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2011 DIGILAW 586 (MP)

State of Madhya Pradesh v. Union of India

2011-05-11

BRIJ KISHORE DUBE, S.K.GANGELE

body2011
ORDER S.K. Gangele, J. 1. Though Respondent No. 2 has been served, no body has filed power on behalf of Respondent. Shri Yogesh Chaturvedi, Advocate, appeared on behalf of Respondent No. 2 and he argued upto some length. Thereafter, he submitted that Respondent No. 2 wants to file reply. However, from record it transpires that Respondent No. 2 deliberately has not filed reply though notice was served on him on 24.01.2011. In our opinion, this has deliberately been done to delay the decision of the petition. Looking to the nature of the case that detention of Respondent No. 2 under the National security Act, 1980 has been cancelled by the Union of India vide impugned order, Annexure P-1, hence, petition has been heard and disposed of finally. 2. Petitioners have filed this petition against the order dated 08.12.2009, Annexure P-1, passed by the Union of India. 3. District Magistrate, Gwalior passed a detention order of Respondent No. 2 under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980, hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of 1980'. It has been mentioned in the order that he is satisfied that the activities of Respondent No. 2 are prejudicial to maintenance of supplies and services essential to the community, hence, detention of Respondent No. 2 is necessary under the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act of 1980 and the grounds of detention are mentioned in the order dated 13.10.2009, Annexure P-2. It has been mentioned in the order that Respondent No. 2 was in the business of manufacturing synthetic Ghee in the factory, named, as Hind Dairy and Food Products, B-58, Industrial Area, Maharajpura, District Gwalior and due to the aforesaid act of the Respondent No. 2 there was danger to the health of the resident consumers. It has further been mentioned that no body was willing to lodge report against Respondent No. 2 because he had created terror and fear in the area. It has further been mentioned that no body was willing to lodge report against Respondent No. 2 because he had created terror and fear in the area. Respondent No. 2 had earned huge money from the aforesaid business and raids were conducted on number of times at the factory premises of Respondent No. 2 and samples were taken and sent to State Food Laboratory, Bhopal and the samples of Ghee seized from the factory premises of Respondent No. 2 were found adulterated / synthetic and he had been continuously manufacturing synthetic Ghee, due to which there was danger to the health of the society and looking to possible unrest and Law and Order problem detention of Respondent No. 2 is necessary. 4. It has further been stated in the grounds of detention that due to synthetic Ghee the health of the citizens had been adversely affected. Respondent No. 2 was manufacturing synthetic Ghee in the name of 'Shri Anmol' and 'Gwala-Shri' brands and samples were sent in November 2008 to State Food Laboratory, Bhopal, where it was found below-standard and synthetic Ghee and the District Magistrate vide order dated 15.10.2008 found Respondent No. 2 guilty under Section 188 IPC. 5. It has further been stated that on 03.10.2009 the District Administration inspected the factory premises, Hind Dairy and Food Products, Industrial Area, Maharajpura of Respondent No. 2 and in the inspection 8380 liters of synthetic Ghee was found. Thereafter, samples had been taken and they were sent for analysis to State Food Laboratory, Bhopal and a case under Sections 420 and 188 IPC was also registered against him. The samples of Anmol Brand sent to State Food Laboratory for analysis were found below standard. The Respondent No. 2 was also convicted in a Criminal Case No. 327/95 by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sheopur vide order dated 13.01.2005 and awarded a sentence of one years imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 300/-. In another case, Criminal Case No. 10/95 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sheopur vide order dated 13.01.1995 imposed a sentence of one year's imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 300/-. 300/-. In another case, Criminal Case No. 10/95 the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sheopur vide order dated 13.01.1995 imposed a sentence of one year's imprisonment with a fine of Rs. 300/-. It has further been observed that Respondent No. 2 had been continuously doing the business of manufacturing synthetic Ghee, hence, the detention of Respondent No. 2 under the provisions of the Act of 1980 was necessary and the Chief Medical and Health Officer, Gwalior also recommended vide letter dated 12.10.2009 for taking action against Respondent No. 2 under Section 3(2) of the Act of 1980. The Collector also recorded statements of Mr. R.K. Joshi, Mr. Vimal Kulshrestha and Mr. Dharmendra Soni and the witnesses deposed that Respondent No. 2 was in the business of manufacturing synthetic Ghee and he had earned crores of rupees from the aforesaid business. After passing of the detention order Respondent No. 2 had been absconding. 6. Respondent No. 2 submitted a representation before the Union of India under Section 14 of the Act of 1980 and under the aforesaid section the Union of India revoked the detention order of Respondent No. 2. It has only been mentioned in the order of revocation that after careful consideration of the representation the order has been passed. 7. Learned Counsel for Petitioners submitted that no opportunity of hearing was given to the State before revocation of the order of detention of Respondent No. 2 and no reasons have been assigned by the Union of India in revocation of the order of detention. Hence, the order impugned order is bad in law. 8. Contrary to this, learned Assistant Solicitor General, appearing on behalf of the Union of India, has submitted that after considering various provisions of the Act and representation of Respondent No. 2 the Union of India has passed the order of revocation. It is in accordance with law. 9. As per the grounds of detention, mentioned briefly above in the order, there are serious allegations against Respondent No. 2 in regard to his involvement in manufacture of synthetic Ghee. It has been contended that the Respondent No. 2 was involved in the aforesaid business for quite a long time and number of raids were conducted at his factory premises and he was also convicted and sentenced by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sheopur. It has been contended that the Respondent No. 2 was involved in the aforesaid business for quite a long time and number of raids were conducted at his factory premises and he was also convicted and sentenced by Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sheopur. In one of the raid conducted by the District Administration at his factory premises 8380 liter synthetic Ghee was found. It was quite huge quantity of seizure and the offence committed by the Respondent No. 2 is quite serious. The Collector has fairly observed that there is a danger to the health of thousands of citizens and it is quite possible that number of citizens had been affected adversely due to use of synthetic Ghee. The citizens were not coming forward to give evidence against Respondent No. 2. 10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in Dineshchandra Jamnadas Ganghi v. State of Gujrat (1989) 1 SCC 420 has held as under, with regard to object and purpose of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954: 16. The object and the purpose of the Act are to eliminate the danger to human life from the sale of unwholesome articles of food. The legislation is on the topic 'Adulteration of Food Stuffs and Other Goods' (Entry 18 List III Seventh Schedule). It is enacted to curb the widespread evil of food adulteration and is a legislative measure for social defence. It is intended to suppress a social and economic mischief - an evil which attempts to poison, for monetary gains, the very sources of sustenance of life and the well-being of the community. The evil of adulteration of food and its effects on the health of the community are assuming alarming proportions. The offence of adulteration is a socio-economic offence. In Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Kacheroo Mal (1976) 1 SCC 412 Sarkaria, J. said: The Act has been enacted to curb and remedy the widespread evil of food adulteration, and to ensure the sale of wholesome food to the people. It is well settled that wherever possible, without unreasonable stretching or straining, the language of such a statute should be construed in a manner which would suppress the miischief, advance the remedy, promote its object, prevent its subtle evasion and foil its artful circumvention. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut V. Lakshmi Chand and Ors. It is well settled that wherever possible, without unreasonable stretching or straining, the language of such a statute should be construed in a manner which would suppress the miischief, advance the remedy, promote its object, prevent its subtle evasion and foil its artful circumvention. 11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. Meerut V. Lakshmi Chand and Ors. AIR 1963 SC 677 has approved its earlier judgment and held as under with regard to administrative acts: (12) It may be observed that Mukherjee J., was on the ultimate decision in the case, in the minority, but the principle enunciated by him had substantially the approval of the Court. Das J., in the same case at p. 719 (of SCR): (at p. 257 of AIR) observed: a person entrusted to do an administrative act has often to determine questions of fact to enable him to exercise his power. He has to consider facts and circumstances and to weigh pros and cons in his mind before he makes up his mind to exercise his power just as a person exercising a judicial or quasi-judicial function has to do. Both have to act in good faith. A good and valid administrative or executive act binds the subject and affects his rights or imposes liability on him just as effectively as a quasi-judicial act does. The exercise of an administrative or executive act may well be and is frequently made dependent by the Legislature upon a condition or contingency which may involve a question of fact, but the question of fulfilment of which may, nevertheless, be left to the subjective opinion or satisfaction of the executive authority. 12. Hon'ble the Supreme Court in State of NCT of Delhi and Anr. v. Sanjeev alias Bittoo (2005) 5 SCC 181 has held as under with regard to judicial interference and scope in matters of administrative decisions: 15. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope of judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. One of the points that falls for determination is the scope of judicial interference in matters of administrative decisions. Administrative action is stated to be referable to broad area of governmental activities in which the repositories of power may exercise every class of statutory function of executive quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial nature. It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if power there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary see State of U.P. v. Renusagar Power Co. (1988) 4 SCC 59 : AIR 1988 Sc 1737 At one time, the traditional view in England was that the executive was not answerable where its action was attributable to the exercise of prerogative power. Professor de Smith in his classical work Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Edn. at pp.285-87 states the legal position in his own terse language that the relevant principles formulated by the courts may be broadly summarised as follows: The authority in which discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it; it must not act under the dictates of another body or disable itself from exercising discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion, it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations and must not be influenced by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories: (i) failure to exercise a discretion, and (ii) excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under: ... The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account, and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further held as under: ... One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is "illegality", the second "irrationality", and the third "procedural impropriety". These principles were highlighted by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 3 All ER 935: 1985 AC 374: (1984) 3 WLR 1174 HL(commonly known as CCSU case), If the power has been exercised on a non-consideration or non-application of mind to relevant factors, the exercise of power will be regarded as manifestly erroneous. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated. See CIT v. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. 1983 4 SCC 392 : 1983 SCC Tax 336: AIR 1984 SC 1182 The effect of several decisions on the question of jurisdiction has been summed up by Grahame Aldous and John Alder in their book Applications for Judicial Review, Law and Practice thus: There is a general presumption against ousting the jurisdiction of the courts, so that statutory provisions which purport to exclude judicial review are construed restrictively. There are, however, certain areas of governmental activity, national security being the paradigm, which the courts regard themselves as incompetent to investigate, beyond an initial decision as to whether the government's claim is bona fide. In this kind of non-justiciable area judicial review is not entirely excluded, but very limited. It has also been said that powers conferred by the Royal Prerogative are inherently unreviewable but since the speeches of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service(supra) this is doubtful.. Lords Siplock, Scarman and Roskill appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular power, in that case national security. Lords Siplock, Scarman and Roskill appeared to agree that there is no general distinction between powers, based upon whether their source is statutory or prerogative but that judicial review can be limited by the subject-matter of a particular power, in that case national security. Many prerogative powers are in fact concerned with sensitive, non-justiciable areas, for example, foreign affairs, but some are reviewable in principle, including the prerogatives relating to the civil service where national security is not involved. Another non-justiciable power is the Attorney General's prerogative to decide whether to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the public interest. Also see Pafield v. Minister of Agriculture Fisheries and Food 1968 AC 997: (1968) 1 All ER 694 : (1968) 2 WLR 924 HL 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan and Ors. (2010) 9 SCC 496has held, as under, in regard to necessity of giving reasons by an Authority in support of its decision, if it adversely affects the right of a person or a body: 12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India (1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150 13. In Keshav Mills Co. Ltd. v. Union of India (1973) 1 SCC 380 : AIR 1973 SC 389 this Court approvingly referred to the opinion of Lord Denning in R. v. Gaming Board for Great Britain ex p Benam (1970) 2 QB 417: (1970) 2 All ER 528 CAand quoted him as saying "that heresy was scotched in Ridge v. Baldwin 1964 AC 40: (1963) 2 All ER 66 HL 14. The expression "speaking order" was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97, Vol. The expression "speaking order" was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97, Vol. 4, Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the Report). 15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the "inscrutable face of a sphinx". 16. In Harinagar Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala AIR 1961 SC 1669 the question of recording reasons came up for consideration in the context of a refusal by Harinagar to transfer, without giving reasons, shares held by Shyam Sunder. Challenging such refusal, the transferee moved the High Court contending, inter alia, that the refusal is mala fide, arbitrary and capricious. The High Court rejected such pleas and the transferee was asked to file a suit. The transferee filed an appeal to the Central Government under Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 which was dismissed. Thereafter, the son of the original transferee filed another application for transfer of his shares which was similarly refused by the Company. On appeal, the Central Government quashed the resolution passed by the Company and directed the Company to register the transfer. However, in passing the said order, the Government did not give any reason. The Company challenged the said decision before this Court. 17. The other question which arose in Harinagar (supra) was whether the Central Government, in passing the appellate order acted as a tribunal and is amenable to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. 18. Even though in Harinagar (supra) the decision was administrative, this Court insisted on the requirement of recording reason and further held that in exercising appellate powers, the Central Government acted as a tribunal in exercising judicial powers of the State and such exercise is subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court. Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of the order (AIR pp. 1678-79, para 23). 19. Such powers, this Court held, cannot be effectively exercised if reasons are not given by the Central Government in support of the order (AIR pp. 1678-79, para 23). 19. Again in Bhagat Raja v. Union of India AIR 1967 SC 1606 the Constitution Bench of this Court examined the question whether the Central Government was bound to pass a speaking order while dismissing a revision and confirming the order of the State Government in the context of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, and having regard to the provision of Rule 55 of the Mineral Concession Rules. The Constitution Bench held that in exercising its power of revision under the aforesaid Rule the Central Government acts in a quasi-judicial capacity (see AIR p. 1610, ara 8). Where the State Government gives a number of reasons some of which are good and some are not, and the Central Government merely endorses the order of the State Government without specifying any reason, this Court, exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136, may find it difficult to ascertain which are the grounds on which the Central Government upheld the order of the State Government (see AIR p.1610, para 9). Therefore, this Court insisted on reasons being given for the order. 20. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U. P. (1970) 1 SCC 764 : AIR 1970 SC 1302 while dealing with the U.P. Sugar Dealers' Licensing Order under which the licence was cancelled, this Court held that such an order of cancellation is quasi-judicial and must be a speaking one. This Court further held that merely giving an opportunity of hearing is not enough and further pointed out where the order is subject to appeal, the necessity to record reason is even greater. The learned Judges held that the recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. (See SCC p.768, para 7: AIR p.1304, para 7.) 21. The learned Judges held that the recording of reasons in support of a decision on a disputed claim ensures that the decision is not a result of caprice, whim or fancy but was arrived at after considering the relevant law and that the decision was just. (See SCC p.768, para 7: AIR p.1304, para 7.) 21. In Travancore Rayon Ltd. v. Union of India (1969) 3 SCC 868 : AIR 1971 SC 862 the Court, dealing with the revisional jurisdiction of the Central Government under the then Section 36 of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, held that the Central Government was actually exercising judicial power of the State and in exercising judicial power reasons in support of the order must be disclosed on two grounds. The first is that the person aggrieved gets an opportunity to demonstrate that the reasons are erroneous and secondly, the obligation to record reasons operates as a deterrent against possible arbitrary action by the executive authority invested with the judicial power (see SCC p.874, para 11: AIR pp. 865-66, para 11). 22. In Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Workers Union (1974) 3 SCC 318 AIR 1973 SC 2758 this Court while considering an award under Section 11 of the Industrial Disputes Act insisted on the need of giving reasons in support of conclusions in the award. The Court held that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. The learned Judges said that a just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice. The third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (see SCC pp. 320-21, para 5: AIR p.2761, para 5). 23. The third ground is that such awards are subject to Article 136 jurisdiction of this Court and in the absence of reasons, it is difficult for this Court to ascertain whether the decision is right or wrong (see SCC pp. 320-21, para 5: AIR p.2761, para 5). 23. In Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor (1973) 2 SCC 836 : AIR 1974 SC 87 this Court while dealing with the question of selection under the Indian Administrative Service/Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations held that the expression "reasons for the proposed supersession" should not be mere rubber-stamp reasons. Such reasons must disclose how mind was applied to the subject-matter for a decision regardless of the fact whether such a decision is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. This Court held that the reasons in such context would mean the link between materials which are considered and the conclusions which are reached. Reasons must reveal a rational nexus between the two (see SCC pp. 853-54, paras 27-28: AIR pp. 97-98, paras 27-28). 24. In Siemens Engg. and Mfg. Co. of India Ltd. v. Union of India (1976) 2 SCC 981 : AIR 1976 SC 1785 this Court held that it is far too well settled that an authority in making an order in exercise of its quasi-judicial function, must record reasons in support of the order it makes. The learned Judges emphatically said that every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. The rule requiring reasons in support of a quasi-judicial order is, this Court held, as basic as following the principles of natural justice. And the rule must be observed in its proper spirit. A mere pretence of compliance would not satisfy the requirement of law (see SCC p.986, para 6: AIR p.1789, para 6). 25. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 1 SCC 248 : AIR 1978 SC 597 which is a decision of great jurisprudential significance in our constitutional law, Beg, C.J. in a concurring but different opinion held that an order impounding a passport is a quasi-judicial decision (SCC p. 311, para 34: AIR p. 612, para 34). The learned Chief Justice also held, when an administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done as well. The learned Chief Justice also held, when an administrative action involving any deprivation of or restriction on fundamental rights is taken, the authorities must see that justice is not only done but manifestly appears to be done as well. This principle would obviously demand disclosure of reasons for the decision. 26. Y. V. Chandrachud, J. (as His Lordship then was) in a concurring but a separate opinion in Maneka Gandhi (supra) also held that refusal to disclose reasons for impounding a passport is an exercise of an exceptional nature and is to be done very sparingly and only when it is fully justified by the exigencies of an uncommon situation. The learned Judge further held that law cannot permit any exercise of power by an executive to keep the reasons undisclosed if the only motive for doing so is to keep the reasons away from judicial scrutiny. (See SCC p.317, para 39: AIR p.613, para 39.) 27. In Rama Varma Bharathan Thampuram v. State of Kerala (1979) 4 SCC 782 AIR 1979 SC 1918 V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench held that the functioning of the Board was quasi-judicial in character. One of the attributes of quasi-judicial functioning is the recording of reasons in support of decisions taken and the other requirement is following the principles of natural justice. The learned Judge held that natural justice requires reasons to be written for the conclusions made (see SCC p.788, para 14: AIR p.1922, para 14). 28. In Gurdial Singh Fijji v. State of Punjab (1979) 2 SCC 368 this Court, dealing with a service matter, relying on the ratio in Capoor (supra), held that "rubber-stamp reason" is not enough and virtually quoted the observation in Capoor10 to the extent that: (Capoor case (supra) , SCC p.854, para 28) 28. ... Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions." (See AIR p.377, para 18.) 29. In a Constitution Bench decision of this Court in H.H. Shri Swamiji of Shri Amar Mutt v. Commr. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. (1979) 4 SCC 642 : AIR 1980 SC 1 while giving the majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p.658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p.97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. 30. Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Deptt. (1979) 4 SCC 642 : AIR 1980 SC 1 while giving the majority judgment Y.V. Chandrachud, C.J. referred to (SCC p.658, para 29) Broom's Legal Maxims (1939 Edn., p.97) where the principle in Latin runs as follows: Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. 30. The English version of the said principle given by the Chief Justice is that: (H.H. Shri Swamiji case (supra), SCC p.658, para 29) 29... 'reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself'." (See AIR p.11, para 29.) 31. In Bombay Oil Industries P. Ltd. v. Union of India (1984) 1 SCC 141 : AIR 1984 SC 160 this Court held that while disposing of applications under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act the duty of the Government is to give reasons for its order. This Court made it very clear that the faith of the people in administrative tribunals can be sustained only if the tribunals act fairly and dispose of the matters before them by well-considered orders. In saying so, this Court relied on its previous decisions in Capoor (supra) and Siemens Engg. (supra) discussed above. 32. In Ram Chander v. Union of India (1986) 3 SCC 103 : AIR 1986 SC 1173 this Court was dealing with the appellate provisions under the Railway Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1968 condemned the mechanical way of dismissal of appeal in the context of requirement of Rule 22(2) of the aforesaid Rules. This Court held that the word "consider" occurring in Rule 22(2) must mean that the Railway Board shall duly apply its mind and give reasons for its decision. The learned Judges held that the duty to give reason is an incident of the judicial process and emphasised that in discharging quasi-judicial functions the appellate authority must act in accordance with natural justice and give reasons for its decision (SCC pp.106-07, para 4: AIR p.1176, para 4). 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. (1990) 3 SCC 280 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set-up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various fields of public law. 33. In Star Enterprises v. City and Industrial Development Corpn. of Maharashtra Ltd. (1990) 3 SCC 280 a three-Judge Bench of this Court held that in the present day set-up judicial review of administrative action has become expansive and is becoming wider day by day and the State has to justify its action in various fields of public law. All these necessitate recording of reason for executive actions including the rejection of the highest offer. This Court held that disclosure of reasons in matters of such rejection provides an opportunity for an objective review both by superior administrative heads and for judicial process and opined that such reasons should be communicated unless there are specific justifications for not doing so (see SCC pp 284-85, para 10). 34. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi (1991) 2 SCC 716 this Court held that even in domestic enquiry if the facts are not in dispute non-recording of reason may not be violative of the principles of natural justice but where facts are disputed necessarily the authority or the enquiry officer, on consideration of the materials on record, should record reasons in support of the conclusion reached (see SCC pp.738-39, para 22). 35. In M.L. Jaggi v. MTNL (1996) 3 SCC 119 this Court dealt with an award under Section 7 of the Telegraph Act and held that since the said award affects public interest, reasons must be recorded in the award. It was also held that such reasons are to be recorded so that it enables the High Court to exercise its power of judicial review on the validity of the award. (See SCC p.23, para 8.) 36. In Charan Singh v. Healing Touch Hospital (2000) 7 SCC 668 : AIR 2000 SC 3138 a three-Judge Bench of this Court, dealing with a grievance under the CP Act, held that the authorities under the Act exercise quasi-judicial powers for redressal of consumer disputes and it is, therefore, imperative that such a body should arrive at conclusions based on reasons. This Court held that the said Act, being one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation as the said Act provides for an alternative mode for consumer justice by the process of a summary trial. This Court held that the said Act, being one of the benevolent pieces of legislation, is intended to protect a large body of consumers from exploitation as the said Act provides for an alternative mode for consumer justice by the process of a summary trial. The powers which are exercised are definitely quasi-judicial in nature and in such a situation the conclusions must be based on reasons and held that requirement of recording reasons is "too obvious to be reiterated and needs no emphasising". (See SCC p.673, para 11: AIR p.3141, para 11 of the Report.) 37. Only in cases of Court Martial, this Court struck a different note in two of its Constitution Bench decisions, the first of which was rendered in Som Datt Datta v. Union of India AIR 1969 SC 414 : 1969 CriLJ 663 where Ramaswami, J. delivering the judgment for the unanimous Constitution Bench held that provisions of Sections 164 and 165 of the Army Act do not require an order confirming proceedings of Court Martial to be supported by reasons. This Court held that an order confirming such proceedings does not become illegal if it does not record reasons. (AIR pp. 421-22, para 10 of the Report.) 38. About two decades thereafter, a similar question cropped up before this Court in S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594 : AIR 1990 SC 1984 . A unanimous Constitution Bench speaking through S.C. Agrawal, J. confirmed its earlier decision in Som Datt22 in S.N. Mukherjee case (supra), SCC p.619, para 47: AIR para 47 at p. 2000 of the Report and held that reasons are not required to be recorded for an order confirming the finding and sentence recorded by the Court Martial. 39. It must be remembered in this connection that the court martial as a proceeding is sui generis in nature and the Court of Court Martial is different, being called a court of honour and the proceedings therein are slightly different from other proceedings. 39. It must be remembered in this connection that the court martial as a proceeding is sui generis in nature and the Court of Court Martial is different, being called a court of honour and the proceedings therein are slightly different from other proceedings. About the nature of Court Martial and its proceedings the observations of Winthrop in Military Law and Precedents are very pertinent and are extracted hereinbelow: Not belonging to the judicial branch of the Government, it follows that Courts Martial must pertain to the executive department; and they are in fact simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by Congress for the President as Commander-in-Chief, to aid him in properly commanding the Army and Navy and enforcing discipline therein, and utilised under his orders or those of his authorised military representatives. 40. Our Constitution also deals with court-martial proceedings differently as is clear from Articles 33, 136(2) and 227(4) of the Constitution. 41. In England there was no common law duty of recording of reasons. In Stefan v. General Medical Council (1999) 1 WLR 1293 (PC) it has been held: WLR p.1300 the established position of the common law is that there is no general duty imposed on our decision makers to record reasons. It has been acknowledged in the Justice Report, Administration Under Law (1971) at p.23 that: No single factor has inhibited the development of English administrative law as seriously as the absence of any general obligation upon public authorities to give reasons for their decisions. 42. Even then in R. v. Civil Service Appeal Board ex p Cunningham (1991) 4 All ER 310 CALord Donaldson, Master of Rolls, opined very strongly in favour of disclosing of reasons in a case where the Court is acting in its discretion. The learned Master of Rolls said: (All ER p.317) ... it is a corollary of the discretion conferred upon the Board that it is their duty to set out their reasoning in sufficient form to show the principles on which they have proceeded. Adopting Lord Lane, C.J.'s observations in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p Khan Mahmud 1983 QB 790 : (1983) 2 All ER 420 CA All ER at p. 423 QB at pp. 794-95the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Adopting Lord Lane, C.J.'s observations in R. v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal ex p Khan Mahmud 1983 QB 790 : (1983) 2 All ER 420 CA All ER at p. 423 QB at pp. 794-95the reasons for the lower amount is not obvious. Mr Cunningham is entitled to know, either expressly or inferentially stated, what it was to which the Board were addressing their mind in arriving at their conclusion. It must be obvious to the Board that Mr Cunningham is left with a burning sense of grievance. They should be sensitive to the fact that he is left with a real feeling of injustice, that having been found to have been unfairly dismissed, he has been deprived of his just desserts (as he sees them). 43. The learned Master of Rolls further clarified by saying: (Civil Service Appeal Board case (1991) 4 All ER 310 (CA), All ER p.317) ... Thus, in the particular circumstances of this case, and without wishing to establish any precedent whatsoever, I am prepared to spell out an obligation on this Board to give succinct reasons, if only to put the mind of Mr Cunningham at rest. I would therefore allow this application. 44. But, however, the present trend of the law has been towards an increasing recognition of the duty of court to give reasons (see North Range Shipping Ltd. v. Seatrans Shipping Corpn. 2002 1 WLR 2397 : (2002) 4 All ER 390). It has been acknowledged that this trend is consistent with the development towards openness in the Government and judicial administration. 45. In English v. Emery Reimbold and Strick Ltd. (2002) 1 WLR 2409: (2002) 3 All ER 385 CAit has been held that justice will not be done if it is not apparent to the parties why one has won and the other has lost. The House of Lords in Cullen v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (2003) 1 WLR 1763 : (2004) 2 All ER 237 HLLord Bingham of Cornhill and Lord Steyn, on the requirement of reason held: (WLR p.1769, para 7) 7. ... First, they impose a discipline ... which may contribute to such refusals being considered with care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency ... Thirdly, they assist the courts in performing their supervisory function if judicial review proceedings are launched. 46. ... First, they impose a discipline ... which may contribute to such refusals being considered with care. Secondly, reasons encourage transparency ... Thirdly, they assist the courts in performing their supervisory function if judicial review proceedings are launched. 46. The position in the United States has been indicated by this Court in S.N. Mukherjee (supra) in SCC p.602, para 11: AIR para 11 at p.1988 of the judgment. This Court held that in the United States the courts have always insisted on the recording of reasons by administrative authorities in exercise of their powers. It was further held that such recording of reasons is required as "the courts cannot exercise their duty of review unless they are advised of the considerations underlying the action under review". In S.N. Mukherjee (supra) this Court relied on the decisions of the US Court in Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corpn. 87 L Ed 626: 318 US 80 1942 and Dunlop v. Bachowski 44 L Ed 2d 377 ; 1974 421 US 560 in support of its opinion discussed above. 47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds: (a) In India the judicial trend has always been to record reasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially. (b) A quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in support of its conclusions. (c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done it must also appear to be done as well. (d) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial or even administrative power. (e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations. (f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a component of a decision-making process as observing principles of natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even by administrative bodies. (g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review by superior courts. (h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. This is virtually the lifeblood of judicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is the soul of justice. (i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days can be as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All these decisions serve one common purpose which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have been objectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants' faith in the justice delivery system. (j) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial accountability and transparency. (k) If a judge or a quasi-judicial authority is not candid enough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of incrementalism. (l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of reasons or "rubber-stamp reasons" is not to be equated with a valid decision-making process. (m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency in decision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makers less prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor, (1987) 100 HLR 731-37.) (n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates from the broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the said requirement is now virtually a component of human rights and was considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See Ruiz Torija v. Spain (1994) 19 EHRR 553 EHRR at 562 para 29and Anya v. University of Oxford 2001 EWCA Civ 405 CAwherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights which requires, adequate and intelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions. (o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of "due process. 14. Respondent, Union of India, in the counter affidavit submitted that a report was received in the concerned Desk in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 10.11.2009. The same was examined and placed before the Competent Authority. A representation dated 05.11.2009 was also received from the detenu. 14. Respondent, Union of India, in the counter affidavit submitted that a report was received in the concerned Desk in the Ministry of Home Affairs on 10.11.2009. The same was examined and placed before the Competent Authority. A representation dated 05.11.2009 was also received from the detenu. The State Government and District Magistrate, Gwalior were requested vide wireless message dated 23.11.2009 and reminder dated 27.22.2009 to send para-wise comments on the representation. Despite reminder, no para-wise comments received in the Ministry. It has further been mentioned that the State Government never brought to notice of the Ministry that detenu was still absconding and thereafter the representation of Respondent No. 2 was examined and the Union Home Secretary considered the case of Respondent No. 2 and after careful consideration of the detention order passed by the District Magistrate it has been decided to revoke the order of detention of Respondent No. 2. 15. From the reply filed by Respondent, Union of India, it is clear that the Authorities had no knowledge that in spite of order of detention Respondent No. 2 was absconding. From the reply filed by the Union of India and the annexures filed along with the reply, it is clear that Union of India has not considered the fact that Respondent No. 2 was involved in manufacturing of synthetic Ghee and a huge quantity of synthetic Ghee (8380 liter) was recovered by the District Administration from the factory premises of Respondent No. 2. The Union of India has also not considered the gravity and seriousness of the offence committed by Respondent No. 2, due to which there was a danger to the life of millions of people. In our opinion, the matter is serious in nature. However, the Union of India considered the matter casually. Even a casual revocation of order of detention has been passed without considering the grievousness of the situation. 16. Section 14 of the Act of 1980 gives power to the Union of India to revoke the order of detention, which is as under: 14. However, the Union of India considered the matter casually. Even a casual revocation of order of detention has been passed without considering the grievousness of the situation. 16. Section 14 of the Act of 1980 gives power to the Union of India to revoke the order of detention, which is as under: 14. Revocation of detention orders .- (1) Without prejudice to the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), a detention order may, at any time be revoked or modified .- (a) notwithstanding that the order has been made by an officer mentioned in Sub-section (3) of Section 3, by the State Government to which that officer is subordinate or by the Central Government; (b) notwithstanding that the order has been made by a State Government, by the Central Government. (2) The expiry or revocation of a detention order (hereafter in this Sub-section referred to as the earlier detention order) shall not [ whether such earlier detention order has been made before or after the commencement of the National Security (Sercond Amendment) Act, 1984] bar the making of another detention order (hereafter in this Sub-section referred to as the subsequent detention order) udner Section 3 against the same person. Provided that in a case where no fresh facts have arisen after the expiry or revocation of the earlier detention order made against such person, the maximum period for which such person may be detained in pursuance of the subsequent detention order shall, in no case, extend beyond the expiry of a period of twelve months from the date of detention under the earlier detention order.] 17. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sat Pal v. State of Punjab and Ors. AIR 1981 SC 2230 has held, as under, in regard to Section 11 of Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act (52 of 1974), which is analogous to Section 14 of the Act of 1980: 7. Ours is a Constitution where there is a combination of federal structure with unitary features while in a Unitary State there is only one Governments federal State involves multi-governments, namely, national or federal government and the governments of component States. Ours is a Constitution where there is a combination of federal structure with unitary features while in a Unitary State there is only one Governments federal State involves multi-governments, namely, national or federal government and the governments of component States. A federal State, in short, is a fusion of several States into a single State in regard to matters affecting common interest leaving each component State to enjoy autonomy in regard to other matters. Under our Constitution, certain powers vest in the Central Government leaving certain powers to its component units to exercise autonomy in spheres assigned to them in the Constitution itself. The component States are not merely delegates or agents of the federal government. Both federal and State Governments draw their authority from the same source, the Constitution. The conferment of executive power on the States in relation to a subject with respect to which the Legislatures of the States have no power to make a law under Article 258(2) must necessarily be subject to the administrative control of the Union under Arts. 256 and 257 (1), to the giving of such directions to the States as may appear to the Government of India to be necessary for that purpose. 8. The constitutional imperatives of Article 22(5) enjoin that where the detenu makes simultaneously a representation to the detaining authority as well as an application for revocation under Section 11 of the Act, they must both be dealt with by the appropriate governments at the same time, and there is no question of any conflict of jurisdiction. To illustrate, if the Central Government were to revoke an order of detention under Section 11(1)(b) of the Act, there would be no representation for the State Government, to consider, or to refer to the Advisory Board under Section 8(b); nor will there arise any question of the Advisory Board submitting a report to it, or on receipt of such a report, confirming the order of detention under Section 8(f) The other type of case would be where notwithstanding that the order of detention has been confirmed under Section 8(f), the appropriate Government may, at any time, revoke the same under Section 11 of the Act. The power of revocation conferred on the appropriate Government under Section 11 of the Act is independent of the power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under Section 8(f). 9. The power of revocation conferred on the appropriate Government under Section 11 of the Act is independent of the power of confirming or setting aside an order of detention under Section 8(f). 9. Although it was earlier thought that Section 14 of the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, which was in pari materia with Section 11 of the Act, did not confer any right or privilege on the detenu, there is a general consensus of opinion that the power of revocation conferred on the Central Government under Section 11 of the Act is a supervisory power, and is intended to be an additional check or safeguard against the improper exercise of its Power of detention by the detaining authority or the State Government. 10. The power under Section 11(1)(b) may either be exercised on information received by the Central Government from its own sources including that supplied by the State Government under Section 3(2), or, from the detenu in the form of a petition or representation. It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not, it should revoke the order of detention in a Particular case, The use of the words 'at any time, in Section 11, gives the Power of revocation and overriding effect on the power of detention under Section 3. Ordinarily, the Central Government would in a case like the present under the Act, like to await the report of the Advisory Board under Section 8(c), before taking any action under Section 11(1)(b) but the circumstances may differ, and there may be a case where the Central Government finds that the order of detention passed under Section 3 is mala fide or constitutes an abuse of power on the part of the State Government or an officer of the State Government specially empowered in that behalf, it may 'at any time', revoke the order of detention. The detenu has therefore the right to approach the Central Government by a representation for revocation of his order of detention under Section 11(1)(b) and when such a representation is made, the State Government has the corresponding duty to forward it to the Central Government for necessary action. 11. The making of an application for revocation to the central Government under Section 11 of the Act is, therefore. part of the constitutional right a citizen has against his detention under a law relating to preventive detention. 11. The making of an application for revocation to the central Government under Section 11 of the Act is, therefore. part of the constitutional right a citizen has against his detention under a law relating to preventive detention. While Article 22(5) contemplates the making of a representation against the order of detention to the detaining authority which has to be referred by the appropriate Government to the Advisory Board constituted under Section 8(a) of the Act. Parliament has, in its wisdom, enacted Section 11 and conferred an additional safeguard against arbitrary executive action. 18. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgment has specifically held that "It is for the Central Government to decide whether or not, it should revoke the order of detention in a particular case." The decision means active application of mind, proper consideration of facts of the case. The power given to the Central Government is independent to the power of the State in order to safe guard the liberty of a citizen but at the same time the larger interest of citizens be also kept in mind. After perusal of the order, in our opinion, the Authority failed to perform its duty. It had no knowledge of vital fact that the Respondent No. 2 was absconding. 19. We do not want to comment about merits of the detention order because prima facie we have satisfied that the Union of India, Respondent No. 1 has revoked the order without application of mind. In our opinion, it is the duty of the Union of India to consider the facts in detail before passing the order of revocation of the order of detention and also consider the grievousness of the conduct of the detenu. In the present case, the District Magistrate has clearly observed that due to the activities of Respondent No. 2 when there was a danger to the life and health of the millions of citizens. In such circumstances, the duty to consider all the relevant facts before revocation of the order of detention was more heavy on the part of the Union of India and we are constrained to observe that the Prescribed Authority has failed utterly in its duty. 20. Consequently, the petition is allowed. The impugned order, Annexure P-1 is hereby quashed. No order as to costs.