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2011 DIGILAW 584 (BOM)

Zilo Zo v. State of Goa

2011-05-06

F.M.REIS, S.C.DHARMADHIKARI

body2011
S.C.DHARMADHIKARI, J. :- By this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioners challenge the order dated 4th July, 2005 of the Government of Go a, office of the Executive Engineer, Division IV (Mech-Elec/North), Public Works Department, Goa informing the Assistant Engineer of the Division and Subdivision thereof that the Petitioners would retire on the following dates from the services: Sr. No. Name and Designation (Regular) Date of Retirement 1) Shri. Rauji G. Naik Auto Elect. 28/2/2006 A.N. 2) Shri. Zilo So, Forman (Smithy) 30/6/2006 A.N. 3) Shri. Bhiqui A Sancoalkar, Mech. Gr. II 31/7/2006 A.N. 4) Shri. Devendra Vaingankar –do - 31/10/2006 A.N. 5) Shri. Milagris Fernandes, Painter 31/8/2006 A.N 2. The Petitioners pray that this Court should be pleased to declare that Rule 3 as it stood prior to fourth amendment to Goa Civil Services (Retirement) Rules, 2000 ‘the Goa Rules’ for short) to the extent of reducing the retirement age of the workman to 58 years is beyond the legislative competence of respondent no. 1 and, therefore, its enforcement as against the Petitioners is unconstitutional and violative of the mandate of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, this Court should be pleased to declare that the workman/artisan like the Petitioners are entitled to continue in services till they attain the age of superannuation in terms of Rule 56(b) of the Fundamental Rules. As a consequence of the aforementioned prayers, this Court should issue a writ of Certiorari or Mandamus or any other writ order or direction directing the respondents to pay full back wages for two years to the Petitioners with all accrued retirement benefits. 3. Briefly, the Petitioners state that they are employees working as “workmen” and are appointed by respondent no.1. After setting out the details of their birth dates and nature of their work in paragraph nos.3 and 4, it is stated that in terms of the service conditions, the age of superannuation of the petitioners would have been attained by them from February, 2008 to October, 2008. In other words, they would have retired on attaining the age of 60 years on these dates. The Fundamental Rules 56(a) and (b) would be the applicable rules in so far as the age of superannuation is concerned. 4. In other words, they would have retired on attaining the age of 60 years on these dates. The Fundamental Rules 56(a) and (b) would be the applicable rules in so far as the age of superannuation is concerned. 4. It is stated that since Respondent no.4 served a letter Annexure A to the petition on the Petitioners, they approached him in person and requested him to reconsider the case. The petitioners state that they have followed up the matter persistently with the Authorities and in this behalf, they rely upon the meeting in the office of the Chief Engineer held in December, 2007 wherein he orally informed them that their superannuation orders have been lawfully issued in terms of Rule 3 of the Goa Rules and if they have got a grievance against the action of the respondents, they have to lodge a written complaint. Accordingly, a written representation dated 10th January, 2008 has been lodged requesting the Authorities to reconsider the decision and restore the services with back wages. The Petitioners were informed by letters dated 4th April, 2008 and 30th April, 2008 that their request is rejected in view of Notification No.2/6/94-PER (VOL-I) dated 29-8-2000 and order No.2-6-94-PER Order No.2-6-04 PER Vol (I) dated 5-8-2001. 5. The Petitioners state that although respondent nos.3 and 4 relied on the notification dated 29th August, 2000 and order dated 5th August, 2001, copies thereof were not forwarded and, therefore, the Petitioners by their letter dated 11th June, 2008 requested them to furnish copies of the notification/order. 6. These copies were submitted somewhere in the mid of August, 2008 and it is, therefore, contended that the Petitioners' services are not governed by the Goa Rules as they were employed as Union Territory employees. Prior to Goa becoming a State with effect from 30th May, 1987, it was an Union Territory. Therefore, Union Territory Goa, Daman and Diu being governed by the Central Government terms and conditions and more particularly Fundamental Rules, Rule 56 thereof would apply. It is submitted that although the Union Territory of Go a became State by virtue of The Goa State, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987, (‘the Act of 1987’ for short), the terms and conditions of service as to the age of retirement was regulated by the Fundamental Rules. It is submitted that although the Union Territory of Go a became State by virtue of The Goa State, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987, (‘the Act of 1987’ for short), the terms and conditions of service as to the age of retirement was regulated by the Fundamental Rules. Section 60(6), the proviso thereto of the Act of 1987 have been relied upon by the Petitioners to support their argument that there is an embargo on altering the service conditions of the Petitioners to their disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. However, there is no previous approval before the Goa Rules were applied to the Petitioners and they were superannuated and retired at the age of 58 years. Therefore, the impugned order is illegal. 7. Raising such pleas that the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed. 8. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Petitioners submits that the retirement of the Petitioners is a premature retirement and by relying on alteration/variation of terms and conditions of their services as per the Goa Rules, to the disadvantage of the Petitioners. It is submitted that there is no prior approval obtained by the Respondents from the Central Government. Without such prior approval, there could not have been any a1teration in the terms and conditions of service altering the age of superannuation and, therefore, the retirement at the age of 58 years of the Petitioners, is illegal and unconstitutional. It violates the mandate of Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 9. It is submitted by the learned Advocate for the Petitioners that an Affidavit-in-reply is filed on 20th October, 2008. In that affidavit in paragraph 3, it has been stated by the State Government that the Petitioners were aware of the Rules framed by the Government which were published in the Official Gazette on 29th August, 2000 and the consequent approval dated 30th July, 2001 from the Central Government approving the decision of the State Government reducing the age of superannuation from 60 to 58 years and therefore the impugned order is perfectly legal. Hence, the Petitioners cannot be continued in services till 2008 on the basis of their contention that they would retire at the age of 60 years. Hence, the Petitioners cannot be continued in services till 2008 on the basis of their contention that they would retire at the age of 60 years. Thus, it is contended on behalf of the Petitioners Counsel that the ex-post facto approval allegedly given is no approval in the eyes of law. It is submitted that the petition was amended and the Petitioners have raised several pleas, particularly pointing out that Rules 3 and 4 of the Goa Rules are repugnant to Rule 56(b) of the Fundamental Rules and they are ultra vires under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. It is submitted that Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987 contemplates prior approval and that is a mandatory requirement There is nothing like ex-post facto sanction. Once there is alleged ex-post facto sanction, then, there is no question of the Goa Rules applying to the Petitioners. He submits that it is admitted that alteration or change in the age of retirement from service amounts to change or alteration of terms and conditions of service. Therefore, prior approval of Central Government was necessary. In these circumstances, the letter dated 30th August, 2001 cannot be said to be due compliance with law. 10. Our attention is invited to paragraph 17(E) and 17(F) of the Petition. It is submitted that the Ministry of Home Affairs issued purported letter without seeking concurrence of Ministry of Finance. Therefore, on this count as well, the purported approval is ultra-vires to the Fundamental Rules and illegal. 11. It is contended on behalf of the Petitioners that the contention raised by the State Government in its affidavit that there is gross delay and laches and, therefore, the Petition should be dismissed, has no substance. However, in paragraph nos.8(A) to 8(G) and paragraph no. 9, it is pointed out as to how their case was recommended for extension even after the Goa Rules were purportedly sanctioned. He submits that the Assistant Engineer had specifically recommended on the file that the Petitioners should be continued. His recommendation is available and if the file is called for, it will clear the doubts. On 2nd May, 2007, the recommendations were made. Thus, the Petitioners were following up the matter and it is only in the year 2008 that their representations were rejected. In these circumstances, is submitted that there is no delav or laches m their part in approaching this Court. On 2nd May, 2007, the recommendations were made. Thus, the Petitioners were following up the matter and it is only in the year 2008 that their representations were rejected. In these circumstances, is submitted that there is no delav or laches m their part in approaching this Court. 12. On the other hand, the learned Additional Government Advocate appearing on behalf of Respondent nos. 1 to 4 submitted that the Petition is barred by delay and laches. The Petitioners are guilty of approaching this Court belatedly. They have been retired from service in the year 2006, whereas the Petition has been filed in the year 2008. No relief can be granted to the Petitioners. On merits, it is submitted that this Court in the judgment reported in 2004(2) Goa Law Reporter 273 (Shri. Ramnath Parwatkar Vs. State of Go a and another) so also other Writ Petitions decided on 1st April, 2004 held that assuming this Court was called upon to decide the question whether ex-post facto approval can be granted and even if this Court was to hold in favour of the Petitioners that ex-post facto approval cannot be granted, the Petitioners would be entitled for the monetary relief which according to the Government Affidavit in that matter is the pay and allowances till the date of receiving approval from the Central Government. That could alone be granted. In other words, in that case, the Petitioners were retired in the month of October, 1999. They were granted benefit only till 30th April, 2001 which is the date of ex-post facto sanction/approval. The monetary relief till this date only can be granted and therefore, in the alternative as well, it is submitted that this Court should not grant any relief, but proceed to dismiss the petition. 13. Our attention is invited to Affidavit of Mr. A. Vachasundar, Principal Chief Engineer, Public Works Department, Government of Go a filed in this petition on 20th October, 2008. For all these reasons and relying upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision reported in 1992 (Supplementary) (3) SCC 43 (Chandigarh Administration Vs. Mehar Singh and another), it is submitted that the Petitioners have nowhere stated that they were workmen within the meaning of Sub rule (b) of Fundamental Rule 56 and that rule is not applicable to them. For all these reasons and relying upon the Hon'ble Supreme Court decision reported in 1992 (Supplementary) (3) SCC 43 (Chandigarh Administration Vs. Mehar Singh and another), it is submitted that the Petitioners have nowhere stated that they were workmen within the meaning of Sub rule (b) of Fundamental Rule 56 and that rule is not applicable to them. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of AIR 1965 SC 136 (N. Raghvendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner and others). Finally, the learned Additional Government Advocate relied on the Division Bench judgment in W.P. No.377/2002 (Keshav K. Parab Vs. Executive Engineer and others) dated 21st February, 2011) to which one of us (F.M. Reis, 1.) is a party. It is submitted that the controversy stands concluded by the Division Bench judgment in the case of Ramnath Parwatkar (supra) and Keshav K. Parab (supra). For all these reasons, it is submitted that the Petition be dismissed. 14. With the assistance of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties, we have perused the Petition and all Annexures thereof so also the Affidavits filed on record. We have perused the relevant statutory provisions. We have also perused the decisions which have been brought to our notice by the Counsel appearing for the parties. 15. Fundamental Rule 56(b) which is relied upon by the Counsel reads thus: “Rule 56(b) - A workman who is governed by these rules shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of sixty years.” 16. Bare perusal thereof, indicates that the employees, who are styled as workmen would attain the age of superannuation at 60 years, when, Fundamental Rules are applicable to employees of the Central Government. It is not disputed before us that they would apply to the Petitioners, who are the employees recruited by the erstwhile Union Territory of Go a, Daman and Diu Administration. There is no substance in the contention of Respondent nos. 1 to 4 that the Petitioners have not satisfied the condition of being “workmen” so as to attract the Fundamental Rule 56(b). It must be stated straightway that the Additional Government Advocate raised this plea although such stand is not taken in the Affidavit-in-reply. The Petitioners have stated in the Petition that they are appointed as workmen by Respondent no. 1 to 4 that the Petitioners have not satisfied the condition of being “workmen” so as to attract the Fundamental Rule 56(b). It must be stated straightway that the Additional Government Advocate raised this plea although such stand is not taken in the Affidavit-in-reply. The Petitioners have stated in the Petition that they are appointed as workmen by Respondent no. 1 on different dates in different categories and this is pointed out in paragraph No.4 of the Petition. The Petitioners have, after setting out their dates of birth, stated so and there are no denials of the statements and averments in paragraph nos.3 and 4 of the Petition. Further, the Affidavit-in-reply proceeds on the basis that the Petitioners are the employees/workmen recruited by the erstwhile Union Territory of Goa, Daman and Diu Administration and consequent upon Goa becoming a State by virtue of the Act of 1987, their terms and conditions of Service will be governed by the Goa Rules. This is the factual basis on which the affidavit proceeds. It is not open for Respondent nos.1 to 4 to now argue that the Petitioners are not workmen and, therefore, Fundamental Rules are inapplicable to them. 17. Equally, untenable and unacceptable is the stand of Respondent nos. I to 4 that the Petition is barred by delay and laches. True that the petition is filed on 30th September, 2008. True that the Petitioners have been retired from services by the State from February, 2006 to October, 2006 respectively. However, each of the Petitioners had approached the Assistant Engineer despite receipt of the notice/order of retirement and requested that they be continued in service till they attain the age of 60 years and in terms of their date of birth that would be in the year 2008. Now, the statement made in the Petition namely the recommendation of the Assistant Engineer and the file being put up through proper channel to Superintending Engineer and Chief Engineer by the State Government has not been denied. The averment that the Petitioners were called upon to make representation which they made and, therefore, the order came to be passed thereon rejecting the same on 4th April, 2008 is undisputed. The averment that the Petitioners were called upon to make representation which they made and, therefore, the order came to be passed thereon rejecting the same on 4th April, 2008 is undisputed. Further, the Petitioners' request seeking copy of the notifications dated 29th August, 2000 and order dated 5th January, 2001 being complied with only in the mid of August, 2008 is also not dealt with, leave alone denied. When, all these statements and averments in the Petition are not denied and if the Petitioners were to continue in service till the year 2008, then, in the peculiar facts of this case, it cannot be said that the Petition is barred by delay and laches. Even otherwise, at the most, this is an aspect which will have some bearing on the relief to be granted to the Petitioners. This aspect will be considered later in this judgment. However, it cannot be said that the Petition is barred by delay and laches in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. The second contention of the learned Additional Government Advocate must also, therefore, fail. 18. Then, reliance is placed on Annexure E-1 to the Petition, which is a copy of notice, Ministry of Home Affairs. The same reads thus: New Delhi, the 30th July, 2001. To The Chief Secretary, Govt. of Goa, Panaji. Subject : Goa State Civil Service (Retirement) Rules, 2000 -ex-post-facto approval of Central Government to alter the age of retirement from 60 years to 58 years. 1 am directed to refer to your D.O. Letter no.2/6/94-PER (Vol-I) dated 10-42001 on the subject mention above and to convey ex-post-facto approval of the Central Government under the proviso to Section 60(6) of the Goa Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act, 1987, to alter the age of retirement from 60 years to 58 years in respect of all categories of employees including teachers and other teaching staff, except Group 0 employees. Yours faithfully, sd/ (Taradatt) Director 19. It is, therefore, submitted that the Goa Rules would apply. It is submitted that these Rules have come into force with effect from 31st December, 2000 (a.n.). It is submitted that except as otherwise provided in these Rules, every Government Servant including a Workman/ Artisan shall retire from the service in the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 58 years. It is submitted that these Rules have come into force with effect from 31st December, 2000 (a.n.). It is submitted that except as otherwise provided in these Rules, every Government Servant including a Workman/ Artisan shall retire from the service in the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of 58 years. Rules 3 and 4 read thus: “3. Retirement of Government Servants(1) Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, every Government servant including workman/artisan shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the month in which he attains the age of fifty eight years: Provided that a Government servant whose date of birth is the first of a month, shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of fifty eight years. (2) No Government servant shall be granted extension in service beyond the age of retirement of fifty eight years. Provided that a specialist in medical or scientific fields may be granted extension of service upto the age of sixty years if such extension is in public interest and the grounds for such extension are recorded in writing: Provided further that the appropriate authority shall have the right to terminate the extension by giving notice in writing of not less than one month or pay an allowances in lieu of such notice. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in public interest so to do, have the absolute right to retire any Government servant by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice, (i) if he is in Group ‘A’ or Group ‘B’ service or post in a substantive, or temporary capacity and had entered Government Service before attaining the age of35 years, after he has attained the age of 50 years; (ii) in any other case, after he has attained the age of fifty five years. (4) (i) If on a review of the case, either on a representation from the Government servant retired prematurely or otherwise, it is decided to reinstate the Government servant in service, the authority ordering reinstatement may regulate the intervening period between the date of premature retirement and the date of reinstatement by the grant of leave of any kind due and admissible, including extraordinary leave, or by treating it as dies-non depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case: Provided that the intervening period shall be treated as a period spent on duty for all purposes including, pay and allowances, if it is specifically held by the authority ordering reinstatement that the premature retirement was itself not justified in the circumstances of the case, or, if the order of premature retirement is set aside by a Court of Law. (ii) Where the order of premature retirement is set aside by a Court of Law with specific directions in regard to regulation of the period between the date of premature retirement and the date of reinstatement and no further appeal is proposed to be filed, the aforesaid period shall be regulated in accordance with the directions of the Court. (5) (i) Any Government servant may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire from service after he has attained the age of fifty years if he is in Group ‘A’ or Group 'B' service or post (and had entered Government service before attaining the age of thirty five years) and in all other cases, after he has attained the age of fifty five years: Provided that, it shall be open to the appropriate authority to withhold permission to a Government servant under suspension who seeks to retire under this sub-rule. (ii) A Government servant may make a request in writing to the appropriate authority to accept notice of less than three months, giving reasons therefor. (ii) A Government servant may make a request in writing to the appropriate authority to accept notice of less than three months, giving reasons therefor. (iii) On receipt of a request under clause (ii) of sub-rule (5) above, the appropriate authority may consider such request for the curtailment of the period of notice of three months on merits and if it is satisfied that the curtailment of the period of notice will not cause any administrative inconvenience, the appropriate authority may relax the requirement of notice of three months on the condition that the Government servant shall not apply for commutation of a part of his pension before the expiry of the period of notice of three months. (iv) A Government servant, who has elected to retire under this rule and has given the necessary intimation to that effect to the appropriate authority, shall be precluded from withdrawing his election subsequently except with the specific approval of such authority: Provided that the request for withdrawal shall be within the intended date of his retirement. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-rule (5) above, the appropriate authority shall, if it is of the opinion that it is in the public interest to do so, have the absolute right to retire a Government servant in Group 'c' service or post who is not governed by any pension rules, after he has completed thirty years service by giving him notice of not less than three months in writing or three months pay and allowances in lieu of such notice. (7) A Government servant in Group ‘C’ service or post who is not governed by any pension rules, may, by giving notice of not less than three months in writing to the appropriate authority, retire from service after he has completed thirty years service. 4. Cessation and Saving. - (1) On and from the date of coming into force of these Rules, the provisions of F.R.56 shall cease to apply to all the employees in Group ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts under Government of Goa. 4. Cessation and Saving. - (1) On and from the date of coming into force of these Rules, the provisions of F.R.56 shall cease to apply to all the employees in Group ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘D’ posts under Government of Goa. (2) Notwithstanding such cessation, anything done or any action taken including any order made, direction given or notice issued under the provisions of said F.R. 56, shall in so far as it is not inconsistent with these Rules, be deemed to have been done, taken, made, given or issued as the case may be, within the corresponding provisions of these Rules. NOTE 1 - The three months notice referred to in sub-rules (3), (5), (6) and (7) of Rule 3, may be given before the Government servant attains the age specified in sub-rules (3) and (5) or has completed 30 years of service in respect of cases specified in sub-rules (6) and (7), provided that the retirement take place after he has attained the specified age or has completed 30 years service, as the case may be. NOTE 2 - In computing the notice period of three months referred in these Rules, date of service of the notice and the date of its expiry shall be excluded. NOTE 3 - A Government servant, including a workman/artisan, who is granted extension of service, after he has attained the age of superannuation, shall not be promoted to another post during the period of extension. NOTE 4 - The date on which a Government servant attains the age of fifty eight years shall be determined with reference to the date of birth declared by the Government servant at the time of appointment and accepted by the appropriate authority on production, as far as possible, of confirmatory documentary evidence, such as, High School or Higher Secondary or Secondary School Certificate or extracts from birth register. The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not be subject to any alteration except as specified in this note. The date of birth so declared by the Government servant and accepted by the appropriate authority shall not be subject to any alteration except as specified in this note. An alteration of date of birth of a Government servant can be made, with the sanction of the appropriate authority if – (i) a request in this regard is made within five years of his entry into Government service; (ii) it is clearly established that genuine bonafide mistake has occurred; and (iii) the date of birth so altered would not make him ineligible to appear in any School or University or Goa Public Service Commission examination in which he has appeared, or for entry into Government service on the date on which he first appeared at such examination or on the date on which he entered Government service. NOTE 5 - A Government servant whose date of birth is the first of a month shall retire from service on the afternoon of the last day of the preceding month on attaining the age of fifty eight years.” 20. Bare perusal of these Rules would indicate that they have been made in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India by the Government of Go a, Department of Personnel. Reliance is also placed on the notification dated 23rd March, 2007 which amends Rule 3 of the Goa Rules by inserting subrule 1 below Rule 3 and once again making the age of retirement as 60 years. It is submitted that these Rules have been made in terms of the power conferred by Section 60 of the Act of 1987. 21. A Division Bench of this Court to which one of us (S. C. Dharmadhikari, J.) was a party in the case of Chandra has D. Chodankar Vs. State of Goa and others-W.P. 235/2001 decided on 29th July/1st August, 2008 and reported in 2008(6) Bombay Cases Reporter 789 had an occasion to consider the ambit and scope of the Act of 1987 and particularly Sections 59 and 60 thereunder and in that context this is what is observed in paragraph nos.28 to 32. They read thus: “28. The Goa Reorganisation Act is an Act providing for the reorganization of the Union territory of Go a, Daman and Diu for matters connected therewith. They read thus: “28. The Goa Reorganisation Act is an Act providing for the reorganization of the Union territory of Go a, Daman and Diu for matters connected therewith. Part II of the same deals with reorganisation of the Union Territory of Go a, Daman and Diu. Section 3 deals with formation of State of Goa and section 4 provides for formation of Union Territory of Daman and Diu. The Constitution of India is amended to the extent indicated in section 5. Part III provides for Representation in the Legislatures. Part IV provides for High Court. Part V deals with authorisation of expenditure and distribution of revenues. Part VI deals with assets and liabilities. We may not refer to these provisions, in details, as they are not relevant for the present petition. 29. Part VII makes provision with regard to arrangements, corporations and inter-state agreements. Then comes section VIII, which contains provisions as to services. Section 59 makes provision relating to All India Services and defines the expression “State Cadre”. The strength and composition of the cadre of Goa shall, on and from the appointed day, be such as is determined by the Central Government in consultation with the State Government. Section 59(3) and (4) read thus: “(3) The members of each of the said Services borne on the Union territories cadre immediately before the appointed day shall continue to be in the cadre of the same service of the Union territory in which they stand allocated before the appointed day. (4) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the operation, on or after the appointed day, of the All India Services Act, 1951, or the rules made thereunder, in relation to the State cadre of the said services and in relation to the members of those services borne on the said cadres.” A bare perusal of the same would indicate that the services of the members of Union territory cadre which are in force immediately before the appointed day have been continued in the same cadre and the same services in the Union territory are allocated to the Goa State. The section is not affecting anything prior to the appointed day, including operation of All India Services Act, 1951 or Rules made thereunder in relation to the cadre of the said services. The section is not affecting anything prior to the appointed day, including operation of All India Services Act, 1951 or Rules made thereunder in relation to the cadre of the said services. It is apparent that the Legislature was aware of the extension of cadre of Union territory and while granting independent power to the State Government to determine its own strength and composition as far as services are concerned, did not affect the provisions and services hitherto under the control of the Union territory. 30. This becomes apparent if one peruses section 60 of the Reorganisation Act. Subsection (1) thereof mandates that every person employed in connection with the affairs of the Union territory or the State of Goa and serving, immediately before the appointed day in the district of Goa of the existing Union territory shall, on and from that day continue to serve in connection with the affairs of the Sate of Go a and be deemed to be provisionally allotted to serve in connection with the affairs of the said State. Deputations were excluded from the purview of section 60(1)(b). Sub-section (2) provides that the Central Government shall determine by general or special order, whether every person referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 60 shall be finally allotted for service in the State of Go a or under the Union in connection with the affairs of the Union territory of Go a, Daman and Diu or not and sub-section (3) of section 60 provides for consequence of final allotment by the Central Government to the State of Goa. Further consequences of final allotment are provided in sub-section (4) and sub-section (5). Further consequences of final allotment are provided in sub-section (4) and sub-section (5). Sub-section (6) of section 60 has been pressed into service and it reads thus: “Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect, on or after the appointed day, the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Go a or the Union: Provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval the Central Government.” A bare perusal of the same would indicate that Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution in relation to the determination of the conditions of service of persons serving in connection with the affairs of the State of Go a or the Union remain unaffected after the appointed day. While continuing various conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in section 60(1) or section 60(2), the Legislature has ensured that such conditions shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. 31. Then comes sub-section (7) which provides that all services prior to the appointed day rendered by a person allotted under sub-section (2) in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory shall for purposes of the rules regarding his conditions of service, be deemed to have been rendered in connection with the affairs of the State or the Union to which he is finally allotted. 32. Section 61 reads thus: “61. Provisions as to continuance of officers in the same posts. 32. Section 61 reads thus: “61. Provisions as to continuance of officers in the same posts. - Every person who immediately before the appointed day is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory shall continue to hold the same post or office and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed on the same terms and conditions of appointment and on the same tenure to that post or office by the Government of, or the other appropriate authority, in the State of Go a or of the Union, as the case may be: Provided that nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Competent Authority, on or after the appointed day, from passing in relation to such person any order affecting his continuance in such post or office.” A bare perusal of section 61 would indicate that every person, who immediately before the appointed day, is holding or discharging the duties of any post or office in connection with the affairs of the existing Union territory, shall continue to hold the same post or office and shall be deemed, on and from that day, to have been duly appointed on the same terms and conditions of appointment and on the same tenure to that post or office by the Government of, or the other appropriate authority, in the State of Goa or of the Union, as the case may be.” 22. Thus, Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987 which has been pressed into service, clarifies that nothing in Section 60 shall be deemed to affect on or after the appointed date, the operation of the provisions of Chapter I of Part XIV of the Constitution of India in relation to determination of conditions of service of persons serving in connection with affairs of the State of Goa or Union, provided that the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred in sub-section 1 and 2 shal1 not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government. In the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 747 (Mysore State and Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg) referred in AIR 1977 SC 1233 (Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal Vs. In the decision reported in AIR 1977 SC 747 (Mysore State and Road Transport Corporation Vs. Mirja Khasim Ali Beg) referred in AIR 1977 SC 1233 (Krishan Murari Lal Sehgal Vs. State of Punjab), the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that the term ‘previous approval’ does not contemplate subsequent ratification. This decision construes Section 115(7) of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956. That provision is identical to Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987. Paragraph nos.12 to 14 of Krishan Murari's case read thus: “12. We are unable to appreciate the above line of reasoning of the High Court. Section 116(1) is very clear. To concretise the appellant's case in terms of Section 116(1), it is sufficient to state that the appellant who, immediately before the appointed day, was holding the post of an Assistant in the former State of Pepsu, shall continue to hold the same post in the new State of Punjab and shall be deemed as from that day to have been duly appointed to such post by the Government of Punjab. We are not concerned in the instant case about the appointment being deemed to be made by “other appropriate authority” in the State of Punjab since the appellant had been appointed by the Rajpramukh of Pepsu which is equivalent to the State Government of Pepsu and the coordinate authority in the new State of Punjab is the Governor of Punjab. The argument that in the new State of Punjab the Financial Commissioner (Revenue) is the appropriate authority for appointing Assistants is absolutely irrelevant in the context of Section 116(1) which enables the status quo ante to continue except where the post ceases to exist under the provisions of the Act. It is also important to bear in mind the provisions of Section 115(7) of the Act where under the proviso thereto "the conditions of service applicable immediately before the appointed day to the case of any person referred to in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) shall not be varied to his disadvantage except with the previous approval of the Central Government”. 13. One of the conditions of service of the appellant was that having been appointed by the State Government of Pepsu he could be only dismissed by the State Government of Pepsu if he had continued there. 13. One of the conditions of service of the appellant was that having been appointed by the State Government of Pepsu he could be only dismissed by the State Government of Pepsu if he had continued there. Under Section 116 when he is integrated in the new State of Punjab he carries with him that condition of service with regard to his termination of employment and it cannot be varied to his disadvantage under Section 115(7) of the Act except with the previous approval of the Central Government. (See Takhatray Shivdatray Mankad Vs. State of Gujarat, (1970)1 SCR 244 and Bholanath 1. Thakur Vs. State of Saurashtra, AIR 1954 SC 680 ) No such approval of the Central Government in the instant case is produced before us. It is, therefore, clear that an authority subordinate to the Governor of Punjab was not competent to pass the order of dismissal of the appellant. 14. Mr. Sharma submits that the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service Class III) Rules, 1957, are applicable in the instant case. Therefore, under Rule 4 thereof the Financial Commissioner is the appointing authority for Assistants, the category to which the appellant belongs. He adds that even though these Rules may be disadvantageous to the appellant he cannot complain on account of the approval of these Rules by the Central Government under Section 115(7) of the Act. Mr. Sharma submits that these Rules received the approval of the Central Government as will appear from the general circular dated May 11, 1957, to all the State Governments. He further submits that in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Deputy Commissioner, South Kanara, Mangalore (1964)7 SCR 549 = ( AIR 1965 SC 136 ) and in a recent decision in Mohammad Shujat Ali Vs. Union of India (1975)1 SCR 449 = ( AIR 1974 SC 1631 ) this Court referred to that circular of May 11, 1957, and held that circular amounted to general approval under the proviso to Section 115(7) of the Act. We are, however, unable to see how this memorandum of May II, 1957, can be called in aid as “previous approval” under Section 115(7) of the Act when the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service Class III) Rules, 1957 were already promulgated on February 28, 1957. Approval under Section 115(7) is previous approval and not subsequent ratification. We are, however, unable to see how this memorandum of May II, 1957, can be called in aid as “previous approval” under Section 115(7) of the Act when the Punjab Financial Commissioner's Office (State Service Class III) Rules, 1957 were already promulgated on February 28, 1957. Approval under Section 115(7) is previous approval and not subsequent ratification. The above decisions, therefore, do not come to the aid of the respondent.” (emphasis supplied) 23. This decision is a complete answer to the argument of the learned Additional Government Advocate. His reliance on the decision in the case of N. Raghvendra Rao (supra) is, therefore, misplaced because in the subsequent decision, the Supreme Court has clarified that when the term is ‘previous approval’, the question of subsequent ratification does not arise and that will not assist the Authorities in any manner. The view taken in this decision has been followed subsequently and in this behalf, reliance placed by Shri. Supekar on the decision reported in 1986 (Supplementary) SCC 584 (T. R. Kapoor and other Vs. State of Haryana and others is apposite. In paragraph 12 of the said decision, the Supreme Court reiterates the view that conditions of the service can be altered only with the previous approval. In the present case also there is nothing on record to indicate that the State sought previous approval of the Central Government when it brought into effect the Goa Rules. Admittedly, there is no previous approval on record. In L.I.C. of India Vs. Escorts Ltd. reported in AIR 1986 se 1370, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the distinction between the terms “Previous Permission”, the terms “Approval” and “Permission” and the term “Permission” simpliciter. (See paras 63 to 65) (Page 1402-1404). 24. Once again, reliance on the decision reported in (1997)6 SCC 771 in Paira Lal Vs. State of Punjab and another is appropriate. In paragraph nos.10 and 11 of this decision, the Supreme Court holds that : “10. The point arising before us has been dealt with previously by three Constitution Benches of this Court, which, unfortunately, were not placed before the High Court. The first of these decisions is the one in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Dy. Commr. In paragraph nos.10 and 11 of this decision, the Supreme Court holds that : “10. The point arising before us has been dealt with previously by three Constitution Benches of this Court, which, unfortunately, were not placed before the High Court. The first of these decisions is the one in N. Raghavendra Rao Vs. Dy. Commr. In that case, the State to which the employee was allotted relied upon a letter of “general approval” issued by the Central Government dated 11-5-1957 (Memorandum No.S.O. SR DI-I,APM-57) which was communicated to all States on reorganisation. It was said in that letter that certain conditions of service enumerated therein in respect of allotted employees are not protected. This Court held that the words “previous approval” in the proviso Section 115(7), would include the “general approval” granted by the Central Government in regard to the variation of the conditions of service of the allotted personnel. The said memorandum of the Central Government says that the Central Government is permitting the States to whom the employees are allotted, to vary their conditions of service in respect of “travelling allowance”, discipline, control, classification, appeal, conduct, probation and departmental promotion. The other conditions of service as applicable to the employee in his parent State remained protected. It was held in the facts of the case that certain rules of 1959 made after 1-11-1956 by the State to which the employee was allotted, modifying certain benefits of service and increments were valid. The contention that "previous approval" meant specific previous approval and not a general approval was rejected. The above decision was followed by another Constitution Bench of this Court in N. Subba Rao Vs. Union of India (see SCC para 38 at P.872-83). The matter came up again before another Constitution Bench of this Court in Mohd. Shujat Ali Vs. Union of India. It was held (see paras 16 to 18, pp.96-100) that the view taken in N. Raghavendra case was to be followed. 11. It will be noticed that the memorandum of the Central Government dated 11-5-1957 which was communicated to all the States gave “general approval” for variation of certain specific conditions of service to which we have referred above. The said memorandum does not refer to the “age of superannuation” as one of the conditions of service for the variation of which general approval is given by the Central Government. The said memorandum does not refer to the “age of superannuation” as one of the conditions of service for the variation of which general approval is given by the Central Government. Neither in the courts below, nor before us, was any order of the Central Government issued in exercise of powers under the proviso to Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 relied upon by the respondent to say that the State of Punjab while prescribing 58 years as the age of superannuation for “Constables” had obtained approval of the Central Government either generally or specifically. There is no dispute before us that the age of retirement is a “condition of service” and that the age of retirement in PEPSU for Class IV employees including “Constables” was 60 years. Inasmuch as there is no previous or general approval after 1-11-1956 to vary the age of superannuation from 60 years to 58 years, it was not open to the Superintendent of Police, Punjab to retire the appellant on completion of 58 years. The high Court erred in law in not noticing the above authorities and statutory provisions and in applying the age of superannuation applicable to Constable recruited in the State of Punjab. The unreported judgment of this Court .n Secy. To Govt Vs. Niranjan Singh above-referred to is also in favour of the appellant and is consistent with the view taken in the above rulings of the Constitution Bench. 25. Thus, all the earlier decisions have been considered and the consistent view of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has been that if the age of retirement is a condition of service and that the age of retirement of employees such as workmen in this case is 60 years and if on 1st November, 1956 there is no previous or general approval to vary the age of superannuation, then, the authorities cannot retire the employees/workmen like the Petitioners on completion of 58 years of service. 26. It may be that the argument in that case was that the requirement is satisfied with the previous or general approval. However, when the Supreme Court holds that the requirement is of previous approval and that is the view taken in several decisions, then, based on this observation, it cannot be held that the requirement is satisfied because of ex-post facto sanction dated 30th July, 2001. However, when the Supreme Court holds that the requirement is of previous approval and that is the view taken in several decisions, then, based on this observation, it cannot be held that the requirement is satisfied because of ex-post facto sanction dated 30th July, 2001. In all cases before the Supreme Court, the approval was prior or previous. The only argument was that it is not specific and qua every term and condition of service. That has been negatived by holding that a previous general approval is in tune with the requirement of Section 115(7) of the State Reorganisation Act, 1956. In our case, the Goa Rules are effective from 2000 but the approval is subsequent thereto and from 30th July, 2001. It is not the case of the respondents that the ex-post facto sanction of the Central Government under Section 60(6) of the Act 1987 to alter the age of retirement from 60 years to 58 years in respect of the categories of employees including the teachers and other teaching staff could be termed as Previous or Prior General Approval. Group D employees are superannuated on attaining the age of 60 years and that is clear from perusal of the notification framing the Goa Rules as amended by the further notification published in the Government of Goa extraordinary gazette dated 30th May, 2006 making amendment to Rule 3 of the Goa Rules. [See Rule 3(i) Subrule (1) as inserted by the first proviso of these Amendment Rules.] That is also clarified from the further notification dated 23rd March, 2007. Therefore, ex-post facto approval is restricted to all categories of employees including teachers and other teaching staff except Group D employees. 27. In any event, para 11 of the decision in Paira Lal will have to be read in its entirety. Once, the law laid down is that approval must be prior, then, there is no question of the age of retirement being altered to the disadvantage of the Petitioners by Respondent nos. 1 to 4. That it has been so altered, it is undisputed. In such circumstances, the impugned letter/order dated 4th July, 2005 cannot be sustained. 28. Reliance placed by the learned Additional Government Advocate on the Division Bench orders and decision ofthis Court is totally misplaced. 1 to 4. That it has been so altered, it is undisputed. In such circumstances, the impugned letter/order dated 4th July, 2005 cannot be sustained. 28. Reliance placed by the learned Additional Government Advocate on the Division Bench orders and decision ofthis Court is totally misplaced. In Ramnath Parwatkar's case (supra), the Division Bench merely reproduced Rule 56 of the Fundamental Rules and Section 60(6) of the Act of I 987. However, relying on the statements made in the Affidavit filed in that case, the learned Judges did not decide the controversy. They rested their conclusion on the statements made in the Affidavit of the State and without in any manner deciding the issue of “previous approval of the Central Government.” Even the Petitioners in that case did not press their challenge, but accepted the monetary reliefs. This order is, therefore, clearly based on the statements in the Affidavit filed by the State Government and concession given by the Petitioners before this Court. Similarly, before the Division Bench deciding Keshav Parab's case in Writ Petition No.377/2002 (Supra), the Division Bench to which one of us F. M. Reis, J. was a party noted the contentions of both sides, but without deciding the larger controversy and placing reliance on the decision in the case of Ramnath Parwatkar ( Supra) gave the monetary relief. Perusal of the judgment particularly, paragraphs 5 and 6, shows that Keshav Parab's case is no different from Ramnath Parwatkar's case. Therefore, these judgments cannot be said to be laying down any binding principle. The Rule of Precedents, namely, any disagreement with the view of a Co-ordinate Bench necessitates a Reference to a Larger Bench does not hold good in this case. There is no necessity, therefore, of any Reference to Larger Bench in this case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgments bind us as they cover identical controversy. 29. The judgment relied upon by the State on the point of delay including the latest judgment reported in (2010)3 SCC 616 (Ash ok Kumar Das Vs. University of Burdwan) is inapplicable on facts. In the said judgment, the provision was not identical to one as Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987. Therefore, this decision is clearly distinguishable. 30. The reliance placed on the decision of Harwindra Kumar Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam reported in (2005)13 SCC 300 and in the case of U. P. Jal Nigam Vs. In the said judgment, the provision was not identical to one as Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987. Therefore, this decision is clearly distinguishable. 30. The reliance placed on the decision of Harwindra Kumar Vs. U.P. Jal Nigam reported in (2005)13 SCC 300 and in the case of U. P. Jal Nigam Vs. Jaswant Singh and (2006)11 SCC 464 is once again misplaced because no stand has been taken in the Affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State Government that the Petitioners have acquiesced in any manner or have consented to the position similar to the one taken in the case of Harvindra Kumar that the retirement dues were collected and the Petitioners stood by and collected them without any complaint or grievance being made. Therefore, there is difference between mere delay and delay amounting to laches. There is no case of laches made out. The facts were gross in the Jal Nigam's case. Huge number of employees approached the Court and sought such reliefs creating financial burden on the State Government. In the instant case, there is no such apprehension because we clarify that the reliefs given are restricted to the Petitioners in this case. The relief has been appropriately modified and has not been granted in terms of the prayers in the Petition. In fact, equity has been balanced sufficiently by us. 31. In these circumstances, we are of the opinion that the action of Respondent nos. 1 to 4 in retiring the Petitioners at the age of 58 years cannot be sustained. The same is contrary to Section 60(6) of the Act of 1987 and violates the mandate of Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. The Petitioners are, therefore, entitled to continue in services of the State Government till they attain the age of superannuation i.e. 60 years. Therefore, each of the Petitioners shall be held as retired from services with effect from the date on which they attain the age of 60 years and on the basis of the last day of the month in which they attain the age of 60 years. However, we find that the Petitioners had been retired in the year 2006. They were following up the matters with the authorities and moved the Court only on 30th September, 2008. However, we find that the Petitioners had been retired in the year 2006. They were following up the matters with the authorities and moved the Court only on 30th September, 2008. While it is true that they could have continued in services till the age of 60 years i.e. till the year 2008, but the record indicates that they have been retired in the year 2006 in terms of the impugned letter at Annexure A to the Petition. We find that they have approached this Court only in the month of September, 2008. Although we find that they could have been continued in services till the year 2008, but they having taken no steps from 2006 to 2008 except relying on the representations and assurances given to them and awaiting fate of their written complaints, interest of justice would be served by directing that each of the Petitioners would be entitled to retirement benefits from the date of filing of the Petition namely 30th September, 2008. The Authorities are directed to compute and calculate the retirement benefits by fixing their salary as if they had continued in service till the date they attained the age of 60 years, but the retirement benefits shall be released only from the date of filing of the Writ Petition. The benefits including the arrears be released within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order. Rule is made absolute in these terms but without any order as to costs. Petition allowed