Judgment JAYANT PATEL, J. ( 1. ) AS in all the appeals common questions arise for consideration, they are being considered by this common judgment. ( 2. ) THE relevant facts are that the officers of the respondent-Corporation fixed the Gross Ratable Value (G.R.V.) of the concerned premises at the different rates for the concerned respective assessment years. As the assessees concerned, who are the respondents herein, were aggrieved by the assessment made by the officers of the respondent-Corporation for the concerned years, they preferred respective Municipal appeals before learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad. Learned Judge, vide impugned judgments and order in all the appeals, found that in respect of earlier year, as notice contemplated under Rule 15(2) of the Taxation Rules (the Rules) was not served, the assessment was quashed and set aside. It was further found by the learned Judge that thereafter once the assessment for the earlier year was quashed and set aside, thereafter if any entry was to be made in the assessment book, it was required for the officers of the Corporation to issue notice under Rule 15(2) of the Rules afresh, if such notice has not been issued, the G.R.V. fixed even in the present cases would be required to be quashed. Under the circumstances, the learned Judge has quashed and set aside fixation of G.R.V. and consequently it becomes a case for zero tax assessment of the concerned year. All those impugned judgments are the subject-matter of the present appeals before us. ( 3. ) WE have heard Mr. Tanna, learned Senior Counsel, with Mr. Bhatt, learned Counsel for the appellants. In First Appeal Nos. 1735, 1722, 1730, 1737, 5858, 5864 and 5868 all of 1995, the respondents have refused to accept the service, whereas in First Appeal No. 3073 of 1996, Mr. Kinariwala, learned Counsel, has filed appearance for the respondent and in First Appeal No. 3097 of 1996, Mr. Bhagat, learned Counsel, has filed appearance for the respondent. ( 4. ) MR. Tanna contended that in all the appeals the impugned judgments and order of learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad are ex-facie erroneous inasmuch as they have resulted into zero tax assessment of all the premises, which is contrary to the decision of this Court reported in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad v. Oriental Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd., 1994 (2) GLR 1498 and he further submitted that on the contrary if the entry has continued in the assessment book and no complaints/objections have been filed, and thereafter bills are issued by the Corporation to the assessee, the appeals could not be maintained against the bill. MR. Tanna further submitted that as per the decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra), the appeal was available against the assessment only on the disposal of the complaint/objections against the assessment and if the person concerned has failed to lodged objection, after the Corporation has completed the procedure under Rule 15(1) of the Rules by publication of the notice in the newspaper, it would be an end of the matter and the appeal would not be competent before the learned Small Causes Judge. It was also contended that as per the observations made by this Court in the above referred judgment, at the most, it would be a case where the person may file a writ petition under Arts. 226/227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it was submitted that neither the appeal was competent nor the learned Small Causes Judge could I quash the whole assessment by creating a situation of zero tax assessment in the concerned order. It was also submitted that the learned Small Causes Judge, as per the scheme of the Act and observations made by the aforesaid decision, ought to have fixed the G.R.V. of the concerned premises for the concerned year. Since the same has not been done, there is material error in exercise of power by the learned Small Causes Judge, which calls for interference in the present appeals. It was, therefore, submitted that the appeals deserve to be allowed by setting aside impugned judgments of the learned Small Causes Judge. ( 5. ) LEARNED Counsel also relied upon the subsequent decision of this Court in case of Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Mukeshkumar Babulal Shah, 2000 (1) GLR 871 for contending that the learned Small Causes Judge could not have created a situation of assessment into zero by allowing the assessee to go scot-free from paying any tax to the Corporation in the respective year. ( 6. ( 6. ) BEFORE we consider the controversy involved in the present appeals, it would be profitable to extract certain observations of this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra). We may record that as per the view taken by this Court in the above referred decision, each assessment year is to be treated as separate and distinct. The relevant observations are available at Paragraph No. 73 of the decisions, which reads as under : "......If after such adoption for the years 1982-83 and 1983-84, the appellate Court in respect of the assessment year 1981-82 allows the appeal and reduces the rateable value, the decision in the said appeal can only be regarded as being given for the assessment year 1981-82. In taxation, each year is to be regarded as distinct and separate. The Act does not postulate that the appellate decision for one year will, ipso facto, be regarded as a decision for the other years as well. As long as appeals have been filed before the Small Causes Court, or to the High Court, the assessment cannot be regarded as having become final." (Emphasis supplied) ( 7. ) THE aforesaid aspect shows that as per the view taken by this Court in the above referred decision, each year of assessment is to be regarded as distinct and separate and the act does not postulate that the decision in respect of assessment of one year can automatically be regarded as the decision for subsequent year too. On the aspect of further steps to be taken into consideration by the learned Small Causes Judge, in the event it finds that there is violation of breach of principles of natural justice or that the notice under Rule 15(2) of the Rules was not issued, this Court in the above referred decision has observed at Paragraph No. 67, relevant of which are as under : "We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid observations in Anant Mill's case. Following the said ratio, it would mean that even if the assessment is held to be not in accordance with law, whether because of the wrong method followed with regard to determining the rateable value or because of any irregularity or illegality in procedure or because of violation of the principles of natural justice or because notice under Rule 15(2) had not been issued, then the Small Causes Court would itself have the jurisdiction to examine evidence and determine the correct rateable value: It would be wholly inappropriate for the Small Causes Court to merely quash the assessment, which would have the effect that for the official years in question, the entire tax would be lost to the Corporation. In effect, the ratio decidendi of the decision in Anant Mills' case is that the Small Causes Court exercises the same power and will have the same jurisdiction, which is exercised by the Commissioner for the purposes of determining what should be the correct rateable value." (Emphasis supplied) ( 8. ) THE aforesaid aspect shows that as observed by this Court, in the event any procedural irregularity or illegality is found on the aspect of principles of natural justice or on the aspect that notice under Rule 15(2) of the Rules was not issued or was not served to the party concerned, the learned Small Causes Judge, after quashing the assessment, shall further proceed to assess the ratable value of the premises in question in the manner and mode provided under the Rules and after recording the necessary evidence for such purpose but it would be for the learned Small Causes Judge to fix the correct ratable value of the premises and not to leave the matter by quashing the assessment on account of non-observance of principles of natural justice or non-service of the notice under Rule 15(2) of the Rules or otherwise. ( 9. ) ON the aspect of maintainability of the appeal, this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) has observed thus in Paragraph Nos. 79 and 80 as under : "79. It is now well-settled that the right to file an appeal is a creation of the statute. Section 406(1) provides of appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this Act. Reference to rateable value in sub- sec. 79 and 80 as under : "79. It is now well-settled that the right to file an appeal is a creation of the statute. Section 406(1) provides of appeals against any rateable value or tax fixed or charged under this Act. Reference to rateable value in sub- sec. (1) of Sec. 406, necessarily, pertains to tax on property. In view of the fact that under Sec. 127, other taxes such as taxes on vehicles, boats, animals, octroi, etc., are also levied, sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 406 also refers to appeals against "tax fixed or charged" under the Act. Section 406(2)(b) specifically relates to appeal against a rateable value and sub-clause (d) relates to appeal against any amendment made in the assessment book for property tax. It is not necessary to refer to sub-clause (d) because that pertains to deposit of tax pending the entertainment of the appeal. Sub-clauses (b) and (d), as we have already observed, postulate in relation to property tax appeals being filed only against rateable value. Sub-clause (c) of Sec. 406(2), no doubt, contemplates filing of an appeal against any tax. But, this sub-clause contemplates an appeal against such a tax in respect of which provisions exist for filing a complaint and the complaint being disposed of. Neither the Act, nor the Rules contemplate any complaint being filed against a bill, a property tax and complaints, relating to property tax can only be filed against the rateable value. The Legislative intent, therefore, clearly is that it is only at the first stage, viz., the determination of the rateable value, that the appeals will be entertained and no appeal can be preferred against a bill levying tax as a consequence of the rateable value having been determined. The reason for this is obvious. The sending of a bill levying tax would amount to a mere mathematical calculation on the basis of the rateable value which is determined. If the determination of the rateable value can only be challenged by filing an appeal under Sec. 406(2)(b) or (d) and the same cannot be challenged once it has become final, then providing for appeal against the tax calculated on the basis of the rateable value would be meaningless. 80. If the determination of the rateable value can only be challenged by filing an appeal under Sec. 406(2)(b) or (d) and the same cannot be challenged once it has become final, then providing for appeal against the tax calculated on the basis of the rateable value would be meaningless. 80. It may happen that the rateable value may have been determine in gross violation of the provisions of the Act or the Rules and without following the procedure laid down in the Rules requiring giving the opportunity of filing a complaint by giving a public notice or a special notice. Where an owner has had an occasion or opportunity to file a complaint under the Rules against the proposed rateable value, but he fails to do so, no relief can be granted to him. If, on the other hand, in a rare case, such an opportunity has not at all been afforded, then merely for equitable reasons a Court should not and cannot entertain an appeal against the bill because such a provision does not exist. The appropriate remedy in such a case will be for the owner to take recourse to the constitutional remedies provided by Art. 227 or Art. 226 of the Constitution of India." ( 10. ) THE aforesaid observations at Paragraph No. 80 shows that this Court in the above referred decision observed that where an owner has or had an occasion or opportunity to file a complaint under the Rules against the proposed ratable value, but he failed to do so, no relief can be granted to him. If, on the other hand, in a rare case, such an opportunity has not at all been afforded, then merely for equitable reasons the Court should not and cannot entertain an appeal against the bill because the provision does not exist. However, the pertinent aspect is that the Court did not end so but further observed that an appropriate remedy in such a case will be for the owner to take recourse to the constitutional remedies available by Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 11. However, the pertinent aspect is that the Court did not end so but further observed that an appropriate remedy in such a case will be for the owner to take recourse to the constitutional remedies available by Arts. 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 11. ) THE decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) was further carried before the Apex Court in case of Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India v. Commissioner, Municipal Corporation for the City of Ahmedabad, 1995 (4) SCC 696 : [1995 (2) GLR 1189 (SC)], wherein, on the aspect of entertainment of appeal, the Ape c Court observed at Paragraph No. 15, relevant part of which reads as under : "......In other words, it cannot be said that since the tenant has not filed the complaint in a given case, he has no right to file the appeal. THE right to file appeal is governed by Secs. 406 and 407. Section 407 speaks of disposal of complaint; it does not say that the complaint must have been filed by the person proposing to file the appeal. It may be noticed that the right of appeal conferred by Sec. 406 is more akin to the right of appeal provided by Sec. 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It provides a right of appeal but does not say who can file the appeal. It means that any person who is affected by or who can be said to be aggrieved with the order is entitled to maintain an appeal so long as he complies with the conditions attaching the said appeal. Where the tenant lodges a complaint, he can directly file an appeal under Sec. 406 but where he himself has not filed a complaint, he has to file the appeal with the leave of the appellate Court." THE aforesaid observation of the Apex Court goes to show that the above referred observation of this Court at Paragraph No. 80 in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra), on the aspect of right to file appeal, has been diluted to the effect that even aggrieved person, who has not filed complaint, can prefer an appeal. ( 12. ( 12. ) THE aforesaid leads us to examine the aspect of the requirement to follow the provision of Rules 15(1) and 15(2) of the Rules in a case where for the first year the assessment has been made against which the complaint was filed by the assessee and that complaint came to be disposed of, against which the appeal has been preferred before the Court under Sec. 406 of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporations Act, 1949 (the Act) by the assessee and wherein the assessment has been reduced and/or set aside by the Court. It may also be required to be examined about the effect of the decision of the competent Court in respect of assessment of the very premises in such appeal for the subsequent year so far as it relates to continuation of the entry in the assessment book and also so far as it relates to giving effect to the orders of the competent forum. THE next aspect, which may be required to be considered, would be the approach on the part of the appellate Court if in a given case for the subsequent year the effect has not been given by the Commissioner or the Corporation in the subsequent year for the assessment of tax of the very premises. ( 13. ) WE may record that as observed earlier in the decision of this Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) this Court did observe that in taxation each year is to be regarded as distinct and separate and, therefore, the Court further observed that the appellate decision for one year ipso facto cannot be regarded as a decision for the other years as a whole but in the very decision it was further observed that such a situation may continue as long as the appeals have been filed before the Small Causes Court or to the High Court the assessment cannot be regarded as having become final. Under the circumstances, the aspect, which has been considered in the above decision, is for giving treatment to each year as separate and district and this Court had no occasion to examine the question as referred to hereinabove inasmuch as what will be the effect of the decision of the appellate Court upon the assessment book or that if the assessee has already filed objections against the assessment made for the first year in the span of four years, whether would he be required to submit objections once again for the next year or whether the Corporation would be justified in continuing with the entry in the assessment book in spite of having conscious knowledge of the fact that the objections have been filed against the entry made in the assessment book by the assessee but they were not accepted or they were filed or that the appeal has been filed against the assessment made by the Corporation after the disposal of the objections, ( 14. ) IN order to understand the situation a query was raised to the learned Advocate for the appellants that if after the entry made in the assessment book any objection or complaint has been filed by the assessee and after consideration of the complaint or objections of the assessee the Commissioner takes a decision for reduction of G.R.V. or otherwise, would the Commissioner be entitled to continue with the old entry made in the assessment book of the earlier year or he will record the modified entry in the subsequent year? IN response thereto learned Counsel fairly submitted that if the Commissioner himself has corrected the entry in the first year after considering the objections naturally for the subsequent year he will be required to show corrected entry and not the old entry prior to the correction. IN response thereto learned Counsel fairly submitted that if the Commissioner himself has corrected the entry in the first year after considering the objections naturally for the subsequent year he will be required to show corrected entry and not the old entry prior to the correction. We find that even otherwise also once the Commissioner has corrected the entry for the first year after considering the objections unless there is a fresh assessment made or additional material available with him, he would be required to show the corrected entry in the subsequent year at least until the expiry of span of four years and he cannot create a situation of continuing with the old entry (uncorrected) for the subsequent year leading the complainant to file same complaint for the subsequent year of the same type and he may be required to decide the same once against and thereafter the further proceedings of appeal or otherwise. We are at loss to understand as to if the correction is made by the Commissioner and that correction is to be given effect in the subsequent year in the assessment book, why the effect of the same type should not be given to the decision of the appellate Court whose powers is otherwise read by the Court in all respect as that of the Commissioner for the assessment of any premises. Further it can hardly be countenanced that the Commissioner for the subsequent year will not give effect to the decision of the appellate Court even if such decision of the appellate Court is accepted for the respective year and no challenge is made nor can we countenance the approach on the part of the Commissioner for not giving effect to the order of the competent forum i.e. the appellate Court in respect of the assessment of any premises unless there is any change in the circumstances on record available with the Commissioner. ( 15. ) APART from the above, in any case while considering the continuation of the entry in the assessment book for the subsequent year even after considering each taxation year as separate and distinct, the provision of Sec. 21 of the Act are required to be considered. ( 15. ) APART from the above, in any case while considering the continuation of the entry in the assessment book for the subsequent year even after considering each taxation year as separate and distinct, the provision of Sec. 21 of the Act are required to be considered. The aforesaid provision shows that it will not be necessary for the Commissioner to prepare new assessment book every year and subject to the provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of the Rules the Commissioner may adopt the entries in the last preceding year with such alteration as thinks fit as the entries for each new year. Therefore, after the entry is to be altered provision of sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 of the Rules would apply. Another pertinent aspect is that by the first proviso it has been provided that a public notice shall be given every year in such circumstances when the entries made in the first preceding year are adopted for the subsequent year without there being any change. The second proviso makes it abundantly clear that it will be obligatory for the Commissioner to give effect to every final appellate decision for all the final years, subsequent to the final year to which such entries have been made by adopting them. Therefore, at least in a taxation span of four years, if the correction is made in respect of first year or modification is made in respect of first year by the appellate decision the Commissioner will have to give effect for all final years subsequent to the final year to which such entries have been made by adopting them. This makes it clear that it is not open to the Commissioner for not to give effect to the appellate decision. ( 16. ) UNDER the circumstances, the observations made by this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) made at Paragraph No. 73, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinabove, are required to be considered in light of the aforesaid statutory provision, more particularly the second proviso to Rule 21 of the Rules. ( 16. ) UNDER the circumstances, the observations made by this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) made at Paragraph No. 73, relevant portion whereof is reproduced hereinabove, are required to be considered in light of the aforesaid statutory provision, more particularly the second proviso to Rule 21 of the Rules. As such in the above referred decision, the Division Bench of this Court had no occasion to consider the second proviso to Rule 21 of the Rules for the purposes of giving effect to the appellate decision for all final years subsequent to which entry was made and adopted. As observed earlier, the new assessment book prepared is to be prepared once in every four years and, therefore, such, in any case, will have to be given effect if there is a decision of the appellate Court in the first year for subsequent three years or, in another words, at least till expiry of the span of four years during which the assessment book have been continued and not prepared afresh. ( 17. ) FURTHER, the aspect of sanctity to the orders of the competent Court to the authority who is bound by it, would also be required to be considered. Once a decision is taken by the competent Court may be for a particular year for the assessment; of the premises, the same is bound to be respected in the every span of taxation may be for subsequent year unless there is any material available for not giving effect to the said decision and/or to make a fresh assessment. We can appreciate that in a case where the assessment is set aside on the ground of not following the mandatory procedure under Rule 15(2) of the Rules and thereafter the Small Causes Court has not proceeded to make any assessment of the tax thereby creating a situation of zero tax assessment may stand on different footing but in a case where the assessment has been made by reduction or modification than that of the Commissioner by the appellate Court, in absence of any other additional material, there is no reason why such an assessment as decided by the appellate Court should not be given effect in the subsequent year. Possibly, keeping in mind the said aspect, this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) used the words "ipso facto" which may leave room for consideration of the other additional material, if any, available with the Corporation or Commissioner for not to give the effect to the decision of the appellate Court for the very premises or a fresh assessment has been made on the revised norms or otherwise. It is true that each year in taxation matter is to be regarded as distinct and separate, but in our view, giving effect to the decision of the Court may touch at the threshold either for continuing with the entry of the assessment book and/or to maintain the sanctity of the orders of the competent Court. No power can be read with the Commissioner to continue with the assessment book either by closing eyes to the proceedings of filing complaint by the assessee and the appeal preferred by the assessee against disposal of the compliant and confirmation of the assessment and/or the decision of the competent Court nor a situation can be created compelling the assessee to file complaint or objections in the subsequent year within the same span of four years of taxation if the assessment was made by the Commissioner for the first year in the span of taxation, out of four and is allowed to continue for subsequent years within the same span irrespective of the objections filed and decided or the modification thereof by the Court. There is no reason why such benefit should not be extended to the assessee for continuation with the same resistance of the assessment made in the assessment book as was made for the first year in the span of taxation. If the Commissioner is entitled to continue with the entries made in the assessment book for subsequent three years for the span of total four years, the objections once filed can be termed for subsequent year too within the same span so as to maintain the appeal, which is a substantive right of the assessee, and as observed by the Apex Court analogs to the rights under Sec. 96 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as and when the bills are so received on the basis of the assessment made by the Corporation by the assessee. We find that the consideration of the aforesaid aspect never arose before this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra). ( 18. ) WE find that the matter may not end there but further aspect may be required to be examined about compliance of the provision of Rules 15(1) and 15(2) of the Rules if the entries in the book are to be continued by giving effect to the decision of the appellate Court for subsequent year in the span of four years of taxation. In the same manner, the question of giving effect to the order by the Court itself would also be required to be considered in the event for the any premises the appellate Court has assessed a particular amount as G.R.V. and for the subsequent year the appeal is preferred against the assessment made by the Corporation or the bills are issued by continuing with the same assessment by the Corporation. If the Corporation has been able to show any material justifying continuation of the assessment or any additional material showing that the assessment was made earlier by the Court may not be continued on the ground of change in the premises, its occupation or use or zoning, etc., it might stand on different footing and the Court may be required to examine the aspect as to whether such additional materials are sufficient to modify the amount of assessment made and fixed by the Court or not after giving opportunity to both sides. ( 19. ) AN attempt was made by the learned Advocate for the appellants contending that the whole burden would lie upon the assessee to show the appellate Court that the assessment made by the Corporation is wrong or that the valuation of the premises or G.R.V. of the premises, because of the position prevailing in the nearby area, should be lower or otherwise. For such purpose the reliance was placed upon the observations made by this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) at Paragraph No. 71, relevant of which reads as under : "......For the purposes of giving an opportunity to an owner or an occupier to file a complaint, all that he has to be informed is what the Commissioner has entered in the assessment book. One of the items, which is entered, is the ratable value. One of the items, which is entered, is the ratable value. The Commissioner is under no obligation to inform as to how the rateable value, which is entered in the assessment book, has been arrived at. It is for the owner to complain if he finds the rateable value to be high. The principles for fixation of rateable value are well- known. Ordinarily, a rateable value will be arrived at after particulars had been given by the owners or occupiers under Rule 8 of the Rules. On the receipt of the notice, it will be for the complainant to lead evidence and prove as to what should be the correct rateable value. A hearing is contemplated by Rule 18 and if the assessee requires any clarification with regard to the entry made in the assessment book, we see no reason as to why this clarification would not, ordinarily, be given. Be that as it may, Rule 15(2) does not require the giving of any particulars in addition to what is stated therein. The aforesaid decisions of various Courts, therefore, can be of no assistance to the respondents." ( 20. ) WE may also observe that the aforesaid observations of this Court were also considered by the Apex Court in case of Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of India (supra) at Paragraph Nos. 39 and 40, which reads as under : "39. WE must deal with one another contention urged by Sri Rohinton Nariman. He submitted that the special notice issued in his case under Rule 15(2) of Chapter-VIII of Schedule-A is totally devoid of any particulars or grounds upon which the assessment was sought to be enhanced. He relies upon the general proposition that a show-cause notice must contain the relevant particulars and grounds sufficient to put the person concerned on notice of the proposed action and its basis. Absence of such particulars and grounds in such show-cause notice, he submits, vitiates the special notice itself. The High Court has rejected the contention in the following words : "Notice under Rule 15(2) is issued after entry in the assessment book has been made. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 requires that the special written notice to the owner or the occupier shall specify the nature of such entry. The High Court has rejected the contention in the following words : "Notice under Rule 15(2) is issued after entry in the assessment book has been made. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 15 requires that the special written notice to the owner or the occupier shall specify the nature of such entry. In other words, the special notice must inform the owner about the entries mentioned in Rule 9, clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) because the said Rule 15 has to be read with Rules 9 and 13. When a statute specified as to what should be the contents of a notice, and that is so specified in Rule 15(2), the general principles enunciated by the aforesaid decisions and of the other High Courts would not be applicable. For the purposes of giving an opportunity to an owner or an occupier to file a complaint, all that he has to be informed is what the Commissioner has entered in the assessment book. One of the items, which is entered, is the rateable value. The Commissioner is under no obligation to inform as to how the rateable value, which is entered in the assessment book, has been arrived at. It is for the owner to complain if he finds the rateable value to be high. The principles for fixation of rateable value are well-known. Ordinarily, a rateable value will be arrived at after particulars had been given by the owners or occupiers under Rule 8 of the said Rules. On the receipt of the notice, it will be for the complainant to lead evidence and prove as to what should be correct rateable value. A hearing is contemplated by Rule 18 and if the assessee requires any classification with regard to the entry made in the assessment book, we see no reason as to why this classification would not, ordinarily, be given. Be that as it may, Rule 15(2) does not require the giving of any particulars in addition to what is stated therein. The aforesaid decisions of various Courts, therefore, can be of no assistance to the respondents." 40. WE agree with and affirm the reasoning of the High Court and accordingly reject the contention." ( 21. ) MR. Be that as it may, Rule 15(2) does not require the giving of any particulars in addition to what is stated therein. The aforesaid decisions of various Courts, therefore, can be of no assistance to the respondents." 40. WE agree with and affirm the reasoning of the High Court and accordingly reject the contention." ( 21. ) MR. Tanna, learned Senior Counsel, by reading the aforesaid observations attempted to contend that the whole burden would lie upon the assessee to show that ratable value would not be so high and the burden is not upon the Commissioner to prove or justify the assessment. ( 22. ) IN our view, the said contention is misconceived inasmuch as the observations made by this Court in the decision of Municipal Corporation of the City of Ahmedabad (supra) read with the observations made by the Apex Court in case of Assistant General Manager, Central Bank of INdia (supra) are pertaining to the composition or the contents of the show-cause notice and for further examination of the aspects at the level of the Commissioner while considering the complaint and it cannot be read for burden to be discharged by the party concerned in the proceedings of the appeal under Sec. 406 of the Act. IN a matter where the Commissioner has to issue notice to the assessee under Rule 15(2) of the Rules, such aspect for observation of principles of natural justice before finalizing the assessment is different. Further, at the time when the assessment is to be finalized by disposal of the complaint or objections, as the case may be, the Commissioner is strictly not exercising the judicial power but rather a party who is to take decision upon the assessment in the event it is objected or against which a complaint is filed after observing principles of natural justice. But the proceedings of the appeal under Sec. 406 of the Act before the Court are as that of the judicial proceedings. When a challenge is made to the decision of assessment before the Court, it is not possible for us to accept the submission that the Commissioner is under no obligation to satisfy the appellate Court that the assessment made was justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case. When a challenge is made to the decision of assessment before the Court, it is not possible for us to accept the submission that the Commissioner is under no obligation to satisfy the appellate Court that the assessment made was justifiable in the facts and circumstances of the case. Further, in a case where there is already a decision of the appellate Court for assessment of a particular amount as G.R.V. for a particular premises, if the same is not accepted or a different assessment has been made by the Commissioner, such burden would be upon the Commissioner to show in the appeal that because of additional material, may be of increase of ratable value in the market or change in the premises or occupation or its use or locality or otherwise, the ratable value has been rightly increased or otherwise. Hence, the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants that the Commissioner is not under obligation to justify the ratable value before the appellate Court or that the Commissioner is under no obligation to justify the increase in the ratable value than as was fixed by the Court for the very premises in the earlier year, cannot be accepted. ( 23. ) SUFFICE it to state that both the parties will have to discharge their respective burden to satisfy the appellate Court on the aspect as to whether a particular amount of ratable value of a premise is justified or not and if not to what extent and what should be a correct ratable value of the premises for the respective year. ( 24. ) AS observed earlier since by the impugned judgment and order learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad has created a situation resulting into zero tax assessment without examining the fixation of ratable value of the premises after having exercised powers as if that of Commissioner, the matters will have to be decided afresh but while taking such decision, the learned Judge would be required to take into consideration the observations made by this Court in the present judgment. ( 25. ) IN view of the aforesaid, the impugned judgment and order passed by learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad, in all the appeals are quashed and set aside with a direction that all the Municipal Valuation Appeals shall stand restored to the file of learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad. ( 25. ) IN view of the aforesaid, the impugned judgment and order passed by learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad, in all the appeals are quashed and set aside with a direction that all the Municipal Valuation Appeals shall stand restored to the file of learned Small Causes Judge, Ahmedabad. The learned Judge shall give an opportunity of hearing to both sides and shall decide the appeals afresh, after taking into consideration the observations made in the present judgment and in accordance with law, preferably within a period of 6 (six) months from the date of receipt of copy of this order since the matters are very old. ( 26. ) APPEALS are allowed to the aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs. ( 27. ) REGISTRY to place a copy of this order in connected matters. Matter Remanded.

Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation v. Rasiklal S. Maradia