trust with a request to grant him a loan of Rs. 10 lakh for raising a Tea Plantation at Tizit. Accordingly, on 23.6.1989, a resolution had been passed by the Chairman, the then Deputy Commissioner, Mon, namely, I. Ao. 10 lakh for raising a Tea Plantation at Tizit. Accordingly, on 23.6.1989, a resolution had been passed by the Chairman, the then Deputy Commissioner, Mon, namely, I. Ao. The resolution was signed by the Chairman and Deputy Chairman and it also had the thumb impression of the 4 (four) Trust members. Based on the aforesaid resolution, a loan was processed by the bank and ultimately the same was received by the respondent No. 1 on 27-6-89. It was stated that the investigation had established that the Trust resolution was passed without the knowledge and consent of the four members and the thumb impressions appearing in the resolution were not the thumb impressions of the four members. Thus, the loan was fraudulently sanctioned and dishonestly received by the respondent No. 1. 5. It has also been stated that on 8.5.1991, a request was made by the villagers before the Trust for according permission to release Rs. 1.6 lakh for purchase of a Maruti Car for use of the villagers. The Deputy Commissioner Shri I. Ao, had by that time relinquished the office of Deputy Commissioner, Mon and one Shri Anil Chandra Bal, respondent No. 2 was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Mon. A resolution was also purportedly adopted in the meeting on 8.5.1991 to release the amount of Rs. 1.6 lakh to the respondent No. 1. Based on the aforesaid resolution, loan was sanctioned and the loan documents were executed by the respondents No. 1 & 2. Thereafter, on 24.6.1991, the respondent No. 1 received a sum of Rs. 1.6 lakh in cash from the bank on the basis of the resolution taken by the Trust. It has been brought out during the course of investigation that the thumb impressions appearing in the Trust resolution also did not belong to the Trust members and the loan was granted fraudulently and dishonestly received by the respondent No. 1. There was one more meeting of the Trust on 3.3.1992, under the Chairmanship of the respondent No. 3, who was then posted as Deputy Commissioner, Mon. A resolution was also signed by the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman on 3.3.1992 and thumb impressions of four persons were also appearing in the said resolution. As has been done in the earlier occasions, based on the aforesaid resolution, the bank had granted a loan of Rs. 5 lakh to the respondent No. 1. A resolution was also signed by the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman on 3.3.1992 and thumb impressions of four persons were also appearing in the said resolution. As has been done in the earlier occasions, based on the aforesaid resolution, the bank had granted a loan of Rs. 5 lakh to the respondent No. 1. It also appears that the Trust resolution was taken without the knowledge of the members and the thumb impressions do not belong to the members but are of some other persons. It has been indicated that the loan was fraudulently sanctioned by the Chairman and dishonestly received by the Deputy Chairman, who happens to be from the village. It has further been fortified by the expert of the Department of Government Examination of Questioned Document that the thumb impressions appearing in the resolution were not the thumb impressions of the four trust members. On these broad facts, contending that the prima facie case was found to have been well established against the accused persons, Charge-Sheet had been submitted against the present respondents. 6. It is to be noted that before the charge-sheet came to be filed, Mr. I. Ao had expired and, therefore, he was not arrayed as an accused in the charge-sheet. Along with the charge-sheet, the prosecution had also given the list of witnesses as well as the list of documents. It appears from the order dated 13.9.2005 of the learned trial Court that the counsel for the parties were heard on consideration of charge and on the prayer of the learned counsel for the CBI to submit his detail argument, the case was re-fixed on 17.10.2005 for further hearing on consideration of charge. It appears that a compromise petition, as noted by the Court below, had been filed and hearing had taken place on the aforesaid compromise petition also. Thereafter, by an order dated 29.11.2005, the learned trial Court, taking a view that no prima facie case has been made out against the accused persons, discharged the accused persons from criminal liability in connection with the case. It is this order of the learned trial Court dated 29.11.2005, which is assailed in the present revision petition. 7. Mr. Thereafter, by an order dated 29.11.2005, the learned trial Court, taking a view that no prima facie case has been made out against the accused persons, discharged the accused persons from criminal liability in connection with the case. It is this order of the learned trial Court dated 29.11.2005, which is assailed in the present revision petition. 7. Mr. K.L. John, learned counsel appearing for the CBI submits that the learned trial Court was wholly wrong in discharging the accused persons on the face of materials on record, which demonstrate that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. He submits that the learned trial Court committed manifest error of law in taking cognizance of the alleged compromise agreement in deciding to discharge the accused persons. He submits that at the time of consideration of charge, the trial Court cannot accept any document on behalf of the defence and the trial Court is to decide the question of consideration of charge on the basis of materials produced by the prosecution alone. It is his submission that the trial Court had discharged all the accused persons solely on the basis of the compromise agreement arrived at between the accused No. 1 and the four complainants. The so-called agreement would also demonstrate that one of the members/complainants was also not a party to the said compromise agreement. He has also submitted that the learned trial Court had recorded a cryptic finding that the accused Nos. 2 & 3, the Deputy Commissioners at the relevant point of time, had nothing to do in connection with the case and thereby discharging them from the criminal liability. According to him, all the offences mentioned in the charge-sheet are not compoundable except Section 420, IPC and, therefore, even otherwise, the learned trial Court wholly misdirected itself in placing reliance on the deed of compromise in discharging the accused persons. That there is enough materials to proceed against the accused No. 1 is not in dispute and the trial Court had also not recorded any finding to the contrary and as it would appear, the only consideration on which the accused No. 1 was discharged was on the basis of the so called compromise agreement. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to the statement of PW 2, in particular, to indicate the complicity of the accused No. 1. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also drawn my attention to the statement of PW 2, in particular, to indicate the complicity of the accused No. 1. He has also relied upon the documents, wherein the experts opined that the thumb impressions appearing in the resolutions are not the thumb impressions of the complainants. The existence of the aforesaid materials, on the face of it, is sufficient to frame charge against the accused No. 1. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad v. Dilip Nathumal Chordia & Anr. reported in (1989) 1 SCC 715 , with particular emphasis upon paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 to indicate the approach which a Court should take in the matter of framing of charge. He submits that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial, the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged and the probable defence of the accused should be shut out. It is also not the stage to consider whether there is sufficient ground for conviction and for the purpose of framing of charge, i.e. at the initial stage, if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, the Court has got no option but to proceed against the accused. 9. Learned counsel also places reliance on the case of Suresh alias Pappu Bhudharmal Kalani v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2001) 3 SCC 703 , to drive home the point that sometimes even a remote link between the activities of an accused and the facts of the case may justify a reasonable inference warranting a judicial finding that there is ground for presuming that an accused has committed the offence or at least to presume that the question of his being directly or indirectly involved in the commission of such offence is not to be ruled out. Placing reliance on the case of Yogesh alias Sachin jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 10 SCC 394 , Mr. Placing reliance on the case of Yogesh alias Sachin jagdish Joshi v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2008) 10 SCC 394 , Mr. K.L. John submits that it is only when the evidence produced before the Magistrate gives rise to suspicion in contradiction to grave suspicion, the Magistrate would be within his right to discharge the accused and not otherwise. In respect of the accused Nos. 2 and 3, who are arrayed as respondents Nos. 3 and 2 in the petition, Mr. John has drawn my pointed attention to the statements recorded by the investigating agency and which the prosecution has styled as PW 2 and PWs 6, 7, 8 & 9, to show that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the aforesaid accused persons and there is grave suspicion of the accused Nos. 2 and 3 being part of the criminal conspiracy as well as in the other offences alleged in the charge-sheet. From the statement of PW 2, Mr. N. Konyak, who was the Office Superintendent at the relevant point of time in the Office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon, the learned counsel submits that from his statement it is crystal clear that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 did not make any effort whatsoever to ascertain whether the loan amount granted to the accused No. 1 was spent for actual purpose or as to whether the accused No. 1 had re-paid the loan. Basing on the statements of PWs 6, 7, 8 and 9, who were the complainants and who were the members of the Trust, who had alleged that they were not parties to the resolutions on the basis of which monetary benefits were granted to the accused No. 1, Mr. John submits that the meetings of the Trust were held in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon and they had unequivocally stated that they had not attended the office in connection with the meeting of the Trust and had not put any thumb impressions on any document, paper or resolution, laying the foundation of offences against the accused Nos. 2 and 3. 2 and 3. It is his further submission that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the Deputy Commissioner, Mon is the ex-officio Chairman of the Trust and it was his responsibility to ensure that it was the members of the Trust who had attended the meeting but he had failed to discharge that duty. The materials on record unfailingly pointed to the fact that four persons other than the actual members had put their thumb impressions in the resolutions. According to him, unless there is complicity on the part of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon, it would not have been possible for some other persons to have come and attended the meeting in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. On the basis of the aforesaid submissions, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a case as projected in the charge-sheet is well made out against the accused Nos. 2 and 3 as well. The trial Court was wholly unjustified in discharging the accused Nos. 2 and 3 holding that the accused Nos. 2 and 3 have no connection with the case. The learned counsel further submits that the order of the trial Court is not a speaking order and as such the same is vitiated. 10. Mr. John has also placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Damodar v. State of Rajasthan reported in (2004) 12 SCC 336 as well as in the case of Esher Singh v. State of A.P. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 585 to explain the concept of criminal conspiracy. According to him, in a case of criminal conspiracy, there may not be any direct evidence and that the foundation of criminal conspiracy lies in an agreement to do an illegal act and such an agreement can be proved either by direct evidence or by substantial evidence or by both and, therefore, the circumstances appearing in a case are also very relevant for the purpose of determining the existence or otherwise of criminal conspiracy. He submits that it is in this context that the statement of PW 2 that the Deputy Commissioners i.e. accused Nos. 2 & 3 had not taken any steps to ascertain as to whether the loan had been repaid or as to whether the loan had been spent for the actual purpose for which it was granted is a circumstance appearing against the accused Nos. 2 & 3 had not taken any steps to ascertain as to whether the loan had been repaid or as to whether the loan had been spent for the actual purpose for which it was granted is a circumstance appearing against the accused Nos. 2 & 3 to fasten them with criminal conspiracy. 11. Before winding up his submission, the learned counsel has also placed reliance in the case of State of Orissa v. Devendra Nath Padhi reported in (2005) 1 SCC 568 , to substantiate his argument that at the stage of framing of charge there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, which entitled an accused to file any material or document and that such a right is available to the accused only at the stage of trial. 12. Mr. T. Ao, on the other hand, emphatically submits that the learned trial Court was wholly justified in discharging the accused Nos. 2 & 3 and, according to him, permitting to proceed with the trial of the case by framing charge against the accused Nos. 2 & 3, would be an abuse of the process of the Court, in view of absence of any incriminating materials against the aforesaid two accused persons with regard to the aforesaid offences. He submits that he does not hold any brief for the accused No. 1 and, therefore, he would refrain from making any submission with regard to the accused No. 1. The learned counsel submits that it is correct that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 were holding the post of Deputy Commissioner, Mon and by virtue of their being the Deputy Commissioner, were also, at some point of time, an ex-officio Chairman of the Trust Board. He also admits that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 were the joint signatories with accused No. 1. Learned counsel submits that the statements of the witnesses do not allege that no meeting of the Trust Board had taken place in the office of the Deputy Commissioner or that no such resolutions were passed in the office of the Deputy Commissioner. That resolutions are adopted in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon is an admitted fact but he takes pain to explain that in absence of any statement indicating that the opposite party Nos. That resolutions are adopted in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon is an admitted fact but he takes pain to explain that in absence of any statement indicating that the opposite party Nos. 2 & 3 had known personally the members of the Trust and they had allowed others to take part in the proceedings of the Trust held in the office chamber of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon, the edifice of the charges falls flat. The learned counsel submits that out of many witnesses who are cited, the statements of PWs 2, 4, 5, 6 & 7 are the material witnesses and, therefore, the learned counsel for the petitioner had also relied on the aforesaid statements. Drawing pointed attention to the statement of PW 2, the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 submits that the said witness, who was a ministerial staff of the office of the Deputy Commissioner, had also not recognized the other Trust members but have known the accused No. 1 personally and that he is categorical in saying that such persons had signed the resolutions by putting thumb impressions. Though this witness had stated that he could not recognize the persons who had put their thumb impressions, he would be able to identify the persons who had put their thumb impressions. The learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 & 3 points out that there is nothing in the statement of any of the witnesses as to whether any effort was made to identify and bring to book such persons. The learned counsel submits that the only conclusion that can be drawn from the statements of PWs 6, 7, 8 & 9 are that they had not attended the meeting in the office of the Deputy Commissioner and had not put their thumb impressions in the resolutions. Beyond that there is nothing in the statement which can implicate accused Nos. 2 & 3 in any manner. He further submits that there is no allegation that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 allowed four other persons to participate in the meeting of the Trust and allowed them to put their thumb impressions fictitiously, not being the members of the Trust. According to him, in order to connect the accused Nos. 2 & 3 in any manner. He further submits that there is no allegation that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 allowed four other persons to participate in the meeting of the Trust and allowed them to put their thumb impressions fictitiously, not being the members of the Trust. According to him, in order to connect the accused Nos. 2 & 3 to the offences alleged, at the minimum, this allegation ought to have been there on record and he further submits that given the circumstances, they should have been, on the contrary, cited as prosecution witnesses instead of being arrayed as accused. 13. The learned counsel also places reliance on Yogesh (supra) to emphasize that only if the material evidence gives rise to grave suspicion, the trial Court will be justified to frame charge in accordance with law. Learned counsel relies on the decision rendered in P. Vijayan v. State of Kerala & Anr. reported in (2010) 2 SCC 398 to explain the scope and ambit of Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Reliance has also been placed in the judgment rendered in State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari & Ors. reported in (2000) 2 SCC 57 , to bolster his contention that only if a prima facie case is made out for proceeding further than only a charge has to be framed. According to him, the materials on record, even if fully accepted, cannot show that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 had committed any offence and, therefore, the trial Court was wholly justified in discharging the accused Nos. 2 & 3. The learned counsel further submits that the compromise agreement which was produced before the learned trial Court was not a document produced by the defence and the record would reveal that the same was produced by the complainants and, therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court could not have taken cognizance of the compromise agreement, is misplaced. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given my anxious consideration to the weighty submissions advanced. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to consider the scope and ambit of Sections 227 & 228 of the Cr. P.C., relating to discharge and framing of charge. Section 227, Cr. 14. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have given my anxious consideration to the weighty submissions advanced. Before proceeding further, it would be relevant to consider the scope and ambit of Sections 227 & 228 of the Cr. P.C., relating to discharge and framing of charge. Section 227, Cr. P.C. provides that if, upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith, and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf, the judge considers that there is not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing. Section 228, Cr PC provides that if after such consideration and hearing under Section 227 Cr PC, the Judge is of the opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, he would proceed to frame charge as provided under sub-section 1, Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 228. Sub-Section 2 of Section 228, Cr PC provides that where the Judge frames any charge under Clause (b) of sub-section (1), the charge shall be read and explained to the accused and the accused shall be asked whether he pleads guilty of the offence charged or claim to be tried. 15. The Apex Court in Yogesh (supra) explained that the words, "not sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused", appearing in Section 227 of the Cr PC envisage exercise of judicial mind on the part of the Judge to the facts of the case in order to determine as to whether a case of trial has been made out by the prosecution. It has also been pointed out that in assessing and endeavouring to find out as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding with the case, the Judge has the power to sift and weigh the material for the limited purpose of finding out about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case against the accused. Though there is no rule of universal application as to what would constitute to be a prima facie case, suffice it to say that the same would depend on the facts and circumstances as emerging in a particular case. Though there is no rule of universal application as to what would constitute to be a prima facie case, suffice it to say that the same would depend on the facts and circumstances as emerging in a particular case. The Apex Court in Martin Burn Ltd. v. R.N. Banerjee reported in AIR 1958 SC 79 , observed that a prima facie case does not mean a case proved to the hilt but a case, which can be said to be established if the evidence, which is led in support of the same, were believed. The Apex Court further stated that while determining whether a prima facie case had been made out, the relevant consideration is whether on the evidence led it was possible to arrive at the conclusion, in question, and not whether that was the only conclusion, which could be arrived at on that evidence. If on the basis of application of judicial mind to the material facts, the learned Judge comes to the conclusion that the materials give rise to suspicion, he would be within his right to discharge the accused. On the contrary, if grave suspicion arises in the mind of the Judge, the Judge would have no option but to frame charge and proceed in accordance with law without taking into consideration as to whether the materials so unfolded would result in conviction in the trial or not. He may not be unjustified to consider as to whether the materials on record, if unrebutted, would make conviction reasonably possible. 16. In para 12 of the judgment rendered in Stree Atyachar Virodhi Parishad (supra), the Supreme Court stated thus :-- 12. Section 228 requires the Judge to frame charge if he considers that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed the offence. The interaction of these two sections has already been the subject matter of consideration by this Court. In State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh, Untwalia, J., while explaining the scope of the said sections observed : (SCR p. 259: SCC pp. 41-42: SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36, para 4). Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. 41-42: SCC (Cri) pp. 535-36, para 4). Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the Court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the Court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the Court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 17. In State of M.P. v. S.B. Johari & Ors. (supra), the Apex Court opined that at the Sections 227-228, Cr PC stage, the Court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclose the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. The Court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. 18. The Court may, for this limited purpose, sift the evidence as it cannot be expected even at the initial stage to accept all that the prosecution states as gospel truth even if it is opposed to common sense or the broad probabilities of the case. 18. It would be also relevant, though not cited by the parties, to take note of the decision rendered in Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal reported in (1979) 3 SCC 4 , wherein the Supreme Court enunciated the following principles: (1) That the Judge while considering the question of framing the charges under Section 227 of the Code has the undoubted power to sift and weigh the evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not a prima facie case against the accused has been made out. (2) Where the materials placed before the Court disclose grave suspicion against the accused which has not been properly explained the Court will be fully justified in framing a charge and proceeding with the trial. (3) The test to determine a prima facie case would naturally depend upon the facts of each case and it is difficult to lay down a rule of universal application. By and large however if two views are equally possible and the Judge is satisfied that the evidence produced before him while giving rise to some suspicion but not grave suspicion against the accused, he will be fully within his right to discharge the accused. (4) That in exercising his jurisdiction under Section 227 of the Code the Judge which under the present Code is a senior and experienced Court cannot act merely as a post office or a mouthpiece of the prosecution, but has to consider the broad probabilities of the case, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the Court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This however does not mean that the Judge should make a roving enquiry into the pros and cons of the matter and weigh the evidence as if he was conducting a trial. 19. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Devendra Nath Padhi (supra) had occasion to explain the meaning of the expression "the record of the case" as used in Section 227 of the Code. 19. The Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Devendra Nath Padhi (supra) had occasion to explain the meaning of the expression "the record of the case" as used in Section 227 of the Code. The Supreme Court pointed out that record of the case and documents submitted therewith as postulated under Section 227related to the case and documents referred to in Section 209. The Apex Court has also laid down that accused has not been conferred with any right by the Code to file any material or documents at the stage of framing of charge. It is also laid down that "after hearing of the submissions of the accused and the prosecution" means hearing the submissions of the accused on the record of the case as filed by the prosecution and documents submitted therewith and nothing more and the said expression does not afford any opportunity to the accused to submit material. In short, at the stage of framing of charge, hearing the submissions of the accused has to be restricted and confined to the materials and documents produced by the investigating agency. If any other view is taken thereby permitting the accused to produce materials even at the stage of framing of charge, the same would result in conducting a mini trial at the stage of framing of charge. 20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, when I advert to the facts of the case and, more particularly to the areas traversed by the learned counsel for the parties, it is seen that three resolutions were passed in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon at three different points of time with three different ex-officio Chairman of the Trust in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, wherein accused No. 1 and four persons, stated to be members, had participated in the deliberations and had adopted resolutions attesting their presence as well as affirmation to the resolutions based on which the accused No. 1 obtained loan from bank against pledging of fixed deposit amount of the Trust. The accused No. 1 was the Vice-Chairman of the Trust and he was also a villager of Zaboka village and it appears from the materials on record that he was known, at least to PW 2. The accused No. 1 was the Vice-Chairman of the Trust and he was also a villager of Zaboka village and it appears from the materials on record that he was known, at least to PW 2. I have perused the materials on record, on which reliance has been placed by the parties, for the limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused Nos. 1, 2 & 3 and as to whether grave suspicion arises from such materials on record about the involvement of the accused Nos. 1, 2 & 3 in the offences alleged. It has not appeared from the materials on record that the identity of the members were known to the accused Nos. 2 & 3, or even to PW 2. The picture that emerges is that along with accused No. 1, some persons had come and they had put their thumb impressions in the resolutions in the office chamber of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon. It appears that the PW 2 was working in the office of the Deputy Commissioner since 1963 and he was there in the office of the Deputy Commissioner, Mon all along. It also appears from the statements of PWs 6, 7, 8 & 9, which are almost identical to one another, that the witnesses do not, in any manner, attribute any wrong doing on the part of the accused Nos. 2 & 3. The Deputy Commissioner that they referred to in their statements was one Shri Angami (not an accused), who was holding the post of Deputy Commissioner in 1993 when the PWs 6, 7, 8 & 9 had gone to the office of the Deputy Commissioner to enquire about the fixed deposit account and about non-payment of interest and who reportedly did not show any response to their request to hold meeting of the Trust. It is also not in their statement that the Deputy Commissioners in question had known them personally or was aware of their identity. It is in this context that Mr. John had argued that the circumstances appearing in the case against the Deputy Commissioners in the statement of PW 2 should be taken into consideration, namely, that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 had not taken any steps to ascertain as to whether the loan was properly utilized and as to whether the loan was repaid. John had argued that the circumstances appearing in the case against the Deputy Commissioners in the statement of PW 2 should be taken into consideration, namely, that the accused Nos. 2 & 3 had not taken any steps to ascertain as to whether the loan was properly utilized and as to whether the loan was repaid. These circumstances, according to the petitioner, establish a connection, though remotely, but sufficient to arouse grave suspicion of the complicity of the accused Nos. 2 & 3 to the offences committed. In the considered opinion of the Court, while, at the most, the same may indicate dereliction of duty, it does not lead to a conclusion that ingredients of criminal conspiracy is present. 21. Section 120-A of the Indian Penal Code defines criminal conspiracy. The section reads as under :- 120-A. Definition of criminal conspiracy.--When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done,- (1) an illegal act, or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy: Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof. Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment of an offence of criminal conspiracy. The basic ingredients of the offence of criminal conspiracy are : (i) an agreement between two or more persons; (ii) the agreement must relate to doing or causing to be done either (a) an illegal act; or (b) an act which is not illegal in itself but is done by illegal means. It is, therefore, plain that meeting of minds of two or more persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means is sine qua non of criminal conspiracy. However, conspiracy being what it is, the same is almost invariably shrouded in secrecy and it may not be possible to adduce direct evidence of the common intention of the conspirators. This is where the meeting of the mind of the conspirators can be gathered and inferred from the circumstances laid by the prosecution, if such inference is possible. 22. In Damodar (supra), the Supreme Court had laid down as follows :- 24. This is where the meeting of the mind of the conspirators can be gathered and inferred from the circumstances laid by the prosecution, if such inference is possible. 22. In Damodar (supra), the Supreme Court had laid down as follows :- 24. The aforesaid decisions, weighty as they are, lead us to conclude that to establish a charge of conspiracy knowledge about indulgence in either an illegal act or a legal act by illegal means is necessary. In some cases, intent of unlawful use being made of the goods or services in question may be inferred from the knowledge itself. This apart, the prosecution has not to establish that a particular unlawful use was intended, so long as the goods or service in question could not be put to any lawful use. Finally, when the ultimate offence consists of a chain of actions, it would not be necessary for the prosecution to establish, to bring home the charge of conspiracy, that each of the conspirators had the knowledge of what the collaborator would do, so long as it is known that the collaborator would put the goods or service to an unlawful use. In Esher Singh (supra) also, the Apex Court had reiterated the same principle regarding criminal conspiracy. 23. It had been argued by Mr. John, learned counsel for the petitioner that the trial Court, while passing the impugned order, did not record its reasons for discharging the accused person in an elaborate manner. While it would appear that accused persons were discharged on the ground that there was an amicable agreement between the parties and that the accused Nos. 1 had paid the loan amount taken by him from the Trust with the permission of the Trustees and also through recoveries made out of his immovable/mobile properties, so far as the accused Nos. 2 & 3 are concerned, the learned trial Court had taken a view that they have nothing to do in connection with the case. It also noted that no prima facie case was made out against the accused persons. However, the parties have made elaborate arguments and that is how this Court had perused the materials on record to the limited extent of finding out as to whether the trial Court was justified in discharging the accused persons and as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused persons. However, the parties have made elaborate arguments and that is how this Court had perused the materials on record to the limited extent of finding out as to whether the trial Court was justified in discharging the accused persons and as to whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused persons. It may be that there was a compromise agreement signed by three out of four members. The trial Court had entirely relied on the said document to discharge the accused No. 1. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Devendra Nath Padhi (supra), the trial Court could not have relied on the said document even if the compromise agreement was produced and submitted by the members, more particularly, in view of the fact that except for the offence under Section 420, IPC, other offences were not compoundable. Materials on record do indicate that a prima facie case for trial is made out against the accused No. 1. 24. In respect of the accused Nos. 2 & 3, judged on the touchstone of the guidelines of the Apex Court in respect of consideration of materials at the stage of Sections 227 & 228 of the Code, this Court is of the opinion that from the records of the case and the documents submitted therewith, no sufficient ground for proceeding against the aforesaid two accused persons are made out and, therefore, the discharge order passed by the trial Court with regard to the aforesaid two persons, namely, Shri Anil Chandra Bal and Shri Katikaba Jamir Ao, is maintained. 25. In the result, the petition is partly allowed. The learned trial Court would consider the materials available in the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and would frame appropriate charges in accordance with law. Lower Court records be transmitted to the Court of learned Special Judge/District & Sessions Judge, Dimapur, who on receipt of the records, will pass appropriate orders for framing of charge and completing the trial by a Court of competent jurisdiction.